


PERU AND THE BRITISH NAVAL STATION (1808-1839)

Jorge Ortiz-Sotelo

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews**



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
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ABSTRACT

The protection of British interests in the Pacific was the basic reason to detach a number of Royal Navy's vessels to that Ocean during the Nineteenth Century. There were several British interests in the area, and an assorted number of Britons established in Spanish America since the beginning of the struggle for Independence. Amongst them, merchants was perhaps the most important and influential group, pressing on their government for protection to their trade. As soon as independence reached the western coast of America, a new space was created for British presence. First Valparaiso and afterwards Callao, British merchants were soon firmly established in that part of South America. As had happened in the Atlantic coast, their claims for protection were attended by the British government through the Pacific Squadron, under the flag of the Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station, until 1837, when it was raised to a separate Station.

During the period covered by this research (1808-1839), Peru came through three crucial moments: the Wars of Independence, the initial years as a republic, and its confederation with Bolivia under the rule of Santa Cruz. Accordingly, the country shifted from being ruled by a strong authority, as the viceroy; to became a highly unstable republic, first because the War of Independence itself, and afterwards by reason of internal disputes amongst the military.

British merchants already established in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Valparaiso, considered Peruvian as a very profitable market, and consequently tried by every possible way to open it to foreign trade. Following the independence, in 1821, this market was officially opened, but it did not matched

what British merchants expected. Potential buyers were too small in number and a reaction from local merchants proved efficient enough to maintain a high taxation on foreign goods. Even when British merchants reacted against these official policy, namely Protectionism, they were unable to obtain a more aggressive support from their government. Other British interests in Peru were built around a loan granted by a number of British investors in 1822, and some further investments on mining. Even when this time was a period in which Great Britain had achieved a paramount position in industry, commerce, naval and several other fields, its government maintained its policy of “free hands” towards the new republics in America. Consequently, British consular agents, as well as British Captains, devoted their main efforts to keep British trade as safe as possible, and to protect their national from abuses committed by local authorities.

This thesis aims to study how well the Royal Navy, through the Pacific Squadron and afterwards the Pacific Station, protected British subjects and interests in Peru, between 1808 and 1839. The research focused in the effectiveness of that naval presence, discussing how it was affected by local circumstances, the number of vessels available, the urgencies of transport of treasure and the limitations associated to operate without a shore base.

DECLARATIONS

- (i) I, Jorge Ortiz-Sotelo, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

date: January 20, 1996

- (ii) I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance N° 12 in October 1986 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in October 1986; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1986 and 1996.

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- (iii) I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph. D. in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

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Introduction

Shortly after the South America British Naval Station was established at Rio de Janeiro, some of its vessels were send round Cape Horn to be stationed on the Pacific. Even when their initial duty was to chase U.S. vessels, during the War of 1812, as soon as Wars of Independence opened the West Coast markets, that mission focused on the protection of British trade, citizens and their interest along that coast. First acting as the Pacific Squadron and from 1837 onwards as a separate station, British naval presence on the western coast of Spanish America lasted until the first years of the present century, exerting a variable degree of activity in respect to each country on its jurisdiction.

Along its almost centenary existence, several complains were made against the British naval forces stationed on the Pacific both by British consular agents and merchants. An example usually quoted was Consul General in Lima Belford Wilson's letter to Lord Palmerston, on 15 January 1834, stating that British captains were "too much occupied with the business of 'freight hunting' to be of much service to the various British communities."¹ This sort of complains had been taken at its face value for the current historiography, giving a general idea of a relative passive and underemployed British naval force, who hardly could provide an efficient protection to their countrymen interest along the area under its responsibility.²

¹.- W.M. Mathew, "The first Anglo-Peruvian Debt and its Settlement, 1822-49", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, U. of Cambridge, 2, 1 (1970): 85.

².- Idem.

The fact is that most of the works approached this issue only in a collateral form, and has been made heavily based on Foreign Office papers. From our point of view, the lack of use of Admiralty papers helped to create such an idea, which did not reflect the effectiveness of British naval activity in the West Coast of South America.

To obtain a more balanced view of it, we should first analyse the difficulties of running a naval force in those waters, whose nearest base, at least in the first half of the Eighteenth Century, were either in Brazil or in Australia, with a variable degree of autonomy due to the difficulties of communications, and facing a complex and variable reality in each one of the countries where it was due to act. Moreover, such an activity was framed in the British foreign policy towards Latin-American countries, which left very much in hands of private initiative.

As could be easily suspected, British captains faced a number of problems to fulfil their duties. In some cases they succeeded, in others they failed, as is usual in any human activity, but in general terms I will try to prove in this research the following points:

- a) The passiveness and underemployment of British Naval Forces on the Pacific accepted by current historiography, should be reviewed;
- b) The number of vessels destined to the Pacific was increased accordingly to the importance of the trade;
- c) "Freight hunting", being important as it was, could not be generalised as the main concern of British captains in the Pacific.

For this purpose, I had chosen the case of Peru and the British Naval Station from 1808 to 1839. In this period, Peru experienced fundamental changes: its independence from Spain, the initial struggle to create a Republic, and the attempt to rejoin Alto and Bajo Peru by a confederation between Peru and Bolivia.

Great Britain's attitude respect Latin America also suffered some changes during this period. Learning from its failure on Buenos Aires, 1806-1807, the British government recognized that the only possible way to gain a legal entry in the Spanish American market was by encouraging a substantial change: the end of the Spanish monopoly. The Wars of Independence provided the proper answer and

soon those markets were legally opened to British merchants, who despite the risk and heavy local taxes managed to establish a relatively important trade. The next and inevitable step was to recognize the new states, which for some time suffered a tremendous political instability, threatening British local interests.

In order to provide a suitable division for the history of this particular British-Peruvian relationship, this work had been divided into six chapters. The first concerns the relationship between the British naval forces and the Peruvian Viceroyalty in the years in which the latter was fighting back revolutionary movements in other parts of the continent. During these years some attempts were made to obtain permission from the Peruvian Viceroy for British merchant vessels to trade with Peru. For part of this time Great Britain and United States were at war, and a British squadron was sent to the Pacific, being followed by other men-of-war until the end of the war.

Second chapter describes those difficult years of the independence wars in Peru. These wars involved three main campaigns. The first one was the privateering campaign sent out by the governments of Buenos Aires and Chile against Peruvian seaborne trade, and the response by the Peruvian Viceroy. The second campaign was in charge of Lord Cochrane, as Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Chilean Navy. Finally, the wars ended with the arrivals of Generals San Martin and Bolivar. During this period British trade was allowed in Peruvian ports as soon as the Spanish naval forces lost the control of the sea. British naval presence was soon required to protect the merchants against both opponents, and it was increased in direct proportion to British trade itself. In the final stage of this period, the Peruvian Navy appeared as a new agent in the west coast of South America. Along these years, British captains played quite a complex role, since Britain was both at peace with Spain and anxious to gain the market offered by her colonies in America.

Next chapter covers the years between the end of the independence wars and the preliminary stages of the Confederation of Peru and Bolivia. During this

time, internal struggles between military leaders brought the country to a very unsettled condition, affecting maritime trade both through naval campaigns and by fluctuating and sometimes capricious taxes on foreign goods. British consular action was not always carried out in harmony with naval interest, and difficulties arose between him and the Naval Senior Officer. This was the period when a very serious incident between Peru and Britain took place. H.M.S. *Sapphire* and H.M.S. *Tribune* seized the Peruvian sloop-of-war *Libertad*, when the latter arrived at Callao, and a considerable amount of money belonging to the Peruvian government was taken from her to compensate a British merchant. This incident damaged relations between both countries, and is currently known in Peruvian historiography as the brigantine *Hidalgo*'s incident.

The fourth chapter deals with General Santa Cruz's attempts to confederate Peru and Bolivia. Ruling Peru during this period, Santa Cruz provide some stability to the country after several years of civil war, gaining the respect of both the British Consul General and the Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron. As the Chilean Government considered that such a confederation could be dangerous for their own national aspirations, they declared war on Peru and Bolivia, and finally defeat Santa Cruz in Yungay, north of Lima. In his retreat, Santa Cruz reached Islay, the sea-port of Arequipa, where a party of British marines and sailors landed to protect his life and to give political asylum on board H.M.S. *Samarang*

Fifth chapter was devoted to discuss the matter of "freight hunting", and in which degree British captains put this consideration above their duties or not. This chapter was made using considerable data of places, dates, names and amount of bullion exported or transported from one port to another. This information could be useful for those economic historians and for this reason it was included as an appendix.

The last chapter deals with the development of the Pacific Squadron and afterwards the Pacific Station itself, covering a variety of aspects, such as the area under its responsibility, the number of vessels destined to it, the frequency of their

calls at Peruvian ports, and the logistic of “baseless” operations. This chapter includes an appendix providing a complete list of those British warships stationed or calling at the West Coast of South America during the period under research, and other with the list of those who commanded British naval forces destined to the Pacific.

British trade in Peru, incipient at the beginning of our research and important enough at the closing date, specially as carriers of foreign goods, was the main reason for the presence of a British Squadron in the West Coast of South America. In the exercise of their function several incidents arose, some concerning blockades established without proper forces and some referred to claims presented by British merchants against the Peruvian government.

Until 1824, the senior naval officer in the Pacific was the only British authority in this quarter of the world, having to represent and inform his government about the countries on the west coast of South America at the time when they were fighting for their independence from Spain. Those reports were the main means of providing guidance to the British government in decisions on policy towards the new republics in South America. They were usually addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, whose task was to put the matter before the relevant authority.³ The Admiralty in this period comprised six or seven admirals, under the presidency of the First Lord, who was a politician. After the Napoleonic wars, in which French and Spanish naval power were defeated in a decisive manner, this group of admirals were in command of the most powerful navy. More than one hundred ships, one fourth of the total list, were normally in commission in several

³.- Three secretaries were part of the Admiralty during the period covered by our research: the First Lord's private secretary, the first secretary, and the second secretary. Usually, the correspondence was addressed to and relayed by the first secretary, whose duty was to direct each matter to the member of the Admiralty concerned with it. Those first secretaries mentioned in this thesis are: H.W.W. Pole (1807-1809); John Wilson Croker (1809-1830); G. Elliot (1830-1834); G. R. Dawson (1834-1835); C. Wood (1835-1839); and More O'Ferrall (1839-1841). In absence of the first secretary, the correspondence was addressed to the second secretary, who was John Barrow from 1807 to 1835 [J. C. Sainty (compiler) “Admiralty officials, 1660-1870”, *Office-Holders in modern Britain*, London, The Atholone Press, 1975, vol. IV].

stations around the world, and the other three fourths were keep in “ordinary” or reserve. This hemispheric distribution lasted for almost one century, and is usually known as the period of the *Pax Britannica*. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, British naval forces were placed in the following stations: Mediterranean, North America and West Indies, Pacific, East Indies, China, Australia and Africa.

In addition to the general function of the Royal Navy, certain ships were commissioned under the Hydrographic Office exclusively to make surveys of the several seas of the world. Amongst the most remarkable was H.M.S. *Beagle*, Captain Robert FitzRoy, who visited Callao in 1834. The importance of these surveys has already been pointed out by scholars both in Britain and Peru,⁴ and for this reason we shall make little mention of them. Similarly, we shall not attempt to go deeply into the subject of land expeditions carried out in Peru by Royal Navy officers, such as Lieutenants Brand (1827), Maw (1827), Smith and Lowe (1836).

Primary sources for this subject were basically found at three archives: the Public Record Office (quoted onwards as PRO), at Kew Gardens, London, Great Britain; the Archivo-Museo “Don Alvaro de Bazán” (quoted onwards as AAB), at El Viso del Marqués, Ciudad Real, Spain; and the Archivo Histórico de Marina (quoted onwards as A.H. de M.), at Lima, Perú.

The Admiralty Papers of the PRO are by far the most useful source for this research, and to avoid a continuous repetition, we quote these papers as ADM followed by the series number. For instance, Admiralty 1, the Secretary’s Department, in-letters, which contains the correspondence from the Commander-in-Chief of the Brazil or South American Station, and afterwards the Pacific Station, are quoted as ADM 1. Even when we reviewed entirely this series for the period under research, those letters included in R.A. Humphreys and Gerald S. Graham’s, *The Navy and South America* (London, Navy Records Society, 1962),

⁴.- L.S. Dawson, *Memoirs of Hidrography*. (London, Cornmarket Press, 1969) [1885]. Félix Denegri Luna, “La República 1826 a 1851”, *Historia Maritima del Perú*, (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú, 1976).

will be referred in its printed form. Journals and logs kept by admirals, captains, lieutenants, and masters of ships serving in the area, were also a valuable source. Official records, private correspondence and journals were also abundant, both in manuscript or printed form. The most valuable private papers collection is in the National Maritime Museum, at Greenwich, London.

Every reference to a document, along the footnotes, start with the names of the signatory and the addressee, followed by the place and the date (day/month/year) the document was written. The reference ends with the name of the archive where the document is housed.

A grant given by the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister allowed me to use the Spanish Navy archive, the already mentioned AAB, where I found very valuable information for the first part of this research, covering the period until 1821. From thence onwards, the A.H. de M. was quite useful, specially for the information copied on thick books which were kept by the Peruvian Navy's Commander-in-Chief's Secretary.

This research has been helped and inspired by earlier works, which despite partial treatment of the subject suggest how rich this topic could be. Amongst the most important are the volumes written by José de la Puente, "La Independencia - 1790 a 1826", and Félix Denegri, "La República -1826 a 1851", both for *Historia Marítima del Perú* (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú, 1976); the already mentioned R.A. Humphreys and Gerald S. Graham, *The Navy and South America* (London, Navy Records Society, 1962); and Celia Wu, *Generals and Diplomats, Great Britain and Peru, 1820-40* (Cambridge, Centre of Latin American Studies, 1991). Were also valuable Barry Gough's "Specie conveyance from the West Coast of Mexico, in British Warships, c. 1820-1870: An Aspect of the 'Pax Britannica'", *The Mariner's Mirror* (1983): 419-433; and his book *Northwest Coast of North America (1810-1914)* (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1971); as well as John Bach, "Maintenance of the Royal

Navy vessels in the Pacific Ocean, 1825-1875", *The Mariner's Mirror* (1970): 259-273.

General background was provided by several authors, amongst whom Jorge Basadre, *Historia de la República del Perú* (Lima, Editorial Universitaria, 1968), remains as the most important Peruvian source. For the British background we basically relied on John Lynch, *Las revoluciones hispanoamericanas 1808-1826* (Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1989); D.C.M. Platt *Latin America and the British Trade 1806-1914* (London, Adam and Charles Blake, 1972); and several articles of W.M. Mathew and Paul Gootenberg.

I will like to express my gratitude to several historians and naval officers, Peruvians, Spaniards and British, as well as librarians and archivists of various institutions. Their help was invaluable. My family deserves a very special thanks, particularly my wife Nora, and my daughters Dafne and Brenda, whose encouragement and patience helped to keep me in this project over the years.

CHAPTER ONE

Initial Approaches (1808-1816)

The embarrassing defeat suffered by British forces at Buenos Aires and its retirement from Montevideo helped to modify the British government attitude towards Spanish America, and from thence onwards it became an official policy not to interfere in their affairs. Subsequent transference of the Portuguese Royal Family from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, under British naval protection, and British alliance with Spain, following the capture of the Spanish Royal Family by Napoleón, increased the possibilities to open Spanish American ports to British trade, a trade which already existed since late Eighteen Century but only with special permission. Moreover, shortly after these changes, Spanish Americans began to designate its own authorities, a decision initially taken in the name of the absent king but which soon became the first step for independence. But not all Spanish America was evolving in the same way. The Peruvian situation was different, as Viceroy Abascal fully recognized the authorities established in Spain to replace the king, and was unwilling to open Peruvian ports to British vessels. His attitude led to some conflicts both with British vessels sailing on the Pacific with trade purpose and with the authorities appointed by Cabildos and Juntas in other parts of South America.

From a naval point of view, even before Trafalgar Britain was able to exert an efficient control on the sea routes from Spain to America, to a point that trade between both sides of the Atlantic was almost non-existent for Spanish vessels by 1806. For this reason, and due to the influence of some important members of the

Spanish bureaucracy, some permissions were given to a few British merchants to trade directly with Spanish American ports. During the period covered by this chapter, it is possible to distinguish two different moments in naval activity on the west coast of America. The first one, 1808 and 1809, saw some actions between Spanish and British privateers, unaware that they were already allies. The second moment is between 1812 and 1814, when the Pacific became another scenery of the war between United States of America and Great Britain. Due to the alliance between Spain and Britain, the Peruvian Viceroy provided certain facilities to British men-of-war arriving at Peruvian ports.

Framed by this general situation, we are going to analyse the attitude of British captains, both in respect of their general naval duties and with regards to the Peruvian Viceroyalty. By this way, we should find the first elements who served to the British Admiralty to establish a long term policy which was to be observed by their captains in respect to Peruvian internal affairs and on the protection of their nationals. Particularly important on this issue were the attitudes adopted by Rear-Admiral Smith, Captain Fleeming and Captain Hillyar.

It should be mentioned that during the period covered by this chapter (1808-1815), transport of bullion on board British ships from Peruvian ports was very limited, since it only became a regular system of shipping back treasure during the war of Independence (1816-1824). Moreover, as the main reason of British naval presence on the west coast was referred to the war with the United States, its logistic aspects were as those squadrons operating in distant waters. This situation will change from 1817 onwards, when the protection of British shipping demanded a new approach on the deployment of the squadron and the length of time they were commissioned to the Pacific.

The South American Station

Since 1796, following the French Revolution and Napoleon raise, Europe had been in permanent war until 1802, when a Peace Treaty was signed at Amiens. Fourteen months later hostilities renewed between Britain and France. Soon after that Spain, Holland, Italy, Portugal and other continental kingdoms became under Napoleon influence, and a Continental blockade was established to any British goods or vessel. As a response, Britain declared a general blockade to European ports, and deployed its fleet before Brest, Toulon and Cadiz. In 1805 a new coalition was made against Napoleon, this time between Britain, Russia, Austria and Sweden, but it was almost destroyed within a few months, leaving Britain once again alone in its struggle. The naval part of the war was defined by Nelson's victory at Trafalgar, October 1805, but despite this fact, in the following two years it appeared that continental blockade was about to achieve its goal to ban British exports and goods.

The war will lasted another ten year until the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, but in 1807, Britain exporters sought for the expansion of its traditional markets: United States and "all parts of the world", which include Spanish America. Foreign trade with them was forbade by old Spanish colonial laws, but British merchants found their way to introduce their goods in that market by re-exporting from Spain, or by contraband through the British West Indies and Brazil. Conditions to smuggling British goods in Spanish colonial ports had improved after the treaty of San Lorenzo el Real, signed on 27 October 1790 to put an end to the incident on the Northwest coast of North America usually known as the Nootka Sound crisis. Accordingly, British vessels sailing in Spanish American waters were no longer to be considered enemies, provided they restricted themselves to fishing outside a ten leagues limit from the coast. Despite containing an explicit prohibition on British ships to enter and sustain trade in the ports of that coast, the treaty allowed their entry for refreshments, and for repairs only in case of

emergency. Soon after this treaty, the whaling grounds around the Galapagos islands began to be visited by an increasing number of British vessels, and from 1795 onwards by North-American whalers too. As could be easily suppose, their presence brought a considerable increase in smuggling along the coast, and consequently drastic measures were adopted by the Spanish authorities.¹

In the case of the Peruvian viceroyalty, its naval defence relied on a small number of men-of-war coming from Spain and eventually stationed at Callao. The worrying increase of smuggling, towards the end of the century, led the Spanish Government to create a small but permanent naval establishment in Peru. Therefore, in 1793 one frigate and two brigs were sent to spend their working life as coast guards based in Callao, where some facilities to support them were built. These vessels, helped by a good number of locally owned privateers and some ships commissioned in Peru, were involved in several actions against British ships reaching the West Coast of South America after the Treaty of 1790 and during the European wars since 1796 until 1809.²

In the context of these wars, some plans were made in Britain to open a diversionary theatre of war in Spanish America, but for a number of reasons they were abandoned until 1806, when a decisive step was given at Rio de la Plata. On 27 June 1806, Buenos Aires was captured by an unauthorised expedition leaded by Commodore Sir Home Popham and General Beresford. For a few weeks the port

1.- Here we must face a semantic problem. North-Americans or U.S. citizens are commonly referred in English as "Americans", however, this terms comprises all those living in America, which includes North, Central and South American. This dissertation will distinguish between them, refering U.S. citizens as North-Americans instead of only Americans.

A good account of smuggling was recorded in John Nicol, *The Life and Adventures of John Nicol*, Mariner, London, 1937: 153-156. His whaler visited Paita shortly after the treaty of 1790 was signed.

2.- Only one British man-of-war was reported cruising along the West Coast of South America during the last part of Napoleonic wars, it was H.M. frigate *Cornwallis*, Captain Charles James Johnstone, who captured a considerable number of vessels [ADM 51/1777. AAB, Expediciones de Indias, legajo 41, carpeta 1904; legajo 43, carpeta 1853; legajo 44, carpetas 1991 and 16/2/1809].

remained open to foreign trade, but by mid-August the British garrison was defeated and surrendered. Its temporary success was warmly received in Britain, moving the government to send reinforcements under General Whitelocke destined to the conquest of Chile and to prepare new plans to send other expeditions to Venezuela and Mexico, while scores of British merchant vessels departed for Buenos Aires. In February 1807, on the arrival of the reinforcements to the Rio de la Plata, Montevideo was captured and opened to British trade. Six months later, a considerable British force failed in a new attempt to capture of Buenos Aires, being forced to abandon Montevideo and to leave a considerable number of prisoners in Spanish hands.³

As some scholars had pointed out, one of the reasons of the British failure at Rio de la Plata was its lack of a clear policy respect the people of Spanish America, who were unwilling to accept a British rule instead of independence. The lesson was clear, Britain would only succeed in that continent with a policy of emancipation, which will deprive Spain and France of vital resources and provide important markets.⁴

That was the general situation in November 1807, when a French army invaded Portugal, forcing the Portuguese government to flee from the country to avoid capture. Consequently, Dom Joao, the Prince Regent of Portugal, his demented mother, Queen Maria I, his wife, Carlota Joaquina, daughter of Carlos IV of Spain, and the rest of his family and court, sailed to Brazil in the Portuguese fleet.⁵ The British squadron stationed in the river Tagus, under the flag of Rear Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, had to convoy them according to the

3.- John Lynch, "British Policy and Spanish America, 1783-1808", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 1 (1969), U. of Cambridge: 19-20.

4.- Lynch (1969): 21-22.

5.- The Portuguese fleet, of thirty-six vessels, departed the Tagus on 27 November 1807, with almost 15,000 "passengers" on board [Rudy Bauss, "Rio de Janeiro: Strategic Base for the Global Designs of the British Royal Navy, 1777-1815" in Craig Symonds (ed.) *New Aspects of Naval History*, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1981: 75-89].

convention signed between both governments on October 22 of the same year. Commodore Graham More was appointed in command of the escorting British warships, receiving clear instructions “to protect the embarkation of the royal family and to escort them to America (...) to such port or place in the Brazils as his Royal Highness may decide to go to, affording them every aid and assistance in your power”.⁶

Beyond Madeira island, More would be acting under direct control of the Admiralty, being instructed by Smith to deploy his squadron in the best form to protect the Brazilian coast against any attempt at attack or invasion by the Spaniards or French, coming from Europe or America. He was also commanded to support the Prince Regent’s government, and “to protect the trade of his Majesty’s subjects and annoy that of the enemy.”⁷

The Portuguese royal family reached Bahia in January 1808, and on the 28th Brazilian ports were declared open to the trade of all friendly nations. Shortly after this, the Portuguese court was re-established in Rio de Janeiro, and the British squadron reinforced with some ships-of-the-line, which arrived at Rio de Janeiro on 17 May 1808 under Rear Admiral Smith’s flag. His appointment as Commander-in-Chief of this squadron was the recognition that a new administrative naval unit should be created in Brazil, the Brazils or South America Station, especially in a moment in which the British government was about to assemble an expeditionary force to attack Spanish America.⁸

Smith had made himself a British national hero by his defence of Acre against Napoleon, in 1799, having many brilliant qualities as naval officer. In the following months Spanish situation became very complicated, with the capture of

6.- Gerald S. Graham and R. A. Humphreys (editors), *The Navy and South America. 1807-1823*, London, Navy Records Society, 1962: 3-4.

7.- Graham and Humphreys: 3-4. John Barrow, *The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith*, London, Richard Bentley, 1848, II: 270-278.

8.- Lynch (1969): 22-23.

the royal family and its change from enemy to ally. Admiral Smith was convinced that this change would open South American ports to British trade, and with this idea on mind became an enthusiastic supporter of Princess Carlota Joaquina's aspirations to the Spanish crown, sending a number of letter to colonial authorities at Rio de la Plata, Chile and Peru. By this way he became involved in Spanish colonial affairs, interfering with the British Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro's policy.⁹ Smith's attitude was very much in the line of his character, but it deserves a more extensive analysis, at least in his approaches to the Peruvian Viceroyalty, since it provides a good starting point of the way in which these relations will conducted during the next decade, serving as a reference for future Commander-in-chief.

Just by the time Smith arrived at Rio de Janeiro, the Spanish monarchy was overthrown by Napoleon, at Bayonne, and Fernando VII was replaced by Jose Bonaparte as king of Spain and the Indies. These outrageous events found an immediate response by the Spaniards, and "Juntas" of resistance were formed almost all over the country, sending agent to London to request British assistance against the common enemy: Napoleon. On 4 July 1808, peace between both countries was proclaimed, and British plans to invade Spanish America were definitively cancel. In September, a Junta Central was appointed to rule Spain and its colonies in the name of Fernando VII.

Since February 1806 some British merchants were already engaged in a licence trade with Spanish America, which according to some authors included Peruvian ports.¹⁰ But as soon as Spain became an ally, a significant number of British merchants considered that this trade will no longer be in hand of a few individuals, and several vessels departed British ports bound for Spanish America. In the winter of 1807-1808, eleven of them sailed for Chile and Peru with cargoes

9.- Barrow, I: Introduction; II: 281. Graham and Humphreys: 2. Robert A. Humphreys, *La Marina Real Británica y la Liberación de Sudamérica*, Caracas, Fundación John Bulton y Fundación Eugenio Mendoza, 1962: 10.

10.- Lynch (1969): 27.

valued almost a million pounds. Amongst them was the *Vulture*, of London, master Joseph Christie, with goods worth more than 800,000 dollars, in charge of Alexander McClure, as supercargo.¹¹

By the time this vessel arrived at Rio de Janeiro, Admiral Smith was already in possession of a letter from the Spanish Secretary of State addresses to the viceroys of Buenos Aires and Lima and to the Capitán General of Chile, instructing them to release any British soldier taken prisoner at Buenos Aires in 1806. Most of them were already liberated following the agreement signed between Buenos Aires Viceroy Liniers and British General Whitelock, on 7 July 1807, but it was thought that a number of them remained in inner towns, and even in Chile or Peru. To carry the letters to the other side of the continent, Smith appointed Lieutenant William Fitzmaurice, who was to sail on the *Vulture*, and to take back the prisoners on board of the same vessels.

As far as we know, no British prisoner was sent to Peru in 1806-1807, but how aware was Smith of that situation? It is difficult if not impossible to know that, but he surely thought that it would be an excellent opportunity to initiate correspondence with the Peruvian Viceroy in a moment in which several British merchant vessels were already sailing around Cape Horn with that destination. As a matter of fact, when the *Vulture* departed Rio for Valparaíso, there was still quite a number of British and Spanish privateers fighting each other along the West Coast, whose masters were unaware of the alliance treaty between Spain and Britain, against the French. For this reason several incidents happened during the second half of 1808, involving the capture of both Spanish and British vessels, amongst whom was the *Vulture*, taken by the *Cantabria*, off Valparaíso, on September 27. A few days before, the Spanish vessel *Napoleon* was captured at Coquimbo by the British frigate *Scorpion*, master Tomas Wane. On October 12, two British vessels,

11.- Lynch (1969): 29. Graham and Humphreys: 6-7. José A. de la Puente Candamo, "La Independencia - 1790 a 1826", *Historia Marítima del Perú*, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú, 1975, I: 159.

frigate *Pandur*, master Tomas Anderson, and brig *Antelope*, captured the frigate *Nueva Castor*, master Ramón Goycochea, even when the latter produced a printed copy of the peace treaty. On the next day, following a fighting in which the skipper was killed, another British vessel named *Scorpion* was captured, at Pichidanqui, by the frigate *San Andrés*, master José Medina.¹² Another capture reported in British sources was the *Warren*, but following the Spanish naval report of this capture she was a North-American vessel taken in Concepcion, Chile, in February 1808.¹³

As could be easily understood, the situation was uneven in the Pacific, and to make it even more complicated, in some cases Chilean and Peruvian authorities permitted British vessels to trade. That was the case of the *Scorpion*, who was captured and condemned for contraband after being allowed to enter in Valparaiso and to receive some cargo on board.¹⁴

Back to Lieutenant Fitzmaurice's mission, following his arrival at Valparaiso on 17 September 1808, he informed the Governor of the recent peace and obtained permission to travel to Santiago in company with Mr. McClure. Provided with an official permission from the Governor of Valparaiso, the *Vulture*'s skipper was instructed to cruise off the port, and to send a boat for them on the sixth day. A few days later, the Buenos Aires privateer *Cantabria* entered the port, and her master was warned not to attack the British vessel. However, he replied arrogantly that the Governor can "command in land what ever he wish, but in sea I will act under my own judgement". Saying this, the privateer left the port on September 27 and captured the *Vulture*, sailing afterwards to Callao.¹⁵ On the

12.- Vivero to the Secretario de Marina, Callao 24/11/1808. AAB, Expediciones a Indias, legajo 44, carpeta 26/5/1809.

13.- Vivero to Gil de Taboada, Callao 24/2/1808, AAB, Expediciones de Indias, legajo 43, carpetas 1858 & 1860, n° 187.

14.- John Stoddard Jones, "Historical Study of Anglo-South American Trade, with special reference to the Period 1807-25" (Ph. D. Thesis. U. of London. 1934): 131. Smith to Pole, Foudroyant Rio de Janeiro, 24/2/1809, and enclosed letters. ADM 1/19.

15.- Vivero to the Secretario de Marina, 25/10/1808, AAB, Expediciones de Indias, legajo 44, carpeta 26/5/1809. Some other sources pointed out that the privateer's name was *Ramoncita*, a brig belonging to the Limenian company of Almazza and Arismendi

same day, Fitzmaurice and McClure returned from Santiago, presenting an energetic protest against the privateer's aggression. After some delay, they managed to find a vessel to take them to Callao, where McClure was to try to rescue his ship and cargo, while Fitzmaurice continue the second part of his mission.¹⁶ The latter's presence in Lima was not recorded in any Peruvian source; however, he returned to Rio in 1809, having fulfilled his mission in a way satisfactory to Smith.¹⁷

Shortly after the *Vulture* departure, Smith gave a more decisive step in his aim to open Spanish ports to the British trade, writing letters to Viceroy Liniers, from Buenos Aires, and Abascal, from Peru, and to the Captain General of Chile. He was convinced that most of the population of these territories were in favour of free trade, but were opposed by a small group, "who are averse to all trade or intercourse with Great Britain", which could be reduced with the help of Princess Carlota Joaquina an by "sending the Portuguese line-of-battle ships, which are useless here, round Cape Horn to those coasts under the command of the Spanish Prince Don Pedro Carlos, nephew to King Charles IV".¹⁸

His point of view respect British involvement in Spanish internal affairs was not shared by Viscount Strangford, arrived at Rio as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in July, motivating a number of complains against the Admiral which finally led to his replacement in 1809. But in September 1808, Smith was firmly convinced that British intervention will be absolutely legal, as Princess Carlota Joaquina, the only member of the Spanish royal family free at that

[Puente (1975) I: 159. Smith to Pole, *Foudroyant* Rio de Janeiro, 24/2/1809, and enclosed letters addressed to Smith, ADM 1/19].

16.- Puente (1975) I: 159.

17.- William Fitzmaurice joined the Navy in 1793. Discharged from the *Foudroyant* on 4 July 1808, to carry out his mission on the *Vulture*. His return to Rio is not registered, however, he was positively there in November 1809, on board the *Nereida*. He would remained Lieutenant until his retirement [ADM 9/7; ADM 9/31].

18.- Graham and Humphreys: 13.

time, would provide the proper authorisation. Since Portuguese approval for this project was unlikely to be obtained, the Princess, whose ambitious increased proportionally to the problems of her family in Spain, “offers herself to go and conciliate parties towards permanent political and commercial arrangements between the three countries” (Peru and Chile, with Brazil and Britain). Smith, who even acted as intermediary between Carlota Joaquina and her husband, offered his own flag ship, the *London*, “for the conveyance of the princess”.¹⁹

While such a proposal was studied by the Admiralty, Smith found no problem at all to write proclamations and letters on behalf of the Princess, sending them “from one end of this continent to the other”. They reached Peru early in 1809, a month after the local proclamation of Fernando VII as Spanish King, accompanying a letter from Carlota Joaquina. Abascal recorded in his memoirs that the Princess was “encouraging this government, high court, archbishop, bishops, town council, and many private individuals to maintain their loyalty to her father, ignoring his abdication to the first-born”, and announced “that Prince Carlos de Borbon y Braganza would be appearing in a short time, to rule in the name of Carlos IV, during his absence and the absence of the other members of his August Royal Family”.²⁰

The letters were entrusted to Frederick Dowling, master of the *Higginson Sennior*, who was appointed as messenger of Her Royal Highness Cabinet. Loaded with goods for more than one million dollars, and furnished with an expressive letter from the Princess to the Spanish authorities introducing Dowling to the trade, the *Higginson Senior* sailed for the Pacific in September 1808. Smith was hoping that her admission to the trade would “operate as a precedent at this

19.- Idem: 18-19.

20.- José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa. *Memoria de Gobierno*. Sevilla. Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos. 1944. I: 481-482. Vivero to the Secretario de Marina, Callao 10/2/1809, AAB. Expediciones a Indias, legajo 44, carpeta 2066.

moment of enthusiasm”,²¹ and in this sense he asked Viceroy Abascal to “allow to extend here direct trade with his Nation, according to those intimate relations recently acquired by the alliance with our Nation”. A third letter was addressed to Abascal by Fernando Jose de Portugal, secretary of the Princess, and known to the Viceroy, also recommending Dowling’s trade enterprise.²²

Smith’s enthusiasm found little support either from the Captain General of Chile or the Peruvian Viceroy, since none of them allowed the *Higginson Senior* to trade. In Callao, where she arrived in December 1808, Dowling’s representations to Abascal were rewarded only with a passport to protect his vessel from the Spanish privateers on her return to Rio de Janeiro. Despite this offer, Dowling showed himself reluctant to leave the port and insisted to be allowed to sell his cargo. He was clearly acting against the “Leyes de Indias” and the treaty of 1790, which banned any foreign trade with Spanish colonies, and therefore Abascal was fully entitled to detain and put to trial the *Higginson Senior* charged as smuggler. Finally, Dowling was forced to depart Callao by two gunboats.²³

Even when this attempt to open Peruvian ports to British trade failed, Abascal was impressed by Smith’s audacity. It was clear that, as happened in Buenos Aires, the offer was tempting, since Princess Carlota Joaquina’s aspirations could not be regarded as totally illegal. Moreover, as certain amount of British trade was already allowed, under the regulation of 1806, its increase could be a matter of interpretation. Finally, it was out of doubt that such a trade would benefit some important members of the local administration. Therefore, why Abascal rejected such a proposition? It is out of the scope of the present thesis to provide a full analysis of the Spanish internal affairs during the last colonial years in Peru,

21.- Barrow II: 301-302. Graham and Humphreys: 18.

22.- Abascal I: 481-482. Graham and Humphreys: 18.

23.- Abascal I: 480-484. Guillermo Lohmann Villena (editor), “Documentación Oficial Española” en *Colección Documental de la Independencia del Perú* (quoted onwards as *C.D.I.P.*), Lima, Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia, 1972-1974, t. XXII, vol. I: 180-182.

however, it seems that Abascal was quite convinced that any concession in this sense would debilitate its own condition as Viceroy, representing a king who no longer was legally recognized. For this reason, we could agree with Abascal when he refers to Smith, at least in this issue, as a man with “a great sagacity and intelligence in political matters”.²⁴

However, as already mentioned along previous pages, the Admiral was very impulsive and for that reason and due to the capture of several British vessels on the West Coast, by early 1809 he wrote to the Admiralty expressing his “wish to be authorised and enabled to send two frigates and a sloop-of-war round Cape Horn with the precise instructions how far to interfere for the protection of the British flag”.²⁵ Moreover, as he feared that French influence in Buenos Aires could threaten British interest, he even proposed a new attempt to capture that city.²⁶

For all these reasons, Smith was replaced in June 1809 by Vice Admiral the Hon. Michael de Courcy, who commanded the Naval Station for the next three years. In that time a few incidents arose along the west coast, including the capture of some British vessels for smuggling, as was the case of the *Cyrus*, in November 1810, but none of them motivates a direct intervention of the Naval Station. Trade remain very much the same, with certain amount of British goods entering Peruvian ports on neutral vessels “under the protection of passports from the constituted sovereignties of Spain”, and some bullion sent in return on Spanish vessels, under the protection of the Royal Navy. That were the case of the *Gerona*, Crosbie master, with 600,000 pesos, and the *Archiduke Carlos*, H.S. Moore

24.- Abascal I: 480-484.

25.- Smith to Liniers, *Foudroyant*, Rio de Janeiro, 16/1/1809; enclosed with Smith to Pole, 24/2/1809. ADM 1/19.

26.- Carlos Roberts. *Las invasiones inglesas del Río de la Plata (1806-1807) y la influencia inglesa en la independencia y organización de las Provincias del Río de la Plata*. Buenos Aires. Talleres Gráficos Jacobo Peuser, 1938: 345-353, 358-359.

master, with 4'000,000 pesos on board, with cargo owned by Larrazabal, Menoyo & Trotiga Company.²⁷

These years were also extremely important for the Spanish colonial system. In January 1810, the Junta Central dissolved itself to avoid being captured as the French were advancing through Andalucia, appointing a Regency of five in its place. They should summon the Cortes, or Spanish parliament, in Cadiz, one of the few places still not occupied by the enemy. The Cortes represented all the territories under the Spanish crown, including America and the Philippines, and therefore deputies from all these places were to be elected and make their way to Cadiz. As the Regency was also needing some economic support, they asked for a loan from the British government, which will be reimbursed with the public treasure sent by the viceroyalties of Mexico and Peru. As a result of this appeal, the Regency received half a million dollars, and the British government commissioned two warships for the transport of the deputies and treasure from America. H.M.S. *Baluart* was to sail for Nueva España, and H.M.S. *Standard*, Captain Charles Elphinstone Fleeming,²⁸ to Peru and Chile. The latter departed Cadiz in April 1811, with some Spanish officers and passengers on board, amongst whom was José Miguel Carrera, a Chilean who would play a relevant role in the independence of his country. If the naval and political part of the expedition will remain in hands of Captain Fleeming, the collection of treasure was commissioned to Mr. D. Drummond, British Army's quartermaster general for Spain and the Mediterranean. He had to ask the Peruvian Viceroy for two or three millions dollars in silver which the Regency had promised. Part of this money would be

27.- William Bennet Stevenson, *A historical and descriptive narrative of twenty years' residence in South America*, London, Hurst, Robinson, Edinburg, Constable and Oliver and Boyd, 1825, III: 120-121. Jones: 143. Admiralty to De Courcy, 22/3/1810, ADM 2/934: 7-8.

28.- Fleeming was promoted to Captain in 1794, and appointed to the *Standard* in April 1811 [John Marshall, *Royal Navy Biography*, London, Longman, 1823-1830, I: 578. Pitcairn Jones, "The commissioned officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815", P.R.O.]

used to repay the British loan and the balance to continue the war in Spain.²⁹ The *Standard* receive some cargo from the Spanish government, but also was authorised to took on board private owned goods, either from Spaniards or foreigners.³⁰

Beyond the fact that the *Standard* was the first British man-of-war sailing as an ally along the Pacific Coast of South America, this voyage is important as it was taken as a reference for setting up a guideline for British captains in its relation with the newly formed independent governments. Unaware of local complexities, Captain Fleeming did not adopted a neutral position in the struggle between patriots and loyalist already happening in Chile on his arrival at Valparaíso. Following his personal feelings, and probably after Peruvian Viceroy Abascal's advise, he wrote a letter addressed to the newly formed independent Chilean government compromising himself and Britain as firm supporters of the loyalist cause. As could be expected, the Chilean government complained against that letter before the British government, Fleeming being disapproved and his case refereed as an example of how not to conduct themselves in the conflict between Spain and its colonies.³¹ For this reason, this voyage deserves a more detailed explanation.

Even before the *Standard's* reached Valparaíso, Chile and many other places in Spanish America adopted self-government as a direct result of the problems in Spain. Initially, these juntas were acting in the name of the prisoner King Fernando VII, claiming that sovereignty had reverted to the people, and

29.- Fray Melchor Martínez, *Memoria histórica sobre la revolución de Chile*, Santiago, Biblioteca Nacional, 1964, I: 263]. Abram Langlas mentions H.M.S. *Undaunted* as the British man-of-war due to sail for Peru. As no mention of this ship had been found in any other source, it seems that either Langlas mistook the *Standard* with the *Undaunted* or the latter was replaced by Fleeming's frigate at some stage before her departure [Abram Isaac Langlas "The relations between Great Britain and the Spanish Colonies. 1810-1812", Ph. D. Thesis, U. of London 1939, chapter III: 24].

30.- The cargo list was published by the *Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima*, 7/9/1811.

31.- De Courcy to Croker. *Foudroyant*, Rio de Janeiro. 3/3/1812, ADM 1/22. Graham and Humphreys: 72-73.

therefore the authority had to come from them rather than from a Junta or Regency in Spain. In practical terms, this point of view implied independent government, and in the Chilean case a Junta was appointed with that end in view on 18 September 1810. A few days later, on 2 October, the Junta sent a letter to Admiral de Courcy asking him to use force to detain any French vessel coming to the West Coast, and “offering him, at the same time, anything in our hands to improve our relations”.³² Some weeks later, on 21 February 1811, a further step to independence was given when the Chilean Junta decided to open four ports to foreign trade, a measure which was regarded as subversive by Peruvian Viceroy Abascal. When news of Abascal’s reaction reached Chile, the Junta became afraid that a military expedition would be prepared against them from Lima.

Framed by these conditions the *Standard* arrived at Valparaíso, and on July 27, Fleeming reported his mission to the newly formed Chilean Congress, and in the name of the alliance existing between Britain and Spain, offered the *Standard* to transport deputies and treasure to Spain. After a long debate on the issue, the Congress replied in very ambiguous terms, inviting the British Captain to visit Santiago to explain his mission in person. As Fleeming refused to leave his ship, and emphasised the purpose of his visit, the Congress replied that no deputies had been elected, and no treasure would be sent to Spain since it was needed to prepare the defence of the country against Abascal’s expedition. Obviously, both replies were highly displeasing to the British Captain, and, firmly convinced that the majority of the population were against the new government, he invited Carrera to sail with him to avoid such an unsettled country. Fleeming was far to know that Carrera would dissolve the Congress few weeks later, in September, to establish himself in the government.³³

32.- Martínez I: 131-132.

33.- Martínez I: 264-268. Diego Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*. Santiago, Rafael Jover y otros, 1884-1902, VIII: 362-367. José Miguel Carrera, *Diario de José Miguel Carrera*, Santiago, Quimantú, 1973: 20-22.

The frigate's arrival at Callao was registered in the official local newspaper, in a note which include a long list of goods coming aboard. A few days later, both Fleeming and Drummond send introducing letters to the Viceroy. The latter, whose main mission was to receive treasure for the repayment of the British loan, offered himself to transport private or state owned treasure, and to make any financial arrangements with banks in London. His offer was accepted, both by the Viceroy and by local merchants, and when the *Standard* finally departed, she took on board some tin and nitrate state owned, 2'516,652 private owned pesos and 410,797 state owned pesos. Almost 13% of this treasure belonged to the British Government as a repayment for the loan given to the Junta Central.³⁴ The local agency of the Real Compañía de Filipinas, one of the most powerful Spanish shipping companies at the time, collected the treasure at its office in Lima.³⁵

During his stay at Lima, Fleeming met Abascal more than once, providing him with useful information on Chilean affairs and with a copy of his correspondence with that government. When news of the overthrow of the Junta in Chile reached Callao, on September 4, Fleeming thought that the new rulers were loyalist, who would allow him to fulfil his mission. For this reason, and probably on Abascal's advice, he wrote a letter to the new government in Chile inviting them to maintain their loyalty to the King, and denied any rumours regarding British support and interest in the independence of the Spanish colonies in America. In his letter, dated October 3, Fleeming pointed out that the British Nation, honouring its alliance with the Spanish Nation, would be acting absurdly by "supporting with one hand Spanish interests in Europe and ruining with the other the same interests in America". To make things even more complicate, Fleeming stated that "England considers that the Spanish Americans have not yet reached those indispensable

34.- *Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima*, 2/11/1811. *El Peruano*, 19/12/1811. Vivero to the Secretario de Marina, Lima 31/10 & 30/11/1811, AAB, Expediciones a Indias, legajo 48, carpetas 29/3 & 29/4/1812.

35.- *Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima*, 7 and 11/9/1811 and 15/10/1811. The *Standard* was the first British warship who convey treasure from the West Coast of the continent.

conditions which could allow their independence;" considering that such an attitude was not the general opinion of its inhabitants.³⁶

Despite his gross mistake in get involved in that internal struggle, Fleeming was able to describe colonial society in very crude but realistic terms, very much in the line of arguments used by Timothy E. Anna on his study of Lima society at the time of independence.³⁷ In this sense, Fleeming include the following paragraph:

"Those called indigenous, have no opinion strictly speaking; and those European Spaniards, living in America, show horror to such an idea; the American Spaniards, who live and work have the same feelings; and those half-caste, by inclination, followed the same party".³⁸

On its arrival at Santiago, this letter caused great indignation amongst the new Chilean rulers, leaded by Carrera, who were more radical than the junta met by Fleeming in July. This letter and the intervention of Captain Hillyar, H.M.S. *Phoebe*, in setting a peace treaty between both parties in 1814, were used in the following years to complain against the British policy in respect of the new republics in America. It is important to mention that despite Admiralty disapproval, Fleeming's career was not affected, and eventually reached the high rank of Admiral.³⁹ It could be difficult to explanation such an attitude, but as far as it was impossible to provide him with proper instructions in a issue which was not foresaw at his departure from Britain, he could not be blamed on that.

The war with the United States and the British squadron in the Pacific (1812-1816)

36.- Barros Arana VIII: 362-367. *Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima*, 15/10/1811.

37.- Timothy E. Anna. "The Peruvian Declaration of Independence: Freedom by Coercion", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 7 (November 1975), University of Cambridge: 221-248.

38.- Barros Arana VIII: 362-367. *Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima*, 15/10/1811.

39.- Marshall I: 578. Pitcairn Jones, Op. Cit.

The lesson learned by the Admiralty after Fleeming's mistake was applied with the British squadron sent round Cape Horn to protect British whalers during the war with the United States. Nonetheless, his senior officer, Captain Hillyar, of H.M.S. *Phoebe*, became involved in the struggle between loyalist and patriots, providing a further lesson to the Admiralty when the latter blamed him for misleading their leaders to accept an improper treaty. Obviously, captains sailing to the west coast needed a far more precise set of instructions to avoid future complains against British neutrality in what was officially regarded as an Spanish internal affair.

The war also provide another set of experience, referred to the operation of a squadron in those distant waters, with a limited support offered by Spanish colonial authorities. The latter, at once, enforced trade regulations, capturing a number of British vessels and motivating an increasing commitment of British captains in the protection of their nationals. This situation will worsen from 1816 onwards, when patriots privateers included new threats to British shipping, but the experience gained between 1813 and 1815 helped to provide a line of conduct on this sort of issues.

As part of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain retaliated the continental blockade by declaring that any cargo destined for Europe should be landed at British ports. This measure mainly affected the fast growing North American shipping, and eventually led to an open war between Britain and the United States. This war lasted for almost three years, in which basically the Royal Navy blockade the enemy ports, while the United States Navy concentrated its effort against British shipping. Most of the action was seen on Atlantic waters, but the North American presence on Fort Astoria, Columbia River, and basically the U.S. frigate *Essex*'s presence on the whaling grounds off the Peruvian coast, moves the British Admiralty to send a squadron to the Pacific.

By June 1812, the British North West Company bought the *Isaac Todd*, arming and fitting her as a privateer destined to support their interests in the Columbia territories, requesting support from their government. As a response, H.M.S. *Phoebe*, Captain James Hillyar,⁴⁰ was commissioned to accompany that privateer and to clear the area of hostile vessels. Secret orders were also issued, commanding Hillyar to capture Fort Astoria, and then to form a British settlement at the mouth of the Columbia river.⁴¹

By late-January 1813, before this expedition departed British ports, U.S. frigate *Essex*,⁴² Captain David Porter, managed to escape from the continental blockade and to sail round Cape Horn into the Pacific, with orders to destroy english whalers in the Pacific. Porter quickly established a warm relationship with the patriots, specially with the Chilean leader José Miguel Carrera, being supported by Joel Roberts Poinsett, who had arrived in Chile early in 1812 as the first official American consul general to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru.⁴³

From mid-April to early-October, Porter raided the whaling grounds, which lay between 17° South and the Equator, at a distance of 10 to 100 leagues from coast, taking advantage of his unexpected presence and capturing twelve British whalers. One of them, the *Atlantic*, was fitted out as a naval vessel, being manned by 60 men, armed with 20 guns, and renamed *Essex Junior*.⁴⁴ Some of the British prisoners were liberated at Tumbes, and within few weeks they were dispersed at Guayaquil, Callao and Valparaiso. The notice of the *Essex* raid and the fate of

40.- Hillyar (1769-1843) was promoted to Captain in 1804. In command of the *Phoebe* since 1810, he participate in several actions (Madagascar, July 1811, and capture of Java). Rear Admiral in 1837 [Marshall. Op. cit].

41.- Admiralty to Hillyar, *London*, 12/3/1813, ADM 2/1380.

42.- On her arrival at Valparaiso, on 15 March 1813, the *Essex* was reported with 40 guns, 28 twenty four-pounder, and 12 long nines, and 340 men [William S. Dudley, (editor), *The Naval War of 1812. A Documentary History*, Washington, Naval Historical Center, 1992: 690].

43.- Lawrence A. Clayton, "The Eagle and the Condor. The United States and Peru, 1800-1995", manuscript version, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1995: 58-59.

44.- Dudley: 697-699.

these British seamen reached Rio de Janeiro within few weeks, specially as some of the later were in “the greatest distress” and “in danger of being starved to death”.⁴⁵

The *Isaac Todd* and the *Phoebe* finally sailed from Portsmouth in March 1813, and three months later entered Rio de Janeiro. During the voyage, the Company vessel showed poor sailing conditions, probably “in part of her being badly stowed, heavy masts and rigging and too many guns on her deck”.⁴⁶ In Brazil they were received by Rear Admiral Manley Dixon, who had been appointed as Commander-in-Chief in 1812. A man of impulsive temperament, Dixon was to encounter problems during his command in South America, one of which was linked to this voyage and the subsequent capture of the *Essex*. As this frigate was known to be stronger than the *Phoebe*, and since the latter’s final destination had become known by word of mouth from two Company officers, Dixon felt it necessary to reinforce Hillyar with two sloops. They were the *Raccoon*, Captain William Black,⁴⁷ and the *Cherub*, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker,⁴⁸ both already under orders to sail for the West Coast to protect the whalers. To prevent a total loss, the *Isaac Todd*’s cargo was redistributed amongst the other ships, departing Rio in July. Dixon’s decision to reinforce Hillyar was approved by the Admiralty; however, his delay in sending men-of-war to the Pacific was criticised.⁴⁹

Hillyar’s instructions, in addition to his main task with the *Isaac Todd* and enemy vessels on the North West Coast, reminded him that the sloops were to patrol the whaling ground, but according to the circumstances, he was permitted to

45.- Dixon to Staines, *La Ceres*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/3/1814; enclosed with Dixon to Croker 30/3/1814, ADM 1/22.

46.- Graham and Humphreys: 93-94.

47.- Black joined the Navy in 1793. He was present during action in Toulon (1793) and Ile de Groix (1795). Promoted to Captain in 1814, he left the Navy in 1846 [Marshall II: 426-428].

48.- Tucker (1775-1852) joined the Navy in 1793. Commander of the *Cherub* since 1809, was promoted to Captain in 1811. Rear Admiral in 1846 [William R. O’Byrne, *A Naval biographical Dictionary*, London, John Murray, 1849: 1209].

49.- Graham and Humphreys: 92-95, 98-102. Croker to Dixon, *London*, 10/8/1813, ADM 2/934.

modify the mission of any or both of them.⁵⁰ The Company's vessel became separated from the squadron just before the Cape, failing to reunite with them at Juan Fernandez. Suspecting that she had been captured by the *Essex*, Hillyar decided to continue his original mission with the *Raccoon* and to cruise in search of the enemy with his frigate and the *Cherub*. The three vessels sailed northwards and Captain Black parted company off Tumbes, early in October. He was to reach Columbia river two months later, just to find that Fort Astoria was already in British hands. After a formal ceremony, taking possession of the fort and renaming it Fort George, the *Raccoon* sailed to San Francisco, where the *Isaac Todd* was finally met.⁵¹

The *Phoebe* and *Cherub* patrolled the whaling grounds for a while before anchoring in the mouth of Tumbes river, where they remained ten days watering and completing supplies before returning to their task.⁵² There remained patrolling the area one further month before heading for Callao, where they entered on 3 December 1813. Hillyar was to find three vessels at the anchorage, arrested under the charge of smuggling. Two of them were British, the *Hunter*, master V. Rapel, captured off Valparaiso, and the whaler *Hector*; the third was the North American *Boriska*, chartered by the British ambassador in Brazil to buy grain and flour "for the use of the combined armies in Portugal".⁵³

It was clear that trade could not be legally entertained with colonial ports, but as far Valparaiso was declared an open port by Chilean authorities and Britain

50.- Graham and Humphreys: 98-101.

51.- Graham and Humphreys: 149. Barry Gough, *The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1810-1914: A Study of British Maritime Ascendancy*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1971: 16-24.

52.- During this time a lieutenant and two men drowned, when the launch in which they were sailing up river Tumbes capsized.

53.- The *Hunter* was captured by the *Vulture* or *Primer Cantabria*, Captain Domingo Arellano. The *Hector* was seized by the brig *Santa Teresa*, captain Juan Villa. The *Boriska* was captured by a privateer under the command of Domingo de Amezaga [Hillyar to Croker, 23/12/1813 and Hillyar to Abascal, 10/12/1813: enclosed with Dixon to Croker, *Aquilon*, Rio de Janeiro, 16/4/1814, ADM 1/22. Puente (1975) I: 159]

and Spain were allies, Hillyar found proper to intervene in the protection of these vessels. Following his instructions, which specified that if he found

“any reprisals to have been made of British Vessels or their Cargoes by Spanish Privateers or Guarda Costas, or by the authorities of their Ports (...) You are to inquire the cause thereof and to do your utmost by conciliation, to have them restored, according to the Laws subsisting between the two Nations”,⁵⁴

Hillyar wrote a letter to Abascal, on December 10, and talked to him at least twice, one on the *Phoebe*, three days later; and the other one at Lima Palace. The British captain was very confident about his intervention, even to write to the Admiralty saying that “I have many personal influence with his Excellency”, but despite that assumption, Abascal restrained himself from interfering by arguing that the ships’ trial was out of his jurisdiction, under the local Naval Court. To reinforce his assertion, Abascal asked Spanish Navy Captain José Pascual de Vivero, President of that court, to give guarantees of a fair trial, which were provided on the 17th of that month.⁵⁵

This kind of official response to British captains interventions became the general rule in the following years, making difficult to them to go further on their claims. However, as the local Naval Court was under the presidency of the Commander of Callao Naval Department, its almost invariable failed in favour of Spanish naval vessels and privateers. Moreover, even when Callao Naval Department had its own jurisdiction, the Viceroy had a great influence on it, and it was unlikely that any Spanish naval captain will act against his will. In general terms, this was a fine setting to avoid any political compromise from the Viceroy himself. British captains realized that soon, and in the following years several

54.- Graham and Humphreys: 98-101.

55.- Hillyar to Croker. 23/12/1813. Vivero to Hillyar. 17/12/1813. and Abascal to Hillyar. 16/12/1813; enclosed with Dixon to Croker. *Aquilon*, Rio de Janeiro 16/4/1814, ADM 1/22.

suggestions were made to the Admiralty to put some political pressure to change that system.

But beyond legal frames, it was clear that foreigners were not welcome to Peru, especially if they tried to compete with local merchants, represented by the powerful Consulado del Comercio. After independence, both groups pressed on the Peruvian government to obtain either a protectionism or a liberal policy on foreign trade. This struggle will last for several decades, with some up and downs in the period covered by this research, until the 1850s, when the latter were able to gain enough local support to emerge as the winner of this economic contest.⁵⁶

Back to the *Phoebe* and the *Cherub*, in January 1814 they left Callao for Valparaíso, where the *Essex* and the *Essex Junior* were finally found. After some minor incidents in the anchorage, the British ships sailed and remained off the port, to prevent the escape of their enemies.⁵⁷ Six weeks later, on 28 March, the *Essex* tried to make her way out of the port, being forced by the British ships to present combat still at neutral waters. After a gallant defence, in which casualties were severe in both sides, the *Essex* was defeated. The *Essex Junior*, neutralised by an agreement between Porter and Hillyar, sailed in the following weeks to the United States with the prisoners.⁵⁸

The attack of the British men-of-war clearly attempted against Chilean neutrality, and according to Captain Porter's journal, the Governor of Valparaíso refused to attend a request to fire the port batteries in defense of the *Essex*, but promised to intercede if she was able to make their way to the anchorage.⁵⁹ Obviously, Captain Hillyar considered far more risky to allow the *Essex* gaining

56.- Paul Gootenberg, "The Social Origins of Protectionism and Free Trade in Nineteenth-Century Lima", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 14 (November 1982), Cambridge University: 329-358.

57.- Graham and Humphreys: 132-133.

58.- Gough (1971): 17-18. C.S. Forester, *The Naval War of 1812*, London, 1957: 184-187. Graham and Humphreys: 141-142.

59.- Clayton, 60-61.

open sea than the Chilean reaction. On the other hand, Chilean authorities were not willing to get involved in that war, specially against the British, which already were their most important commercial partners.

By this time, Chile was still under control of the Patriots. Carrera had been deposed and the government entrusted to General Francisco de la Lastra, backed by the influential patriot leader Bernardo O'Higgins. Abascal's initial hopes were for a peaceful settlement of the Chilean affair, however, in January 1813 he realized that only military action could succeed in re-establishing the loyalist order there. Consequently, a military expedition was sent under Brigadier Pareja. After his defeat in Chillan, a second expedition was preparing to sail from Callao, under General Gainza, when the *Phoebe* and *Cherub* visited that port, in December 1813. During the visit done by Hillyar to the Viceroy, he was asked by Abascal to intercede with the Chilean government to avoid further bloodshed. As a similar invitation was made by the newly established Chilean government, the British Captain went to Santiago to meet General Lastra; and after that, to Talca, where General Gainza and the loyalist troops were already present. His negotiation ended when both generals subscribed to the treaty of Lircay, in May 1814. By this treaty, most of the conditions before February 1810 were re-established in return for accepting some autonomy for Chile and open trade. However, as the Patriots in Chile were already involved in a civil war, between Carrera and O'Higgins, and the loyalist troops were to be withdrawn from that territory, Abascal repudiated the treaty and sent more troops under Brigadier Mariano Osorio. Finally, the Patriots were defeated in Rancagua, 1-2 October 1814, and the colonial order was restored. Without foreseen how little effect Lircay's treaty would have, Hillyar left Valparaiso for Rio de Janeiro late in May, sailing in company with his prize.⁶⁰

60.- Abascal II: 174-175. Graham and Humphreys: 141-143. Ricardo Montaner Bello, *Historia Diplomática de la Independencia de Chile*, Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1961: 20-21. Germán Leguía y Martínez, *Historia de la Emancipación del Perú: el Protectorado*, Lima, Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario, 1972, I: 237-240. Martínez II: 223-225.

Hillyar's intervention in the Chilean conflict and the settlement obtained in Lircay, was then recognized both by the Viceroy and by the Chilean government, as well as the British one. However, when in 1818 Chile reached a definitive independence, its new government accused Hillyar of inducing their previous leaders to accept a treaty with conditions which were contrary to their principles.⁶¹

Having fulfilled his mission and captured his main opponent in the Pacific, Hillyar returned to Rio de Janeiro, while Captain Tucker, of the *Cherub*, sailed to Callao in April and afterward to the Sandwich Islands, where he remained for two months searching for enemy vessels, before returning to Valparaiso.⁶²

Meanwhile in Britain, the news of the *Essex* cruise on the Pacific had produced a strong reaction from those involved in the Southern whale-fishery. Pressure was put on the Admiralty for more protection, and therefore, in November 1813, Admiral Dixon was commanded to send round the Cape two additional frigates and one sloop, with this sole object. The *Tagus*, Captain Philip Pipon,⁶³ was the first to be sent to the Pacific, reaching Valparaiso in April 1814. She was followed, one month later, by the *Briton*, Captain Sir Thomas Staines.⁶⁴

These two ships were to relieve Hillyar's squadron "for the protection of the southern whale-fishery", patrolling the same area all around the year except in March and April, when the grounds move south and eastwards (laying between 38° S to 48° S and from 10 to 50 leagues off shore). Both captains were instructed to take fresh supplies and water from western ports, and a special mention was made to take every care not to get involved in political affairs. They also were to give

61.- Croker to Dixon, *London*, 26/9/1814. ADM 2/934. *Archivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins*, (quoted onwards as O'Higgins), Santiago, Archivo Nacional, 1946-1953, III: 48.

62.- Graham and Humphreys: 147-148. ADM 51/2206.

63.- Pipon joined the Navy in 1792. Captain since 1808, commanding the *Tagus*, and in company with the *Niger*, he captured the French frigate *Ceres*, off Cape Verde Islands [Marshall Sup. 1].

64.- Staines (1776-1830) joined the Navy in 1790. Captain in 1806 [Marshall Sup. 1].

assistance to those British seamen landed by Captain Porter in several American ports.⁶⁵

In Valparaiso, first the *Tagus* and later the *Briton*, found the *Phoebe* and her prize, sailing for Callao in June. At a request of the Chilean government, and considering that such an attitude will not compromise British neutrality, they took “on board a number of the Loyalist party, who had been prisoners in Chile”. This was the first British intervention in exchange of prisoners during the wars of independence. In most of these sort of cases they were regarded by both parties as an humanitarian task, but eventually this exchange was used by one of them to take advantage from the other, placing British captains in an embarrassing situation. We will come back to this issue latter on, when dealing with Peruvian independence itself.

The *Tagus* and the *Briton* had a pleasant ten days stay at Callao, receiving “frequent visits from the Limenians” and making “frequent parties to the great city”. Having completed supplies for a long cruise at the whaling grounds, both men-of-war departed Callao by late-June. After calling in northern ports, they sailed westwards, to Otaheti and Marques Islands. On their way back to Valparaiso, they struck in Pitcairn Island, discovering there the last survivor of the *Bounty*’s mutineers. At the Chilean port, they found the *Cherub* and the *Racoon*, as well as fresh instructions from Admiral Dixon, commanding Captain Staines to remain in the Pacific pending new orders, rather than return to the Atlantic after the six month period initially stated.⁶⁶

The *Racoon*, after meeting the *Isaac Todd* in San Francisco, visited New Albion, the Sandwich and Society Islands, and finally arrived at Callao in August 1814. She was to remain forty days at this port, receiving supplies, naval stores and

65.- Dixon to Staines; enclosed with Dixon to Croker, *La Ceres* Rio de Janeiro, 30/3/1814, ADM 1/22. Graham and Humphreys: 128-129.

66.- Graham and Humphreys: 147-148. ADM 51/2184. John Shillibeer, *A Narrative of the Briton's voyage to Pitcairn's Island*, London, Law & Wittaker, 1817: 22-23.

repairing her hull with the help of carpenters and caulkers from the Naval Station, “to proceed round the Cape during the summer months”. On her way to Rio de Janeiro, the *Racoon* entered Valparaiso to receive some bullion to be convoyed to Britain.⁶⁷

By late-November, the *Briton* and the *Tagus* departed Valparaiso for Callao, to be closer to the whaling grounds and to make some repairs with the help of the Naval Station. They remained at this port for almost two months, time enough for their officers to establish good relationships with Limenians, specially with the ladies, as the relevant accounts pointed out. Regarding this point, should be mentioned a funny incident involving two young officers of the *Briton*, who were detained when attempting to pay a nocturnal visit to Miss Ramona Abascal, the Viceroy’s daughter. On the other hand, in a more serious aspect, another officer of the *Briton*, Lieutenant Shillibeer, bought a bundle of documents belonging to the Inquisition. It seems that the seller was William Bennet Stevenson, an Englishman who lived in Lima since 1804, and when a mob sacked the Inquisition in 1812, he bough some documents taken from its archives. These papers contained “chiefly allegations against the Friars for libertinism, and immorality, and even of offering violence to women to when they had been called as spiritual confessors”.⁶⁸

The last vessel to be commissioned to the Pacific in this time was the *Indefatigable*, Captain John Fyffe,⁶⁹ who reached Valparaiso by Late-January 1815. As very little enemy activity was expected, she remained as the sole British man-of-war on that coast until January 1816. The *Indefatigable* visited Callao twice, in June and September. On her first arrival at that port, the local Spanish

67.- Black to Croker, *Racoon*, Lima, 30/8/1814; enclosed with Dixon to Croker, *Cherub*, Rio de Janeiro, 24/12/1814, ADM 1/22. Staines to Dixon, *Briton*, Valparaiso, 9/11/1814, ADM 1/22. ADM 51/2765.

68.- Stevenson I: 229-230, 268-270. Shillibeer: 126-127.

69.- Promoted to Captain in 1807 [Marshall, Op. Cit.]

authorities learned that the government of Buenos Aires had commissioned up to four privateers (*Hércules*, *Ospot*, *Constitución* and *Trinidad*), to cruise on the West Coast. On her second visit, after being patrolling the whaling grounds, Fyffe obtained some supplies and local support to have her hull caulked.⁷⁰

The war with United States had already ended more than a year before by the treaty of Ghent, signed on 24 December 1814. Since Britain no longer had a reason to keep a man-of-war on the West Coast of America, and since the trade in that region was not fully allowed, no relief was sent for the *Indefatigable*. The small number of British merchants still trading in Valparaíso, after the defeat of the Patriots, complained about that decision, feeling that the privateering campaign inaugurated by the Buenos Aires government could affect their interest. However, their appeal found no response.⁷¹

The period that closed with Fyffe's withdrawal had comprising several important situations in the West Coast of South America. An international war was fought in these waters; the first Chilean attempt to become independent failed to resist the reaction of Abascal; and the Patriots from Buenos Aires were sending forces through Alto Peru, and preparing a privateer campaign against the Peruvian Viceroyalty. The latter, under the strong hand of Abascal, remained as the cornerstone of the Spanish colonial system in South America, sending forces to fight the Patriots to almost everywhere. However, the next few years would involve substantial changes in that situation. They began in December 1815, with the Buenos Aires' privateering campaign, followed by General Jose de San Martin campaign in Chile, initiated in January 1816. The final defeat of the Loyalist, in Chacabuco, in February 1817, would allow the return of British trade to Chilean ports, and therefore an increasing importance of Valparaíso, which soon became

70.- ADM 51/2463.

71.- Marshall Supplement: Staines.

the busiest port on the West Coast. With this expansion of British interest, under the stress of privateers from both parties, it was only a matter of time before British warships were again commissioned in the Pacific.

In a broad sense, the period covered since the creation of the South America Station until January 1816, shown a growing but still incipient British commercial interest on the West Coast. The Admiralty's response to it was to commission a squadron to operate on the Pacific to protect their whaling-fishery during the war with the United States. Rear-Admiral Smith and Captain Fleeming's intervention in internal South American affairs provided a valuable lesson to the Admiralty, who from thence onwards provide more precise instructions to those captain send round Cape Horn to serve on the Pacific. The case of Captain Hillyar was rather different, since he acted by invitation of both parties. But the reaction of the Chilean government after 1818, prevented other British captains to adopt such a degree of personal commitment.

British captains interventions on protecting British vessels captured by colonial authorities were totally unsuccessful during this time, but this result could not be blamed to them, as Viceroy Abascal was determined to enforce existing legislation, which clearly forbade any foreign trade. In the next few years, the attitude adopted by colonial authorities became more permissive, and consequently British captains succeeded on their claims.

CHAPTER TWO

The War of Independence (1816-1826)

The struggle for Peruvian independence came through several moments in respect of its maritime aspects. Initially, patriots from Rio de la Plata and Chile armed a privateering campaign against Peruvian maritime trade. This menace was considerably increased when the newly constituted Chilean Squadron gained control of the western coast of South America. Finally, while the military campaign was conducted in Peruvian territory, a national squadron was formed to finish with any loyalist resistance on the sea.

In this context, and taking into consideration the growing number of neutral vessels aiming to sustain trade with loyalist or patriots, both sides established a number of blockades upon the coast controlled by the opposite. In general terms, these measures were far from the normal usage on European maritime war, and consequently a number of incidents arose with neutral vessels, most of them British.

The South American Naval Station sent a squadron to the Pacific shortly after the final liberation of Chile, with clear and precise instructions not to compromise British neutrality in the war between Spain and its colonies. Beyond those difficulties related to operating a naval force without a base facility, there were a number of reasons which make this task more complicated. We are going to analyse them later in the text, but in general terms we can identify the following ones:

- a) For most of this time, British captains were the sole British authority along the West Coast of America, and therefore had to exert a great deal of autonomy, some times beyond the instructions given by the Commander-in-Chief;
- b) During the war, the patriot party gained esteem amongst British naval officers and, in spite of incidents with Lord Cochrane and some other former British naval officers in the patriot service, they began to support the patriots with some secrecy;
- c) The attitude of local authorities changed accordingly to the development of the war;
- d) The number of naval vessels destined to the Pacific was not enough to satisfy the increasing demands of protection first from British merchants and afterwards from consular agents;
- e) Transport of bullion represented a temptation not only for British captains but also for British and local merchants to act illegally;
- f) Finally, during this period, two former enemies, the United States and France, sent naval squadrons to be stationed on the Pacific for the protection of their national interest.

Privateers in the South Pacific (1816-1818)

San Martin's triumph over the royalists at Chacabuco, on 12 February 1817, albeit not decisive, brought many important changes to the West Coast of South America. With central Chile liberated, and the defeated Spanish army under siege in Talcahuano and Concepción, a government was established in Santiago with Bernardo O'Higgins as Supreme Director *ad interim*. Amongst the first measures adopted by his government, were the re-opening of Chilean ports to foreign trade, bringing to Valparaiso an increasing number of British ships. Initially from Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, and later directly from England, they began to arrive, glutting the port's stores "with every description of goods and wares".⁷²

The Chilean economy, as O'Higgins and San Martin clearly understood, relied basically on this trade, and every effort was to be made to keep it running. As long as the Spanish squadron based in Callao was in control of the sea, those

72.- Samuel Haig, *Sketches of Buenos Ayres, Chile, and Peru*, London, Effingham Wilson, 1831: 253.

vessels engaged in the trade were under threat; consequently, it became absolutely necessary to built up a navy capable to protect the trade. Moreover, both patriot leaders also realized that it was necessary to destroy the loyalist stronghold in South America to avoid any further reaction and to secure the already achieved independence. In this sense, the Chilean Navy-to-be should also defeat the Spanish squadron and support the subsequent landing of an army in Peru. The weakness of the Spanish Navy after Trafalgar would help this achievement. It was only a matter of time, as one of the commissioners who visited South America on behalf of the United States government between 1817 and 1819 stated, “Peru must soon follow the condition of Chile, the power of Spain once annihilated in this quarter, can never be restored; she can only send troops round Cape Horn (an enterprise beyond her strength)”.⁷³

As happened in 1811, as soon as the news of Chacabuco reached Lima, the Peruvian Viceroy decided to fight back Chilean independence once again, this time by focusing his effort to annoy the Chilean economy, based almost solely on foreign trade. As already mentioned, it only could be protected by the naval force which the Chilean government had to build up very quickly, but in the meantime something had to be done. As most of that trade was carried by British vessels, San Martin considered that he could obtain a certain degree of involvement from Commodore William Bowles,⁷⁴ senior officer of the British South America Station, who knew San Martin from his previous two-year service in Rio de la Plata (1813-1814). For this reason, a few days after the battle of Chacabuco, he wrote a friendly letter to Bowles, inviting him to come round the Cape to discuss some important points, and stating that “an interview between us would contribute very much to the welfare of this country, and I hope if it is in your power we shall have

73.- Henry Marie Brackenridge, *South America. A letter of the Present State of that country, addressed to James Monroe, President of the United States*, London, Ridgeway & Booth, 1818: 34.

74.- Bowles (1780-1869) entered the navy in 1796. Admiral in 1869 [Graham and Humphreys: 158].

one". Moreover, San Martín suggested "that some British ships-of-war should come to these seas, as much for the protection of your commerce as for the advantages which would result from their presence".⁷⁵

Quite aware that such an attitude would affect British neutrality, Bowles replied very politely to San Martín, letting him know that it was impossible for him to depart Rio de la Plata at that moment. In the following months, a number of British merchant vessels were detained by Spanish naval vessels and privateers, convincing Bowles that the West Coast was likely to become a very unsafe place for British shipping. However, he was unable to sail round the Cape until the second half of the year, when additional men-of-war would arrive at the Station. Meanwhile, Bowles' action was restricted to explaining to the merchants involved the risk in this trade and his own limitations to provide assistance if required. Despite his advice, by late May "several valuable English ships have nevertheless been dispatched for Valparayso".⁷⁶

As was expected by the newly established Chilean government, on 15 March 1817, Peruvian Viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela retaliated by proclaiming a blockade of all the ports in Chile and Peru, except Colan, Callao and the island of Santa María. Pezuela had three main maritime problems: the blockading itself against the Patriots in Chile; the defence against privateers from Buenos Aires and Chile; and finally, the control of the illegal trade, mainly carried out by British and North American vessels.

The Spanish squadron at Callao, already engaged in the pursuit of enemy privateers and in the transport of troops to Arica and Talcaguano, consisted of five vessels, as follows: 34-gun frigate *Venganza*, 34-gun frigate *Esmeralda*, 26-gun sloop *Sebastiana*, 16-gun brig *Potrillo*, and 18-gun brig *Pezuela*.⁷⁷ They were

75.- Graham and Humphreys: 191.

76.- Graham and Humphreys: 196.

77.- José Gregorio Paredes, *Almanaque Peruano y Guía de Forasteros para el año de 1818*. Lima 1817.

clearly too small a number to cover all that extended coast properly. Economic reasons contributed to making their task more difficult, and only after a long delay, Captain Tomás Blanco Cabrera, with the *Venganza*, the *Potrillo*, and the *Sebastiana*, was able to leave Callao to blockade Valparaíso. On his arrival there, late in October 1817, six months after the blockade had been proclaimed, he found that a large number of foreign vessels, principally British, were already at the port. Amongst the ships lying in the anchorage was H.M.S. *Amphion*, with Commodore Bowles on board, who had finally been able to come to the West Coast. Despite Blanco's efforts to carry out his mission, in the following days four British merchant ships entered and another three left the port, without being able to intercept them.⁷⁸ His only success during these days was the capture of the *Mary Ann*, with some compromising papers on board.⁷⁹

The third problem which Viceroy Pezuela had to cope with, was contraband. As the available Spanish naval force was insufficient to prevent it, new regulations, published on 6 November 1817, authorized the use of privateers for this purpose. Both the blockade and the use of privateering to enforce revenue laws deserves a more detailed analysis.

In the first case, Pezuela was blockading not only enemy ports but also his own ports, giving no official notice of this measure to foreign countries since it was considered an internal affair and no foreign trade was allowed there. These were the reasons outlined by Pezuela to Bowles on his arrival at Callao, in November 1817. Bowles' reply was cautious but energetic, pointing out that the issue would be forwarded to his government, and asking for a reasonable period of grace for those vessels coming from Europe. He argued that British ships, in spite of Spanish legislation, should be allowed to trade with Chile, since the ports of that country were already open to foreign trade. To illustrate his complaint, he argued that the

78.- Graham and Humphreys: 211-214.

79.- Blanco Cabrera to Antonio Vacaro, *Venganza*, Valparaíso, 2/2/1818: enclosed with Vacaro to Secretario de Marina, Callao, 8/5/1818. AAB Expediciones a Indias, leg. 63.

Mary Ann, was detained “upon no pretence that I can understand, except that she was attempting to enter a port in Chile the blockade of which had not at that time been either declared or notified”.⁸⁰ This argument contains a tacit recognition of Chilean independence, and it reflects, to some extent, the Admiralty’s point of view concerning British commerce in the Pacific. Nevertheless, as Bowles realized that the main issue was not the blockade itself, but the “Leyes de Indias” (Spanish laws concerning its colonies in America), he refrained from “venture on debating without positive instruction” from the Admiralty.⁸¹ Some months later, at Valparaiso, Bowles reached a provisional agreement with Captain Blanco Cabrera, Senior Officer of the Spanish blockading squadron. According to it, British merchant vessels “shall not be molested, but are merely to be warned off, agreeably to established custom, and considered at full liberty to proceed for any other destination”.⁸² The circumstances in which this agreement was reached will be explained later on, but at this stage it should be mentioned that, despite being disapproved of by Viceroy Pezuela, it provided a couple of months of tranquillity for British shipping heading to the West Coast of South America.

Despite the insistence of Britain, and the eventual permission given to some merchants, Spanish American ports remained officially closed to foreign trade. As the Patriots succeeded in other parts of the continent, opening more ports to foreign shipping and fitting out privateers to destroy the seaborne trade based in Callao, the Peruvian economy became isolated. Consequently, a more liberal interpretation of the “Leyes de Indias” became necessary to avoid a total collapse, and finally Callao was opened discreetly to foreign trade. However, when Bowles reached this port, Peruvian shipping was still unaffected and therefore the prohibition of foreign trade was enforced with great energy. Less than one year later, the situation would be rather different.

80.- Graham and Humphreys: 211-214.

81.- Graham and Humphreys: 196-199.

82.- Graham and Humphreys: 220-221.

In respect to the use of privateers to enforce revenue laws, it should be taken into account that merchant vessels could be commissioned as naval vessels only in time of war and to fight with another power. Bowles also realized that and, without complaining to Pezuela, informed the Admiralty.⁸³ Despite these considerations, it became clear that Pezuela was adopting the only possible course of action, since its own restrictions to establish a proper blockade encouraged illegal trade. On the other hand, smuggling was not only a threat to the legal trade but was also helping the spread of liberal ideas through books and proclamations.

As was already mentioned, Bowles finally entered Callao in November 1817, finding at the anchorage four British ships under arrest. Two of them, the *Justinian*, Thomas Patrick owner and master, and the *Will*, F. Heartley master, sailed from Buenos Aires to Valparaiso, late in 1816, on the strength of a royal order issued by the Spanish King two years before, on 3 September 1814, “authorising Spanish loyalists in a rebellious colony to proceed with their property by any possible means to a loyal colony”.⁸⁴ Furnished with a letter from Bowles to Field-Marshal Francisco Marco del Pont, Spanish President of Chile, the *Justinian* entered Valparaiso with a single Spanish passenger and more than 200,000 dollars worth of goods. As four North American vessels were allowed to land part of their cargo prior to the *Justinian*’s arrival, Patrick was also authorized to discharge. Unfortunately, before this could be completed, news of the defeat at Chacabuco reached the port, which was soon involved in great confusion, with troops and loyalists fleeing from the patriot’s advance. In these circumstances, the *Justinian* was confiscated, and sent to Callao with evacuee troops, reaching this port on 9 March 1817. Her case was brought to the Prize Court, as having entered Valparaiso with the main purpose of trade, but on 1 May, before the sentence could be proclaimed, she was sold and armed as a privateer. To make Patrick’s

83.- Graham and Humphreys: 218.

84.- Graham and Humphreys: 215.

situation more complicated, the cargo landed at Valparaiso, valued at 202,008 dollars, was confiscated by the patriots on entering the port.⁸⁵

The *Will*, F. Heartley master, furnished with a similar letter from Bowles to Marco del Pont, reached Valparaiso on 1 January 1817 with eight Spaniards on board. Nevertheless, it seems that the master landed part of his cargo without proper permission, and consequently the ship was arrested a few days later. Heartley and his crew were landed and the ship used as powder depot from 25 January until the evacuation of the port after Chacabuco. On 1 March, she entered Callao with 250 evacuee troops on board. Heartley managed to reach Callao in a French merchant vessel, and after forty-five days of complaint and representation, was allowed to come on board to attend to the maintenance of the ship.⁸⁶

The other two British ships found by Bowles at Callao were the already mentioned *Mary Ann* of London, master Edward Hadaway; and the whaler *Hydra* of Plymouth, master Laban Russell. The former had been captured by the *Venganza*, on 24 October 1817, when she tried to enter Valparaiso. Officially, the *Mary Ann* was bound for New Holland, but papers on board identified Valparaiso as her real destination. Sent to Callao, she was condemned and her cargo sold for 89,134 pesos, for attempting to “to enter Valparaiso without an urgent cause, and having goods on board”.⁸⁷ The *Hydra* was captured at Tumbes river, where she entered to buy supplies after being at sea for more than five months. Following the usual practice of British and North American whalers fishing in the Galapagos grounds, the master paid for his provisions with some old clothes, old iron, oil, “slop clothes (...) earthen ware” and other trifling goods. Unfortunately for him, he

85.- *Justinian's* case, enclosed with Bowles to Croker, *Amphion*, Callao, 28/11/1817, ADM 1/23.

86.- *Will's* case, enclosed with Bowles to Croker, *Amphion*, Buenos Aires, 21/6/1817; and Callao, 28/11/1817, ADM 1/23.

87.- Jones: 257. Joaquín de la Pezuela, *Memoria de Gobierno del Virrey Joaquín de la Pezuela*, Sevilla, Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos, 1947: 179-180, 268. Graham and Humphreys: 214-217.

was denounced, and his vessel was captured by the privateers *Cleopatra* and *Tagle*. The crew was taken on board the privateers and the *Hydra* was sent to Callao, arriving on 25 October. At this port, the Tribunal de Presas ordered her release on 16 December, but all the money and goods on board which could not be proved to have come from Britain were confiscated. Russell, the master, declared that 20 doubloons in gold, and 533 dollars in silver, were the balance in his favour of the goods he sold at Tumbes, but 2,113 dollars, and 23 watches, were also found on board.⁸⁸

Bowles interceded for the first two of these ships, succeeding with the *Will*, which was finally returned to her owner on 17 January 1818, after being partially repaired and allowed to take some cargo on board as compensation.⁸⁹ The circumstances in which the other two vessels had been captured deprived them of Bowles' protection, as he realized that they had been acting unlawfully. These kinds of problems would increase in the following months, with some British skippers trying hard to trade with local merchants, while Spanish authorities enforced colonial laws, which banned such a trade. Strictly speaking, the latter had the right to detain any unauthorized neutral vessel attempting to trade along the western coast of South America, however, some failures on the establishment of blockades and on the procedures following the detention of a British vessel, would allow British captains to intervene. In these cases, they would conduct themselves very much in the line of Bowles in 1817, considering first if they were not acting against current legislation.

This legislation ascertained that any vessels detained under suspicion of contraband or by violating a blockade, should be judged by the Prize Court. As

88.- Pezuela to Bowles, 25/11/1817 and *Hydra*'s case: enclosed with Bowles to Croker, *Amphion* Callao, 28/11/1817; & at sea, 4/1/1818, ADM 1/23. Julio F. Guillén, *Independencia de América. Índice de los papeles de Expediciones de Indias. 1807-1837*, Madrid, Instituto de Historia Naval, 1953: note 3921. Pezuela: 160.

89.- Pezuela: 633. Pezuela to Bowles, enclosed with Bowles to Croker, *Amphion* at sea, 4/1/1818, ADM 1/23.

head of a maritime department, comprising the West Coast of South America, Callao housed that local version of the Admiralty Court. This tribunal differed from British courts in its composition, being under the presidency of the Commander of the Naval Station and was composed of naval officers rather than lawyers. Their decision had to be submitted for approval to the Viceroy, and therefore it was affected by many external elements. When a foreign vessel became involved in a trial, very few lawyers offered their services to defend it, and even when one was finally accepted by the Court, he was subject to much pressure to act according to due form. As foreign trade was forbidden in Spanish America, no consular agent was present at Peru, and only two Britons were living in Lima at that time. Bowles realized that, reporting to the Admiralty that "the masters of the vessels, alike ignorant of the language and laws, suffer themselves to fall into the hands of designing persons, who betray them into declarations of which advantage is then taken for their ruin".⁹⁰ He considered that the main reason for this unfair treatment by the Tribunal was the generalized animosity to foreigners in Peru, and suggested to the Admiralty, that some pressure should be put on the Spanish government for "the amelioration of the Spanish prize courts, and -for- the establishment of some commercial agent" in Lima.⁹¹

On his arrival at Callao, Bowles was taken on board the *Amphion* Sergeant Major Domingo Torres, as an emissary of San Martin and O'Higgins to Pezuela. He also carried two letters addressed to the Viceroy by both the Patriot leaders. In this way, he was the first British captain to use his vessel to transport emissaries or messages from one side to the other, a policy which was also followed by North Americans and eventually French Captains. It is difficult to say whether he was compromising British neutrality with such an attitude, as far as it could be expected from a neutral power, however, as happened in this particular case, most of these

90.- Graham and Humphreys: 216.

91.- Idem.

emissaries used neutral warships to conduct intelligence activity. Were British, North American or French captains already aware of such a situation? It is difficult to provide an answer to this question, but as far as British captains became more sympathetic to the patriots, it could be suspected there was a certain degree of complicity.

The *Amphion* arrived in Callao at the time when General Osorio's expedition was preparing to sail to attempt the reconquest of Chile, Pezuela became suspicious of Torres' presence and Bowles' well-known friendly relationship with San Martin. For this reason, Bowles was asked to either remain in port for a fortnight after the departure of the expedition, or to leave within 24 hours. Taking into account the purpose of his mission, Bowles decided to remain in port. Pezuela, whose suspicion of British support for the Patriots was increasingly strong, distrusted Bowles' promise and ordered the Governor of Callao to prevent his escape by use of the artillery of the forts if necessary. On the other hand, Torres was confined to the fort of Santa Catalina, in Lima, to prevent him making contact with local Patriots. However, he succeeded in this part of his mission, and returned with valuable information for San Martin concerning the expedition which was being prepared to liberate Peru.⁹²

Fulfilling Bowles' promise to Pezuela, the *Amphion* only set sail for Valparaiso on December 19, ten days after General Osorio's expedition left Callao. On board was Sergeant Major Torres, who would be transhipped to the Spanish man-of-war *Venganza*, since Pezuela insisted on the most strict respect for the blockade for part of the *Amphion*, to a point that both captains had to agree to land "one launch manned by British and Spanish seamen to pick up one officer and 18 sailors, who were landed as sick at Valparaiso".⁹³ All these precautions failed when

92.- Pezuela: 183-184, 186-189.

93.- Blanco Cabrera to Vacaro, *Venganza*, Valparaíso, 2/2/1818; enclosed with Vacaro to Secretario de Marina, Callao 8/5/1818, AAB Expediciones a Indias, leg. 63. Pezuela: 200-201.

no Spanish naval vessel was found sustaining the blockade at the arrival of the *Amphion*, having been called by the Governor of Talcaguano to help in the defence of that place. Feeling that this circumstance liberated him from the promise made to the Viceroy, Bowles entered the port. As the Spanish squadron reappeared off the port a few days later, the very day when San Martin was visiting his ship, Bowles was placed in a difficult dilemma, having to choose between leaving the port “appearing to abandon the British trade which looked up to me for protection” or remain “infringing the acknowledged rights of a belligerent power”. He decided to remain. Two weeks later, the second U.S. man-of-war entering the Pacific, frigate *Ontario*, Captain James Biddle, arrived from Rio de Janeiro with judge John B. Prevost, a special agent of the U.S. government appointed to Chile and Peru. Prevented from entering the port by Captain Blanco Cabrera, Biddle replied that he was unaware of the blockade and, even when this measure already existed, neutral warships should not be included on it. Stating that he departed Rio de Janeiro with the full-knowledge of the Spanish Consul General at this port, and that his orders were to sail to Valparaiso and Callao to protect North American shipping along the West Coast, Biddle refused to accept the blockade for United States warships and made clear his intention to use force if necessary. Blanco, placed in the difficult position of either giving concessions or replying to Biddle’s arrogance by force, and taking into account Pezuela’s instructions dated 10 December 1817, which clearly mentioned not to compromise both nations, allowed the frigate to enter the port.⁹⁴

Bowles, learning of this incident, met Blanco on 30 January 1818, asking for similar a concession for British warships. The latter, after an amicable conference, and feeling himself forced by his first decision, agreed that British men-of-war “might enter and sail freely” from Valparaiso.⁹⁵ It is interesting to point out

94.- Blanco to Vacaro, *Venganza*, Valparaiso, 2/2/1818; enclosed with Vacaro to Secretario de Marina, Callao, 8/5/1818, AAB Expediciones a Indias, leg. 63.

95.- Blanco Cabrera to Bowles, Valparaiso, 30/1/1818, enclosed with Bowles to Croker. *Amphion* at sea, 10/2/1818, ADM 1/23. Graham and Humpireys: 219-224.

that Blanco was aware of Bowles' compromise with the Viceroy, since a packet boat dispatched by the latter arrived at Valparaiso a few days ahead the *Amphion*.⁹⁶

Being already aware that the detention of British merchant vessels was "not for attempting to infringe the blockade of Valparaiso, but for undertaking a voyage prohibited by the Spanish colonial laws", Bowles asked Blanco Cabrera for an additional concession. Arguing that no official notice was given before October 1817, "many English ships had been encouraged by the absence of any prohibition of this nature to sail with valuable cargoes for the ports of Chile", and consequently they should not be liable to detention. Taking into account Pezuela's instructions regarding foreign shipping, which clearly expressed not to detain any vessel unless war contraband was found on board, Blanco Cabrera accepted not to detain them but to warn them off. Notwithstanding, this concession did not include those foreign vessels already at Valparaiso.⁹⁷ A few days latter, Biddle met Blanco, and requested and obtained the same facilities for North American vessels.⁹⁸

As was already mentioned, Bowles considered that this provisional agreement provided two months of tranquillity for British shipping heading to the West Coast, time enough, either for another British man-of-war to be sent to the Pacific or for the Spanish squadron to abandon the blockade for some other reason. Two months later, the Spanish squadron was in fact defeated by the Chilean one, ending the blockade.⁹⁹

The attitude of all three captains, Spanish, British, and North American, reflected, to some extent, the way in which their countries and navies were to conduct themselves in the following years. The Spaniards, at the nadir of their

96.- Edward Baxter Billingsley, *In defence of neutral rights: The United States Navy and the Wars of Independence in Chile and Peru*, North Carolina U.P. 1967: 20-21.

97.- Blanco to Vacaro, *Venganza*, Valparaíso, 2/2/1818; enclosed with Vacaro to Secretario de Marina, Callao 8/5/1818. AAB Expediciones a Indias, leg. 63.

98.- Blanco to Vacaro, *Venganza*, Valparaíso, 6/3/1818; enclosed with Vacaro to Secretario de Marina, Callao, 8/5/1818, AAB Expediciones a Indias, leg. 63.

99.- Pezuela: 201, 227-228.

strength, were forced to accept conditions both from the British and from the North Americans. The North Americans were more activated by feelings of national pride, even when their attitude led to illegalities. The British conducted themselves more politely but finally obtained what they wanted for their trade, making good use of every opportunity to legalize their position.

When Bowles left Valparaiso, in February 1818, the economic activity of the port had increased considerably despite the blockade. A clear indication of this was the fact that a considerable number of British vessels entered or left the port since it was opened by the Chilean government, only one being captured by the blockading squadron. Another indication of this increase, more closely related to his own ship, was an unusually high number of deserters.¹⁰⁰

With first hand experience on what was happening on the Pacific coast of South America, Bowles asked the Admiralty for additional men-of-war to be commissioned to the South America Station. As a result of his petition, four ships were sent, two of them to be based on the West Coast, with precise instructions to observe the most strict neutrality in the conflict between Spain and her colonies, “abstaining from all political interference with the several parties”, protecting British shipping and prosecuting those British ships involved in piratical or illegal activities.¹⁰¹

The two naval vessels commissioned to the Pacific were the frigate *Andromache*, Captain William Henry Shirreff,¹⁰² and the sloop-of-war *Blossom*, Captain Frederick Hickey.¹⁰³ As senior officer of this squadron, Shirreff's

100.- ADM 51/2091. Gustavo Pons Muzzo (editor), “La Expedición Libertadora”, in *C.D.I.P.*, Lima 1971, t. VIII, vol 1: 334-335.

101.- Graham and Humphreys: 196-199. Admiralty minutes, London 9/6/1817; enclosed with Bowles to Croker. *Amphion*, Callao, 28/11/1817, ADM 1/23.

102.- Shirreff entered the navy in 1796. Appointed to the *Andromache* in September 1817. Rear-Admiral in 1846 [Graham and Humphreys: 230]

103.- Hickey entered the navy in 1787. Captain in 1814, and sent to the South American station in command of the *Blossom* [Graham and Humphreys: 268].

instructions gave particular attention to the provisional agreement signed by Bowles and Blanco Carrera, as it was the main legal argument likely to be used in protection of British trade. Foreseeing that Viceroy Pezuela had already disapproved of the agreement, Shirreff was to request a two months extension, to receive new instructions from Bowles.¹⁰⁴

When the British men-of-war entered Valparaiso, in May 1818, the Spanish squadron had already abandoned the blockade, while the loyalist army, under General Osorio, after a victory over San Martín in Cancha Rayada, was finally defeated in Maipo, early in April. No further complication was expected for the moment, and the only incident that arose following Bowles' departure occurred when the Chilean squadron attacked the Spanish one, on 26 April. During the action, the Chilean frigate *Lautaro*, Captain Jorge O'Brien, hoisted British colours to confuse the Spanish frigate *Esmeralda*, and some British regimental uniforms were also seen on board. Consequently, General Osorio complained to Hickey, on his arrival at Talcahuano, early in May, and the latter protested to the Chilean government.¹⁰⁵

Both the *Andromache* and the *Blossom* arrived at Callao in July. The latter remained only a few days, sailing afterwards to the Columbia river, but the former remained in port for almost a month. Shirreff brought with him more than twenty loyalists deported by the Chilean government, and certain letters addressed to the Viceroy by the Spanish ambassadors in London and in Rio de Janeiro. The British Captain visited Pezuela, and this courtesy was returned by the Viceroy's wife and

104.- Graham and Humphreys: 230-234.

105.- George O'Brien, a former Lieutenant in the *Phoebe*, was dismissed from the Royal Navy for disciplinary reasons. Captain in the Chilean Navy, he was killed during this combat. Some Chilean historians have suggested that the *Amphion* was at Valparaiso on the date of the combat, allowing the *Lautaro* to use British colours and to be painted as she was to confuse the Spanish warships [Rodrigo Fuenzalida Badé, *La Armada de Chile. Desde la alborada al sesquicentenario*, Santiago, 1978, I: 44-50].

daughter, who could hardly know that the same frigate would take them back to Europe two years later in very different circumstances.¹⁰⁶

The Peruvian seaborne trade and economy, eight months after Bowles' visit, was already being affected by privateers from Chile and Rio de la Plata, many of them manned by British and North American seamen and adventurers. The Spanish squadron, based in Callao, was seriously affected by this situation, being unable to attempt any decisive action to regain control of the Southern Pacific. In May 1818, the deficit in the Peruvian defence budget amounted to 117,000 pesos monthly, besides 200,000 pesos needed for the most urgent expenditures. To study and suggest possible solutions to this complex problem, Pezuela commissioned the "Junta de Arbitrios", the body responsible for taxation. Several ideas were discussed, and finally, in July, after prolonged debate, the opening of Callao to British trade was proposed to the Viceroy as the only possible way to reverse the economic decline. They suggested opening the port for a two-year period to vessels coming from Britain and Ireland, even if they called at Brazil or Chile. Goods imported by these ships were to be taxed according to a selective base, and masters were to present their cargo list 48 hours after arrival, or leave the port within six days. The master or supercargo would be allowed to stay and live in Lima as long as their business required, but not on a permanent basis and not by opening offices. They would have to designate an agent amongst the members of the Tribunal del Consulado, the body which represented merchants, traders, bankers and other active groups in the economic life of Lima. On the other hand, British merchants would be allowed to export gold and silver, on paying the normal rate.¹⁰⁷

106.- Pezuela: 285-293. Graham and Humphreys: 263-265. ADM 51/2131. Mariano Torrente. "Historia de la Revolución de la Independencia del Perú" en *C.D.I.P* t. XXVI, vol 4, Lima 1971: 190. Rubén Vargas Ugarte. *Historia General del Perú*, Lima. Milla Batres, 1996. VI: 112.

107.- Junta de Arbitrios' proposal: enclosed with Bowles to Croker, *Amphion*, Buenos Aires, 10/10 & 30/11/1818, ADM 1/24.

It is unlikely that Shirreff, whose arrival at Callao was quite opportune, was unaware of the proposal made by the Junta de Arbitrios, since during his conversations with Pezuela, he had suggested a similar plan. The Viceroy, already convinced that the opening of Callao was the only realistic way of obtaining resources to continue the war against the Patriots, needed to obtain the support of the Tribunal del Consulado before executing the idea. Pezuela found support for this proposal amongst the majority of this body, except the Gremio de Comercio (Chamber of Commerce) which congregated the most important merchants in Lima. They were firmly opposed to accept foreign trade in Peru, and having offered to contribute 117,000 pesos monthly for defence expenditure in a five-month period, any decision concerning the opening of the port was deferred for that period. However, amongst those members of the Tribunal who were in favour of the proposal were Pedro Abadía and Félix de Ochavarriague y Blanco, agents of the Compañía de Filipinas. They firmly believed that the merchants would be unable to fulfil their promise, and asked Shirreff to return to Callao when the time had elapsed. On the other hand, Pezuela promised to Shirreff that if the merchants failed to pay, he would open Callao for two years, exactly as proposed by the Junta de Arbitrios. As a demonstration of his sincerity, the Viceroy gave the British Captain a copy of this proposal.¹⁰⁸

The acceptance of this idea by Pezuela was the final step in a series of concessions made to foreign vessels which began even before Bowles' arrival, late in 1817. Officially, no permission could be granted for this trade, but in several cases foreign ships were authorized to land their goods. When Shirreff entered Callao, the presence of foreign vessels at the port was already a normal occurrence. Consequently, a small but growing British capital began to be invested in Lima.¹⁰⁹ Despite the fact that this trade was still illegal, the three following

108.- Graham and Humphreys: 248-250. Timothy E. Anna, *The fall of the Royal Government in Peru*, Lincoln, U. of Nebraska, 1979: 139-140.

109.- Anna (1979): 140-141. Puente (1975) II: 122-126.

events gave clear indication of how extensive it was. Firstly, in 1817, when the *Amphion* left Callao, she took treasure worth 20,000 pounds sterling on board, from British properties at Lima and Callao. Secondly, when the U.S. frigate *Ontario* entered Callao on her way from the Columbia river to Valparaíso, Captain Biddle was asked by Pezuela to take on board his emissaries to San Martín; one of them was the British merchant Thomas Crompton, whose main aim was not to negotiate the prisoner's exchange but to obtain intelligence both in that port and at Santiago. Finally, during this first stay of the *Andromache* at Callao, eight parcels of silver were received on board, being transhipped at Valparaíso to the *Tyne*, Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon,¹¹⁰ sent by Bowles from Rio with this sole purpose.¹¹¹

Captain Shirreff returned to Callao in November 1818, when the time given by the Viceroy to the Tribunal del Consulado had elapsed, and to support the opening of the port. As Abadía and Ochavarriague foresaw, the merchants had been unable to fulfil their promise, and on 29 January 1819 the Junta de Arbitrios, summoned again by the Viceroy, proposed the execution of the plan presented in July 1818, and requested that foreign vessels already in Callao were authorized to land their cargo. Pezuela, avoiding so decisive a step, accepted only the second suggestion, but assured Shirreff that British merchant ships would continue to be allowed to enter and trade at the port, according to the Junta de Arbitrios' proposal. The only explanation of this ambiguity can be found in Pezuela's intention not to place himself in total rupture of existing Spanish law. At least in this aspect of his administration, he tried to act pragmatically but still within the law, a difficult and sometimes impossible situation. In November 1819, when the proposal to open Callao to foreign trade was finally sent to Spain, it was too late to

110.- Falcon entered the navy in 1800. Appointed to the *Tyne* on June 1817. Rear-Admiral in 1848 [Graham and Humphreys: 265].

111.- ADM 51/2131. ADM 51/2880.

exert some practical effect to revert the situation.¹¹² Nonetheless, the Spanish government did not disapprove immediately Pezuela's decision to open the port to foreign trade. Only by late December 1819, Pezuela was instructed to close the port because an expedition was about to sail to Rio de la Plata.¹¹³

As might readily be supposed, Pezuela's decision was strongly criticized, especially by those local merchants who would be affected by loosing control of the market. Even today Lima is a city in which gossip is very easy to spread, and in 1819 the possibility of a Viceroy opening the port of Callao to British vessels provided enough elements to many tales referring to a commercial liaison between Pezuela and Shirreff. Concerning the latter, it was said that great care had to be taken with him "since he is a resolute enemy of America, and as his only wish is money, he will not stop to use his influence to allow for more vessels and goods coming in, and to carry the contraband authorized by Pezuela, who receives a percentage of this trade".¹¹⁴ We have found no proof to confirm those stories.

A rather different kind of opposition was found in Chile when the news of the tacit opening of Callao reached Valparaiso. It was argued that this trade would complicate the operations against the Peruvian Viceroyalty, providing it with economic resources to sustain the war and facilitating the contraband of war. Acting from this point of view, some patriots tried to persuade Shirreff to delay this agreement until the departure of the expedition to liberate Peru, which was planned to sail shortly.¹¹⁵ However, the opening of Callao to foreign shipping was not in Shirreff hands. His intervention on this issue was according with his instructions, which directed him to do everything possible to improve the security of British shipping along the west coast.

112.- Pezuela: 397-404. Anna (1979): 141. Lohmann (1972-1974) II: 46-50.

113.- José María de Alava to Pezuela, Madrid 30/12/1819, AAB Expediciones a Indias, leg 66, 1820 (enero).

114.- Pons 2: 355-357.

115.- Pons 2: 11.

Despite all this, Pezuela remained highly suspicious of British neutrality, and when in July 1818, he wrote in his diary that Shirreff sailed from Callao “against all my will, because I have so much experience of these English, who are less attached to us than to the insurgents, and always prejudicial to both, making more damage to us than to them”.¹¹⁶

Captain Shirreff was the first British captain to be involved in an exchange of prisoners as a humanitarian task. On his first arrival at Callao, in July 1818, Viceroy Pezuela agreed to that exchange and an equal number of patriots sailed on the British frigate to Chile. However, there were returned from Valparaíso because their ranks did not correspond with those initially sent.¹¹⁷ In his second visit to Callao, in November 1818, Shirreff conducted not only prisoners to be exchanged but also a proposal from San Martín to establish a system to administer the funds required by those prisoners who still remained both in Chile and Peru. In the following months, other neutral naval vessels became involved in this issue, helping to make less painful a war in which there were so many links amongst those who were actually fighting.

As happened to Bowles, Shirreff also had to deal with incidents referring to British merchant vessels detained by both parties. One of the more complicated of them was the case of the whaler *Inspector*, master John Duncan. She was confiscated on the Tumbes river, by orders of the Governor of Guayaquil and the local authorities, to chase the *Chileno*, a patriot privateer who had just captured the Peruvian vessel *Dolores*. Duncan refused an initial offer of 22,000 pesos for the use of his ship in this search, and also refused to accept the return of the ship when it was offered by the pilot in charge of the chase, named Eduardo Cano. He considered that he could only accept that return if the Governor of Guayaquil agreed to pay a suitable compensation, and he persisted in this opinion even when the

116.- Pezuela: 304-305. Pons I: 364.

117.- *Gazeta Ministerial de Chile* I, n° 75 (16/1/1819).

Chileno was sighted. Following a short fight, the whaler was captured and sent to Valparaiso. In the trial that followed, Duncan remained obstinate, refusing to defend himself, and despite Shirreff and Hackey's interventions, the *Inspector* was condemned as a good prize. Under the circumstances in which the British vessel was captured, no further complaint could be made to the Chilean government. Instead of that, and taking into consideration the intervention of loyalist authorities from Tumbes and Guayaquil, Shirreff wrote to Pezuela in protest. In his reply, the Viceroy could only indicate that he had given strict orders to avoid the repetition of incidents of this kind.¹¹⁸

When the *Andromache* entered Callao in November, it became known that the Chilean squadron, under Blanco Encalada, had left Valparaiso to intercept a Spanish convoy with troops coming from Cadiz.¹¹⁹ There is no evidence that Shirreff himself provided this sort of information. Instead of that, it is more likely that such kind of news could be spread by word of mouth either by the prisoners taken from Chile for exchange, or by some crew-member of his frigate. Up to this stage, Shirreff could not be blamed for acting against his neutral condition, but after a few months his attitude changed in favour of the patriots, providing first hand information to Admiral Lord Cochrane to respect Callao's defences.

The *Andromache* remained at Callao until February 1819, sailing for Valparaiso in company with the *Blossom* and the merchant vessel *Alexander*. On board the second were more than 3'000,000 pesos in treasure which "was sent out of Lima by wealthy Europeans". It seems that part of this treasure was shipped without paying duties, causing an energetic protest from Pezuela and the adoption of certain measures to watch over the British warships in the anchorage. However, in the enquiry ordered by the Viceroy, no proof was found against Shirreff or

118.- Irisarri to Shirreff, 21/9/1818; enclosed with Bowles to Croker, *Amphion*, Buenos Aires, 31/10/1818, ADM 1/24. Graham and Humphreys: 251.

119.- Jose A. de la Puente Candamo (editor), "Obra gubernativa y epistolario de San Martín" in *C.D.I.P.* t. XIII, Lima 1974-1976, vol. 1: 366-367. Pezuela: 380, 385.

Hickey, but certain British and Peruvian merchants from Lima were blamed.¹²⁰ This was the first incident involving British warships convoying treasure from Callao. In the following years another two events would contribute to Callao gaining a bad reputation in this particular respect. They involved the captains of the *Hyperion* and *Superb*, who were victims of fraud, and lost a large amount of money thereby.

During the three months when Shirreff was at Callao, an important event occurred in Chile: the arrival of Lord Thomas Cochrane to take the command of the Chilean squadron. Cochrane, the future Earl of Dundonald, was without doubt, one of the best frigate captains in the Royal Navy, but having been involved in a famous Stock Exchange scandal, in 1814, he was dismissed both from the Navy and from Parliament. Irascible, intrepid, and with an intense interest in money, he was to introduce an important and decisive factor to the war in the Pacific. With him in command of the Chilean Squadron, the recent permission given by Pezuela for British trade at Callao, might be threatened. In the following months, he would give clear proof that this fear was quite real.

Lord Cochrane as Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy. (1818-1822)

Until the second half of the Seventeenth Century Callao was the sole port of entrance for those goods coming from Spain to Peru, Alto Peru, Chile, and Rio de la Plata. With the opening of Buenos Aires and other ports, Callao's preponderance became threatened, forcing Peruvian shipowners and merchants to diversify their investments, exerting a greater control up on Chilean grain and Guayaquilean cacao. At the beginning of the Nineteen Century, Callao became the head of a newly established naval department, with jurisdiction from Panama to Chiloe. All these elements explained the importance of Callao as a maritime centre,

120.- Anna (1979): 146. Pons 2: 354.

with a considerable mercantile fleet and a number of related activities. This situation changed during the struggle for independence, bringing about the almost complete destruction of Peruvian shipping, and driving away those human and economic resources invested in maritime enterprises.

The immediate beneficiary was Valparaiso, which was opened to foreign trade several years before Callao, attracting a large number of merchants. Soon, the Chilean port was full of European goods, but that market was limited, and many of the foreign merchants trading there were really interested in what was supposedly the more profitable Peruvian market. In the years 1817 and 1818, as already mentioned, British ships began to trade with the latter market, replacing Peruvian and Chilean ships in the regular grain traffic, and re-exporting British goods from Chile at a higher price. Despite the benefits this trade could bring to those merchants involved, it had clear disadvantages to the Chilean war effort and was of direct benefit to Peru in preventing wartime shortages, providing a cover for war contraband, and diverting grain from home.¹²¹

Consequently, it became absolutely necessary both to destroy Spanish naval power and to exert effective control of the trade from Chile to Peru, which in practical terms meant imposing a blockade. However, in 1817, when the Chilean government committed itself to building up a navy with this purpose in mind, the first difficulty to overcome was the scarcity of seamen. One of the greatest achievements of Bernardo O'Higgins, the Supreme Director, was to understand that reality, and to seek in other regions the human contribution needed to support their effort. A warm response was found both in Europe and the United States, and a considerable number of British and North American seamen and adventures made their way to Valparaíso; some of them looking for an easy way to earn money and reputation, but others truly convinced of the justice of the Patriot's cause. Many of

121.- A full description of this trade was provided by Lieutenant R.N. William Bowers, *Naval Adventures during thirty-five years' service*, London, Richard Bentley, 1833, II: 59 onwards.

these men would give their lives for the freedom of South America, fighting either on the battlefields or on the decks of warships and privateers. Others, at the end of the war, established themselves as citizens of the new republics. Amongst the Britons who came to fight for the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, and who distinguished themselves were Martin George Guise, William Miller, F.B. O'Connor, Frederic Augustus Elmore, George Young, James Paroissien, William Wilkinson, Robert Forster, Thomas William Cartier, George O'Brien. But, undoubtedly, one of the most controversial was Lord Thomas Cochrane.

Sacked from the Royal Navy and the House of Lords in 1814, Cochrane enjoyed a well established prestige for his remarkable ability as a frigate captain, but his precariously controlled temper, and his undeniable ambition, made him a difficult personage, especially as the subordinate of a new republic. Cochrane himself, by his writings, provides a good deal of information about his personality and career, before, during and after his service in America.¹²² It is sufficient to say here that he accepted the command of the newly-born Chilean Navy, after refusing an invitation to serve as Admiral in the Spanish Navy. Contacted by the Chilean envoy to the European courts, Alvarez Condarco, Cochrane arrived at Valparaíso late in 1818 to take command of the Chilean squadron, composed of seven sails, as follows: 50-gun frigate *O'Higgins*, Captain Robert Forster; 56-gun frigate *San Martín*, Captain William Wilkinson; 48-gun frigate *Lautaro*, initially Captain Charles Wooster and later Martin Guise; 20-gun schooner *Chacabuco*, Captain Thomas Carter; 18-gun brig *Galvariño*, Captain John Tooker Spry; 16-gun brig *Araucano*, Captain Ramsay; and 16-gun *Puyrredon*, Captain Prunier.

122.- *Servicios Navales que, en Libertar al Chile y al Perú de la Dominación Española, rindió el Conde de Dundonald*, London, James Ridway, 1859 For his service in the Chilean Navy, see David John Cubbitt "Lord Cochrane and the Chilean Navy, 1818-1823" (Edinburgh, Ph.D. Thesis, 1954). For his life, see Ian Grimble *The Sea Wolf. The Life of Admiral Cochrane*, London, 1978. In 1832 Cochrane was pardoned by the British government and soon afterwards became Rear-Admiral of the Blue.

Knowing Cochrane's virtues and frailties, as early as December 1818, Commodore Bowles and his officers anticipated all sorts of troubles. Furthermore, while his fame as captain was fully recognized by his former comrades, the cause of his dismissal had gained for him a very bad reputation and even antipathy amongst them. A measure of this feeling was Bowles' instructions to Shirreff, in February 1819, regarding the conduct he would have to observe in dealing with Cochrane. Bowles pointed out that, Cochrane being a British subject fighting against a King who is at peace with his own King, was acting illegally. Furthermore, concerning the specific question raised by Shirreff about saluting Cochrane's ensign, Bowles denied that right, adding that "it is highly improbable that British warships should show any mark of respect" for him, and if he insisted in being saluted, Shirreff was to refuse even to the point of using force.¹²³

These fears would be fulfilled shortly after Cochrane's arrival at Chile, through several incidents involving foreign merchant ships and warships, the very first of which arose when Captain Biddle, of the U.S. frigate *Ontario*, refused to salute his pennant. The *Ontario*'s arrival at Valparaíso from Callao, having received at that port merchants' bullion remittances for the ports on the East Coast, would bring another misunderstanding with Cochrane. The Chilean government, suspecting that this treasure, as well as that brought from Callao by the British frigate *Andromache*, arrived some time later, belonged to Peruvian rather than British merchants, showed great concern about the neutrality of both men-of-war. Several suggestions were made to stop this illegality, the strongest of which seems to be an official requirement to surrender the treasure, by using force if necessary. Chilean and British sources differ on what happened after Cochrane was prevented by the Chilean government from taking this extreme course. British sources indicate that the Chilean Admiral, assuming that action was the only suitable way to obtain the treasure, prepared his squadron to attack both warships as soon as

123.- Bowles to Croker, *Creole*. Buenos Ayres, 1/3/1819, ADM 1/24.

the government gave the order, commanding Captain Wooster, a North American, “you must take the *Andromache*, and I the *Ontario*, lets we should get hanged in our countries when we return”.¹²⁴ At the end, no extreme decision was taken by the government, but rumours of this possibility and of Cochrane’s preparations reached Shirreff and Biddle. Bowles, who learned of this a few weeks later, in March 1819, expressed his disgust to the Chilean envoy in Buenos Aires, indicating that by no means would he allow a British warship to be searched, since that right could only be claimed regarding merchant vessels. Moreover, Bowles pointed out that, if any attempt was to be made, he “without waiting for orders from his government, would know how to take compensatory action by using one ship and two frigates which would arrive in a short time”.¹²⁵

It is difficult to say how successful Bowles would have been had he really used force against Cochrane’s squadron. As stated, this force consisted of three frigates, one schooner and three brigs, totalling 234 guns, which hardly could match a British squadron formed by a ship and two frigates. However, at the time when Bowles wrote his menacing letter, March 1819, the Pacific Squadron was reduced to the 38-gun frigate *Andromache* and the 18-gun sloop *Blossom*, being immediately reinforced by the 10-gun brig-sloop *Icarus* and the 20 gun 6th rate *Slaney*. If we are going to relay only on numerical terms, the Chilean squadron was stronger than the British, even if the latter acted in junction with the North Americans frigate *Macedonian* and frigate *Ontario*; but fighting is not only a matter of numbers, it depends on many other things. Under Cochrane, the Chilean squadron became an effective naval force, but it took to him some time to reach such a level, a time which was far more valuable fighting the weaker Spanish Squadron rather than British and North American naval vessels. Even if succeeding

124.- Graham and Humphreys: 264.

125.- Cochrane to Biddle, Valparaiso 27/12/1818; enclosed with Bowles to Croker, *Creole*, Buenos Aires, 1/3/1819, ADM 1/24. Billingsley: 65, 68-69. O’Higgins IV: 122-123; V: 59-64.

in an action against naval vessels of these two nations, the Chilean squadron surely would be destroyed by a superior naval force sent some months later. Taking this into account, it seems that Cochrane was really trying to know how far he could go without actually compromising himself in a real incident with two stronger naval powers such as Britain and the United States.

Bowles' attitude was promptly known in Chile, but no further comment was made on the issue until August 1819, when Antonio José de Irisarri, Chilean envoy to the European courts, took cognisance of the appointment of Commodore Thomas Hardy as Commander-in-Chief, and that in fact a ship and two frigates were ready to sail from Britain to the Pacific. Fearing that Hardy's appointment and the reinforcements were an indication of hostility to Cochrane, Irisarri applied to the Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, complaining of the British captains' attitude in the West Coast. Flemming was the first to be mentioned, for his unhappy communication to the Chilean government in 1811; but the main complaint was directed against the consular condition assumed by all the others, who "without diplomatic investiture, had tried some times to compromise that Government, making declarations against the policy of this Cabinet, and asking extravagant things to that Supreme Authority."¹²⁶

Using these arguments cleverly, Irisarri was really asking for the appointment of a British consul in Chile, which would mean the recognition of its independence. He also argued that Chilean ports being the only ones opened to foreign commerce on the West Coast, British merchants used them to trade with Peruvian ports, providing the royalists with a protected way to move their property out of the country, and supplying Lima with provisions. Finally, he stated that if no acceptable solution was adopted by the British government, Chilean ports would be closed to their ships.¹²⁷

126.- O'Higgins III: 42-48.

127.- Idem.

Shortly after his flag had been hoisted on the *O'Higgins*, Cochrane was ready to sail for his first cruise along the Peruvian coast. The Chilean government's instructions were to use the squadron to blockade Callao, seeking out and destroying the Spanish naval forces, which were supposed to be out of the port, and to destroy the Peruvian mercantile marine. With four vessels, the Admiral left Valparaíso on 14 January 1819, giving orders to Rear Admiral Blanco Encalada, his second in command, to follow his force as soon the other three were ready.¹²⁸

One month later, when the squadron was already off Callao, the *Lautaro*, the look-out vessel, sighted three ships sailing south. They were the *Andromache*, the *Blossom*, and the merchant ship *Alexander*, being informed of the proximity of the Chilean Squadron. About 5 p.m., the *Andromache* closed distances with the *O'Higgins*, and Shirreff came aboard the Chilean frigate to have a meeting with Cochrane. At this encounter, amongst other things, the latter gave extensive assurances "that although he had left England he had not forgotten he was an Englishman",¹²⁹ and that he would not act against British interests. Shirreff, in flagrant violation of his neutral condition, and by way of return for Cochrane's declarations, gave the Admiral valuable information about the port defences and movements of the Spanish squadron and merchant ships. Obviously, Shirreff did not mention this in official reports, but his help was recorded in several accounts.¹³⁰

However, an unhappy incident overshadowed the meeting, when boats of the *Lautaro* were sent to examine the *Alexander* and certain British whalers which were sailing near to her. The officer sent to the *Alexander* told her master, in a very indiscreet way, "that if the *Andromache* had not been in company they would

128.- Fuenzalida (1978) I: 117-118, 323-325.

129.- Ibidem.

130.- *Gazeta Ministerial de Chile* I, nº 83, 13/3/1819. Pons 2: 23, 44. Antonio Alvarez Jonte, "Diario general de los acontecimientos más notables de la Escuadra Nacional de Chile desde la noche del 14 de enero de 1819 en que zarpó de Valparaíso" en *C.D.I.P.* T. XXVI, vol. 2: 438.

have searched the *Blossom* also”.¹³¹ The boarding officer’s attitude, probably only a swagger, should be interpreted as an indication of the general aggressiveness of the officers in the Chilean service under the vigorous leadership of their Admiral. Despite this incident, the meeting of Cochrane and Shirreff reassured Bowles of the urgency of sailing for the West Coast once again, with the purpose of convincing the Chilean government

“of the danger they will incur if they suffer Lord Cochrane to compromise them with England, and if possible to induce them to reinstate the former commander of their squadron -Rear-Admiral Blanco Encalada-, who is an officer of one of the best families in Chile and has always conducted himself with good sense and propriety”.¹³²

Even when he finally was unable to return to the West Coast, Bowles’ attitude reflected a greater intention to become involved in Chilean internal affairs, an attitude which was followed to some extent by his successor, Commodore Thomas Masterman Hardy. Cochrane’s behaviour was the reason for such a change, since, in many cases, he acted far beyond the Chilean government’s instructions, as we shall see in the following pages.

Back on the West Coast, having failed in his first attack to Callao (29 February and 1 March 1819), Cochrane left Callao to sail along the northern coast to distribute proclamations and to procure provisions for his ships. On 1 March, he issued a proclamation declaring under blockade “the port of Callao, and all other ports, bays and harbours, as well as the line of coast from the port of Guayaquil to Atacama in Peru”. Neutral ships already in any of the port under this blockade, were to leave them before 8 March. If any neutral ship was found with “military officers, masters, supercargoes, or merchants, of the countries subject to the king

131.- Graham and Humphreys: 270.

132.- Graham and Humphreys: 263.

of Spain, it shall be sent to Valparaiso” to be judged.¹³³ Callao was initially blockaded by the *Chacabuco*, until early April, when Rear-Admiral Blanco Encalada took over this responsibility with the *San Martín* and *Puyrredon*. This first blockade of Callao would last only for two months, since Blanco Encalada was forced to suspend it in May to avoid the starvation of his squadron, the ship with supplies sent from Valparaiso having been captured by Spanish privateers.¹³⁴ Shortly after that, Cochrane returned to Valparaiso as well.

Like the previous loyalist blockades, this one was impossible to carry out properly with the number of ships in the blockading squadron; and therefore it was denounced as illegal by Captain John Downes, of the U.S. frigate *Macedonian*, senior officer of the North American Pacific Squadron. Furthermore, when the news of Cochrane’s proclamation reached Europe, Irrisarri advised his government to reduce the area under blockade, “to Callao, or other, or other ports, which in reality were to be blockaded”, thus legalising it.¹³⁵ Peruvian ports, although not formally opened to foreign trade, were already allowing individual British and United States merchant ships to land their cargoes, since this was the only way of satisfying local needs. The privateering campaigns of 1817 and 1818 had made sailing under Spanish colours extremely insecure, to such an extent that Shirreff was asked by Viceroy Pezuela to transport to Europe the treasure belonging to the Spanish Crown. This request was refused, in accordance with Shirreff’s instructions which only allowed him to accept on board treasure and property belonging to his own countrymen.¹³⁶

133.- “Proclamation by Lord Cochrane. Vice-Admiral of Chili, Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the Ships and Vessels of the States”, *The Annual Register*, 1819, London 1820: 154-155. Graham and Humphreys: 270-272.

134.- Fuenzalida (1978) I: 128. Billingsley: 93. Cochrane: 18-21.

135.- O’Higgins III: 64-65. Pons I: 428.

136.- Bowles to Croker, *Creole*, Rio de Janeiro, 22/6/1819, ADM 1/24. Hardy to Croker, *Owen Glendower*, Buenos Aires, 20/5/1820, ADM 1/25.

Bowles' reaction to Cochrane's proclamation was cautious, taking into account that any serious misunderstanding with the new republics would threaten the "immense mass of British property" in their ports. Consequently, he decided not "to resist the blockade now established by the government of Chile" until new instructions were received from the Admiralty. He only asked for two things: free access to all the blockaded ports for British warships, and for British whalers, "the designation of a port in Peru, between Callao and Guayaquil, where they could take water, fresh supplies (...) in reply of which was designated the port of Paíta".¹³⁷

In September 1819, after several months in Valparaíso, the Chilean squadron sailed to attack and destroy the shipping at Callao, and to re-establish the blockade, achieving in that way the dominion of the Pacific. If he succeeded, "the expeditionary army could, without impediment, set sail from our [Chilean] ports, which is going to give freedom to Peru, and secure, as a necessary consequence, the unalterable independence of South America".¹³⁸ A few days after the departure of Cochrane, the *Slaney*, Captain Donat Hendry O'Brien,¹³⁹ sailed from Valparaíso to Callao. Even when the departure of the British vessel was already delayed by Shirreff attending a request made by the Chilean government, O'Brien reached Callao before the Chilean squadron. At the anchorage there were four British ships: *Inspector*, master James Bruce; *Pacific*, master William Robinett; *Merope*, master John Libon; and *Catalina*. When Cochrane arrived, on 26 September, all the ships in the anchorage were commanded to move behind the defensive line formed by the Spanish squadron, within gun-range from the forts. However, O'Brien considered that British vessels would be more secure sailing to Huacho under his protection, requesting and obtaining a proper permission from Viceroy

137.- O'Higgins IV: 151.

138.- Fuenzalida (1978) I: 327.

139.- O'Brien entered the navy in 1796 as ordinary seaman. Captain of the *Slaney* since August 1818 [Graham and Humphreys: 298]

Pezuela. In this sense, orders were issued from the *Slaney* to the merchant ships to prepare to leave the port under her protection.¹⁴⁰

It should be mentioned that Pezuela initially refused to provide such permission, fearing that Cochrane would attempt to capture the British vessels or, at least, try to attract their crew to the patriot service. However, taking into account that the 20-gun *Slaney* was no real protection for the British merchantmen, it is possible to think that Pezuela was actually looking for an incident between the Chilean Admiral and the British Captain, as a result of which the loyalist would take advantage. In fact, that incident almost happened when the already mentioned British merchant vessels departed Callao.

The *Pacific* was the first of them to leave the port, bound for Valparaiso, on the afternoon of 28 September. The following morning, she was intercepted and captured by the *Galvariño*, being forced to head towards San Lorenzo Island, in spite of the master's claims that his ship was under the *Slaney*'s protection. The *Inspector* and the *Catalina* were the next two to leave the anchorage, late on the 28th. They were instructed by O'Brien to wait until the morning, five miles to the north, and then to proceed to Ancon, in order to finish the landing of their cargo. On the next day, while the *Catalina* made her way to Ancon, the *Inspector* was intercepted, captured and forced to change her course for San Lorenzo Island, by another Chilean man-of-war.

Meanwhile, the main body of Cochrane's squadron having reached Callao harbour, an officer was sent to the *Slaney* to give official notice of the re-establishment of the blockade. O'Brien, in his reply, stated that Great Britain did not recognize the validity of the blockade, and that he would not allow any action against British ships. Cochrane's insistence, sending an officer to the *Slaney* once again, was followed by a rough exchange of verbal communications, which led O'Brien to declare his intention to use force, if necessary. When the discussion

140.- Hardy to Croker, *Owen Glendower*. Buenos Aires. 9/5/1819, ADM 1/25.

reached this point, the detention of the *Pacific* and the *Inspector* became known on the British naval vessel. Acting immediately, O'Brien closed distances with the *Inspector*, sending an armed boat to liberate her. As the merchant ship did not haul down her sails, the *Slaney* "was under the necessity of firing a shot ahead of the *Inspector* merchant ship to prevent her being taken to the Island of San Lorenzo, which had effect". Immediately after this, the *Slaney* headed towards the *Pacific*, which was already anchored at San Lorenzo, and, closing distances, ordered her to weigh anchor and set sail for Ancon. Robinett, the *Pacific* master, made good use of this opportunity and shortly after the signal was hoisted both the merchant and the man-of-war were sailing in company towards the aforesaid port. The fourth British ship in Callao, the *Merope*, was due to sail for Calcuta with goods and treasure on board, but to prevent any incident, it was transhipped to the *Slaney*. Shortly after this, an armed boat was sent from the *Galvariño* to take possession of the *Merope* and to sail her to San Lorenzo; however, the master refused to obey this order and, following O'Brien's signal, sailed to join the *Slaney*. The same day, the three merchant vessels reached Ancon without further problems with the Chilean squadron.¹⁴¹

In the correspondence Cochrane and O'Brien exchanged on this issue, the former argued that he had no previous knowledge of the *Slaney*'s protection of the merchant vessels and that none of them was taken with violence.¹⁴² Nonetheless, in spite of his success in protecting those vessels, O'Brien's energetic and aggressive attitude was disapproved of first by Bowles and afterwards by the Admiralty, who stated that "Captain O'Brien was not justified in the steps which he took and in

141.- Hardy to Croker, *Owen Glendower*, Buenos Aires, 20/5/1820, ADM 1/25; enclosed. O'Brien to Shirreff, Callao, 1/12/1819; enclosed with the latter, letters from the masters of the *Inspector*, the *Merope*, the *Pacific*, and the *Indian Oak*. Most of the cargo in those ships belonged to the British merchant Thomas Guthrie, master of the *Indian Oak*, who thanked O'Brien for his intervention.

142.- O'Brien to Shirreff, Callao, 1/12/1819; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, *Owen Glendower*, Buenos Aires, 20/5/1820, ADM 1/25.

giving 'convoy' to merchant-ships in time of peace acting illegally against a belligerent".¹⁴³

The *Slaney* was to remain in Ancon until 12 October 1819, receiving the remittances from the merchants there, sailing afterwards to Callao. Her second visit to Callao was to be extended, at the request of both the Viceroy and the British merchants John Heim and Geo. Waddington, not leaving the port until early in November in company with the *Merope*. At a request of the Tribunal del Consulado, Viceroy Pezuela authorized that 348,000 pesos belonging to Mr. Licarazo and Mr. Francisco Murrieta, two local merchants, were shipped on the *Slaney* to buy some goods at Rio de Janeiro. To obtain such a permission, they contributed with certain amount of money for the War effort and payed an advance for the import duties.¹⁴⁴

Cochrane failed in his second attack on Callao, and in his pursuit of the Spanish frigate *Prueba*, achieving a brilliant success by capturing the Spanish stronghold of Valdivia, early in 1820. Back at Valparaiso, the preparations for the great expedition to Peru prevented him from sailing again before September of that year.

The need for the destruction of the Spanish forces in Peru, as the only way to secure their own independence, was understood by patriot leaders both in Buenos Aires and Chile from the very beginning of their struggle for independence. After their initial attempts to destroy these forces, by a land campaign in Alto Peru which ended in complete failure, the patriots realized that the only possibility of achieving their aim would be by sending an expedition by sea. As a result of this new strategy, the privateering campaigns and Cochrane's two expeditions were planned and carried out as preliminaries, making excellent propaganda for the planned expedition.

143.- Graham and Humphreys: 298.

144.- Pezuela: 552. Marshall. Sup. IV: 283-286.

The expedition itself was one of the most complex operations in the wars for the independence of Spanish America, involving every kind of resource. The first step having been taken by Cochrane in gaining the control of the sea from the Spaniards, the second, and most difficult, was committed by O'Higgins and San Martín in preparing and organising the overall operation. Supreme command was conferred on the latter, with power enough even to dismiss Cochrane, if necessary, and to appoint Captain Guise in command of the squadron. The increasing disagreement between San Martín and Cochrane, which was ultimately to end in an unhappy enmity, was one of the points to be taken account of in this operation. The expedition, at its departure, consisted of eight naval vessels and fourteen transports, with an expeditionary army of 4500 men.

The difficulty in keeping secret such an operation led the Chilean government to adopt extraordinary measures, one of which was an embargo placed on those vessels at Valparaíso bound for Peruvian ports. This measure, given as early as 12 February 1820, was the occasion for a serious incident between Cochrane and Captain Thomas Searle,¹⁴⁵ of the *Hyperion*, the new senior officer of the British Pacific Squadron. On his arrival at Valparaíso, in February, Searle found the *Slaney* in port with five British vessels, the whalers *Caledonia* and *Tiber*, and the merchants *Inspector*, *Hydra*, and *Livonia*. The last three, loaded with grain, had been held back by this measure. Considering this action unfair, Searle complained to O'Higgins, obtaining his permission for the departure of the three ships. However, apparently because of some administrative error, Cochrane was not informed of the permission, and therefore refused to allow the merchant ships to leave the port (though the *Hydra* had already departed). As this delay lasted more than one month, and in order to avoid difficulties with the Chilean squadron, Searle travelled to Santiago to meet O'Higgins and ask him for a confirmation of his previous order. The meeting was held on 25 April, and the Director, reiterating

145.- Searle entered the navy in 1789. Commissioned to the *Hyperion* in September 1818. Rear-Admiral in 1846 [Graham and Humphreys: 281].

his authorization, assured Searle that the ships could sail immediately without any kind of impediment. On 5 May, even when no official notice had been received by him, Cochrane allowed the two whalers to leave the port, but maintained the prohibition on the other two merchant ships remaining at the anchorage. Two days later, Searle decided to use force, and ordered the *Inspector* to leave the port under his protection. In spite of orders to the contrary sent by Cochrane to the master, the merchant ship weighed anchor and headed outwards under convoy of the *Hyperion*, with her ports opened and guns ready to open fire. Cochrane, placed in the dilemma whether to enforce his orders and create an international conflict, or to allow the *Inspector* to leave the port, chose the latter course. Obviously, an energetic protest from the Chilean government followed this incident, and Searle's attitude was disapproved of by Commodore Hardy and the Admiralty, qualifying it as "intemperate and injudicious".¹⁴⁶

Searle's disposition towards Cochrane did not improve in the subsequent months, and further incidents arose following the detention of the *Rebecca*, at Pisco, as offender against the blockade. When they met again, at Callao harbour, in late-October 1820, the British Captain took not only an unkind attitude but a hostile one, "by casting loose his guns, with their trompions out, when my flag-ship entered the roads; thereby either intimating that he considered me a pirate, or that he would so treat me, if he had an opportunity".¹⁴⁷ A final incident between Cochrane and Searle occurred on 21 November, when the *Pacific*, a British merchantman arrived at Callao. An officer from the *O'Higgins* was sent to the *Hyperion* with a letter from the Chilean Admiral to Captain Searle. The latter not only refused to receive the letter during the day, as doing this could compromise his neutral condition, but even throwing it overboard.¹⁴⁸

146.- Graham and Humphreys: 300-302, 306. Searle to O'Higgins, enclosed with Hardy to Croker, *Owen Glendower*, Buenos Aires, 1/9/1820, ADM 1/26.

147.- Cochrane I: 93.

148.- Félix Denegri Luna (editor), "Misiones y Documentación de Cancillerías Extranjeras", en *C.D.I.P.*, Lima, 1976, t. XII: 93-95, 172.

While Commodore Hardy disapproved of Searle's attitude and ordered him to proceed to Valparaiso to wait for his arrival, the Admiralty was far more severe. They referred to Searle's actions as "intemperate and injudicious; and as repetition of it might, and probably would, be attended with consequences highly injurious to the public interest, their Lordships direct that the *Hyperion* be removed from the South American station".¹⁴⁹

Before that order reached him, Searle was to witness Cochrane's attack on Callao and the capture of the Spanish frigate *Esmeralda*. In that naval action, the U.S. frigate *Macedonian* and the British *Hyperion* were to be involved to some extent, since both were at the anchorage at that moment, close to the Spanish frigate. On the night of 5 to 6 November, the Chilean squadron made an intrepid boat attack on the aforesaid frigate. The boats were sighted and hailed by the *Hyperion* and the *Macedonian*'s sentries, but in a very discreet way to avoid revealing their presence to the Spanish ship. After a bloody fight on the deck and forecastle, the *Esmeralda* was surrendered and steered out of the forts' range. Having noticed the attack, the batteries on land opened fire on the *Esmeralda*, who immediately hoisted similar lights as the *Hyperion* and *Macedonian*, whose captains had "previously agreed on with the Spanish authorities in case of a night attack (...) to prevent being fired upon". Under these circumstances, the forts fired at random trying to hit the *Esmeralda*, but in the confusion the two neutral men-of-war were several times struck, being forced to cut their cables and left the anchorage.¹⁵⁰

The capture of the *Esmeralda* was a heavy loss for the Royalist cause, and it was natural that the Callao garrison and part of the population became very agitated over it. The common idea, amongst them, was that the attack was led by British and North Americans officers; or, at least, with the help of the *Hyperion*

149.- Graham and Humphreys: 305-306.

150.- Graham and Humphreys: 321-322.

and the *Macedonian*. To some extent, they were right in supposing this, since the attackers were led by English-speaking officers, and both British and North American warships were lying so close to the Spanish frigate that their sentries could have been heard. Acting under these feelings, early next day, certain British and North Americans were attacked by a mob. Amongst them were some crew members of the *Macedonian*, who had landed to buy the daily supplies for their ship. Two of them were killed and six more were badly injured, and only saved their lives when the local authorities came to their help. Their boat was plundered by another group, and only the intervention of another boat from the *Hyperion* saved her from total destruction. While these regrettable events were happening, the British and North Americans at Lima and Callao, numbered as many as 91 people, feared for their lives and requested official protection. Most of them were merchants, but they were also some masters, supercargoes, crew members from the warships, amongst whom was Captain Downes, of the *Macedonian*. Pezuela, fearing that the violence against foreigners would become worse, sent parties of soldiers for their protection, asking them to refrain from showing themselves in the streets and to embark at Chorrillos, where the boats of the *Hyperion* and the *Macedonian* were to be allowed to land to pick them up.¹⁵¹

Incidents between Royalist and foreigners did not conclude with the embarkation of the latter, and on 8 November, the North American sloop *Rampart* was received with shots from the forts, even when her colours were clearly hoisted. The Viceroy, anxious to put an end to this difficult situation, promised a full investigation of the incident to Searle and Downes, and the punishment of those involved in the attack on the boat and the sloop. The collaboration between both captains would continue to be very close in the following days, as was previously agreed between Downes and Shirreff. In this sense, on 21 October, the *Macedonian* convoyed out of the port nine merchant ships, six North Americans

151.- Idem. Pezuela: 761, 797. Billingsley: 112-114.

and three British. When the convoy was crossing before Cochrane's flag ship, a thirty-one gun salute was exchanged with the *Hyperion*, showing both to the forts and to the Chilean squadron their intention of protecting vessels of both nationalities.¹⁵²

Before the Chilean expedition departed Valparaiso, San Martín had asked both the British and the North American senior officers at Valparaiso to be guarantors of any agreement to be reached with the loyalists. Shirreff, who was the senior British officer in Valparaiso at that moment, showed great interest in accepting the proposition, forwarding it to Commodore Hardy for his approval. The latter did not authorize such an intervention in South American internal affairs, considering "that the smallest interference of a British officer between the contending parties would be contrary to the spirit" of his instructions, and that it could endanger the neutrality which they were to observe.¹⁵³ It seems, however, that only Pezuela's refusal to accept any foreign participation in the conflict, still considered by him as an internal dispute, avoided a further compromise from Shirreff, since Hardy's order to not accept the invitation reached Valparaiso too late.¹⁵⁴

The expedition to Peru finally set sail on 20 August 1820, and on the same day the Chilean government declared the coast from Guayaquil to Iquique (2° to 20° South) under blockade. This measure, which would be in force from August 25, provided a reasonable time for those ships coming from distant ports, and indicated the intention of opening Peruvian ports to the foreign trade as soon as they were liberated. Despite these essential aspects, which distinguished this blockade from that of 1818, it was still impossible to carry it out properly with the number of ships available to the patriots; and, therefore, it was rejected as illegal by

152.- Billingsley: 112-114.

153.- ADM 50/151, 17/8/1820. Graham and Humphreys: 303.

154.- Pezuela: 625. Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, 9/12/1820, ADM 1/26.

the British and North American commanders in the Pacific. First Searle and later Hardy protested against the measure, pointing out that no British ship would respect it. Nevertheless, to avoid difficulties, they recommended British merchants to restrain their trade to those ports under blockade.¹⁵⁵

The first place reached by the expedition was Pisco, on 7 September, landing early the following day. In this bay there were two merchant ships, the North American *Canton* and the British *Rebecca*, both of which were captured and sent to Valparaíso as the first offenders against the blockade. The latter, master John Thomson, was freighted at Callao, after having sold all her cargo there, to receive 1,400 bottles of liquor belonging to José Arismendi, agent of the Compañía de Filipinas. Searle, who reached Callao few days later, complained about this capture by sending an extremely brusque letter to Cochrane, and describing this action as piratical in his report to Hardy.¹⁵⁶

We have already mentioned the outcome of this incident, but it provides us with other kind of evidence: foreign trade was by then getting out of any real control from loyalist authorities. The detention of the two mentioned vessels, followed by capture of the *Nightingale* and the *Mary*, at Pucusana and Arica, shown that neutral vessels were already trading in other ports aside Callao, with the collusion of local merchants.¹⁵⁷

A different kind of incident occurred when John Brown, Captain of the Chilean privateer *Maypu*, captured in 1818, escaped from the Hospital at Bellavista and managed to reach the *Tyne*. He was able to obtain asylum from Captain Falcon, who refused to deliver him to the loyalist arguing that Brown was a British

155.- Graham and Humphreys: 309-313. *Gazeta Ministerial de Chile* II, n° 59, 26/8/1820; n° 81, 24/2/1821; n° 99, 6/6/1821.

156.- Hardy to Searle, 10/12/1820; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, Buenos Aires, 12/12/1820, ADM 1/26.

157.- Pezuela: 693, 695.

subject.¹⁵⁸ This kind of attitude was to be repeated several times in the future, not only during the wars of independence, but also during successive civil wars.

When the *Andromache* reached Callao on her fifth visit, in late December 1820, the political, military, and economic situation in Lima had clearly deteriorated. With the Patriot army in Chancay, the Chilean squadron blockading Callao, bands of “montoneros” (guerrilla) fighting almost everywhere, and groups of Patriots conspiring in the city, Pezuela was in a very difficult position. An indication of these difficulties was the proposal made by the town council, in its session of 16 January 1821, to put the city under British protection. The proposal was finally rejected, but its mere existence was clear indication of the desperate situation in Lima.¹⁵⁹

On the other hand, pressed by his generals to adopt a more aggressive strategy, since the loyalist army remained passively quartered at Aznapuquio, near Lima, the Viceroy ordered General La Serna to advance with the Army towards San Martín's position at Huacho. For some reason, a few days later, Pezuela ordered La Serna to counter-march the Army to Aznapuquio. According to certain rumours, Shirreff was involved in Pezuela's decision as he mentioned that the loyalist army's advance was exactly what San Martín expected to occupy Lima, moving its army southwards by sea while the loyalist troops were still marching.¹⁶⁰

Such a lack of decision was too much for loyalist generals, and on 29 January, they forced the Viceroy to relinquish the government to General La Serna. Pezuela was unable to impose his authority any longer and finally resigned. In the following weeks he tried to obtain passage for Europe, for himself and his family, both with Shirreff and with Rear Admiral Pierre R. Jurien de la Graviere, who had just entered the Pacific in command of a French Squadron. San Martín

158.- Vargas VI: 75. Pezuela: 720.

159.- Leguía III: 659-661.

160.- Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, primera parte. 1819-1822. Lima, 1868: 140.

refused to provide a passport for the former Viceroy, but he granted such a document for Pezuela's family, attending a request made by Countess Cochrane. With this permission, Shirreff agreed to receive Doña Angela de Pezuela and her family aboard the *Andromache*, where they were met by Admiral Cochrane, during a farewell visit the Lord made to his wife.¹⁶¹

This sort of humanitarian intervention, providing passage for loyalist or patriots, increased in the following months, and it deserves a small paragraph. As could be easily understood in a war of this kind, a number of people from one side or another tried to leave the country by any possible way. Foreign men-of-war were amongst the safest way of doing so and, consequently, several applications were made, especially for high ranked loyalist officials. Amongst them we can mention Generals Ricaford (September 1821) and Rodil (January 1826), and naval Commander Manuel Abreu (December 1821) who were received on board British men-of-war only after obtaining a proper permission from the patriots.¹⁶² However, it seems that, in some cases, passage was provided without that permission. At least, that was what the Peruvian government claimed in the case of Spanish General Loriga, who sailed on board the *Aurora*, in July 1824.¹⁶³

By November 1820, having elapsed only five years since the final defeat of Napoleon, the presence of a French squadron on South American waters was considered with suspicion by Commodore Hardy on his reports to the Admiralty. Under the flag of Rear Admiral Jurien, the French naval force was formed by three men-of-war, as follows: ship-of-the-line *Colosse*, frigate *Galatee* and corvette *L'Echo*, the first two of them entering the Pacific by late 1820.¹⁶⁴ Considering that only two British frigates were stationed on the West Coast, Admiral Hardy dis-

161.- Anna (1979): 169. ADM 51/3012. Cochrane I: 109. Pezuela finally succeeded in leaving Peru. early in July 1821, in a clandestine way on board the North American merchant vessel *General Brown* [Pezuela: 847-863. Billingsley: 130-135].

162.- ADM 50/151, 6/9/1821. A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 842, 29/11/1821.

163.- A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 839, 11 & 16/7/1824.

164.- Graham and Humphreys: 316.

patched another two men-of-war round the Cape: 6th rate *Conway*, Captain Basil Hall,¹⁶⁵ and 5th rate *Owen Glendower*, Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer,¹⁶⁶ being followed in February by Hardy himself on the *Creole*. By early 1821 the Pacific Squadron consisted of four men-of-war, almost half the actual force of the South America Station.

The main reason for Hardy's presence on the Pacific was Cochrane. As already mentioned, the Chilean Admiral's attitude towards neutral vessels was fairly aggressive, and Hardy feared that it would grow in the following months. His apprehension increased shortly after his arrival at Valparaíso, when four British ships (*Edward Ellice*, *Lord Suffield*, *Rebecca* and *Indian*), captured by the Chilean squadron, entered the port. He also learned that other two British ships, loaded with rice, flour and corn, were detained and diverted to Huacho to supply the Expeditionary Army with their cargo.¹⁶⁷

Sailing to the Peruvian coast in late-April 1821, Hardy failed in his attempts to meet Cochrane and San Martín, returning to Valparaíso to complain to the Chilean Government for the detention of five British seamen on the *O'Higgins* and for the blockade of the Peruvian coast.¹⁶⁸ He succeeded in the first case very easily, and orders were issued by the Supreme Director to release the five seamen. With respect to the blockade, he wrote additional letters making clear his decision to provide a more direct protection to those British ships trading along the Peruvian coast. Finally, on 22 June, the Chilean government issued a new decree

165.- Captain Basil Hall entered the navy in 1802. He wrote several books on his naval service, one of which refers to his interview with Napoleon, at Santa Helena. His *Extracts from a Journal written on the Coast of Chili, Peru and Mexico, in the Years 1820, 1821, 1822* (Edinburgh, 1826), 2 vols., provides valuable information from his personal experience in those years, and has been quoted by several authors.

166.- Spencer entered the navy in 1804. He commanded the *Owen Glendower* from 1819 until 1822 [Graham and Humphreys: 331].

167.- Graham and Humphreys: 328-330.

168.- ADM 50/151, 24-30/4/1821.

reducing the blockade to the coast between Ancon and Pisco (11°48' to 13°51' South).¹⁶⁹

A week later, having learned of new incidents with the Chilean Admiral, Hardy decided to force the Chilean government to put an end to what he considered to be Cochrane's abuses. He therefore landed and came to Santiago, from 29 June to 24 July, to make the claim stronger by his presence. In the meeting held with Bernardo O'Higgins, the British Commodore protested against Cochrane's attitude towards neutral ships, rating it as almost a piratical one. Hardy, who finally demanded to know whether the Chilean government sanctioned the attitude adopted by his admiral or not, received a satisfactory answer from O'Higgins, stating that Cochrane was acting beyond his instructions and "contrary to his wishes".¹⁷⁰ Regarding this point, O'Higgins wrote, "I had to humiliate myself before the British chiefs to reconcile the insanity of this man -Cochrane- with the orderly running of our revolution".¹⁷¹

Almost a year later, when the Peruvian government had already been established, the Minister of War and Marine, Bernardo Monteagudo, was to refer to the same issue, pointing out that Cochrane had gone "not only beyond his Excellency's Instruction [San Martin], but in opposition to it".¹⁷²

O'Higgins, first, and Monteagudo, later, must be taken as witnesses in any final judgement on Cochrane's activities in the Pacific. Despite the irrefutable success he achieved in clearing the sea of enemy vessels, he also created a great number of problems for both newly-established governments. It is easy now to criticize both Cochrane's attitude and O'Higgins' and Monteagudo's opinion, but

169.- *Gazeta Ministerial de Chile* II, n° 81, 24/2/1821, ADM 50/151: 20 & 27/5, 13, 15, 24 & 26/6/1821.

170.- Graham and Humphreys: 341-344, ADM 50/151: 3, 19 & 21/7/1821.

171.- Puente (1975) I: 394.

172.- Monteagudo to Hardy, Lima 21/11/1821; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, Callao, 30/11/1821, ADM 1/28.

in the last resort without the “insanity of this man” the successful conclusion of the naval aspect of the war, and with it the expedition to Peru, would probably have been delayed.

While Hardy remained at Valparaiso, the Peruvian situation deteriorated very fast. In May 1821, negotiations were held between loyalist and patriots, at Punchauca, trying to put an end to the war. During these discussions, both parties agreed to ask for a British guarantee to any agreement reached. This proposal was politely rejected by Captain Spencer, the senior officer at Callao, arguing that any British intrusion could threaten the neutrality which they were instructed to maintain.¹⁷³

On the other hand, the effectiveness of the blockade of Callao had a growing impact on the loyalist economy. Without trade, Callao and even Lima became a heavy charge to the already exhausted Public Treasure. This situation forced Viceroy La Serna to write a letter to Commodore Hardy, offering to provide a close attention to British interests, and even to open Callao to foreign vessels with flour (25 June).¹⁷⁴ However, before any action could be taken, the loyalist abandoned Lima (July 1821).

Within this context, some other incidents arose with the Chilean naval forces. During a cruise along the southern Peruvian coast, Cochrane forced four British ships to pay a duty to allow their trade with the ports already liberated, using as precedent the British rule of 1756 concerning neutral trade.¹⁷⁵ One of them was hit by shots from Arica forts, on 5 April, when the *San Martín*, Cochrane's flag ship, opened fire upon them without giving notice to the neutral shipping.¹⁷⁶ A small garrison left by Cochrane at this port had to abandon it by late July. William

173.- Vargas VI: 153.

174.- ADM 50/151, 16/5/1821; 13/7/1821.

175.- They were: *Admiral Cockburn*, *Rebecca*, *Robert Fuge* and *Joseph* [Hall to Hardy, Conway, 14/6/1821, ADM 1/26].

176.- Billingsley: 137. Cochrane I: 195-196.

Miller, the officer in command, forced a British vessel to take him and his troop to Pisco, giving in return permission to trade with Callao without being detained by the blockading squadron.¹⁷⁷

As already mentioned, by late June 1821, Viceroy La Serna understood the impossibility of keeping the capital under his control any longer. Finally, on 4 July, the loyalist army abandoned the town and withdrew to the Andes. Lima was placed under the control of the Cabildo, with only a small force of two hundred men to keep order. As serious disorders might arise at any moment, threatening the lives and property of the citizens and any foreigners in the town, the Cabildo asked Captain Basil Hall, of the *Conway*, for help. He agreed to provide this support, and British marines landed and marched to Lima, remaining there until the patriot army entered the city, on 6 July. Some days later, the *Conway* left Callao for Ancon, where she would remain for a few days. Lying at the anchorage were several neutral ships, heavily loaded with goods, awaiting the fall of Callao to the patriots and its opening to foreign trade.¹⁷⁸

As Captain Hall's instructions¹⁷⁹ pointed out the convenience of having a complete account of the political situation in the places he visited, he wrote a very complete journal, part of which was published in 1826 as *Extracts of a Journal written on the Coasts of Chili, Peru and Mexico, in the Years 1820, 1821, 1822*. As this book was the sole printed account of a British Captain visiting Peru in those years, it was frequently quoted by Peruvian historians to refer to British opinion on San Martin's plans. Hall and San Martin met several times, and at their last encounter, the latter asked Hall to take aboard a male mummy, found in an archaeological place north of Lima, to be put on exhibition in London as a token of

177.- Hardy to Croker. *Creole*, Callao, 19/8/1821, ADM 1/27.

178.- Vargas, VI: 171. ADM 53/249, 7/8/1821.

179.- Instructions enclosed with Hardy to Croker, *Creole* Bahia, 14/10/1822, ADM 1/27.

friendship. The mummy was taken by the *Comway* to London, and delivered to the British Museum; however, we have found no trace of his exhibition.¹⁸⁰

Late in July 1821, Hardy sailed for Callao with the *Creole* and the *Superb*, Captain Adam Mackenzie.¹⁸¹ On his arrival, Hardy found that a new incident had arisen with the Chilean squadron when the loyalist army left Lima. Captain Forster, who was in charge of the blockade, agreed with San Martín, La Serna and General La Mar, Governor of Callao's castles, to allow the departure of two British ships, the *Lord Lyndock* and the *Saint Patrick*, taking only Spanish passengers who were leaving the country. However, on 8 July, when Cochrane arrived, this permission was cancelled, and the ships declared to be offenders against the blockade. To reinforce his prohibition on leaving the port, Cochrane "personally informed the masters he would sink them if they attempted to come out."¹⁸² Even when the *Comway* was then present at Callao, the masters had no choice but to remain. For this reason, both ships received several shots when the blockading squadron attacked the forts, the night of 24 July. Before the cables were cut and the ships sailed out of the port, Thomas Fairborn, master of the *Saint Patrick*, was mortally injured. Having succeeded in leaving the port, both vessels were captured by the Chilean squadron, being released only after Hardy's intervention. Another two British vessels, the *Wellington* and *Colonel Allen*, were detained by Cochrane. The first of them was the former Spanish corvette *Cleopatra*, purchased by an Englishman residing in Lima, and towed out of the Spanish line by the boats of the *Comway*, on 13 July. The *Colonel Allen* was loaded with wheat owned by Spaniards. Considering that both vessels were acting beyond normal usage of

180.- Hall I: 186-187; II: 54-55.

181.- Mackenzie entered the navy in 1777. In January 1821 commissioned with the *Superb*, returning to Britain in June 1822. He died in November 1823, being Captain of the *Ocean* [ADM 9/2, 115. Marshall (II) 1: 234-237. *The Times* 18 & 28/11/1823].

182.- Graham and Humphreys: 345.

maritime war and clearly aside the permission given by Captain Forster, Hardy decided not to interfere.¹⁸³

The loyalist withdrawal from Lima did not include Callao, which was still defended by a considerable garrison. Therefore, one of the first measures adopted by the newly established Peruvian government was to open the port of Ancon to foreign trade. Hardy was asked by Minister Monteagudo to give notice of this measure to those British merchant ships waiting to trade with Lima.¹⁸⁴ Monteagudo's letter also asked Hardy to recognize Peruvian independence, but the latter, in a very polite way, replied that it was not in his power to give such recognition but that he would forward the request to the British government.¹⁸⁵

The British Commodore reached Ancon late in August, where some forty British ships were lying at the anchorage, waiting for authorization to land approximately five thousand tons of goods. Finally, Lima market was about to be opened to foreign goods. A new kind of struggle would now be faced until the 1850's by British and other foreign merchants: liberalism versus protectionism. Hardy had a first taste of it, when British merchants at Ancon complained to him on the excessive duties the newly established Peruvian government charged their goods.

This long term struggle (liberalism versus protectionism) would provide a general background for the relations between the British squadron and the Peruvian government. The latter was organised by early August, and shortly after a national squadron began to be built up under the command of Captain Guise. Several of the officers and sailors of the Chilean Navy were attracted to the service

183.- Graham and Humphreys: 344-346. ADM 50/151, 22 & 24/8, 3-6, 8, 11-13/9/1821. ADM 51/3445. *Gazeta del Gobierno de Chile*, III, n° 48 extraordinary 29/8/1821.

184.- Some of these vessels were waiting for quite a while, since most merchants expected from San Martin a quickest capture of Lima and Callao. For instance, the *Viper*, William Bowers master, was loaded with wheat for eight months, expecting for the opening of Callao [Bowers: 91].

185.- ADM 50/151, 30/9 & 1, 7, 9-10/10/1821. Monteagudo to Hardy, Lima 21/11/1821; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, Callao, 30/11/1821, ADM 1/28.

of the newly formed squadron, and a serious misunderstanding between the Peruvian government and Admiral Cochrane ended with the departure of the Chilean squadron from the Peruvian coast. As a result of this, San Martín issued a declaration, dated 21 November, stating that Cochrane was acting on his own, and that the Peruvian government could accept no responsibility for that.¹⁸⁶

During the second half of 1821, British captains had to deal with a number of different situations which required great ability and common sense. The war at sea was substantially reduced, since loyalists only retained a few places along the West Coast from which they could conduct a privateering campaign.

The Peruvian Navy (1821-1826)

Peruvian independence was proclaimed by General San Martín at several places in Lima, on 28 July 1821. An independent government was established under his protection, and three Ministries were created: Foreign Affairs, Finance, and War and Marine. Despite the fact that the new government considered itself as a national representation, it should be born in mind that half of Peru was still in loyalist hands. Even worst, as later events will prove, only a minority of people in Lima truly supported the new government, most of them being indifferent.¹⁸⁷

In general terms, in the following three years Peru will suffered a number of changes. The government shifted from San Martín to the Congress, and successively to Riva Agüero, Torre Tagle and finally Bolívar. All of them were much devoted to defeating the loyalist resistance up in the Andes to pay a close

186.- Monteagudo to Hardy. Lima 21/9/1821; enclosed with Hardy to Croker. *Creole*, Callao, 30/11/1821, ADM 1/28. ADM 50/151, 8/11/1821.

187.- Anna (1975).

attention to establishing a long term set of rules on foreign trade. Moreover, as several studies have proved,¹⁸⁸ local merchants, despite being debilitated by the long economic struggle prior to Peruvian independence, were reluctant to support any liberal measure adopted from the government. With several ups and downs in the following decades, especially in the 1820's, only the beginning of the guano era (1850's) provided a favourable moment for the liberals to succeed in this conflict. During the early stages of it, in the very first years, many foreign merchants were attracted to Peru, which was considered the most valuable market in South America. Unfortunately for them, they soon realized that only a small part of Peruvian society could afford European goods.

Heavily taxed since independence, a considerable number of commodities were introduced to Lima market as soon as it was opened (August 1821). However, in the following three years Lima changed hands several times between patriots and loyalist, threatening foreign capital invested in those goods. British captains provided as much support as they could to their countrymen, being the sole official representative of their government until a consular agent was appointed in 1824.

The war at sea lasted until 1826, when General Rodil finally surrender at Callao. In those years, several blockades were established by the Peruvian government, against which British, North Americans and French captains used the same arguments as on previous occasions. As a result of that situation similar

188.- Paul Gootenberg, "Los liberales asediados: La fracasada primera generación de libracambistas en el Perú, 1820-1850", *Revista Andina*, Cuzco, Instituto Bartolomé de las Casas, año 6, n° 2 (diciembre 1988): 403-450; "The Social Origins of Protectionism and Free Trade in Nineteenth-Century Lima", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 14 (November 1982), Cambridge University: 329-358. W.M. Mathew, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru, 1820-70", *The Economic History Review*, Welwyn Garden City, Hertfordshire, The Economic History Society, 2nd series, (1968): 562-579; "Britain and the Bolivarian Republics, 1820-1850: Interimperialism and the Tariff", Reinhard Liehr (editor), *América Latina en la época de Simón Bolívar*, Berlin, Biblioteca Ibero-Americana, 1989: 397-540.

incidents happened. A number of British officers and seamen serving in the Peruvian squadron provided an additional source of conflict.

This naval force began to be built up in September 1821, as soon as Callao surrendered to the patriots. Argentinean Bernardo Monteagudo was nominated Minister of War and Marine, Chilean General Luis de la Cruz appointed General Director of the Navy, and British Captain Martin Guise commissioned as Commander-in-Chief of the squadron. During the second half of 1821, the squadron comprising some purchased, captured or condemned vessels, achieved a considerable number in a very short time. The 1822 Peruvian Navy List includes the following men-of-war:¹⁸⁹ 40-gun frigate *Protector*, Lieutenant Commander James Esmond; 34-gun frigate *Guayas*, Commander Tomás Guillermo Carter; and frigate *Consecuencia*, Captain Hipolito Bouchard; 12-gun sloop *O'Higgins*, Commander José María García; 20-gun sloop *Limeña*, Commander Carlos García del Póstigo; 18-gun brig *Balcarce*, Lieutenant Commander Juan Robinson; 14-gun brig *Belgrano*, Commander Guillermo Prunier; brig *Regencia*, Commander Bernardo Ureta; and brig *Nancy*, Commander Manuel Loro; 17-gun schooner *Cruz*, First Lieutenant James Gull; 7-gun schooner *Macedonia*, First Lieutenant Matías Godomar; and 1-gun schooner *Castelli*, Second Lieutenant José Wikham

Former Spanish naval vessels and facilities, as well as regulations and a number of its officers, petty officers and men, who found themselves identified with Peru rather than with Spain, became part of the Peruvian Navy.

The newly formed squadron's initial task was the establishment of a close control of the southern ports to deny their use by the loyalists. In September 1821, the frigate *Consecuencia*, Captain Bouchard, commissioned to fulfil this purpose at the port of Pisco, detained two British merchant vessels: the brig *Nancy*, William Dowling, master; and the *Livonia*, John Goodfellow, master. The former, having

189.- José Gregorio Paredes, *Almanaque Peruano y Guía de Forasteros para el año de 1822*, Lima, 1821: 37-38.

arrived from San Blas, a Mexican port still held by the loyalists, was obviously lying when he declared to Pisco's authorities Rio de Janeiro as his last port. Furthermore, Dowling was unable to present any one of the relevant papers of his ship. The cargo, part of which had already been landed prior to the detention, was confiscated and the crew was gaoled. Finally, a few days later, manned by a prize crew, the *Nancy* sailed to Callao.¹⁹⁰ In November, having departed Valparaiso without license, the *Livonia* was also detained by Pisco authorities, her cargo, mainly grain, was landed and the vessel sent to Callao.¹⁹¹

Captain Mackenzie, of the *Superb*, by then at Callao, protested to the Peruvian Minister Monteagudo, not for the detention itself but for the ill treatment of the British crews and for having to dispose of the cargo before it was condemned. Several letters were exchanged on this issue and even when Monteagudo assured Mackenzie that orders were already given to return the cargo, nothing happened at Pisco. In the meantime, H.M. sloop-of-war *Dauntless*, Captain Gambier, called at Pisco in her way from Valparaiso to India, with instructions to obtain a full account of this incident. It seems that Gambier went beyond his orders during his three-day presence at this port, since he was accused by the Peruvian government of arresting the persons who guarded the *Nancy* and also for threatening to arrest the frigate *Consecuencia*.¹⁹² Even when this incident was not recorded in the *Dauntless* log, something happened at Pisco to lead Governor Pardo de Zela to complain against Gambier. The Peruvian government's

190.- Dowling to Mackenzie, Pisco 9/10/1821; enclosed with Mackenzie to Monteagudo. *Superb*, Callao, 13/10/1821, A.H. de M. bergantín *Nancy*. Leguía, V: 624. Wilson to Palmerstone, Valparaiso, 24/2/1833, F.O. 61/23 & F.O. 61/18: 323-325. PRO. ADM 50/151: 8/11/1821.

191.- Goodfellow to Mackenzie, *Livonia*, Pisco, 9/10/1821; enclosed with Mackenzie to Monteagudo. *Superb*, Callao 13/10/1821, A.H. de M. bergantín *Nancy*. ADM 50/151. 31/7/1821. Leguía V: 621-623. PRO. F.O. 61/18: 293; 61/20: 173-174, 190; F.O. 61/23. London, 7/6/1833, F.O. to Wilson; and Wilson to Palmerstone, Valparaiso, 22/2/1833.

192.- Gambier to Mackenzie, *Dauntless*, Callao 24/10/1821; enclosed with Mackenzie to Monteagudo, *Superb*, Callao 25/10/1821, A.H. de M. bergantín *Nancy*. Paz Soldán: 351-352.

protest was too much for Mackenzie's patience, and on 27 October he wrote a very energetic letter, pointing out that he was already weary

“of so many Representations on this subject and lament to observe that the Orders of Government should be so evaded or tardily executed at even so short a distance as Pisco (...) I should be wanting, Sir, in my duty did I tamely look on & see not only Property but the Persons of His British Majesty's Subjects, calling upon me for protection, exposed to such gross violations without strongly but respectfully appealing to the Supreme Government of the Country”.¹⁹³

More strongly written was his last letter, dated five days later, mentioning that this sort of incident was far from being the best way to promote “mutual good by exchanging the productions and commodities of each” country, and stating that a formal protest was to be forwarded to the British government.¹⁹⁴

Less than a month later, because of the war, both British merchant ships were already commissioned by the Peruvian government, the *Nancy* as brig-of-war and the *Livonia* as transport. Their trials were to last until February 1822, when the Peruvian Supreme Court condemned both British ships as good prizes.¹⁹⁵ During the following decade, the British government claimed against the sentence and finally succeeded in obtaining a full compensation for the shipowners.

These two cases, and others in the following years, were used by some Peruvian historians to blame the British government for abusing the strength of British warships in the area. However, the facts pointed out that serious miscarriages of justice were committed by Peruvian authorities, either at the moment of the capture itself or during the trials. The most common of them were the improper landing and disposal of the cargo, and the use of the prize before

193.- Mackenzie to Monteagudo, *Superb*, Callao 27/10/1821. A.H. de M., bergantín *Nancy*.

194.- Mackenzie to Monteagudo, *Superb*, Callao 1/11/1821. A.H. de M., bergantín *Nancy*. Paz Soldán: 353.

195.- Guise to Monteagudo, Callao 5/11/1821, A.H. de M. bergantín *Nancy*; corbeta *Livonia* 1821, docs. 9-10; Capitanía de Puerto del Callao, entradas y salidas de buques 1821, doc. 52. Paz Soldán: 351-352.

being condemned. On the other hand, even when Captain Mackenzie's attitude was energetic, his correspondence did not include any threat of using force. Only Captain Gambier's uncertain attitude at Pisco could be blamed as violent, but even so, it is doubtful that a 18-gun sloop could be a real menace to a frigate such as the *Consecuencia*.

On 21 September, Callao fortress surrendered to the Patriots and consequently the port was opened to foreign vessels. A week later, provisional regulations for trade were issued by the Peruvian government, opening Callao and Huanchaco to foreign trade. In general terms, these regulations kept strong reminiscences of the over-protective Spanish system. Import tax was fixed at 25%, and to save 5%, foreign traders had to appoint Peruvian agents; import of goods already produced in the country were charged double; and a lower rate was fixed for Peruvian and other Latin American merchant ships. Silver coins were to pay 5% as export duties, gold was rated as 2.5%, while the export of non minted silver was prohibited.¹⁹⁶ Despite these restrictions, the regulations were welcomed by most of the British merchants, who asked Captain Mackenzie to represent their favourable opinion to the Peruvian government. There are some Peruvian historians who suggest that a number of British merchants protested against these regulations; however, we have found no proof of their complaints.¹⁹⁷

A great number of foreign vessels arrived at Callao in the succeeding days, most of them having been waiting at anchor in Ancon and, shortly after that, local stores were overwhelmed by their goods. This unusual concentration of foreign ships and property, in a port which offered good prospects to newly arrived merchants, and with an avid navy of able seamen, produced a considerable number of desertions amongst foreign vessels, especially British and North American ones. The first reason was to persist for almost the whole century, but the last one

196.- Paz Soldán: 235.

197.- A.H. de M. Departamento de Marina, Dirección General de Marina (quoted as D.G.M. onwards) 1821, docs. 1-3, 5. Paz Soldán: 350-351.

disappeared as soon as the irregularity of payment and the poor quality of the food in the newly formed Peruvian squadron became well-known amongst foreign seamen arriving at Callao. As early as November 1821 the number of North American and British deserters was so great that some of them were reported as wandering in Lima and Callao “in great disgrace”.¹⁹⁸

The situation of those foreign seaman serving in the Peruvian squadron deteriorated very quickly, and by late 1822 discipline in Peruvian men-of-war was seriously affected. At midnight on the 9 December 1822, British sailors of the *Belgrano* took control of the ship, received on board some other British sailors, from land and from the schooner-of-war *Cruz*, landed their officers and sailed for the Philippines. As the Peruvian Squadron was out at Puertos Intermedios, the local naval authority asked the help of the British brig-sloop *Alacrity* and the U.S. schooner *Dolphin* to recapture the *Belgrano*, qualifying her as a pirate vessel. Nevertheless, both Lieutenant Bance, of the *Alacrity*, and the *Dolphin*'s Captain refused to interfere as the mutineers had shown no piratical intentions at all, considering that only Peruvian warships were concerned with the brig's capture. When Hardy learned of this incident, and of a similar one involving the Chilean 18-gun brig *Galvariño*, he gave “the necessary orders to Captain Prescott, of the *Aurora*, to capture her if she committed any piratical act on British ships”.¹⁹⁹

As soon as Callao was opened to foreign trade, a number of problems arose between foreign masters and the newly constituted Peruvian authorities, with the consequent intervention of foreign naval captains.²⁰⁰ Even when in many cases some local authorities abused their position, the Peruvian government considered the latter's intervention were interfering in Peruvian internal policy. For this reason, when a new set of trade rules was issued on 17 October 1821, granting

198.- Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, Callao. 30/11/1821, ADM 1/28.

199.- A.H. de M. corbeta *Livonia* 1822; bergantín *Belgrano* 1822. Puente (1975) I: 429-430. ADM 50/151: 5/3 & 3/5/1823. Graham and Humphreys: 368.

200.- ADM 50/151, 10, 12 & 18/11/1821.

rights of citizenship to those foreigners trading in Peru, it also established that they “should no longer enjoy the privilege of complaining to, and claiming the protection of, the commanders of vessels belonging to their several nations”, unless for those cases recognized by the Law of Nations, such as a complete infraction to their rights. Accordingly, they would be liable to national laws and subject “to all contributions which might be levied by government, as well as to the bearing of arms for the maintenance of public tranquillity” but not to a point to “be called to march against the public enemy”.²⁰¹

Captain Mackenzie, of the *Superb*, who was at Callao when the decree was issued, wrote to the government pointing out that he reserved his right to observe the decree until Hardy’s arrival at the port. Nonetheless, British captains continued offering their protection to those British masters who feared that port authorities were about to detain their vessels.²⁰²

As a result of the war itself, the Peruvian mercantile marine decreased considerably, seriously affecting coastal traffic and the government’s incomes, which heavily depended on external and internal trade. As the former was already in foreign hands, for the aforementioned reason, it became clear that coastal trade should also be opened for them. In May 1822 foreign ships were allowed to undertake this service. It was a good chance to make profitable business and a number of British shipowners applied for the necessary permission. It was granted with a single condition, that foreign merchant vessels agreed to be governed by national regulations in the same way as national merchant ships.²⁰³ Many of these vessels were to trade with the loyalists in Southern Peru, a coast which was officially under blockade, but the government found it proper to allow that trade

201.- Thomas Sutcliffe, *Sixteen years in Chile and Peru, from 1822 to 1839. By the retired governor of Juan Fernandez*, London. Fisher, 1841: 55. *Gaceta del Gobierno*, suplemento. Lima n° 33.

202.- A.H. de M. Departamento de Marina, D.G.M. 1821, doc. 6. ADM 50/151, 3/2/1822.

203.- A.H. de M. Capitanías de Puerto, D.G.M. 1822, docs. 64-65.

on payment of an extra duty. As can be easily understood, these sort of measures were regarded as illegal by foreign naval captains.

Despite this problem, by late 1824 British trade in South Peru was already considerable, to the extent that a number of British agents established themselves at Quilca, Arequipa, Tacna, Arica, etc. One year later, in December 1825, a visitor to Tacna wrote:

“Tacna appeared more like a British colony than a Spanish one. It is amazing how soon every new market opened to our trade is overwhelmed; what a matter of regret it is, to find the national competition, the merchants and manufacturers eating each other, the latter especially going to ruin by engrossing the three branches of ship-owner, merchant, and manufacturer, instead of confining themselves to their own particular business”.²⁰⁴

In fact, as skilful merchants, the British sustained trade with loyalist and patriots, trying to take advantage of both of them. A good example of this was the settlement they reached in early 1824, following the occupation of Lima and Callao by the loyalist, or in 1825, while the patriots blockaded and besieged Callao, enabling the small fishing village of Chorrillos, south of Callao, to be open to foreign trade. In both cases British merchants were allowed to continue with their trade in Lima and Callao. Even when loyalist Marshall Monet refused to give a formal authorization to a trade which was prohibited by colonial legislation, he stated that any goods introduced into Callao were due to pay duties to help support the loyalist army. British Captains at Callao in those days, represented to Monet British merchants' gratitude for this determination, and asked him to allow them to stay or to freely leave the country.²⁰⁵

204.- Joseph Andrews, *Journey from Buenos Ayres, through the provinces of Cordova, Tucuman, and Salta, to Potosi, thence by the deserts of Caranja to Arica, and subsequently, to Santiago de Chili and Coquimbo, undertaken on behalf of the Chilian and Peruvian Mining Association in the years 1825-26*. London. John Murray, 1827: 172-173.

205.- Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro 18/6/1824, ADM 1/29. Proctor: 366-373.

The general situation of the war was to remain with no major changes until 1823. In the meantime, the loyalists not only retained Southern Peru but were also able to advance and occupy Lima. Two expeditions were sent against them by the Peruvian government, following a general strategy elaborated by San Martin. The Junta appointed by the Congress to rule the country, following San Martin's retirement, in September 1822, sent the first of this expeditions. Defeated by the loyalist in January 1823, the Army removed the Junta to appoint Colonel José de la Riva Agüero as President of Peru. He was to sent the second expedition, which was as much a failure as the previous one. Almost immediately, Lima was occupied by the loyalist and Riva Agüero's government abandoned the city first to Callao and afterwards to Trujillo, where he established a new government which was not recognized by the Congress. Late in that year, with General Simon Bolivar and Colombian troops already in Peru, the Congress appointed Marquis of Torre Tagle as President, declaring war on Riva Agüero and his followers as rebels. By early 1824, Lima was occupied once again by the loyalist, forcing the Congress to entrust all political and military power to Bolivar, while Torre Tagle surrendered to the loyalists. Bolivar was to initiate the final campaign against the loyalists, which ended at the Battle of Ayacucho (9 December 1824), with the defeat of Viceroy La Serna.

British trade in Lima and Callao was affected by the circumstances of the war, especially as loyalists and patriots took turns in the control of one or both places. In each one of these cases, the British squadron acted in the protection of their nationals.

In early April 1822, the patriots were defeated at Ica, and it was feared that the loyalists would advance towards Lima. The Callao anchorage was crowded with more than sixty ships, "principally English merchantmen", the port had plenty of stores and goods, and Lima had a considerable "number of smart shops, abounding in French silks and jewellery and British goods of every sort and

description". When news of this defeat reached Lima, some measures were taken to prepare the defence of the city and its port, and it was rumoured "that an attempt would be made to embody foreigners into a company of militia".²⁰⁶ To avoid being involved in the conflict, a number of them took refuge in the shipping "and many of the merchants put all their specie, for safety, on board H.M. brig-of-war *Alacrity*, then lying in the harbour." The panic was so extensive that even the Peruvian government entrusted some public funds to British naval custody. Disregarding the generalized attitude of their nationals, a small number of British merchants "volunteered a much more welcome and efficient measure, that of raising a subscription of some thousand dollars for the assistance of the Government in its present exigencies".²⁰⁷ The loyalists did not advanced on Lima this time, and with some hesitation foreign merchants landed and returned to their activity.

In 18 June 1823, a strong loyalist column, under generals Canterac and Valdez, advanced towards Lima, forcing the government to abandon the city. The British merchant Robert Proctor wrote a first-hand account of those uncertain days. On June 15, Proctor abandoned Lima for Callao, "intending to find shelter on ship-board" for himself and his family, and two days later came aboard the *Aurora* with an official letter for Captain Prescott,²⁰⁸ "from the merchants, requesting him to come to Lima to negotiate with the Spaniards". Attending this request, Prescott landed and meet Canterac, who had just demanded "from the city the sum of 350,000 dollars, to be paid before four o'clock in the afternoon." As the British Captain stated that "it was utterly impossible to raise the sum in the given time", the Spanish General was polite but determined, and only after a long conversation

206 .- Gilbert Farquhar Mathison. *Narrative of a visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru and the Sandwich Islands during the years 1821 and 1822*, London, Charles Knight. 1825: 224-225.

207.- Mathison. 228, 253-254. Hardy to Croker. *Creole*, Rio de Janeiro 15/7/1822, ADM 1/28. ADM 51/3010. Graham.and Humphreys: 358-359.

208.- Prescott entered the navy in 1796. Appointed to the *Aurora* in 1821. Admiral in 1860 [Graham and Humphreys: 355].

on this issue, “he altered his resolutions: about 150,000 dollars were paid at the time specified”.²⁰⁹

That was not the only problem. It should be remembered that colonial laws were still in force, and Canterac also mentioned this topic in his conversation with Prescott. “He said if the English would send their property to his camp, it should be protected, but that while it was in the city, it must take its chance.” Even when British properties were respected by the loyalist, a number of robberies were committed “between the evacuation of the patriot troops and the entrance of the Spaniards.” For this reason, when the loyalist abandoned the city, by mid-July, Prescott requested and obtained permission both from loyalist and patriot’s generals “to march a body of marines into Lima, to protect British property and houses”.²¹⁰ This was the second opportunity in which British marines were landed for this purpose, the first was in July 1821, when the *Conway*’s marines did the same at the request of Lima Council. British merchants showed their gratitude to Captain Prescott by awarding him with a present worth 1,500 dollars.

Lima and Callao were occupied by the loyalists once again in February 1824, following a revolt of Callao’s castles garrison. Immediately, Captain William F. Martin, of the brig-sloop *Fly*, by then the sole British naval vessel at Callao, dispatched boats and marines to protect British ships and property. There were more than forty vessels lying in the harbour at gun-range, fifteen of them were British. Despite gun-fire from the fortress, twelve sailed out during the following days, but three remained because their sails had been taken ashore. Learning that, on 12 February, Martin sent an armed boat which towed them out of the anchorage, and a landing party forced the harbour master’s office, which was

209.- Robert Proctor. *Narrative of a Journey across the cordillera of the Andes, and of a residence in Lima and other parts of Peru, in the years 1823 and 1824*, London 1825: 136, 140-144.

210.- Idem.: 144, 153-154.

abandoned as a result of the revolt, to recover the papers of these vessels.²¹¹ As far as we know, no complaint was made by loyalist authorities about Martin's attitude.

The new ruler of Callao, Colonel Casariego, had good relations with British Captains. Before the revolt, he was a prisoner of the patriots, but even so, his son was received aboard the *Aurora*, and Captain Prescott obtained leave for him to visit the British frigate on his parole. With this background, British merchants asked and obtained Casariego's permission to re-ship their properties in Callao on a payment of 15% of its value, but the arrival of the Peruvian frigate *Prueba*, on 17 February, interrupted the proceedings.²¹²

As Callao was already in enemy hands, and loyalist Marshall Monet was approaching with fresh troops, the patriots were forced to abandon the city. Fearing that the absence of any respectable force would lead to lawlessness and robbery, the town council asked Captain Martin to intercede before Marshall Monet for a quick entry to the city. Consequently, a British Lieutenant formed part of the deputation sent to the loyalist camp, and two days later, on 29 February 1824, Monet's troops entered the city.²¹³

Until December, Lima's situation remained uncertain, to the extent that the city council asked twice for the landing of Royal Marines to protect neutral lives and properties. The first time, early in October, one hundred men were landed and stayed in Lima until the 14, when loyalist troops reoccupied the city. The second time was on 5 December, when the city was abandoned definitively by loyalist troops. This time, the *Cambridge's* marines landed and helped Colonel Soler, the newly appointed Prefect of Lima, to control the city. As a greater number of

211.- ADM 51/3174. Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, Rio de Janeiro, 30/8/1823, ADM 1/28. Bowers: 283. Proctor: 342-343. Sutcliffe: 81-86.

212.- Idem.

213.- Proctor: 353.

patriot troops entered the city on the following day, the marines returned on board.²¹⁴

Probably the most urgent issue which had to be faced by the Peruvian government in those initial years, was to raise enough funds to continue the war. All possible ways to obtain money were employed: local and external loans, as well as voluntary and forcible contributions. British subjects were to participate in all of these ways, one of the most important being the loan given in 1822 for a total value of 1'200,000 pounds sterling which was to generate the first Anglo-Peruvian Debt, only settled twenty seven years latter.²¹⁵ The British Pacific squadron was not related to this debt at any stage, but it became deeply involved in supporting British merchants when the Peruvian government tried to force them to contribute.

On 27 September 1822, the Peruvian Congress issued a decree stating that merchants trading in Lima were due to contribute 400,000 pesos to the war effort. The Tribunal del Consulado, being responsible for the collection, assigned one quarter of the total amount as the share to be covered by British merchants, who were under as much obligation as Peruvians in everything concerning taxes and contributions, according to the trading regulations dated 17 October 1821. Nevertheless, British merchants, under the chairmanship of John Moens, refused to contribute and decided to leave the country instead. Consequently, Moens wrote to Captain Prescott, informing him of their decision and asking him to be received on board the *Aurora* and to request their passports from the Peruvian Government. Prescott conferred what they wanted but, in his reply, he remarked that British merchants were already trading under Peruvian law and therefore were subject to local taxes. The British Captain wrote to the Minister of War and Marine and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, asking both for guarantees for their fellow

214.- Maling to Eyre, Callao. 8/12/1824; enclosed with Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro 4/3/1825, ADM 1/29.

215.- W.M. Mathew, "The First Anglo-Peruvian Debt and Its Settlement, 1822-1849", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 2 (1970), 1: 81-98.

countrymen and for their passports. Guarantees were quickly offered, but no passports were issued despite the Minister's promise. After a prudent period of waiting, Prescott had an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform him that the *Aurora* was to prevent any British vessel entering the port until passports were granted. On the next morning, 10 October, the *Aurora* left anchorage to intercept a British brig which was arriving, sending her to San Lorenzo. Both the Peruvian government and the British Captain were aware that preventing British shipping entering the port would affect import duties, the sole regular income of the government, and consequently, on 11 October a decree was issued allowing British merchants and their properties to leave the country. This misunderstanding between British merchants and the Peruvian government was to be solved in the following days, and a loan of 73,400 pesos was offered by the former and accepted by the latter, under certain conditions. However, a new statement was made by the Government, confirming that no exception was to be made for foreigners in future contributions.²¹⁶

As this sort of incident would occur with certain regularity in the following years, with almost similar results, it deserves some comments on the attitude adopted by the parties involved. The Peruvian government acted with great naiveté in believing that foreigners would accept without protest any sort of contribution, especially when they knew that their trade was essential to the newly-formed republic. British merchants took advantage of this fact and of the presence of Captain Prescott, who realized that they were acting against local regulations but felt unable to refuse his protection. Despite Prescott's reflections concerning their legal condition, the merchants also knew that being a British man-of-war at Callao they would be safe.

216.- *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 28/9 & 12/10/1822. Prescott to Hardy & to Valdivieso, Callao, 7 & 10/10/1822; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, Bahia, 7/3/1823, ADM 1/27. ADM 50/151, 5/3/1821. Gustavo Pons Muzzo y Alberto Tauro (editors), "Primer Congreso Constituyente", en C.D.I.P. t. XV, Lima 1973-1975, I: 145, 154, 156; III: 30, 45. Paz Soldán: 17-20.

Framed by this general situation, the war at sea was conducted mainly by the Peruvian squadron, helped by some Chilean men-of-war, against a few loyalist privateers. In 1821, the loyalist controlled not only Southern Peru, but also Chiloe, in Chile, and San Blas, in Mexico. In late 1824 they lost control of South Peru and San Blas, but in return they gained Callao. From 1821 until 1824, almost all of the logistic support received by the loyalist in Peru was carried out by neutral shipping calling at Puertos Intermedios, named so after their position between Callao and Valparaiso. It was important to the Peruvian government to deny the use of these ports to the enemy.

With this purpose in mind, and linked to the expeditions sent to Alto Peru, two blockades were declared, on 15 October 1821 and on early March 1822.²¹⁷ Both of them considered the coast too long to be effectively covered by the Peruvian squadron, from Nazca and Pisco to Cobija (about 14° to 24° South). Mainly for this reason, but also because the second one did not provide enough time of grace for those merchant ships already heading to those ports, they were rejected by British, North American and French naval captains. At least in the first case, the Peruvian government realized that it would be more realistic to allow ships of these three powers to carry on with their trade, with the sole restriction on war contraband. That, at least, was the answer received by Hardy.²¹⁸

Obviously, a number of incidents arose in respect these two blockades. For instance, in April 1822, as the British brig *Brazen* was captured, Captain Prescott protested emphatically and ordered Captain Maclean, of the *Blossom*, to return to Valparaiso via Quilca, to assist other British vessels in the area. On his arrival at this port, later that month, he found the U.S. ship-of-the-line *Franklin* and the French frigate *L'Amazon*, providing close support for their national shipping

217.- *Gaceta del Gobierno* 15/10/1821. Hardy to Croker, *Creole*, Callao, 14/11/1821. ADM 1/28. A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 839, 4/4/1823.

218.- ADM 50/151, 11/12/1821. A.H. de M. Departamento de Marina, D.G.M. 1821, doc. 4.

entering and leaving the port, in defiance of Peruvian Captains' protest.²¹⁹ The *Franklin* hoisted the flag of Commodore Charles Stewart, who also had under his command the sloop-of-war *Dolphin*.²²⁰

On 16 March 1824, following the fall of Callao into loyalist hands, the Peruvian government issue a decree increasing the coast under blockade up to Chancay, providing legal support to the blockade of Callao already established by Guise since February 19.²²¹ However, this decree had some particulars which made it as inapplicable as the previous ones. For instance, it forbade any sea trade from Chancay to Cobija, but insisted on payment of duty at 25% of the cargo value. Captain Thomas Brown,²²² recently arrived from Valparaíso with the *Tartar*, protested immediately, considering that the decree inflicted basic rules such as a period of grace for those vessels coming from distant places, or the absurd situation of collecting import taxes for those goods destined to a territory not under its control. To make this complaint more emphatic, Brown stated that any British sailor in the Peruvian service who became involved in hostile act towards British vessels on the high seas, were liable to be prosecuted under British law. He probably made this statement having Admiral Guise in mind, as relations between both of them were not on a good standing at that moment as a consequence of a previous incident.²²³ At Pisco, Admiral Guise had forced the *Thomas Nowland*, William Clarke master, to choose between paying the duties or leaving the port with no cargo on board.²²⁴ The master agreed to pay with 85 jars of pisco, a locally made liqueur, but as soon as his ship arrived at Callao he asked for Captain Prescott's support to recover his pisco. Consequently, the *Aurora* sailed to Pisco,

219.- Puente (1975) I: 434-435. Billingsley: 160-163. ADM 50/151, 6/6/1823. ADM 53/141.

220.- Clayton, 72.

221.- A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 839, 19/2/1824.

222.- Brown entered the navy in 1787. Appointed to the *Tartar* in October 1822. Admiral in 1855 [Graham and Humphreys: 372].

223.- Idem., 18/1/1824.

224.- Idem., 23/5/1824.

where the *Protector*, Guise's flag-ship, was anchored. Prescott's complaint was to be answered by the Admiral, but no solution was reached. Therefore, the issue was presented directly to the Peruvian government.²²⁵ In the meantime, the news of the increasing of the blockade's limits, reached Rear-Admiral Eyre, the British Commander-in-Chief, at Rio de Janeiro. He immediately gave clear instructions to the senior officer in the Pacific, to capture and detain any warship acting against the Law of Nations, and to retain the Captain until the government gave guarantees or he himself ordered his release.²²⁶

Without reaching such an extreme position, British men-of-war acted with greater decision on the protection of their shipping. That was the case of the British schooner *Mermaid*, detained by the 20-gun brig *Congreso*, on 24 June 1824, and liberated by an armed boat sent by Captain Bowles.²²⁷ In the following weeks, the *Cambridge* was to protect several other vessels on entering Callao (the sloop *Royal Sovereign*, and the brigs *Antelope*, *Duncan Forbes*, *Elizabeth*, *Atlas* and *Esther*).²²⁸ So close a protection helped the loyalist to increase the number of their privateers. This was the case of the schooner *Grecia*, a former Royal Navy vessel, which was allowed to sail into Callao anchorage to enter into communication with the *Cambridge*. But the master did not honour his word, he not only landed but even sold the schooner to Rodil. A few days later, the *Grecia* was captured by Guise and sent to Trujillo to be condemned.²²⁹

In real terms, this blockade was basically concentrated on Callao, where some incidents occurred. One of them was the result of the difference of opinion between Admiral Guise and the British and North American Senior Officers, in

225.- *Idem.*, 3, 4 & 12/6/1824.

226.- Brown to Bolivar. *Tartar*, Callao, 24/5/1824; Prescott to Brown. *Aurora*, Callao, 7/6/1824, enclosed with Eyre to Croker and Eyre to Maling, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/8/1824, ADM 1/29. ADM 50/152, 17/2/1825.

227.- A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 839, 24/6/1824.

228.- *Idem.*, 10, 11, 28 & 30/7/1824.

229.- *Idem.*, 24/6, 1 & 23/7/1824.

respect to the concept of being in port. The former claimed that Callao port included all the Bay, while the latter replied that foreign ships were not to be considered in port as long as they remained out of the fortress' range.²³⁰

During those years (1821-1824), the Pacific squadron was under the command of succeeding senior officers. As no consular agent was appointed until 1824, British captains had to fulfil consular matters, such as settling controversies amongst British skippers, supercargoes and crews. This particular aspect was far more complicated due to the great mobility of the squadron. It should be born in mind that the area under its responsibility was enormous, covering not only the west coast of America, but also the South Seas Islands. In fact, the Pacific Squadron had to protect British interest from the Cape Horn Meridian to 170° West Longitude. As can be easily understood, despite its importance, it was not always possible to have a vessel at Callao, and even so, the time each one of them remained at port, was also limited. Consequently, it became absolutely necessary to have a consular agent settled in Callao as well as in other important ports all along the area under the Squadron's control.

Towards the end of 1823, the British government decided to appoint consular agents in the newly established Latin American republics. Late in December, the *Cambridge*, Captain Thomas Maling, left England with three consul generals on board (for Montevideo, Santiago and Lima). Mr Thomas Charles Rowcroft, the first British Consul General in Peru, landed at Callao on 21 June 1824; in the company of his Secretary, Mt. Willimott, and V. Passmore, appointed Vice-Consul at Quilca, Arequipa.²³¹

Unfortunately, Consul General Rowcroft was shot dead on 6 December 1824, in a lamentable incident when he was returning to Lima from the *Cambridge*.

230.- Idem.. 23/6/1824.

231.- *Cambridge*, list of passengers, Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 18/6/1824, ADM 1/29. Proctor: 366-373. ADM 50/152, 3/3/1825.

He came on board with his daughter, duly authorized both by Bolivar and Rodil to cross the front safely, to deliver some correspondence for the Foreign Office. It was about 5 p.m. when he finally began his way back, despite General Rodil's advice to wait for the following day to make a safer crossing of the lines. Half a mile after the loyalist line, darkness came, and some minutes later a warning shot was made by patriots' sentinels. The Consul General, showing great imprudence, left his carriage and, riding the horse of one of his servants, took the front, calling the other to follow him. A few minutes later a number of shots were fired and Rowcroft fell down mortally wounded, dying on the following day. Captain Maling buried him with full honours in the island of San Lorenzo, and his daughter was received on board the *Cambridge* to be convoyed back to Britain. Rowcroft's attitude was unnecessarily risky, even foolish, and the only explanation we found was his lack of experience in South America. Maling accepted this situation as an accident, and no complaint was made to the Peruvian government. A few days later, the *Mersey* entered Quilca to transport the Vice Consul Passmore to Chorrillos to take charge of the Consulate.²³²

Between 1821 and 1824, the Pacific Squadron was formed by an average of four men-of-war. A force strong enough if acting together, but not so much in the way it was deployed. As soon as loyalist naval power disappeared from the Eastern Pacific, foreign merchants began to operate along the western coast of America. As already mentioned, first Valparaíso, then Callao, afterwards Guayaquil, Panama, San Blas, and some other ports, were visited by foreign men-of-war, providing protection to their nationals. During these years the most unsettled place was Peru, and therefore British, North American and French squadrons concentrated their efforts in that part of the station. The normal strength of North American and French squadrons was two men-of-war, the largest of them being a frigate. Despite the fact that foreign captains faced similar problems, they

232.- Maling to Eyre. At Sea, 14/12/1824; enclosed with Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 4/3/1825, ADM 1/29.

retained a certain suspicion of each other, especially the British in respect of the French. In 1823, for instance, international relations between both countries deteriorated, to a point that it was reasonable to think of a new war. To prevent such an event, both British and French Pacific Squadrons would be involved in a solitary campaign, both senior naval officers, Captain Prescott and Baron Roussin, agreed to respect Callao's neutrality.²³³

The major naval threat to the British squadron were patriot and loyalist forces. The former consisted of a considerable number of vessels under the flag of a former British Navy Commander, Vice-Admiral Guise. Despite his efforts to conduct a proper maritime war against the loyalist, Guise was unable to prevent gross failures on his government's conception of maritime war, such as the blockades. Forced to fulfil his duties as the Peruvian Squadron Commander-in-Chief, he came through several embarrassing situations, especially with British captains. Neither Guise nor the Peruvian government were willing to be involved in a major incident with foreign powers, and sooner or latter they relinquished their position in favour of what foreign captains required. In practical terms, loyalist naval power had not existed since 1821, as those privateers operating from San Blas, Chiloe and eventually Callao were not a real threat to the British squadron.

Aside official positions, and always in general terms, personal relations between British captains and both patriot and loyalist leaders remained good. Commodore Hardy, for instance, was amongst those invited by San Martin to the ceremony of presentation of the Orden del Sol (Order of the Sun), a sort of nobility (chivalry) order created in December 1821.²³⁴ On July 1823, General O'Higgins was received on board the *Fly* and taken to Callao, having being deposed as Supreme Director of Chile. In October that year, Captain Maclean, of the *Blossom*, met Viceroy La Serna at Quilca, being informed by him about the general situation

233.- O'Byrne, Op. Cit. ADM 50/151, 2/8/1823.

234.- Graham and Humphreys: 353. Leguía V: 151. ADM 50/151, 16/12/1821.

of the war and the chaos involving the independent government.²³⁵ By late 1823, Captain Thomas Brown, of the *Tartar*, held some interviews with members of Torre Tagle's government, receiving a good general impression of them and obtaining a special treatment for British merchant ships calling at Puertos Intermedios.²³⁶ On 10 August 1824, Captain Maling, of the *Cambridge*, met General Rodil at Callao Castles. That November, Maling and Captain Martin, of the *Fly*, landed at Chancay to present their respects to General Bolivar. The latter entertained them and returned the visit twice in the following two days. In his report on these visits, Maling states that Bolivar showed a friendly attitude towards Britain and clearly distrusted the French.²³⁷

One of the few Peruvian authorities unable to have a good personal relationship with British Captains was Admiral Guise, mainly because of his own position as Commander-in-Chief of the Peruvian Squadron. His differences with Captain Maling, of the *Cambridge*, were not softened when both met on board that British man-of-war, on 26 July 1824. Guise accused Maling of favouring the Spaniards, while the latter sent one of his lieutenants before Bolivar to represent his point of view in respect of the incidents arising from the enforcement of the blockade by the Peruvian Admiral.²³⁸ However, when in 1826, having been dismissed for certain political differences with Bolivar, Vice Admiral Guise was imprisoned in Lima, he was visited by Captain Maling and Captain Maxwell, of the *Briton*, as a gesture of friendship to a countryman. On 17 September 1826, when Guise was finally acquitted, he was received on board the *Cambridge* with full honours according to his rank.²³⁹

235.- Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 17/2/1824, ADM 1/29. Sutcliffe: 68-70.

236.- Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 12/6/1824 & 2/5/1825, ADM 1/29. A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 903, 18/12/1823.

237.- Maling to Eyre, Callao, 14/12/1824: enclosed with Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 4/3/1825, ADM 1/29.

238.- A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 839, 30/7/1824.

239.- Hugh Salvin, *Journal written on board of His Majesty's Ship Cambridge from January, 1824, to May, 1827, by the Rev. H.S., Chaplain*, Newcastle, Edward Walker, 1829: 87.

Rodil's resistance

1824 was a crucial year for the independence of South America. Royalist troops were defeated in two major battles (Junin, on 6 August; and Ayacucho, on 9 December), at Ayacucho, General La Serna, the last Viceroy in America, finally surrendered his forces. They included the garrisons of Callao, under Brigadier Rodil, and Chiloe, commanded by Brigadier Quintanilla; and the army of Brigadier Olañeta, in Alto Peru; none of whom accepted the capitulation. The latter army was finally defeated in March 1825. Chiloe, was to resist until early 1826, when it finally surrendered to Chilean forces. During this period, Quintanilla commissioned a number of privateers, some of which acted clearly above the law. British men-of-war visited Chiloe on several occasions, first to announce Ayacucho's capitulation to Quintanilla, and later to protect British shipping, threatened by royalist privateers.²⁴⁰ The third case, Callao two years' resistance and its implications for British-Peruvian relations, need more detailed treatment.

By late 1824 British naval captains and crews stationed in the Pacific were far from the attitude adopted thirteen years previously by Captain Fleeming. In general terms, they felt liking for the patriots, and when the news of their final success at Ayacucho was received on board the *Cambridge*, it was cheered by every one and some officers even asked for Captain Maling's permission to give three hurrays for the patriot's triumph. Putting aside his own personal feelings, Maling did not grant the permission as he considered improper such an attitude from a neutral power.²⁴¹

240.- The *Mersey*, Captain Ferguson, visited Chiloe in March 1824, to complain before General Quintanilla for the capture of the brig *Katherine*. The *Eclair*, Captain Bouchier, sailed in July 1825 to Chiloe in order to inform General Quintanilla of the general situation of South America and Europe [Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 18/6/1824 and *Wellesley*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825, ADM 1/29. Bowers II: 145-163, 190-191].

241.- Salvin, *Op. Cit.*

As Callao was still held by General Rodil, at the request of the Peruvian government, Captain Maling agreed to convoy Peruvian Colonel Monteagudo and two Spanish officers, to inform Rodil of the capitulation. On 26 December 1824, the *Cambridge* anchored out of the range of Callao's fortress with these three officers on board. Immediately, Maling sent a letter to the Spanish General, offering his ship for a meeting between Rodil's commissioners and those already on board, or asking for his permission to land the Spanish emissaries. Already aware of La Serna's capitulation, and with a special mention of the surrender of the Callao fortress, Rodil had no intention of following suit, hoping that reinforcements coming from Spain would arrive at any moment. In this sense, his reply was sharp, refusing any further contact except "every single issue which could be of direct interest to the British government, or one of his subjects". It was clear that any British mediation was banned by Rodil, and therefore Maling returned to his anchorage at Chorrillos. A few days later, up to eight men-of-war from Colombia, Chile and Peru, under Vice-Admiral Blanco Encalada, re-established the blockade of Callao.²⁴²

Until early 1826, when Rodil finally surrendered, the fishing village of Chorrillos was the port of Lima. Foreign ships had no major problems using that port, only the lack of proper ballast. The nearest place where it could be found was the north reef of the Island of San Lorenzo, and for this reason, by early 1825, Captain Murray Maxwell, of the *Briton*, ordered that all British merchant ships should call at that place after landing their cargoes and before going to sea.²⁴³ However, vessels calling at San Lorenzo were to face a new sort of problem, as on 17 May 1825, General Rodil proclaimed as enemies "every single ship or boat, without regard to her nation", which entered the area between the Island and the

242.- José Ramón Rodil, *Memoria del Sitio del Callao*, Sevilla, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1955: 28-29, 213-217.

243.- Murray to Willimot, *Briton*, Chorrillos, 16/7/1825; enclosed with Eyre to Croker, *Wellesley*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825, ADM 1/30.

mainland. When Murray Maxwell learned of that announcement, he sent a launch armed with a carronade and small arms to protect three British merchant vessels already ballasting at San Lorenzo. Wishing to present a formal protest, and to avoid any problem with the blockading squadron, the British Captain landed on 9 June and went to Lima aiming to obtain permission from Colonel Tomas Heres, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to sustain correspondence with Callao fortress. A serious misunderstanding was to arise on this issue, as the Minister refused to grant the permission, considering that Rodil's naval forces were unable to represent any real threat to shipping calling at San Lorenzo. Captain Murray Maxwell and Proconsul Willimott, were to insist on this issue for a complete month, without success.²⁴⁴ On this issue, the Peruvian government's attitude seems to be excessively severe, as there was no real point in refusing to allow British warships to enter into contact with Callao, as long as they could exert some control over it.

When the news of Rodil's decree reached Valparaíso, Captain Maling, by then Senior Officer of the Squadron, ordered Captain Maxwell to enter in contact with Rodil to present his formal protest. To carry out his mission, Maxwell met the President of the Peruvian Government's Council and, after some delay and insistence, permission for the *Briton* and the *Tartar* coming into the port was granted.²⁴⁵ On 27 July, both warships already in the port, an officer from the *Briton* was sent with correspondence to the fortress. As was expected, Rodil reiterated his point of view and refused to cancel the decree. Nevertheless, he invited both British captains to have breakfast with him on the following morning. When Maxwell and Brown landed, they realized that, in spite of the blockading forces' efforts, very little real damage had been inflicted on the fortresses and the garrison was in good health and in high morale. During breakfast, which consisted of various different dishes, Captain Brown offered General Rodil a passage to Europe

244.- Murray to Willimott and to Maling, Chorrillos, 4 & 9/6/1825, and 6/8/1825; enclosed with Eyre to Croker, *Wellesley*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825, ADM 1/30.

245.- Eyre to Croker, *Wellesley*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825, ADM 1/30.

on board the *Tartar*, but the latter replied with irony that he would enjoy very much receiving him in Lima, the next time the *Tartar* entered Callao. Probably to show that the fortress had enough powder, Rodil ordered gun salutes when the British captains left for their ships, a courtesy which was returned by the *Briton* and the *Tartar*.²⁴⁶

Aside these details, the fact was that British captains were forced to continue giving armed protection to British merchant ships calling at San Lorenzo, since the blockade was not effective enough to prevent enemy boats to reaching it.

Rodil's invitation was to bring a disagreeable consequence for Maxwell and Brown, as two deserters from the fortress accused the former of having received two or three boxes with Callao's treasure. Such an accusation was a very serious one, since it mean that British naval officers were acting against blockade rules. Consequently, the Peruvian government asked for explanations and they were given by Maxwell. Finally, the two deserters admitted to have been lying and the Peruvian President himself received Murray Maxwell to present the government's apologies.²⁴⁷

By late December 1825, Rodil was seriously thinking giving up his resistance, but to take a final decision about it he needed fresh information about the European and Spanish situation. In this sense, on 19 and 21 December, British colours were hoisted in the fortress, inviting a British man-of-war to enter the port. Captain Maxwell obtained the Peruvian government's permission and ordered the *Eclair*, Captain Samuel Hemmans, to shorten distances and to the enter in contact with the fortress. However, this attempt failed as a general attack was made before contact was established.²⁴⁸ A few days later, on 11 January 1826, General Rodil asked permission from General Salom, who was in charge of the siege, to send an

246.- Rodil: 287-290. Rodil to Maling, Callao, 28/7/1825; enclosed with Eyre to Croker, Wellesley, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825, ADM 1/30.

247.- Puente (1975) II: 148.

248.- Murray to Eyre, Callao, 31/12/1825, ADM 1/30.

officer aboard the *Briton* to receive information from Europe to help him reach a decision regarding his resistance. This request was accepted and the intelligence brought from the British warship was so discouraging that Rodil finally made up his mind to surrender.²⁴⁹

Negotiations began on 17 January, and a highly honourable capitulation was signed five days later. Even though Rodil repeatedly requested the use of the *Briton* as a meeting place for the negotiations, this time it was the Peruvian government which refused to accept any foreign participation on the agreement. Having requested to be received on board the *Briton* as soon as the capitulation was signed, Rodil came aboard on the afternoon of the 22nd, in company of one officer and three servants. Captain Maxwell showed great consideration towards him, recognizing the great respect Rodil had gained amongst Britons for his gallant defence. The *Briton* finally left Callao in February, Rodil was convoyed to Rio de Janeiro and sailed afterwards to Europe in another ship, reaching Spain in August.²⁵⁰

Just prior to the *Briton*'s departure, the *Cambridge* arrived at Callao, where she was to remain for almost ten months, sailing not further than Huacho. During their long stay at Callao, Captain Maling and pilot William Carr found time to write some directions for entering Callao through the Boqueron. Moreover, finding that the use of this passage could save some time to those vessels coming from the south, Messrs. Gibbs, Crawley and Co., agents of Lloyd's at Lima, with the *Cambridge*'s Captain "have gone to the expense and trouble of laying down buoys in the Channel". These instructions were published in a Peruvian newspaper on April 1827, and in Britain two months later.²⁵¹ These were not the first

249.- Rodil: 123-129

250.- Rodil: 300-312. Anna: 236-237. Murray to Eyre, *Briton*, Callao, 31/12/1825. ADM 1/30.

251.- *El Telégrafo de Lima* n° 17, 23/4/1827, n° 188, 17/11/1827. *The Naval and Military Magazine*, London, I (1827): 625.

hydrographic remarks regarding the Peruvian coast made by British men-of-war. For instance, Casma was surveyed initially by the *Tartar*, in April 1825, and afterwards by the *Mersey*.²⁵² By the same time, Mr. Bayley, Master Mate on the *Cambridge*, had already made several accurate plans of the places touched by his vessel, Captain Maling forwarding them to the Hydrographic Office.²⁵³

The Peruvian struggle for Independence finally ended in 1826, after almost ten years. The country was placed in a difficult economic and political situation, relying almost completely on foreign shipping for its trade as the Peruvian mercantile marine was totally destroyed. The British presence had become absolutely necessary during the war, both for patriots and loyalists, and therefore British warships were involved in quite a delicate task, protecting their nationals from the abuses of both sides. During most of this period, British Captains were the sole British authority in the area, holding responsibility to represent their government and to provide it with proper information to establish a policy regarding the newly-formed republics. The arrival of consular agents was to liberate naval officers of these kind of duties, but in subsequent years the usual lot of inter-service frictions were also present in Peruvian ports.²⁵⁴

252.- ADM 50/151: 5/7/1825, 10 & 14/1, 23/6/1826.

253.- Maling to Lord Melville, 13/4/1825, Scottish Record Office, GD 51/2669-689.

254.- D. C. M. Platt *The Cinderella Service, British Consuls since 1825*. London, Longman, 1971. Eyre to Croker, *Wellesley*, Rio de Janeiro, 26/4/1826, ADM 1/29.

CHAPTER THREE
The Peruvian Republic,
internal and external conflicts
(1826-1835)

With the end of the struggle for Peruvian independence, the government became a sort of prize for a number of military leaders or “caudillos”. Having fought the wars of independence, they were truly convinced that they were the only people able to rule the country; or even worse, that they had the right to do it. Peruvian History calls this period the “first militarism”, and it was full of internal and external conflicts. It finally ended when Peru and Bolivia became a confederation ruled by the strong hand and able mind of Bolivian Marshall Santa Cruz.

During this nine-year period (1826-1835), Peruvian relations with the other two Bolívarian republics, Colombia and Bolivia, went through some ups and downs, to a point that war eventually broke out against them. In the case of Colombia, the reason of the conflict was closely related to Bolívar’s desperate attempts to avoid Colombia breaking up into three separate States: Nueva Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador. The war itself helped very little in that purpose, and Colombia disintegrated in 1830. The reasons for the conflict with Bolivia are more complex, and could be related to the liberal policy instituted by its President, Marshall Santa Cruz, who established a sea-port at such an isolated place as Cobija with the clear intention to compete with Arica as the gate for Bolivia foreign trade.

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Blockades were established in both cases, being regarded as illegal by North-Americans, French and British, for the same reasons argued against most of those blockades declared during the war of independence.

Peruvian relations with Britain, the United States and France, the most important commercial powers at that time, also suffered some changes. According to Paul Gootenberg,²⁵⁵ the most active and persevering of them was the United States, whose consular agents at Lima, notably William Tudor (1824-1828), tried every possible way to open for his nationals the over-protected Peruvian market. The French acted with a great sense of opportunity, appointing a *Charge de Affairs* in 1826, whose main duty was to obtain as many advantages as possible for those luxury goods which were the core of their trade. In a general sense, those willing to improve their lot through trade and commerce, generally viewed the ties between their countries and Peru as positive. Those challenged by foreign imports, such as textile manufacturers in northern Peru, wanted to maintain the *status quo*, keep the markets closed and protected. In this sense, Peruvians were described as either “nationalists” or “internationalist”, “protectionist” or “free trade imperialist”.²⁵⁶

That was a very fluid situation, in which French and North American consular agents committed themselves very seriously and deeply in Peruvian internal affairs to convince politicians, caudillos and merchants, of the advantages of liberalism against protectionism. That was a long term struggle, in which the powerful Chamber of Trade, as part of the Tribunal del Consulado, was able to resist liberalism advances until the 1850's. In this long term struggle, North

²⁵⁵.- *Between Silver and Guano*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989, 18-33.

American and French consular agents were enthusiastically supported, and sometimes overpassed, by naval commodores.²⁵⁷

The British, following Consul General Ricketts failure in convincing Bolívar and Peruvian elite to establish a free-trade regime, limited their efforts to maintain their trade without disturbance. That attitude was to last throughout the period covered by this chapter, in spite of which the value of British imports increased slowly until reach 600,000 dollars in 1836, finally exceeding the 1825's figure, as shown in graphic one named "British imports to Peru (dollars/years)".²⁵⁸

Accordingly, it could be said that commercial links between British and Peruvian merchants improved during these years. However, a serious misunderstanding was to threaten this particular relationship in 1830, following the detention of the brig *Hidalgo* by Peruvian authorities, and the subsequent intervention of two British men-of-war. As a consequence, British consular agents at Lima were forced to abandon the country, and their duties were taken over by naval captains for a couple of years. Even when this incident was soon overcome by both governments, it helped to increase the general antipathy towards foreigners, a feeling which was properly supported by the local elite as a way to defend their control of the Peruvian market against liberal ideas brought by North Americans, British and French.

²⁵⁶.- Clayton, 107-108.


²⁵⁷.- Margarita Guerra. "La Confederación Pacífico-Boliviana en el testimonio de los informes de marinos franceses". (PH. D. Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1967), 1-9, 28-40. Robert E. Johnson, *Thence Around Cape Horn: The Story of United States Naval Forces on the Pacific Station, 1818-1923*, Annapolis, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1963.

²⁵⁸.- Heraclio Bonilla, *Gran Bretaña y el Perú: los mecanismos de un control económico*, Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1977, p. 159.

Graphic 1

British Imports to Peru (dollars/years)

British imports to Peru (dollars/years)



In 1832, the new British Consul General in Peru, Belfort Hinton Wilson, who was to remain in office for a decade, arrived to Callao. A former aide-de-camp of General Bolívar, Wilson was very well acquainted with Bolívarian republics and its leaders. His previous experience and the particular situation he had to face, forced him to request that the Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron should serve for a fixed period of time, establishing in this way a more regular service.

Another topic in which the Pacific Squadron became involved during these years was in the exploration of Peru itself, both by means of hydrographic surveys and by expeditions to the Amazon basin and the Andes. In this task, they were supported by local authorities.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the way in which the British Squadron conducted in each one of the situations previously mentioned, trying to identify the following general issues:

- a) Degree of neutrality British captains adopted during internal struggles;
- b) Attitude towards Peruvian authorities;
- c) Cooperation between British naval captains and local consular agents;
- d) Attitude adopted during international wars against Colombia and Bolivia;
- e) Relations with other naval forces in the area
- f) Commitment of the Pacific Squadron to support the increment of British trade

Internal struggles

In September 1826, mainly because internal problems in Colombia, General Simon Bolívar abandoned Peru, entrusting the government to a Council headed by General Andres de Santa Cruz. A few months later, following the rebellion on the Colombian Division quartered in Lima, echoing Colombian internal problems, the

newly approved Constitution, according to which Bolívar would rule Peru until his death, was revoked. The Colombian Division was repatriated and Santa Cruz, despite his close links with Bolívar, managed to continue ruling the country until June 1827, when the Congress elected Marshall José de la Mar as President of Peru. As was already expected, the new government faced some difficulties with Bolívar and his followers, and soon the relations between Peru and Colombia deteriorated. To avoid a possible Bolivian intervention in favour of Colombia, the Peruvian government supported local nationalist and even sent an expeditionary army to help to depose Bolivian President, Colombian Marshall Antonio José de Sucre.

This intervention, followed by other diplomatic incidents, plunged Peru and Colombia into war. The political outcome of it was the deposition of President La Mar by Great Marshall Agustin Gamarra, who became the new ruler of Peru by late August 1829. Gamarra was to remain in office four years, a time in which seventeen rebellions tried to depose him. In 1830, when he marched to Cuzco, the Presidency was temporary exerted by vice-president General Antonio Gutiérrez de la Fuente, who was replaced in April 1831 by Andrés Reyes, President of the Senate. For a few weeks in 1832, Peruvian Presidency was entrusted to Manuel Tellería, President of the Senate; and in 1833 to José Braulio del Camporredondo, vice-president of that Parliament branch.

In December 1833, Marshal José de Orbegoso was elected President of Peru. A military coup attempted to disown that result, but Lima's population reacted against this *coup* and defeated the rebels, thus beginning another civil war, which finally ended in April 1834 with Orbegoso's triumph. During the fighting, Marshall

Santa Cruz, President of Bolivia since 1828, was called to support Orbegoso. Even when he officially declined to intervene in Peruvian affairs, Santa Cruz was deeply involved in them, by supporting and even encouraging some local South Peruvian leaders to create a separate State. Less than a year later, in January 1835, Callao garrison mutinied against President Orbegoso, while he was in South Peru. Following a short struggle, General Salaverry controlled the situation, only to lead another uprising on the following month. The civil war which followed this revolution lasted almost a year, providing Bolivian President Santa Cruz what he actually was looking for, an official invitation from President Orbegoso to send an army to support him in the struggle. The outcome of Santa Cruz intervention was the establishment of the Confederation of Peru and Bolivia, under his protection.

In general terms, British captains were able to remain aside the revolutionary turmoil of the new Spanish American republics. However, in a few cases they became involved, as happened with Captain Bingham, of the *Thetis*, on December 1829, when he answered a request of the Chilean government to capture the rebel 20-gun brig *Aquiles*. His attitude was highly disapproved of by the Admiralty, and it became an important precedent for those captains who afterwards were to face similar “invitations” from Peruvian or other Latin American governments.²⁵⁹

Regarding Peru, the most sensitive of this situations occurred on 1 January 1835, when the garrison of Callao castles mutinied against President General Orbegoso, and offered allegiance to General La Fuente, who having arrived at Callao two days before was on board U.S. schooner *Fairfield*, Commander

²⁵⁹.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 8/2/1830, and Admiralty minute, 23/9/1830, ADM 1/32. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 379.

Sallet.²⁶⁰ Even when La Fuente declined to accept the leadership of the rebellion, the mutineers considered that he was under the restraint of foreign naval forces and, consequently, decided to attack any foreign boat landing at Callao.

At the anchorage was H.M. sloop *Satellite*, Captain W. C. Smart. He landed by 8 a.m. in order to learn what was going on, and two hours later other boats left the sloop for the shore, in charge of Lieutenant William Russell Drummond. They were received by the mutineers with musket bullets, one of which wounded Lieutenant Drummond “in the leg so badly, that he was obliged to submit to an amputation of which he died” a month later. This young naval officer had the strange honour to be the first buried at the British Cemetery, located at Callao, on 1 February 1835.²⁶¹

The rebellion ended only at 12.30 of the following day, when the “Peruvian flag was hoisted at the fort and a salute fired of 24 guns”, the fort being occupied by troops under Generals Nieto and Salaverry. During the first day of fighting, shots were received on board the shipping lying in the harbour; one of them was the Peruvian schooner *Isabel Estrella*, where a seaman was wounded. Unable to land to get medical care, the master took him to the *Satellite*, but sadly he died that evening. Late that night, as gun and musket fire increased, the British man-of-war shifted further out from shore, sending boats to assist the shipping in the harbour to move out of gun-range from the castle.²⁶²

²⁶⁰.- *El Genio del Rimac*, 2 & 3/1/1835. *El Redactor Peruano*, 7/1/1835.

²⁶¹.- ADM 51/3474. Burial Grave Lt. Drummond. Peter Campbell Scarlett, *South America and the Pacific*, London, Henry Colburn, 1838, II: 121-122. Brenda Harriman, *The British in Peru*: 36.

²⁶².- ADM 51/3474. *El Genio del Rimac*, 1 & 2/1/1835.

A formal complaint was presented to the Peruvian government for these actions, but General Salaverry's rebellion against President Orbegoso, while he was visiting South Peru, brought another unsettled period for Peru, making it impossible to conduct a proper enquiry to identify those responsible for the incidents of January. Salaverry was able to cope with local resistance at Callao and Lima, being proclaimed Supreme Chief of the Republic and declaring war on Orbegoso and his allies. The British Pacific Squadron was to be involved in this civil war in September 1835, when Captain Charles Pearson, of the brig-sloop *Sparrowhawk*, offered protection for two supporters of Marshall Gamarra.

As already mentioned, following Salaverry uprising, President Orbegoso asked for Bolivian President General Santa Cruz's assistance by sending troops. As a consequence of this situation, Salaverry, with Gamarra as new ally, declared war on Bolivia in July 1835.²⁶³

The first battle was fought at Yanacocha, Cuzco, on 13 August 1835, and was a triumph for Santa Cruz and Orbegoso's army over Gamarra. The survivors of the defeated army made their way to the coast, trying to reach the security offered by the navy, which largely supported Salaverry. While a number of them were captured and executed by the victors, Colonels Bernardo Escudero and Juan Torres managed to reach Arica, being received on the French merchant ship *Cassimer Perrier*, sailing afterwards to Islay, already occupied by Orbegoso's troops. The night of 3 September, fearing that they would be shot if the port authorities forced the *Cassimer Perrier*'s skipper to deliver them, both officers came to the just arrived *Sparrowhawk*, asking for asylum. Following his

²⁶³.- Jorge Basadre. *Historia de la República del Perú*. Lima, Editorial Universitaria, 1968. II: 112-113.

instructions, to avoid compromising British neutrality, Captain Pearson refused to receive them on board. Escudero and Torres, already aware that the *Cassimer Perrier* was under search by an armed party, managed to board the British merchant vessel *Dyson* without being discovered. Early in the following morning, having learned of the presence of both Peruvian officers in that vessel, the acting British Consul at Islay, Mr. Crompton, came aboard the *Sparrowhawk* to consult with Pearson what to do in this case. They initially agreed to return Escudero and Torres to the French vessel, but having learned that a boat with an armed party was already at the *Dyson*'s side asking for them, aiming to avoid any violence on board a British vessel and considering that any other decision would mean condemning them to death, decided to offer the *Sparrowhawk*'s protection to both Peruvian officers. To confirm their suspicions, Crompton was informed by the officers in charge of the search party that they had orders to shoot Escudero and Torres two hours after they landed. Pearson's attitude was fully approved by the Admiralty,²⁶⁴ even when, at least technically, British neutrality was affected as those received on board were directly involved in the fighting.

Salaverry was finally defeated in Socabaya (7 February 1836), being shot to death shortly after that battle. His death removed the last obstacle to the establishment of the Confederation of Peru and Bolivia. Even before Socabaya, Salaverry's relatives and followers, most of them naval officers, garrisoned at Callao, which was placed under siege almost immediately by Orbegoso's troops. General Salaverry's mother, wife and brothers, were received as refugees on

²⁶⁴.- Crompton to Pearson and Pearson to Mason, *Sparrowhawk*, Islay, 4/9/1835; Admiralty Minute, 10/1/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Rio de Janeiro, 8/12/1835, ADM 1/45. Hammond a Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 6/12/1836, ADM 1/47.

board the French man-of-war *La Flore*, Commodore Maulac, with the full support of British Commodore Mason, taking into account their civil condition.²⁶⁵

Peruvian civil wars during this period included some blockades, which in turn moved foreign naval captains to repudiate them. That was the case of the blockade of the coast from Atico to Ilo, declared on 7 April 1834 by General Domingo Nieto, Commander-in-Chief of South Peru for President Orbegoso. A few days before, Captain Seymour, in the *Challenger*, arrived at Islay to receive merchants' remittances, being asked by Udmy Passmore, the local British consul, and by a number of British and French merchants, to delay his departure, since it was expected that rebel troops would appear at any moment. Seymour remained at port until 23 April, sailing afterwards for Valparaíso where he informed Captain James Townshend, Senior Officer of the Squadron, of that situation. The blockading decree was initially denounced as illegal by Passmore, since no naval force was present at Islay to enforce it. However, on 14 April, it became known that the Peruvian sloop-of-war *Libertad* was cruising off the port, legalizing in that way the blockade.²⁶⁶

Captain Townshend considered General Nieto's decree as absolutely illegal, since those kind of measures only could be adopted by the highest level of the government, which in the case of Peru was President Orbegoso himself. Therefore, he instructed Captain Eden, of the *Conway*, to cruise off Puertos Intermedios from May to September, recapturing any British vessel seized by Peruvian men-of-war, and landing marines to recover any British property put on shore as a result of this

²⁶⁵.- Alfredo Guinassi Morán, *General Trinidad Morán 1796 a 1854. Estudios Históricos y Biográficos*, Caracas, 1954: 519-520.

²⁶⁶.- Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo, 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

blockade.²⁶⁷ Fortunately, no incident arose as the civil war ended shortly after the blockade was declared.

Despite having quite a small naval force, on 6 March 1835, the government headed by General Salaverry declared Islay and Arica under blockade, closed the coast between Pisco and Islay to foreign trade, and placed an embargo on all native vessels at Callao bound to other Peruvian ports.²⁶⁸

As could be expected, British Commodore Mason, of the *Blonde*, and French Captain Nonay, of the brig *Acteon*, protested against this set of measures, refusing to accept them. Their attitude moved Salaverry's government to soften its position, banning only war contraband. Quite unusually, the U.S. Senior Naval Officer accepted the blockade.²⁶⁹

To avoid compromising British neutrality in this civil war, Rear-Admiral Hammond, Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station, instructed Mason to prevent British vessels from transporting war material for both parties, and asked the Admiralty for reinforcements, taking into account the unstable situation on the West Coast.²⁷⁰ In order to offer better protection to their nationals, Mason and the French senior naval officer reached an agreement, according to which they would help and even replace each other when necessary. This agreement was

²⁶⁷.- Townshend to Eden, *Dublin*, Valparaiso 15/5/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, 11/6/1834. ADM 1/42. ADM 3108.

²⁶⁸.- *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 7/3/1835. Scarlett II: 110.

²⁶⁹.- Scarlett II: 120.

²⁷⁰.- Hammond to Dawson, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro 11 & 12/3/1835, ADM 1/43. Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 25/8/1835, ADM 1/44.

approved by Hammond, but remained unofficial, to avoid a further obligations to his forces.²⁷¹ In the following years, this co-operation will continue very closely.

While civil war between Salaverry and Orbegoso lasted, the Peruvian squadron, having joined Salaverry, was ordered to blockade and commit hostilities along the coast from Nazca to Cobija, still in the hands of Orbegoso and his few followers, as well as to clear the seas from enemy vessels.²⁷² Accordingly, Captain Iladoy, with the *Libertad* and the *Arequipaño*, captured Islay on 5 June. Two days later, H.M. sloop *Satellite*, Captain Smart, arrived and was visited by Iladoy and the senior officer of the landed troops. A few days later, the three men-of-war sailed to Arica, and on 12 June, following the attack of both Peruvian vessels to the port,²⁷³ Captain Smart sent her cutter to help the British barge *Fairfield* to move out of the anchorage.²⁷⁴ These naval operations were legally conducted, not producing any complain from the British captain.

Besides blockades, Peruvian civil wars brought a number of associated problems, both at the countryside and in towns. Claiming to support one of the parties in dispute, several bands of guerrilla groups made it unsafe to travel inland, both for Peruvian and foreigners. British Consul General Wilson, French Viscount Eugene de Satinguies and an English gentleman, were to realise that on 25 March 1835, when they were assaulted by one of these groups just a few miles away from Lima gates.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 31/8/1835, ADM 1/44.

²⁷².- *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 2/5 & 24/6/1835.

²⁷³.- Iladoy to the Minister of War, *Libertad*, Islay, 6/6/1835, published in the *Gaceta del Gobierno*, 17/6/1835.

²⁷⁴.- ADM 51/3474.

²⁷⁵.- Scarlett II: 104-105.

These kind of problems eventually moved British captains to land marines for the protection of British lives and properties. That happened on 27 March 1835, two days after Consul General Wilson was assaulted, when Lima was threatened by a number of guerrilla groups who claimed to be fighting for Orbegoso. In this circumstance, and attending a call made by the British Consul at Callao, Captain Mason sent a party of marines “to protect the property of an Englishman near Callao from the montoneros”.²⁷⁶ This action was not reported by Mason, nor was it recorded in the *Blonde*’s log, for he was acting beyond his instructions, suggesting that these sort of attitudes could be expected in similar situations.

In October 1835, when Captain Harcourt, of the *North Star*, arrived at Callao, the situation was even more complicated. Salaverry had moved south with his troops in late-September, leaving a small garrison to protect the city, at the very moment when Orbegoso’s troops came close. For this reason, British merchants and Consul General Wilson asked for Harcourt’s protection and requested permission from the acting government to allow a party of marines to land. Permission was denied, but within a few weeks the situation deteriorated to a point that this decision was changed.²⁷⁷ On 14 December, attending a new request made by foreign merchants and consuls, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel B. Ferreyros, authorised the landing of British, French and United States marines to protect their fellow countrymen. On his reply to Wilson, Ferreyros recognised that even when the government was still able to guarantee foreigners’ security, that situation could change at any moment. In the following couple of days, North Americans and French marines landed and marched to Lima. On 16 December,

²⁷⁶.- Scarlett II: 117-118.

²⁷⁷.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 14/3/1836, ADM 1/45.

Ferreyros wrote another letter to Wilson, informing him that his government was no longer able to control the city, and therefore marines should land to protect British subjects in Lima. He even offered San Pedro or Las Mercedes monasteries, and the Police barracks, to quarter those troops to be landed. In the following days, the city was abandoned by its garrison, which moved to Callao, and the government dissolved itself.²⁷⁸

British property at Lima amounted to several million dollars, as only Gibbs, Crawley & C^o had 1'200,000 dollars, and there were "fourteen other houses".²⁷⁹ Under normal circumstances it was a difficult task to move such a quantity of goods, but in those days it became impossible as mules were confiscated by the army, and many robberies were committed in the road from Lima.

Foreseeing that chaos, on December 24 Mason landed a party of marines with specific orders to protect British lives and property and not to get involved in the civil war itself. British marines remained in Lima almost a month, until 22 January 1836, when, having occupied the city General Orbegoso, they returned to the *Blonde*. Second Lieutenant Frazier, the officer in command, was recommended to the Admiralty for his troops' intervention to stop a looting attempt.²⁸⁰

Shortly after that, with French and North American marines still at Lima, Mason departed for Valparaíso, ordering the *Rover* to follow him on 31 January. He considered that no further protection was required at Lima, without compromising British neutrality, since the civil war was still going on in South

²⁷⁸. - Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 24/12/1835; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 6/5/1836, ADM 1/45.

²⁷⁹. - Mason to Hammond, 16/4/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, at Sea, 15/7/1836, ADM 1/46.

²⁸⁰. - Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* At Sea, 15/7/1836, ADM 1/46.

Peru. That point of view was not shared by French and North American commodores, neither by British merchants and Consul General Wilson. For this reason, the latter produced a strong complaint assuring that Mason had failed in provide a proper protection. Moreover, they request that the Admiralty appoint an Admiral as a separate command to the Pacific, since the amount of British trade and properties deserved more protection that was actually offered by a Commodore.²⁸¹

This complain reveals the great difficulty naval captains had in fulfilling merchants' and consuls' wishes, and, on the other hand, it also shows the rivalry between naval and consular services, matters which will be discussed latter on. In spite of these considerations, it was the first time a request was made to the Admiralty to create a separate naval station for the Pacific, even when in 1830 Rear Admiral Baker suggested to move the Commander-in-Chief's usual anchorage from Rio de Janeiro to the Pacific.²⁸² That proposal was grounded by the Admiralty, who stated that the Brazilian port was the main place of residence for the Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station.²⁸³

Some months later, in September 1837, Rear Admiral Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station, an appointment which could be directly related to the claim made by British merchants at Lima during those unsettled days in January 1836. Nonetheless, despite this kind of complaint, the British squadron was able to maintain neutrality in those

²⁸¹ .- Merchants complain, Lima 28/1/1836; enclosed with Mason to Hammond. 16/4/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, at Sea, 15/7/1836, ADM 1/46.

²⁸² .- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 8/6/1830, ADM 1/32.

²⁸³ .- Baker to Elliot, and enclosed Baker to Waldegrave, *Warspite* Rio de Janeiro, 5/6/1831, ADM 1/35.

uncertain years, in which a number of caudillos tried by every possible way to reach power.

Several of them were met by British captains and officers, some in their greatest moments and some other in disgrace, and two Peruvian Chiefs of State even visited British men-of-war. Santa Cruz, Head of the Government following Bolívar's departure, came on board the *Cambridge*, Captain Maling, in 26 November 1826;²⁸⁴ and President Orbegoso visited the *Samarang*, Captain Paget, on 25 August 1834, being received by Commodore Mason, of the *Blanche*, Senior Officer of the Squadron. In company with the Peruvian Squadron, the *Samarang* took the President on a short visit to San Lorenzo Island landing him late that evening.²⁸⁵ It is highly suggestive the presence of Santa Cruz and Orbegoso on board British vessels, as they were the most identified with liberals ideas amongst those who ruled Peru in this period.

Amongst those British naval officers who provide a valuable source of this period, was Lieutenant Charles Brand, who visited Callao and Lima from 16 September to 10 November 1827. The reason for his long stay at these places is not clear, especially considering that he arrived and departed in merchant vessels and no records were kept. His journal, published as *Journal of a voyage to Peru* (London 1828), gives no clue of his mission, providing instead a good description of both towns and population.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴.- ADM 51/3085

²⁸⁵.- ADM 51/3077 & 51/3432. The National Maritime Museum. M.C.L./2. Log of proceeding of H.M.S. *Samarang*, Charles H. Paget, Captain, Commencing 22 June 1831, Ending 24 January 1835. T.L. McIntock.

²⁸⁶.- Charles Brand *Journal of a voyage to Peru*, London 1828: 173-191.

But, if high level relations were more or least easy going, it was rather different with naval authorities, mainly because incidents arose in respect to British seamen serving in Peruvian men-of-war.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, a number of foreign seaman joined the Peruvian Navy at its earliest stages. However, as at the end of the independence wars the Peruvian squadron was almost completely dismantled and its budget was deeply cut, wages were delayed and consequently desertion increased, specially amongst British and North American sailors. Some of the former were received on British men-of-war, producing the immediate complain from Peruvian naval authorities.

That happened in late 1827, when Joseph Gilbert and William Brand, two British seamen serving on Vice-Admiral Guise's flag-frigate *Presidente*,²⁸⁷ deserted and were enlisted on the *Menai*, Captain Michael Seymour. He was informed that a number of British seamen were forced to enter Peruvian service, receiving no bounty for it, and being subject to the same treatment and punishment as nationals. Amongst those were mentioned William Elbroo and another two on board the *Congreso*, while Thomas Hillars, Thomas Elmes, James Head and James Osborn were reported on other Peruvian men-of-war.²⁸⁸

On 1 December, Peruvian Vice-Admiral Guise wrote a letter to Captain Sinclair, of the *Doris*, asking for both deserters (Gilbert and Brand), assuring him that they had received a proper bounty. In his reply, Sinclair stated that the Peruvian government would have to release all those British sailors enlisted by

287.- Former *Protector*..

288.- Otway to Croker, *Ganges*. Rio de Janeiro, 29/7/1828, ADM 1/31.

force, and even if they volunteered they were not to be subject to the same punishments as nationals. Nevertheless, in a private letter, he promised to give both sailors back if a receipt for their bounty was provided. A number of letters followed, and they gradually developed into a growing misunderstanding between Guise and Sinclair. Finally, as the deserters were not likely to return from the *Menai*, the Peruvian Admiral proposed to refer the whole subject to the British Admiralty.²⁸⁹

Scarcely two days after the *Doris*' departure, William Elbroo was reported by his brother George as having been enlisted by force on the Peruvian brig *Congreso*. Pro-Consul Willimott immediately complained about this new incident, as well as Captain Pait, of the *Volage*, who sent Lieutenant Parker to the *Congreso* twice to obtain a first-hand account on the subject. Parker's report stated that Elbroo was taken on board against his will and afterwards forced to receive the usual bounty. Peruvian authorities responded that as the sailor had received a proper bounty, there was no reason to release him from the service. Elbroo's situation was to remain uncertain for some months, but his case suggests that some of the British sailors serving in the Peruvian Navy felt that they were properly backed by British Captains if deserted and claimed protection, arguing that they had been enlisted by force.²⁹⁰

In any case, British captains' attitude with respect to British seamen in the Peruvian service was fully approved both by their superiors at Rio and London. Learning of these incidents, Rear-Admiral George Eyre, Commander-in-Chief of

²⁸⁹.- Otway to Sinclair, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 27/4/1828, ADM 1/30.

²⁹⁰.- Several letters between Pait, Guise, Willimott and Sinclair, Callao 25/12/1827 to 9/2/1828; enclosed with Otway to Croker, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 29/7/1828, ADM 1/31.

the South America Station, was very critical towards Peruvian authorities, mentioning on his report to the Admiralty that they only respect force, “being the British on its service the main cause of our problems”.²⁹¹ Consequently, British Captains serving in the Pacific were instructed to direct their claims in these sort of situations through British consular agents, and if this claims were unsuccessful, they were to use force, requiring first a direct order from the Commander-in-Chief.²⁹²

A final judgement of this kind of problems required a serious analysis of Peruvian and British naval records; however, the former are incomplete and, obviously, the latter provide only a half the story. Taking into consideration that during its first years the Peruvian Navy was ruled by former Royal Navy officers, it was quite unlikely that any of them could order or support such a silly action as abducting foreign sailors, or enlisting them without payment. A firm defence of this point of view was made by the Peruvian Commander-in-Chief in 1834, when another incident arose regarding a British sailor deserting from the Peruvian squadron.²⁹³

In conclusion, it seems to be very probable that some abuses were committed on both sides; on the one hand Peruvian captains were trying to have properly manned vessels despite the budget cut, and, on the other, British sailors were taking advantage of the support given by the British squadron, even when not always telling the truth.

²⁹¹.- Eyre to Croker, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 29/7/1828, ADM 1/31.

²⁹².- Otway to Sinclair, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 27/4/1828, ADM 1/30.

²⁹³.- A.H. de M. Libro 847, 7/2/1834.

From our point of view, when British captains claimed that foreign sailors were not to receive the same treatment as nationals, they were reflecting a sense of superiority with respect to Peruvian seamen. It should be reminded that those who signed to join that service, submitted themselves to similar treatment as nationals. This topic raises another issue, already mentioned in the previous chapter, the old dislike Peruvian had for foreigners. It lasted for several years, as an additional aspect of the more complex economic contest between protectionism and liberalism, between local and foreign merchants.

Eventually, British men-of-war were also affected by these kind of feelings, as happened with the *Menai*, Captain Thomas Bouchier, at Arica on 29 December 1828. For unmentioned reasons, a mob attacked a British group which had landed for watering, forcing Bouchier to dispatch a number of armed boats to protect their men. While the boats were heading to shore, port defences were prepared for action and a similar attitude was assumed in the British frigate. Fortunately, shortly after midday, port authorities presented their excuses for the mob attitude, and the incident was overcome.²⁹⁴

A new incident between Peruvian authorities and British Captains arose by late-March 1834, following the U.S. schooner *Dolphin*, Lieutenant Commander J. C. Long, unauthorised visit to Chorrillos, a port which was not officially open to receive vessels. For some inexplicable mistake, José María Corbacho y Abril, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was informed that the vessel at that anchorage was H.M.S. *Dublin* instead of the *Dolphin*, and therefore he wrote a letter to British Consul General Wilson asking for explanations. To make things

²⁹⁴.- ADM 51/3314.

more complicated, Corbacho's letter included a paragraph stating his belief that the *Dublin* was at Chorrillos not with "the object to protect any illegal trade, but for some accident, and if he promises to re-embark those officers who are said to be landed, she could take her usual anchorage in Callao harbour".²⁹⁵

Without consulting with Captain Townshend, of the *Dublin*, Wilson replied making clear the Minister's mistake, refusing to accept the suggestion that British naval officers could be engaged in any sort of unlawful activity, and asking for full explanations.²⁹⁶ A few days later, Corbacho accepted his mistake, but made no further comments on the possibility that British officers were involved in illegal trade, ending his note by stating that it was not necessary to enlarge further on this issue.²⁹⁷

Townshend was not entirely satisfied with this answer, and considered it absolutely necessary to receive written apologies on those suggestions which referred to the honour of his officers. Moreover, according to his point of view, the lack of a trade treaty between Britain and Peru allowed the use of "British power in these seas when so ever and wherever it suits to protect and support His Majesty's subjects and properties".²⁹⁸ Taking advantage of the Minister's mistake, and trying to establish a guideline for relations between Peruvian government and the British squadron, especially in revolutionary times, he made a highly unusual statement, disregarding Peruvian sovereignty:

²⁹⁵.- Corbacho to Wilson, Lima 24/3/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

²⁹⁶.- Wilson to Corbacho, Lima 24/3/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

²⁹⁷.- Corbacho a Wilson, Lima 27/3/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

“I consider myself, as well as every one of his Majesty Ships and Vessels, to be at full liberty to proceed to any part of the coasts of this country, and hold communications therewith, either by the boats, or otherwise, as may considered beneficial for the protection of British subjects, and their property”²⁹⁹

As could easily be expected, Townshend’s letter was unacceptable to the Peruvian government, and therefore Corbacho wrote to Wilson on 5 April, asking for the withdrawal of all those expressions concerning Peruvian sovereignty. The British Captain refused to do so and left Callao in late-April 1834, promising to Wilson to submit all the correspondence on the *Dolphin* incident to the Admiralty.³⁰⁰

It seems that because of internal struggles, the Peruvian government failed to make a further complain to the British government. Townshend’s letter deserved that, as it was the strongest and tactless proclamation done by a British Captain with respect to Peruvian sovereignty. But, as happened in many other cases, the unsettled condition of the country facilitate such kind of disrespect.

But definitely, the most important incident arose in 1830, when the *Tribune* and the *Sapphire* captured the Peruvian sloop-of-war *Libertad*, following the detention of the brig *Hidalgo*.

²⁹⁸.- Townshend to Wilson, *Dublin*, Callao 31/3/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

²⁹⁹.- Townshend to Wilson, *Dublin*, Callao 31/3/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo, 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

³⁰⁰.- Townshend to Wilson, *Dublin*, Callao 4, 9, 21 & 25/4/1834; Wilson to Townshend, 5 & 16/4/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

The brigantine *Hidalgo*'s incident (1830).³⁰¹

The brig *Hidalgo* (former *Pam Be Civil*), a British-owned vessel sailing under Mexican colours, changed owner and name at the Mexican port of Guaymas, departing for Callao early in March 1830. Thomas Spencer, the new owner, taking into account that on a previous visit to this port local authorities had not been very exhaustive in the inspection of the vessel's licence, did not bother to obtain a proper registration of the *Hidalgo* as a Mexican vessel. The Master Juan Pablo Fletes was provided with a licence to sail from Oaxaca to Monterrey, granted by the naval authority at San Blas, on 2 February; and with bills of lading which proved that the cargo was British owned. By the end of that month, the *Hidalgo* entered Guaymas sailing afterwards directly to Callao.³⁰²

On his arrival at this port, on 1 May, Fletes produced the vessel's papers for the port authorities, who immediately detected that the *Hidalgo* registration was quite different from those granted by Mexican authorities. Moreover, as Foreign Affairs Minister José María de Pando pointed out in the following days, the brig was sailing with an irregular licence, since the one presented by Fletes only authorised the *Hidalgo* to trade along the Mexican coast. Charged as offender against article 2º of the 1822 Prize Regulations, article 6º of Privateering Regulations and article 1st of the 10th title of the Matrícula Regulations, the *Hidalgo* and her cargo were detained on 2 May.³⁰³

³⁰¹.- Celia Wu, *Generals and Diplomats, Great Britain and Perú, 1820-40*, Cambridge, Centre of Latin American Studies, 1991: 36-52.

³⁰².- Pando to Willimott, copy nº 5, Lima, 14/5/1830, PRO, FO 61/8.

³⁰³.- A.H. de M. Buques: *Hidalgo*, Callao 27/7/1830, copy of the sentence on the trial of the brig *Hidalgo*; Callao 2/5/1830, Vivero to General José de Ribadeneyra y Tejada, Minister of War.

According to these regulations, a preliminary view of the case was to be made by the Peruvian Navy's Commander-in-Chief, who might choose either to release or to prosecute the vessel. The same authority could decide to land the cargo even before the sentence was pronounced if it was likely to suffer damage on board. In this case, the cargo was deposited in the Customs Office under a number of keys, one of which was delivered to the master of the detained vessel.³⁰⁴

The cargo was valued in 29,574 dollars, consigned at Guaymas by William Duff & Company, the former shipowner, to a number of British merchants at Lima. The main part of it was treasure for John Maclean and William Duff himself. Maclean's part consisted of:³⁰⁵

4,200 dollars in coins	4,200
7 silver bars (144 marks 9 dollars a piece)	8,496
774 marks of silver piña (9 dollars a piece)	6,966
87 ounces of gold and dust (15 dollars a piece)	1,305
20 doubloons (17 dollars a piece)	340
60 cooper bars (21.11 dollars a piece)	1,267
TOTAL	22,574

On the very day of the *Hidalgo's* detention the whole of the cargo was transferred to the storerooms of Callao fortress and, following the normal procedure, the master was provided with one of the three keys which locked it. Up to this stage, it seems that neither the agent Richard Yeoward nor the consignees considered necessary the intervention of British consular agents at Lima, Thomas Sutton Willimott and William Patrick Kelly. However, a few days later the treasure was removed and taken to be melted down for coins at Lima's Mint by direct order of Jose de Rivadeneyra, the Treasury Minister. As no explanation was given to the

³⁰⁴.- Lima, 29/4/1822, Reglamento Provisional de Presas, *Gaceta del Gobierno* n° 37 & 38, 8 & 11/5/1822.

owners, in a very short time news of this action spread amongst British merchants at Lima and Callao, who obviously became indignant for what they considered an abuse.³⁰⁶

As could be easily understood, Yeoward and the consignees complained about such an action, being supported by both British consular agents at Lima, who addressed several strongly written letters to the Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Pando. As the Minister took the issue with calm, excusing the language of the vice-consuls, they considered that a more forcible action should be taken to secure satisfaction. Consequently, when the *Sapphire*, Captain Dundas, and the *Tribune*, Captain Duntze, arrived at Callao, Willimott and Kelly came on board (10 May), and suggested they should impose by force the British claim by taking an equivalent amount from the Peruvian sloop-of-war *Libertad*, Commodore García del Póstigo, which was due to arrive at Callao on the following days with treasure on board. Dundas agreed and from 13 May both British men-of-war established an undeclared blockade of the port, waiting for the *Libertad*'s arrival, announcing Willimott and Kelly the British intention "to detain and hold in deposit an equal amount of Peruvian Government property, wherever it may be with".³⁰⁷

The *Libertad*, having been cruising the southern coast since 7 April, enforcing the government policy to prevent smuggling, left Islay bound for Callao with almost 32,000 dollars and vice-president General Antonio Gutiérrez de la

³⁰⁵.- Duff & C^o to Maclean, Guaymas 2/3/1830, enclosed with Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro 13/8/1830, ADM 1/32.

³⁰⁶.- Vivero to Ribadeneyra, Callao, 8/5/1830, A.H. de M. *Hidalgo*. Willimott to Pando (copy n^o 1), Lima, 10/5/1830, P.R.O. F.O 61/18.

³⁰⁷.- Willimott to Dundas, Lima, 11/5/1830; enclosed with Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro 13/8/1830, ADM 1/32. ADM 51/3410. Willimott to Pando (copy n^o 4), Lima, 10/5/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18.

Fuente on board.³⁰⁸ Since the British decision to recover the *Hidalgo*'s cargo by force was already known by the Peruvian Government, some measures to prevent any forcible action against the shipping lying at Callao were taken. A more strict control on the anchorage was established, armed boats patrolled the port; and the landing of any member of the British squadron at Peruvian ports was prohibited. However, these measures were to be regarded as gestures far from any real effectiveness, unfit to repel any serious attempt made by the two British men-of-war. At port there were only three Peruvian naval vessels: the brig *Congreso*, the schooner *Arequipeño* and an 18 feet-long gunboat, a force too small to prevent any British action, even when it was reinforced on 15 May with a second gunboat.³⁰⁹

Incidents began on 13 May, when two long boats of the *Sapphire* captured one belonging to the *Congreso*. During that night, the *Arequipeño*'s boat discovered two British launches and one boat approaching its position. After a short exchange of fire, the Peruvian gunboat intervened and drove back the British by firing a few rounds of shots. These incidents were recorded in Peruvian and French sources, as the frigate *Vestale*, Captain Neuquer Ducamper, was then at the anchorage.³¹⁰ On the following day, the Peruvian merchant brig *Primer Ayacucho*,

³⁰⁸.- A.H. de M. Libro 402, 15/2 & 7/4/1830.

³⁰⁹.- A.H. de M. Libro 402, 13/5/1830. *Hidalgo*, Callao, 14/5; *Arequipeño*, Callao, 14/5; *Libertad*, Callao, 16/5, all the three Vivero to Rivadeneyra. Willimott to Pando, Copies 2 & 4, Lima 12/5/1830, P.R.O. F.O. 61/18.

³¹⁰.- ADM 51/3410 May 13. A.H. de M. *Hidalgo*, Callao, 14/5/1830; *Arequipeño*, Callao, 14/5/1830; and *Libertad*, Callao, 16/5/1830, all of them addressed by Vivero to Rivadeneyra. Wu (1991): 43.

arriving from the Chincha Islands, was detained by the British to obtain some information on the *Libertad*'s position, being released in that very evening.³¹¹

Meanwhile, Peruvian authorities adopted some measures to prevent Commodore García del Póstigo from entering the port. The schooner *Olmedo* sailed from Callao on 11 May and spent eight days cruising off Sangallán with this purpose in mind;³¹² and shortly after midnight on 13 May, a boat was dispatched with the same task. Despite the officer in charge's efforts to leave the harbour by the southern mouth before dawn, the boat was sighted from the *Sapphire* and pursued by two of her long-boats. The chase lasted for some hours and finally the Peruvian boat was forced to run ashore at Chorrillos to avoid being captured.³¹³

As a consequence of these incidents the Peruvian government adopted a more aggressive attitude towards the British squadron. As very little could be done at sea, since Peruvian naval forces at port were no match for the British, on 14 May it was decided to forbid the British squadron's communications with land at any part of the entire Peruvian coast. It was also decided not to entertain correspondence with consular agents Willimott and Kelly any longer, and to close all Peruvian ports to British trade if the *Tribune* and the *Sapphire* continued in their hostile attitude. Accordingly, the British consular agents asked for their passports the same day, but their letter was returned unopened. Only at this point, did Willimott and Kelly realise that they had exceeded their authority, leading Peru and Britain close to a breaking point. They immediately wrote to Captain Dundas

³¹¹.- Denegri (1976) I: 368.

³¹².- A.H. de M. Libro 847. 10/10/1830.

³¹³.- A.H. de M. *Hidalgo*, Callao, 14/5/1830; *Arequipeño*, Callao, 14/5/1830, Vivero to Rivadeneyra, and enclosed document; Libro 402 15/5/1830.

asking him to end hostilities, but unfortunately, this letter did not reach Dundas on time.³¹⁴

Unaware of all these occurrences, that very night the *Libertad* arrived and anchored at the outer harbour at 3.30 a.m., because of lack of wind. At 5.00 a.m., while she was lifting anchor to enter the inner port, the *Tribune* came alongside at a pistol-shot distance, prepared for battle. Commodore García del Póstigo, who was quite a brave man, found himself placed in a ridiculous situation, with “the deck full of horses and absolutely unready for battle as my sole concern was to weight anchor”. As vice-president, General La Fuente, was on board, García del Póstigo asked him for instructions, being commanded to obey the intimation in order to avoid further outrage. Almost an hour later, the *Sapphire* took up position in front of the *Libertad*, sending a boat with an armed party to take possession of her.³¹⁵

According to Peruvian sources, this British party gave no explanation to the Peruvian Commodore for their attitude, moreover, as García del Postigo recorded, “they only received insults instead of answers to their questions”. However, as soon as the British learnt of vice-president La Fuente presence on board the *Libertad*, they moderated their attitude. At 7:15 a.m., having already manned the captured sloop-of-war, Peruvian colours and the Vice-President’s flag were

³¹⁴.- A.H. de M. Libro 402, May 15. Willimott to Dundas, Lima 15/5/1830; enclosed with Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro 13/8/1830, ADM 1/32.

³¹⁵.- García del Póstigo’s report, enclosed with Vivero to Rivadeneyra, Callao, 17/5/1830, nº 253 & 16/5/1830, A.H. de M. *Libertad*. Dundas to Bingham, *Sapphire*, Callao 31/5/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18.

hoisted by the British crew. Fifteen minutes later, the *Libertad* sailed to anchor three miles away, in the company of the two British men-of-war.³¹⁶

By this time, La Fuente was already aware of the situation by a letter from Captain Dundas. In the same letter Dundas stated that General La Fuente, his family and personal staff, were totally free to land at any moment, taking with them only their baggage but nothing belonging to the Peruvian government. Protesting against the British attitude, La Fuente refused to land without being properly authorised by the Peruvian government. Therefore he wrote a letter to the Foreign Affairs Minister asking for instructions. On his reply, Pando stated that the Peruvian government had no other alternative than to accept the situation, and that it was wisest to land as soon as possible but not to entertain any further correspondence with British captains. Accordingly, General La Fuente landed with his family and personal staff that very evening, while, in an ambiguous attitude, gun-salutes were made from the *Sapphire*.³¹⁷

On 17 May, thirty silver bars and a parcel with “macuquinos”,³¹⁸ valued altogether at twenty thousand dollars, were landed as personal baggage of General La Fuente. Even although part of this treasure really belonged to him, it also included the entire government property. Up to what point La Fuente was aware of this trap is uncertain, but as long as his honour was committed, as soon as he learnt that government property was landed in his name, he notified Dundas that the money would remain on shore to be re-shipped on the *Libertad*. A number of

³¹⁶.- Vivero to Rivadeneyra, Callao, 16/5/, n° 2 & 3, 17/5 n° 253, A.H. de M. *Libertad*.

³¹⁷.- Vivero to Rivadeneyra, Callao, 17/5/1830, n° 252 & 253, A.H. de M. *Libertad*. Willimott to Dundas, Lima 15/5/1830; enclosed with Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 13/8/1830, ADM 1/32.

letters were exchanged on this issue in the following days; Dundas asking for the treasure and La Fuente promising to deliver it as soon as possible. But besides these promises and some information stating that the money was finally shipped, the state owned treasure not only remained on land but it was secretly moved to Lima on 25 May, in two ox carts covered “with herb or any other thing to avoid any suspicion or malice regarding their contents”.³¹⁹

Following La Fuente’s landing, and knowing that the *Libertad* was running short of fresh supplies, the Peruvian government forbade providing her with any while she was under British detention. Moreover, on 20 May, García del Pórtigo was commanded by his government to lower his colours and to consider himself and his men as prisoners of war. The order was carried out as soon as it was received on board, and at 1.30 p.m. on that day Peruvian colours were hauled down on board the *Libertad*. A few hours later, a British prize crew took possession of the vessel, and on the following day the remaining treasure on board the *Libertad*, consisting of 9,972 pesos, 5 reales, and 328 marks 4 ounces of silver piña, was taken on board the *Sapphire* and boxed under García del Pórtigo and Dundas’ seals. The British Captain issued a receipt for this treasure, ordered the British prize crew to withdraw before sunset and informed García del Pórtigo that the *Libertad*, was “at perfect liberty” from that moment onwards. Early next morn-

³¹⁸. - Macuquina was a colonial silver coin, imperfectly minted. Its real value was below its face value.

³¹⁹. - A.H. de M. Libro 402, reserved notes on 24 & 25/5/1830; *Libertad* letter nº 46, 18/5/1830. Dundas to La Fuente, 21, 26 & 29/5/1830; and La Fuente to Dundas, 22/5/1830; enclosed with Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro 13/8/1830, ADM 1/32.

ing, the Peruvian sloop entered the inner port to her usual anchorage, ending in this way a week-long detention.³²⁰

With that treasure in its power, but unable to communicate with land, and to refresh supplies and water, the British squadron was placed in a difficult position. Moreover, since Willimott and Kelly were no longer recognised by the Peruvian government as British consular agents, Captain Dundas was considered responsible for the incident and the only accepted British authority in Peru. Acting accordingly, he wrote a letter to Minister Pando asking for the former British consular agents' passports, which were issued on 18 May. In the following days, Willimott and Kelly, as well as their families, were received on the *Sapphire* and the *Tribune*, respectively, with some help from the Colombian frigate *Colombia*.³²¹

When the incident occurred there were two French and two Colombian men-of-war at Callao, under Captain Ducampier and Commodore Wright, respectively, who provided some assistance both to Captain Dundas and to the Peruvian government. The French help consisted of the use of their boats for watering the British vessels. An action which was conducted since 26 May, having been duly authorised by the Peruvian government.³²²

According to General Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, Colombian Minister at Lima, before the *Libertad* was captured, he was asked to use frigate *Colombia* to prevent the Peruvian man-of-war from entering Callao. Having refused to intervene

³²⁰.- Vivero to Rivadeneyra, Callao, 18, 20 & 21/5/1830 (two on the last date); enclosed García del Pósito to Vivero, 21/5/1830, A.H. de M. *Libertad*; and Libro 402, 18/5/1830, ADM 51/3410 19 to 21/5/1830.

³²¹.- ADM 51/3410, 19/5/1830; ADM 51/3509, 20/5/1830. Vivero to Minister of War, Callao 20/5/1830, A.H. de M. frigate *Colombia*, and Libro 402, 21 & 28/5/1830.

³²².- ADM 51/3410, 20/5/1830. Dundas to Bingham, *Sapphire*, Callao, 31/5/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18. A.H. de M. Libro 402, 24 & 26/5/1830.

in such a way, Mosquera participated in some of the meetings between Peruvian authorities and British consular agents. Following the capture of the *Libertad*, the Colombian Minister continued offering his help to solve the problem, visiting Captain Dundas on 19 May.³²³ Afterwards, Mosquera was officially asked by President Gamarra to be a mediator between both parties. Obviously, such a mediation requires Dundas's agreement, at for this reason Mosquera wrote to the British Captain, who refused to accept it.³²⁴

Why did Captain Dundas refuse on 23 of May something which surely was consulted by Mosquera four days ago? It seems that he changed his mind after the official gazette, *El Conciliador*,³²⁵ on 19 May, published the Peruvian government version of the incident, which includes some judicial references to justify the appropriation of the treasure taken from the *Hidalgo*, blaming the British for what had happened. Moreover, on 22 May, President Gamarra issue a new law, which provided a legal frame to delay the process more, and consequently the return of the funds, if that was the final sentence.³²⁶ Being aware of that, Dundas considered that any proper agreement could be reached at that stage, and therefore he declined to accept Mosquera's mediation.

President Gamarra was quite aware that his initial position was absolutely illegal, since the *Hidalgo*'s trial was still going on when her bullion was minted. On the other hand, the capture of the *Libertad* and the removal of the treasure on

³²³.- Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera, *Examen crítico del libelo publicado en la Imprenta del Comercio en Lima por el reo prófugo José María Obando*, Valparaíso, Imprenta del Mercurio, 1843, I, 285-286.

³²⁴.- ADM 51/3410, 19/5/1830. A.H. de M. Libro 402, 20/5/1830.

³²⁵.- *El Conciliador*, Lima, nº 38 (19/5/1830).

³²⁶.- Wu (1991), 47-49.

board, enabled the Peruvian government to improve its position in the whole incident. Nevertheless, no firm decision was taken, and in the end the Peruvian government reduced its claims to those against British naval and consular officers involved in the incident rather than the British government itself. Realistically, no other solution was feasible. There was no doubt that resistance was unlikely to succeed, even with the help of another Peruvian man-of-war. There was also no doubt that Peru could not afford a more aggressive attitude towards the British and therefore the government had to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Despite the help provided by the French and Colombian commodores, the British remained unable to receive fresh supplies or to entertain any correspondence with land, and therefore were also powerless to provide any support for their nationals on shore. After a few days in this embarrassing situation, on 30 May, the *Sapphire* and the *Tribune* sailed for Valparaiso. Following Rear-Admiral Baker's relief program, the *Sapphire* departed for Rio de Janeiro by mid-June. On her arrival at this port, Baker was fully informed of the incident and approved Dundas' attitude, taking into account the consular agents' request and the lack of stability of the Peruvian government.³²⁷

The trial of the *Hidalgo* would last until 1837, when the Peruvian Supreme Court declared that the brig papers were irregular, but also ordered to return the bullion to its owners, with a compensation at the rate of 12 percent a year.³²⁸ It seems highly probable that this sentence was issued following certain pressure from

³²⁷.- Dundas to Baker, *Sapphire*, At Sea, 7/8/1830; enclosed with Dundas to British merchants at Lima and their reply, 27 & 29/5/1830, ADM 1/33.

³²⁸.- Wu (1991): 51.

Marshall Santa Cruz, by then ruler of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, and very close to the British Consul General at Lima, Belford Hinton Wilson.

In the meantime, the treasure removed from the *Libertad* was transhipped from one British man-of-war to another several times; and finally, by 1833, it was handed over to John Maclean, on the understanding that he would accept Peruvian Justice's final decision on the issue.³²⁹ British captains continued to support the *Hidalgo*'s case, as happened with Captain Burgess, of the *Alert*, who called at Guaymas by mid-1831 to obtain certain papers related to the brig's transference.³³⁰

Shortly after Dundas and Duntze's departure from Callao, Luis Macala, acting as British commissioner, informed the Peruvian government that the *Seringapatan*, Captain William Waldegrave, was due to arrive at any moment. As was already mentioned, President Gamarra had little choice but to compromise with the British, to avoid a more embarrassing situation. Therefore, his prohibition of British men-of-war entering Peruvian ports was modified on 31 May, to affect only the two vessels directly involved in the incident.³³¹

As already mentioned, one of the outcomes of the *Hidalgo* incident was the removal of British consular agents at Lima. Almost immediately, and without any instruction on this sense, Captain Bingham, of the *Thetis*, succeed in restoring relations with Peru. According to his instructions, Bingham was due to leave the West Coast by July, taking on board British merchants' remittances from Chile to Mexico and the treasure convoyed by the *Seringapatan* from the South Seas to

³²⁹.- Wilson to Bidwell, Lima, 19/4/1833; enclosed a receipt signed by Captain Townshend for the treasure handed over by Captain Waldegrave, dated 20/3/1832. P.R.O., F.O. 61/23.

³³⁰.- Waldegrave to Baker, 11/5/1831, enclosed with Baker to Elliot, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/6/1831, ADM 1/36.

³³¹.- A.H. de M. Libro 402, 31/5/1830.

Callao. With this purpose in mind, the *Thetis* entered Callao on 23 June 1830, in the *Alert*'s company.³³²

Being fully aware of the strains on Peruvian and British relations after the *Hidalgo* incident, both British naval vessels entered the port under truce flag, Commander Fitzgerald, of the *Alert*, being commissioned to present Bingham's salute to the Governor of Callao and to ask permission to use port facilities. Since restrictions for British men-of-war entering Peruvian ports were already limited to the *Sapphire* and the *Tribune*, "whereas full satisfactions are received for the outrage both committed against Peruvian colours", permission was granted with no delay and both the *Thetis* and her companion entered to the usual British anchorage, out of the gun range of the castles.³³³

On the same day Bingham wrote a letter to Minister Pando, regretting "exceedingly the unpleasant differences which have arisen" between the Peruvian government and British naval and consular officers, and expressing his hopes that amity and commerce between both nations would continue with no interruption. Pando's reply, dated two days later, clearly stated that the *Hidalgo* incident did not affect Peruvian relations with Great Britain, taking into account that the responsibility for the incident was upon individuals (Kelly, Willimott and Dundas) rather than on the British government. Realizing how anxious the Peruvian government was to restore normal relations, on 5 July, Bingham simultaneously asked to be recognised as provisional Consul General and for the removal of the *Tribune*'s prohibition from entering Peruvian ports, taking into account that the affair was

³³². - Baker to Croker. *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 7/7/1830, ADM 1/33. Vivero to the Minister of War, Callao 23/6/1830, A.H. de M. frigate *Colombia*.

already represented by the Peruvian government to the British one, “of whom that of Peru hopes for the most complete satisfaction”. Two weeks later, the Peruvian government agreed to these requests for the sake of friendship and trade between both nations.³³⁴

Lord Palmerstone, British Foreign Secretary, was to disapprove of the attitude adopted both by Willimott, Kelly and Dundas, “declaring that the blockade and seizure of the *Libertad* and its cargo were quite unjustified”.³³⁵ He was firmly convinced that the two Pro-consuls had exceeded their authority and acted without official consent: “they ought to have protested, exhausted all peaceful mean possible, and then have communicated with the government so as to await instructions from Whitehall”.³³⁶ As a result of this incident, Willimott and Kelly were dismissed; and despite the defence done by the Admiralty to Captain Dundas, he was blamed by Palmerstone for his lack of judgement and forced into retirement on half pay.³³⁷

On his reply to the Peruvian government, although Palmerstone admitted that he disapproved the way in which consular and naval officials conducted in the *Hidalgo* incident, he make clear that it was a result of a number of previous abuses against British merchants and properties.

³³³.- Vivero to Minister of War, Callao 23/6/1830, A.H. de M. frigate *Colombia*. Bingham to the Earl of Aberdeen, *Thetis*, Callao 26/6/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18.

³³⁴.- Bingham to Baker, *Thetis*, Callao, 26/6/1830; enclosed with Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 30/11/1830. ADM 1/34. Bingham to Pando. Callao 23/6 & 5/7, and the latter's replies, 26/6 & 19/7/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18.

³³⁵.- Wu (1991), 50.

³³⁶.- Palmerstone report on Willimott and Kelly, 19/9/1832, P.R.O., F.O. 61/21 [Wu (1991), 50].

³³⁷.- O'Byrne, 312.

“He demanded that the Peruvian Government comply its obligations on the score of compensation and declared that Great Britain was not disposed to tolerate any further abuse of its citizens by Peru. As for the bullion taken off the *Libertad*, he stated that he had ordered that it should be restored to the Peruvian Government since he had no desire to condone any breaking of Peruvian law, granted that the incident had occurred in Peruvian territorial waters”.³³⁸

Disregarding Bingham's success in restoring friendly relations with the Peruvian government, British merchants were disappointed since they expected a far stronger attitude, following the one adopted by Captain Dundas. Their frustration turned to irritation as Bingham asked the Consul Generalship for himself instead of appointing one of the merchants. Finally, when John Maclean was requested by Bingham to hand over consular records, the latter was accused for interfering on consular affairs without authority to do so. The British merchants' irritation could be understood as part of the general feeling towards General Gamarra's government, after the *Hidalgo* incident; however, as Bingham pointed out in his report, it “tends to nothing but to hostilities and to the compromise of their own interest”, valued at four million Pounds Sterling at that time.³³⁹

Opposition to Captain Bingham came also from the former consular agents. As soon as they learned that Bingham had taken possession of the consular records, both protested for what they considered an intolerable interference in their service by a naval officer. Even when the records were returned to Maclean in the following weeks, on 24 July, Kelly and Willimott presented a formal protest addressed to the British merchants at Lima and to the British consular agent at

³³⁸.- Palmerstone to Peruvian Foreign Minister. 19/9/1832, P.R.O., F.O. 61/21 [Wu (1991), 51].

³³⁹.- Waldegrave to the Earl of Aberdeen, Callao, 24/8/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18.

Valparaiso. Unfortunately for them, Lord Palmerston disapproved of their attitude in the entire issue, being compelled to withdraw their protest.³⁴⁰

When Rear-Admiral Baker learned of Bingham's proceedings at Callao, and the reaction amongst British merchants and bygone consular agents, he considered that the former could manage for themselves as they had done prior to 1824, without any sort of consular intervention. Consequently, captains serving on the Pacific squadron were commanded to restrain themselves to the naval service and not to become involved in consular affairs. Baker's order would have been grounded on the old rivalry between naval and consular service, and on the fact that Bingham, and afterwards Captain Waldegrave, of the *Seringapatan*, reported the Peruvian situation directly to the Foreign Office, informing that the "Consul General Ship will be in charge of the Senior Naval Officer in the Pacific until further instructions were received."³⁴¹

When the *Seringapatan* arrived at Callao, on 25 July, Captain Bingham asked permission from the Peruvian Foreign Affairs Minister to be replaced as provisional Consul General by Captain Waldegrave, as he had to leave for Guayaquil, San Blas and Rio de Janeiro in the following days. The answer was interesting, as it is evidence of how much the Peruvian government was willing to improve relations with Britain. It stated that the government was highly satisfied with "the delicacy and moderation showed -by Bingham- as Senior British Naval

³⁴⁰.- Bingham and Waldegrave to the Earl of Aberdeen, Callao, 26/6/ & 24/8/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18. Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 12/11/1830, ADM 1/34.

³⁴¹.- Bingham to the Earl of Aberdeen, Callao, 26/6/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18. Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 30/11/1830, ADM 1/34.

Officer at the port (...) recognizing -Waldegrave- as British provisional consular agent”.³⁴²

Having been appointed Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron with the aim of providing a more regular service for that part of the station, Waldegrave assumed the Pacific squadron's command on his arrival at Callao, late in July 1830.³⁴³ During the following year, Waldegrave's main concern was related to the regularity of the conveyance of treasure, accomplished by the *Thetis*, in September 1830; the *Eden*, in February 1831; the *Tribune*, in June; and the *Alert*, in September. Even when the *Hidalgo* incident was still open, relations between the Peruvian government and British captains were as friendly as before. Examples of this were President Gamarra's conversations with Captain Townshend, of the *Dublin*, in December 1832, in which “the President had to admit there was blame on both sides”,³⁴⁴ and Commodore García del Póstigo visiting Captain Burgess, of the *Alert*, on 22 October 1830, at Ilo.³⁴⁵

The attitude adopted by Captain Bingham deserves a further comment. Acting politely, he was able to restore relations between Peru and Britain at a consular level. Even when afterwards Admiral Baker instructed his captains to restrain their actions to naval duties, Bingham solved a real problem. Waldegrave continued that policy and therefore, at least at an official level, the incident was softened by direct and immediate naval intervention. The incident itself shows how British naval and consular service could cooperate in defence of British interest,

³⁴².- Bingham to Pando and the latter's reply, *Thetis*, Callao, 27/7/1830, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18.

³⁴³.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 18/12/1829 & 15/2/1830, ADM 1/32.

³⁴⁴.- Wu (1991): 49.

³⁴⁵.- ADM 51/3015. Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 14/3/1831, ADM 1/35.

but it also reveals some aspects of the old rivalry between both services. Cooperation and rivalry would come together along the period covered in this chapter.

Following Consul General Rowcroft's death, in December 1824, the Consulate was exerted by V. Passmore, Vice-Consul at Quilca, until March 1826, when the newly appointed Consul General Charles Milner Ricketts arrived in the *Ranger*.³⁴⁶ He remained at Lima for almost a year, being unable to react against the consequences of the oversupply crisis of 1826, which moved early Peruvian trade policy far from liberal standards. In the period covered by this chapter, Santa Cruz and Orbegoso tried to soften that position, being supported, with a variable degree of commitment, by foreign merchants and consular agents.³⁴⁷ From 1828 to 1830, Thomas Willimott and Patrick Kelly took over the responsibility for British representation in Peru, as Pro-Consuls, being succeeded by naval captains, following the *Hidalgo*' incident. This situation lasted until March 1833, when the already mentioned Consul General Belford H. Wilson arrived in the *Tyne*.³⁴⁸

Wilson had acquired an intimate knowledge of South American affairs having served General Bolívar as his personal assistant for several years until his death. When he was appointed Consul General in Peru, in 1832, he was only 28 years old.³⁴⁹ On his way to Peru, he met Rear-Admiral Baker, Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station, at Rio de Janeiro, who provided him with useful

³⁴⁶.- ADM 51/3402.

³⁴⁷.- Gootenberg (1988), 408-409. Gootenberg (1989), 26. Matthew (1968), 566.

³⁴⁸.- Wilson to Palmerstone, *Tyne*, Valparaiso, 23/2/1833; Iquique, 10/3/1833; Islay, 27/3/1833; and Arequipa 26/3/1833, P.R.O., F.O. 61/23.

³⁴⁹.- See Celia Wu, Ph. D. thesis "Introducción al estudio de Sir Belford Hinton Wilson", Lima 1965, for a comprehensive study of Wilson's activities as Consul General in Peru.

information regarding the general situation of Peru and particularly about the *Hidalgo* case.³⁵⁰ Being already aware of the Foreign Office opinion towards the length of service of the British senior naval officer in the Pacific, Wilson asked

“that the command of H.M. Naval Forces on the coast of the Pacific should be entrusted to one individual well acquainted with those countries, as commodores for a fixed term. Such Command not to be liable, as at present, to pass into various hands, according to the Seniority of the Naval Officers whose ships may accidentally visit that Coast”³⁵¹

That measure was already taken by Admiral Baker in July 1830, when he appointed Captain William Earl Waldegrave, of the *Seringapatan*, as Commodore of the Pacific Squadron. When Wilson arrived at Valparaíso, he met the new Commodore, Captain Lord James Townshend, of the *Dublin*,³⁵² and afterwards visited Cobija, Iquique, Arica and Islay, to acquire a first hand knowledge of British trade at those places.³⁵³

For obvious reasons, consular agents were more acquainted with local situations than naval captains, while the latter could develop a better understanding of general situations, involving more than one single place. A good example of this assertion was the continue requirement that consular agents and merchants did for more naval support. This issue was clearly pointed out by Rear-Admiral Baker, in 1830, when disapproving Captain Coghlan, of the *Forte*, for delaying his departure from Valparaíso attending to the request done by the British consular agent at this port. Baker affirmed that British consular agents, far from being sources of

³⁵⁰.- P.R.O., F/O 61/21: 153-159.

³⁵¹.- P.R.O., F/O 61/21: 14-16.

³⁵².- Admiralty to Bart. of the Foreign Office, 13/7/1832, P.R.O., F.O. 61/18.

³⁵³.- Wilson to Palmerstone, *Tyne*, Valparaíso, 23/2/1833; Iquique, 10/3/1833; Islay, 27/3/1833; and Arequipa 26/3/1833, P.R.O., F.O. 61/23.

confidence for their nationals, coloured their requests and even interfered with the regular service.³⁵⁴

The most serious interservice incident in this period occurred between Commodore Mason and Consul General Wilson, during 1835, basically regarding the protection offered by the latter during the civil war currently going on between Salaverry and Orbegoso. It seems that these differences began when Mason proposed a British merchant resident at Callao, to be appointed as Vice-Consul at this port, replacing the one who was settled in Lima. Consul General Wilson was not of the same opinion, and surely took that proposal as an intrusion on his service.³⁵⁵

On 25 August, Mason was about to depart Callao for Valparaíso, when he received a letter from Wilson requesting for a man-of-war to be permanently stationed on the Peruvian coast until the civil war ended, and enclosing a representation of the British merchants to delay his departure.³⁵⁶ Mason considered this request as a sort of reproach, replying that since October 1834, Callao and other Peruvian ports were under protection of the *Satellite* and the *Blonde*. In fact, as the fighting was basically going on in South Peru, he found little reason to have a permanent vessel at Callao. To make clear his point of view, Mason went to Lima to meet Wilson, on 26 August, but unfortunately he was forced to remain in the city, when the city gates were closed by order of General Salaverry to prevent any attack from those guerrilla groups supporting Orbegoso. Finally, three days later, the government issued orders to allow British officers to enter and leave the

³⁵⁴.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 14/4/1830, ADM 1/32.

³⁵⁵.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 12/5/1836, ADM 1/46.

city freely, and consequently Mason was able to come on board the *Blonde*. He was angry and asked Wilson to represent his protest to the government for being detained against his will, even when the latter, and afterwards Rear Admiral Hammond, considered this detention as an accident instead of a premeditated offence. To avoid similar problems in the future, Hammond instructed Mason to issue orders that any member of the British squadron should land properly dressed with uniform.³⁵⁷

At this stage, it seems that both Wilson and Mason already resented each other. A further incident arose when the former retained a letter addressed by Mason to the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Under normal circumstances British captains were not to entertain correspondence directly with any foreign government, since it was the normal duty of consular agents; however, Wilson having declined to intervene in an issue represented by the Peruvian Minister directly with Mason, the latter felt himself duly authorised to reply on the same level. The fact is that Wilson retained Mason's letter, which was a note of appreciation for some arrangements related to duties payable on supplies destined to foreign men-of-war. Obviously, Mason complained about the Consul General's attitude.³⁵⁸

Wilson reacted by early 1836, when he, as well as a number of British merchants of Lima, complained about the protection offered by the British Commodore. As was already mentioned, for almost a month a party of Royal

³⁵⁶.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde*, Callao 2/10/1835; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1835, ADM 1/45.

³⁵⁷.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde*, Callao, 3/10/1835; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1835, ADM 1/45.

Marines were stationed at Lima for the protection of British property and lives. However, it seems that French and North American naval assistance to their nationals was far more intense, including the use of naval boats to transport cargo to merchant vessels.³⁵⁹

From our point of view, both Wilson and Mason acted properly. The former very much concerned on the protection of British local merchants, and the latter taking into account that Callao was not the only place in need of protection on the Pacific. Compromising both approaches produced some friction, as it happened in several other places. But, at the end of the day, British merchants and properties were respected all along that civil war, and in this sense both Mason and Wilson deserve credit.

International Conflicts

As already mentioned, during the period covered by this chapter Peru faced two international conflicts, with Colombia and with Bolivia, both of them affecting British trade to a degree, and therefore involving the Pacific Squadron.

The end of the War of Independence brought to Peru and Colombia a number of collateral problems, such as Colombian claims on Maynas territory and on the payment of a debt for the independence effort, as well as Peruvian counterclaim on the Guayaquil situation and the repatriation of those Peruvians enlisted by force in the Colombian Division stationed at Lima until 1827. These

³⁵⁸.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde*, Callao, 2/10/1835; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1835, ADM 1/45.

³⁵⁹.- Merchants complain, Lima 28/1/1836; enclosed with Mason to Hammond, 16/4/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, at Sea, 15/7/1836. ADM 1/46.

problems were poorly handled by both governments in office in 1828, Bolívar in Colombia and La Mar in Peru, involved as they were in the struggle for power between Bolívar's followers and their enemies, producing a tense situation between the two nations. This tension reached its highest point in July 1828, when Colombia declared war on Peru. A few days later, on 31 August, hostilities began when the Peruvian 24-gun sloop *Libertad*, Commander Carlos García del Póstigo, was attacked at Malpelo, off Tumbes, by Commodore Thomas Wright with the 20-gun sloop *Pichincha* and the 12-gun schooner *Guayaquileña*. García managed to defeat both vessels, one of which eventually surrendered to Peruvian authorities. On 9 September, following this action, President La Mar declared a blockade of the Colombian coast from 3° 6' S to 9° N (from Tumbes to Panama), and shortly afterwards the Peruvian squadron sailed from Callao to enforce this measure.³⁶⁰

When war broke out, Peruvian squadron was formed by frigate *Presidente*, flagship of Vice-Admiral Guise, the already mentioned sloop *Libertad*, brig *Congreso* and 14-gun schooner *Arequipeño*. Colombia had almost no naval forces on the Pacific, except the *Guayaquileña* and *Pichincha*, trying to revert this situation by issuing a number of letters of marque since the very beginning of the war. On the other hand, the British Pacific Squadron, under Captain Coghlan, of the *Forte*, was formed by the *Volage*, *Alert*, *Doris* and *Menai*.³⁶¹

As happened with those blockades decreed during the wars of independence, this one became illegal by virtue of the complete lack of correlation between the extent of the coast to be blockaded and the number of vessels available to enforce

³⁶⁰.- Denegri (1976), I, 175-193.

³⁶¹.- Vivero to Coghlan, Callao, 12/9/1828; enclosed with Otway to Croker, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 28/11/1828, ADM 1/31.

it. Consequently, Rear-Admiral Otway, Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station, instructed Captain Coghlan to denounce it as illegal and to recapture any British vessel detained by the blockading squadron.³⁶²

Based on this attitude, quite a number of British merchants and skippers were deeply involved supporting the war effort on both sides. That were the case of the sloop *Royal Sovereign* and the frigate *Conde Morlay*, arrived at Callao on by late 1828 with arms for the Peruvian army; as well as the schooner *John Catto*, who transported 130 Colombian troops from Panama to Monte Cristo.³⁶³

The naval campaign was to last until mid-1829, with Guayaquil being occupied by Peruvian forces after several attacks by Vice-Admiral Guise and his successors as Commander-in-Chief. On 7 April, schooner *Arequipeño* and brig *Congreso* attacked Panama and took out the English brig *John Catto*, William Clark master, previously detained by the Colombian privateer *Tipuani*.³⁶⁴ The prize sailed for Guayaquil, where her cargo, consisting of 106 packs of tobacco, was landed, losing her papers when frigate *President* was burned and exploded on 18 May.³⁶⁵

Shortly after that, the *John Catto* was put on trial at Callao Prize Court, and in January 1830 she was condemned to be sold in public auction. Learning of this sentence, British Pro-Consul Willimott tried by every possible mean to revoke it, causing obvious reactions amongst the members of the Prize Court. One of the was

³⁶².- Otway to Coghlan, 27/11/1828, and Admiralty Minute, 29/1/1829; enclosed with Otway to Croker, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 28/11/1828, ADM 1/31.

³⁶³.- A.H.M. 1829 carp. 14, leg. 13, docs. 51, 67, 80.

³⁶⁴.- Peruvian pailebot *Tipuani*, Juan José Lara master, sailed from Callao on 23/4/1827. It seems that she was captured afterwards [*El Telégrafo de Lima*, 25/4/1827].

³⁶⁵.- A.H. de M. Goleta *John Catto*. Denegri (1976) I: 271-272, 294-295. *El Telégrafo de Lima*, 11/7 & 23/10/1827.

Lieutenant Jose España, prosecutor on the trial, who with great indignation wrote “If we do not care about enforcing the law amongst foreigners living and trading in our republic, we surely will be shamed for it, and every single day they hold us up to public ridicule even more than now, scorning our laws, regulations, courts and insulting our judges”.³⁶⁶

Finally, on 6 April 1830, the trial reached its final stage by a presidential decree, stating the neutrality of the brig, as having sailed under British colours when she was captured by the *Tipuani*. The *John Catto* was returned to the Colombian government, and six months later sold at Callao, being the sole incident to arise between the British and Peruvians during this war.³⁶⁷

The other international conflict faced by Peru in this period was with Bolivia. Ruled by liberal Andrés de Santa Cruz, the Bolivian government implemented a number of measures to redirect his foreign trade from the Peruvian port of Arica to the newly established port of Cobija. Amongst these measures, lower duties were attractive enough to raise imports from 80,117 to 852,032 dollars in only four years (1828-1832), in spite of the additional cost of transport from such an isolated place as Cobija to La Paz.³⁶⁸ Considering old economic, social and politic links between South Peru and Alto Peru, Santa Cruz also plotted to annex Peruvian southern provinces to Bolivia, driving Lima government to react against him in 1831 and 1835.³⁶⁹ During the first one of these reactions, Captain Waldegrave, of the *Seringapatan*, was involved in an incident occurred at Cobija.

³⁶⁶.- A.H. de M. Goleta *John Catto* 1830, doc. 4, f. 6.

³⁶⁷.- A.H. de M. Goleta *John Catto* 1830; Libro 847, 31/5 & 7/6/1830.

³⁶⁸.- Matthew (1989): 412-414.

³⁶⁹.- Basadre (1968), II, 14-17.

By May 1831, having failed negotiations at Arequipa, a Peruvian army led by General Gamarra was ready to invade Bolivia as a retaliation for Santa Cruz's intrusion in Peruvian internal affairs. In these circumstances, on the night of 26 June, at Islay, the crew of the Peruvian sloop-of-war *Libertad*, mutinied, overpowered and landed their officers, sailing afterwards for Cobija. The reason for the mutiny seems to be the lack of payment in the last five months, but as far as the *Libertad* was received under the protection of Gaspar Aramayo, Governor of Cobija, it is likely that Santa Cruz's agents encouraged the movement. The Peruvian government reacted declaring the mutinied sloop as a piratical vessel, requesting to foreign naval stations as well as consular and diplomatic agents for her capture; and sending brigs *Congreso* and *Arequipeño* on her search.³⁷⁰

As could be expected, the request for foreign naval intervention was declined by French, North American and British commodores. Captain Waldegrave was one the first to be noticed of this request, as on "the 25 at night 30 miles south of Cobija, the *Seringapatan* was hailed by a Schooner who sent a boat on board" with Captain García del Póstigo's request of assistance to recover the *Libertad*. This petition was declined by the British Captain, as contrary to his instructions, stating that he only would intervene if piratical acts were committed by the mutineers. To prevent them from acting in such a way, when the *Seringapatan* entered Cobija, on July 26, she anchored close to the *Libertad*, controlling by this means the mutineers' movements. At port there were certain quantities of British and French property and, consequently, Waldegrave decided to remain at port until 8 August, attending a request made both from the French consular agent and Governor

³⁷⁰.- Denegri (1976) I: 341-342, 344. Juan de Arona, *Páginas Diplomáticas del Perú*, Lima, Academia Diplomática del Perú, 1968: 142-144, 157-158.

Aramayo. The latter's main concern was that President Santa Cruz could refuse to admit the *Libertad* under Bolivian protection, and in such a case he was unable to force the vessel to leave Cobija.³⁷¹

On 29 July, the *Congreso* arrived off the port, sending a boat with Lieutenant Parker to notify Captain Waldegrave of President Gamarra's orders to capture the *Libertad* wherever she was found. To avoid being involved in any eventual action, the *Seringapatan* lifted anchor and sailed to cruise off the port, while the Peruvian boat reached the shore to demand the return of the *Libertad*. As was already expected, Governor Aramayo refused to submit to this requirement, and according to the Peruvian Government's instructions, the *Congreso* established a blockade of the port. Waldegrave refused to recognize this measure, putting forward the following reasons: a) war had not been declared between Peru and Bolivia, b) notification of the blockade had not been given to neutral consular agents, and c) the presence of the Peruvian brig was not enough to enforce the blockade, specially when an "enemy" sloop was at port. Moreover, Waldegrave suggested that the *Congreso* should leave the port, as long as British and other foreign vessels were not going to respect the blockade. To enforce his position, the *Seringapatan* convoyed the arriving Swedish brig *Berger Jack*, of Stockholm, into the harbour, sailing between her and the Peruvian brig.³⁷² Some weeks latter, on

³⁷¹.- Arona: 155-162. Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatan*, At Sea, 5/9/1831; enclosed with Townshend to Elliot, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro. 16/11/1831. ADM 1/37.

³⁷².- Arona: 160-161. Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatan*, At Sea, 5/9/1831; enclosed with Townshend to Elliot, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro. 16/11/1831. ADM 1/37.

his arrival at Callao, Captain Waldegrave addressed a strong protest to the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning the blockade to Cobija.³⁷³

On 1 August, Captain Waldegrave refused to allow the *Libertad* sailing off the port in command of Diego Powell, who was just appointed by Aramayo. It was clear that Powell would be acting illegally unless he was a commissioned officer, a nomination which only could be done by the Bolivian President and, therefore, Waldegrave's attitude was quite proper. Despite the Governor's claims, the British Captain maintained his position, stating that he only would allow the *Libertad* sailing off if "a Peruvian men-of-war appeared off the harbour", the *Congreso* having already abandoned the blockade. Two days latter, all the *Libertad's* crew but twenty men landed, sails were removed and the vessel moved closer to the shore. "All dangers to the neutral property" having disappeared, the *Seringapatan* departed in the following days,³⁷⁴ while the *Libertad* affair was to end that very month, following an agreement reached by both governments at Tiquina, near Lake Titicaca.³⁷⁵

Aside from these two international conflicts involving Peru, the area under the responsibility of the Pacific Squadron was also quite unsettled. Civil wars were fought at Chile, Mexico, United Provinces of Central America, Colombia and Ecuador, while the French presence in the South Seas extended considerably,

³⁷³.- ADM 51/3420. Waldegrave to Pedemonte, *Seringapatan*, Callao, 20/8/1831; enclosed with Waldegrave to Baker, At Sea, 5/9/1831, ADM 1/37.

³⁷⁴.- Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatan*, At Sea, 5/9/1831; enclosed with Townshend to Elliot, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 16/11/1831, ADM 1/37. Arona: 157-158.

³⁷⁵.- Denegri (1976) I: 345-346. Arona: 161-162. Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatan*, At Sea, 5/9/1831; enclosed with Townshend to Elliot, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 16/11/1831, ADM 1/37.

producing some initial frictions between Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Accordingly, British merchants and consular agents in all the area increased their plea for a more active presence of British naval vessels. A request which was almost impossible to attend with the available number of vessels destined to the Squadron.

During this period, and generally speaking, Commanders-in-Chief of the South American Station destined more than half of their vessels to the Pacific, averaging five men-of-war. Until 1829, the length of time they remained in the Pacific was variable, depending very much in the amount of bullion each Captain was able to collect. Even when the Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron finally decided which vessel sailed back to Rio de Janeiro, Rear-Admiral Baker considered necessary to establish a regularity in this service, by mid-1829, he issued a set of rules which remained almost unchanged until the creation of the Pacific Naval Station (1837). First, having in mind that British merchants relied on naval vessels for the conveyance of their bullion, one of them was due to sail round the Cape to Rio de Janeiro quarterly. Second, for the service of British merchants in Central America, a warship was to sail up to San Blas yearly in November. Third, as long as the limits of the Station included Friendly and Society Islands, a ship would visit those places from time to time.³⁷⁶ Finally, regarding some of the previous problems faced in the West Coast, Baker concluded that they “had chiefly arisen from the frequent changing of the Senior Officers, who had but seldom been

³⁷⁶.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 11/7/1829, ADM 1/31; and 15/2/1830, with enclosed letter from Baker to Bingham, 25/10/1829, ADM 1/32.

allowed to continue in that situation a sufficient time to enable them to acquire a competent local knowledge of that part of the Station”³⁷⁷

According to Admiral Baker’s policy and the decline in the level of British trade with Peruvian ports, Royal Navy vessels spent less than one hundred days at Peruvian ports. Obviously, this figure was closely related to the severe decrease on the British maritime trade directed to Peruvian ports. As already mentioned, the starting point of this decline could be fixed in 1826, when struggle for Peruvian independence ended, and a Protectionist set of rules was established for foreign trade. If in 1826, several British men-of-war totaled 851 days at Peruvian ports, in the following year this figure was reduced to 309 days. The lowest figure was that already quoted for 1832, being increased slowly in the following three years until it reached 369 days in 1835, mainly due to the unsettled Peruvian situation, with civil wars between Gamarra, Orbegoso, Salaverry and other caudillos.

All these figures are shown in graphic two, “British men-of-war at Peruvian Ports”, not considering survey vessels, such as the *Beagle*, who visited Callao in 1835, or her tender, the schooner *Constitution*, who sailed along the Peruvian coast from August 1835 to June 1836.


In spite of the time British naval vessels spent in Peruvian ports, it also should be taken into account that, under certain circumstances, British, North American and French commodores, supported each other in the fulfilment of their duties. As long as they faced similar problems, related to the unsettled condition of the country, these naval officers found ways of cooperation, acting jointly in some cases, as was the defence of foreigners at Lima in December 1835.

³⁷⁷.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite* Rio de Janeiro, 18/12/1829, ADM 1/32.

In spite of their own suspicion from each other, all of them considered the Peruvian Navy as an eventual opponent. The strength of this local naval force was seriously affected in 1829, when its largest vessel, frigate *Presidente*, got on fire and blew up at Guayaquil. The Peruvian Navy of the period was formed by a few sloops, brigs and schooners, most of them with good officers but poorly manned, due lack of proper payment. They were able to cope with the faulty Colombian naval opposition during the 1828-1829 war, however, they were not a real threat to foreign squadrons. Both foreign commodores and the Peruvian Commander-in-Chief, were quite aware of this situation and even when the British Squadron rarely concentrated more than three vessels at a single place, no attempt was made to offer resistance when eventually they had to use force for the protection of British lives and properties. That is what happened with the seizure of the *Libertad*, in 1830.

Graphic 2: “British men-of-war at Peruvian Ports”

British men-of-war at Peruvian Ports
(ships/1 March each year)



British captains stationed in the Pacific were to protect their nationals, as Rear-Admiral Baker clearly stated in his instructions to Captain Waldegrave, of the *Seringapatan*, by mid-1831. As Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron, Waldegrave was “to give countenance and protection to this extensive commerce, and support the influence of British interest in these countries, is the first and indispensable duty of the squadron placed under your command”. He, as did many other senior officers, had to attend an always increasing number of petitions for support presented by British merchants along the West Coast.³⁷⁸ In attending them, they came through several problems with consular agents and merchants themselves, who generally considered that they deserved more protection than they actually received.

That happened, for instance, by late 1835, when, aside from landing a party of marines, the *Blonde* had to move to Chorrillos, a fishery village which was declared the sea-port of Lima by Orbegoso. As the situation deteriorated very quickly at Callao, foreign and Peruvian merchants tried to embark their cargo in the safest possible way: by using foreign men-of-war's boats. According to Mason's report, while North American and French boats were committed to this service disregarding the nationality of the cargo's owner and whether or not export duties had been paid or not, he refused to do it, to avoid becoming involved in any illegal operation and so as not to compromise British neutrality. He only sent his launch to save British property, as there was no other way to do it, refusing to take on board 500,000 non-British-owned dollars from another vessel. His attitude disappointed British merchants, who felt that they were due to receive far more

³⁷⁸.- Baker to Elliot, *Warspite* Rio de Janeiro, 25/6/1831, 2 & 3/7/1831, ADM 1/36; 15/12/1831, ADM 1/37; 19/6/1832, ADM 1/38.

“active” protection. Moreover, as the *Blonde* left Callao for Valparaíso on 25 January 1836, the very day when Chorrillos provisional customs were closed, being followed by the *Rover* by early February, the merchants complained against Mason, considering that at least one naval vessel should remain at port until the danger elapsed. British merchants argued that Mason did not have enough authority to leave them without protection, suggesting that a separate station should be created for the West Coast of South America, since British investments in this quarter were considerable. They also complained about the use of British men-of-war in the conveyance of bullion, since this service disturbed the protection that they should offer.³⁷⁹ We have already mentioned the final outcome of this particular suggestion: the establishment of the Pacific Station in 1837.

When Captain Mason learnt of these complaints, two months later, he felt offended and considered that Consul General Wilson was moving British merchants in Lima against him, even unnecessarily delaying their protest. In his report, Mason considered that their fellow countrymen in Lima believed that they were the only part of the Station in need of protection.³⁸⁰ In a general sense, Mason’s attitude during those uncertain days, even though against the will of his compatriots, was quite proper, compared with that of United States and French captains. What happened later, in his relations with Mr. Wilson, can be understood in a general sense to be the usual sort of frictions between naval captains and consular agents. In a more specific sense, it seems to be true that British merchants in Lima, as well as in any other place in which their properties and lives were

³⁷⁹.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* 14 & 16/4; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin at Sea*, 15/7/1836, ADM 1/46.

³⁸⁰.- Mason to Hammond, 16/4/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin at Sea*, 15/7/1836, ADM 1/46.

threatened, asked for more protection than they really needed, and far more than they could effectively receive.

On the other hand, a further incident between Wilson and Mason occurred in June 1836, when Mr. Mariano de Sierra, Peruvian Foreign Affairs Minister, addressed a letter to Consul General Wilson reminding him the regulations for the shipment of cargo, especially silver and gold. Even although Sierra's letter stated that some foreign men-of-war's boats were used to receive this sort of cargo without paying export duties, even entering ports not open to trade, he did not identify any of them, but was surely referred to the U.S. *Dolphin*. As already mentioned, the unauthorized presence of this schooner at Chorrillos, in March that year, produced an incident when the Foreign Affairs Minister wrongly identified her as H.M.S. *Dublin*. Obviously, those captains who allowed these shipments, placed themselves and their countries in a clearly illegal position. However, Mason found Sierra's comments offensive to British captains, arguing that even when the *Satellite* had visited Santa and Pisco, early in 1835; no treasure was received on board. Moreover, when his own frigate was anchored at Chorrillos, during the siege of Callao, in January 1836, he quite adamantly did not receive any non-British owned cargo or treasure. Consequently, he asked Wilson to complain about Minister Sierra's letter. As in a previous situation, first Wilson and afterwards Hammond disapproved of Mason's extreme sensibility, taking into account that the Minister's letter was written in a general sense rather than accusing British vessels.

Furthermore, both considered that everything that Sierra asked was quite acceptable for British Captains.³⁸¹

Accordingly, and reinforcing his own previous instructions, Hammond commanded Mason to remind the captains under his command not to accept any cargo on board their vessels without local customs intervention, in order to avoid giving any reason for complaint to the Peruvian Government. Hammond requested Wilson to inform to the Peruvian government about that part of his instructions, and that “he can assure that they have been perfectly executed”. He recognised that at certain moments, during revolutionary times, the intervention of British men-of-war was absolutely necessary to protect British lives and properties, those being the only situations when British captains were not due to wait for the intervention of Peruvian customs. But in peace time, under normal circumstances, Peruvian law was to be most strictly observed by those British men-of-war visiting their ports.³⁸²

Besides the usual activities of the Pacific Squadron, during this period of time the British Navy was to be related to Peru through the general survey undertaken by Captain Robert Fitz Roy, and the exploration of the Amazon basin performed by two lieutenants. As is already well-known, the Hydrographic Office committed a number of vessels to survey the seas, aiming to produce the most

³⁸¹.- Mason to Wilson, 9/7/1836; Serra to Wilson, 14/6/1836; and Mason to Hammond, 15/7/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 6/9/1836, ADM 1/46.

³⁸².- Hammond to Wilson, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 6/9/1836, ADM 1/46.

accurate charts of both coasts of America for a more safe navigation, replacing former Spanish and British charts.³⁸³

The survey of South American waters began in 1826, with the *Adventure*, Captain P. P. King, and the *Beagle*, Captain Pringle Stokes. The first part of it lasted four years, returning both vessels to England by the end of 1830. Almost a year later, the *Beagle* sailed from Plymouth to continue the survey, under Commander Robert Fitz Roy.³⁸⁴

Having spent almost three years chartering the southern channels, with the help of the *Constitución*, a small schooner of 35 tons burden, the *Beagle* arrived at Callao on 19 July 1835. Captain Fitz Roy, who arrived almost a month later, in the *Blonde*, was introduced by Consul General Wilson to Captain Eduardo Carrasco, Director of the Naval Academy and the Hydrographic Deposit. Having already decided to commission the *Constitución*, Mr. Alexander Burns Usborne master,³⁸⁵ to undertake the examination of the coast of Peru, Fitz Roy and Usborne were provided by Carrasco with a large amount of information “-both verbally and in writing- besides which he ransacked the archives for manuscripts, charts, and books, from which he allowed extracts to be taken or copies to be made, in the most truly liberal manner”.³⁸⁶

³⁸³.- Maling to Melville. 13/4/1825, GD 51/2/669-689, Scottish Records Office. L. S. Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 10/2/1830, ADM 1/32. Dawson I: 14.

³⁸⁴.- Dawson II: 14-15.

³⁸⁵.- Usborne joined the navy in 1825, and served in several surveying vessels along South America, Australia, Ireland and other waters. He retired as captain in 1867 [Dawson II: 122].

³⁸⁶.- Robert Fitzroy, *Narrative of the survey voyages of His Majesty's Ships Adventure and Beagle*, London 1839, I: 483-484. Fitzroy to Hammond, *Beagle* Callao, September 1835; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 18/12/1835, ADM 1/45.

Accordingly to an anonymous biographer of Admiral Carrasco, amongst the information he provided were some “Instructions to Captain Fitz Roy” in two parts, and a “Description of the western coast of America, from Guayaquil to the Strait of Bering”.³⁸⁷ Nonetheless, we have found no other mentions of these works.

The *Constitución*, with an eight men crew, left Callao on September 6, properly furnished with letters of commendation from Bolivian, Chilean and Peruvian authorities. Mr. Usborne was instructed to commence his survey near Paposo, Central Chile, and to work along the coast thence to Guayaquil, returning to Callao to sail back to Britain.³⁸⁸

Carrasco’s support of the *Constitución*’s party continued after the *Beagle*’s departure, on September 7, and even after she was sold at Paita, early in 1836, “winding up by advancing a large sum of money of his own purse, to forward the service in which they were engaged, and increasing their comfort during a long passage to England round Cape Horn.”³⁸⁹

Despite a number of difficulties, mainly due to the civil war between Salaverry and Orbegoso, Usborne’s party managed to fulfil their task. They completed a high quality survey, which was to be used for a number of charts in use for almost a century.³⁹⁰ Before Usborne departed for Britain, he traced copies

³⁸⁷.- Anonymous. “Apuntes biográficos del señor contralmirante Carrasco” *El Comercio*, 18/11/1865.

³⁸⁸.- Fitzroy, I: 484; II: 186-192.

³⁸⁹.- Fitzroy I: 484.

³⁹⁰.- George Basalla, “The voyage of the *Beagle* without Darwin”, *Mariner’s Mirror* 1963, vol. IL: 46-47.

of the charts “of the greater parts of the shores of Peru”, which were given to the Peruvian government in return of their kindness.³⁹¹

As a recognition of Carrasco’s support, Fitz Roy named the hills which surrounded Independencia Bay, south of Callao, after him. He was also proposed and admitted as correspondent member to the Royal Geographical Society of London and to the Royal Northern Antiquary Society, of Stockholm.³⁹²

Even when in 1836 the *Sulphur* was commissioned to continue the survey of the West Coast, she was to spend just a short visit to Callao and Paíta before heading for Central America. This survey vessel was to return to the Peruvian coast by mid-1838.

British interest in the exploration of the Amazon basin began as soon as the Independence war ended, considering that use of their rivers could provide new routes for trade. It is not clear who conceived the idea, but by mid-1827 Peruvian authorities and British Pro-Consul Rickets had already agreed to send an expedition to the Marañón river with the aforementioned purpose, Captain William Carter, Peruvian Navy, being appointed to lead it in company with Rickets’ assistant. However, for some reason, time passed with no further step until October 1827, when Lieutenant Henry Lister Maw, Royal Navy, offered himself to undertake the exploration of that area and the Amazon river.

Having been officially landed from the *Menai* to recover his health, it seems unlikely that Maw was truly sick, since in the following weeks he was involved in

³⁹¹.- John Barrow. “Sketch of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty’s Ships *Adventure* and *Beagle*, 1825-1836”, in *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* (quoted afterwards as JRGS), VI (1836): 312-313.

³⁹².- JRGS, VII (1837): 192 & IX (1839): vi. Anonymous. “Apuntes biográficos...”.

an extraordinary effort to cross the Andes and sail down the Marañón and Amazon rivers. Duly authorized by Captain John Sinclair, by then Senior Officer in the Pacific, Maw's preparations for the journey began almost immediately, with the hearty support of British Pro-Consuls Willimott and Kelly, Peruvian Minister of Government Francisco Mariategui, and the Archbishop of Lima. Provided with letters of introduction from these authorities, on 30 November 1827 Maw sailed for Huanchaco on the Peruvian merchant brig *Alcance Republicano*.³⁹³ From this place, the seaport of Trujillo, he was to begin a four months' journey which ended at Santarem, in Brazil, where the Governor ordered his detention. After some days in this situation, Maw was released, arrived at Para and shortly afterwards sailed home on the brig *Douglas*. In September 1828, Maw presented a full account of his journey to the Admiralty, an extract of which was published on the following year as a *Journal of a Passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic*, London 1829. In this year, Maw sailed back to the South America Station on the *Volage*.³⁹⁴

Maw's journal provided very valuable information about the Marañón and Amazonas, an area which was claimed by Colombia. He listed every single authority found along his route, including priest, finding that all of them were commissioned by the Peruvian government instead of the Colombian one. As this claim passed on to Ecuador, when it became a separate State (1830), and to a degree is still argued by some Ecuadorians historians, the testimony provided by Maw became one of the most valuable Peruvian proofs of effective possession of the area.

³⁹³.- *El Telégrafo de Lima*, nº 201, 3/12/1827.

A second British naval exploration to the Amazon basin was undertaken in 1834, by Lieutenant William Smyth, of the *Samarang*. Being stationed at Callao for several months, Smyth was convinced by Mr. Thomas, an English resident at Lima, to explore a route which could connect Peru with the Atlantic by using the Pachitea, Ucayali and Amazon rivers. Consul General Wilson, Captain Paget, of the *Samarang*, and Commodore Mason supported and encouraged the idea, which was warmly welcomed by the Peruvian government. On 25 August, when President Orbegoso visited that British man-of-war, Mason officially presented the idea and obtained the President's promise to provide every possible help to the expedition. Smyth and his companion, Mr. Frederick Lowe, landed in the following days, to prepare their journey, being commissioned two Peruvian officers, Major Beltrán and naval Lieutenant Azcárate, to accompany them up by the Ucayali and return to Lima by the Marañón. The expedition left Lima in September, provided with some instruments lent by Captain Paget and an number of articles bought by using three hundred dollars "subscribed by some of the British residents".³⁹⁵

The last contact Mason had with both officers was by a letter conveyed by Major Beltrán, who had left them entering the Ucayali river, early in March 1835. They were to sail down this river, enter the Amazon and arrived at Belem do Para some weeks later.³⁹⁶ Considering that this expedition was to contribute to the better understanding of the Amazon basin, opening it to trade and science, Mason asked Rear Admiral Hammond for a letter of commendation for Smyth and Lowe

³⁹⁴.- Lieutenant Henry Lister Maw return of service, 24/4/1840, ADM 9/44; Otway to Croker, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 29/3/1828, ADM 1/31; Maw to Croker, *London*, 1/7, 19/8 & 12/9/1828, ADM 1/3038.

³⁹⁵.- W. Smyth and F. Lowe, *Narrative of a Journey from Lima to Para*, London 1836: 1-11. *JRGS*, IV (1835): 117, 373, 561.

³⁹⁶.- *JRGS*, IV (1835): 561.

before the Lords of the Admiralty. However, this petition was denied as Admiral Hammond showed very little enthusiasm for this enterprise, considering that it would be of little help for British trade.³⁹⁷

Even when the expedition proved “that an easy navigable passage exists from the town of Pozuzo on the Pachitea, within 300 miles of Lima, by the rivers Ucayali and the Amazon to the Atlantic Ocean”,³⁹⁸ the unsettled state of Peru did not allow to be properly exploited until the 1860’s.

³⁹⁷.- Hammond to Dawson, *Spartiate* Rio de Janeiro, 12/3/1835, ADM 1/43. Mason to Hammond, Callao 27/11/1835; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Rio de Janeiro 14/3/1836, ADM 1/45.

³⁹⁸.- “A Sketch of the Progress of Geography and of the labours of the Royal Geographical Society during the years 1836-7” *JRGS*, VII (1837): 191. Smyth, “Account of the Rivers Amazon and Negro, from recent Observations”, *JRGS*, VI (1836): 11-23.

FOURTH CHAPTER

The Confederation of Peru and Bolivia (1836-1839)

Following the defeat of General Salaverry, in February 1836, Peru and Bolivia became a confederation under the leadership of Marshal Andrés de Santa Cruz. In a Congress held at Sicuani, representatives of Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cusco and Puno, decided to become a new State named South Peru (17 March 1836). A few months later, on August 16, deputies from Lima, Junín, Amazonas and La Libertad, summoned a Congress at Huaura and created the State of North Peru. Both States placed themselves under the rule of Santa Cruz, as Supreme Protector. On 28 October 1836, the Confederation was formally created by the union of the states of North-Peru, South-Peru and Bolivia, placed altogether under the protection of Santa Cruz, who was entrusted with a wide range of powers, amongst them defence and foreign affairs.³⁹⁹

The Peru-Bolivian Confederation was to last three years, a time in which Santa Cruz tried to establish a liberal policy, lowering import taxes, opening the overprotected Peruvian market and trying to recover for Callao its leading position along the western coast of South America. With this purpose in mind, he successfully improved his personal links with foreign consular agents, especially with the British, Belford Hinton Wilson, who played quite an important role during the Confederation. Wilson's links with Santa Cruz went back to the Independence Wars, when the former was a young *aide de camp* of Bolívar, but it also reflected

399.- Basadre (1968) II: 131-142. Andrés de Santa-Cruz Schuhkrafft, *Cuadros sinópticos de los gobernantes de la República de Bolivia, 1825 a 1956, y de la del Perú, 1820 a 1956*, (La Paz, Fundación Universitaria Simón I. Patiño, 1956), 78-88.

an important fact: the unstable Peruvian political situation provided very little hope for those British who had invested in the country, either by trade or as shareholders of the British loan of 1822. Santa Cruz's success as President of Bolivia, where he established regulations of unusual liberality, and as previous ruler of Peru (1826-1827), gained him the reputation of being one of the most capable leaders for Peru.⁴⁰⁰ Wilson was not the only one to believe that, since British captains also became supporters of Santa Cruz, producing highly enthusiastic reports on his political activity.

French and North Americans were also fascinated by the new ruler, supporting him accordingly. But this enthusiasm was not shared by the Chileans, who considered the Confederation as a direct threat to their country, declaring war and finally destroying it. During this war, British captains were involved, mainly supporting British trade and citizens, but also acting as mediators and eventually providing some help to Santa Cruz. Consul General Wilson became too much implicated in this situation, carry along with him Rear-Admiral Ross, Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Pacific Station. Wilson's attitude was to create some friction with the British Consul General at Chile, Colonel Walpole, a situation which also was echoed in the relations between the latter and the Pacific Station.

Finally, during these years, French influence in the South Sea Islands grew considerable, mainly through the action of the French Commodore, Captain Abel Bergasse du Petit Thouars. This issue was to create new commitments for the British Pacific Station.

Framed by this general situation, the aim of this chapter is to discuss the following issues:

- a) How deeply involved the Pacific Squadron became in supporting Consul General Wilson attitude towards Santa Cruz and the Confederation?;
- b) The neutrality observed by British Captains during the war between Chile and the Confederation;

400.- W.M. Mathew (1989), 412-413.

- c) The particular relationship between naval and consular agents in Peru and Chile;
- d) If the creation of the Pacific Station brought any substantial and immediate change in the British naval activity in the Pacific;
- e) If there was any significant change in the transport of bullion on naval vessels?; and
- f) Finally, the relationship of the British Pacific Squadron with other naval forces in the area.

The Confederation and the British

Several works had been written on the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, explaining its creation, development and fall. For the purpose of this research, we have already provided the general background of the way in which the Confederation was created. The situation of Peru at that time was chaotic, having lost its leading role as the economic centre of the western coast of South America. Higher taxes than Valparaíso, contraband and unreliable customs, provide an explanation for the decrease in commercial activity. Other State incomes were not well collected, and in many cases they not reach the proper office, producing a growing deficit in the Public Budget. Public Administration was also poorly managed in other fields, with a considerable number of civil servants and military, whose efficiency and discipline was far from being acceptable.⁴⁰¹

Marshal Andrés de Santa Cruz, the Protector and real ruler of the Confederation, adopted a number of measures trying to correct this chaotic situation. New Regulations were issued for Trade and Customs, and a more strict control was exerted over Public funds. The Judicial system was also changed, as well as many other services, like Public Education. However, most of these measures did not last enough to produce a real change. Both, the Chileans and the internal enemies of Santa Cruz, moved faster to destroy the Confederation. Born in Bolivia, ruler of Peru (1826-1827), and President of his native country (1828-1836), Santa Cruz had already shown great abilities as an administrator but a poor

⁴⁰¹.- Basadre (1968), II: 137.

performance as a politician. Having to deal with such unsettled countries as Peru and Bolivia, he lacked a strong and loyal group of generals, and also a proper naval force. Chilean intervention under these circumstances was to precipitate something which would arrive sooner or later: the fall of the Confederation.⁴⁰²

Under the presidency of General Joaquín Prieto, since April 1830, Chile was undergoing one of the most important moments in its history: the consolidation of the republican system and the establishment of stable democratic foundations. Some of the most outstanding figures in this process were Diego Portales and Andrés Bello, whose ideas would constitute the basis for Chilean political thought for the following decades.

As was already mentioned in previous chapters, since independence, Chilean governments established a number of regulations aimed at turning Valparaíso into a more attractive port of destination for foreign trade bound for the West Coast of South America. As foreign goods were allowed to be landed at Valparaíso without paying duties, unless they were destined for local use, this port became a huge warehouse, with many implications for the local economy. The Peruvian economy resented this situation, at a time when protectionism was still strong enough to deny any liberal response to the Chileans' attitude. In spite of this, some attempts were made, but for some reason or another they failed. Within this context, in May 1836, Peruvian President Orbegoso rejected a Trade Treaty which provided Chile with certain advantages.⁴⁰³ This was to be the last act in the long economic struggle between Callao and Valparaíso before it became a war. In fact, for Chilean merchants, it was clear that war was the only way left. Accordingly, they pressed their government to retaliate with higher taxes on Peruvian sugar and alcohol.⁴⁰⁴ Additionally, the influence of those Peruvians deported by Santa Cruz to Chile should be mentioned.

402.- Idem, II: 138, 187-190.

403.- Paz Soldán IV: 3-5, 8-11. Basadre (1968) II: 143-144. Denegri (1976) I: 465-477. Mario Barros, *Historia Diplomática de Chile, 1541-1938*, Barcelona 1970: 120.

404.- Barros: 120.

The immediate cause for the war was the expedition of General Freyre, a former Chilean President, who sailed from Callao in July 1836 with the intention of recapturing power in Chile. For this purpose, he hired the frigate *Monteagudo* and the brig *Orbegoso*, two Peruvian men-of-war which had been unarmed and offered for trading purposes by the Peruvian Government.⁴⁰⁵ President Orbegoso distrusted the Navy too much, for the support it gave to Salaverry during the last civil war, and consequently he reduced the Navy's strength to a minimum.

According to their papers, the frigate left Callao for Guayaquil, while the brig was bound for Costa Rica.⁴⁰⁶ However, General Freyre and a number of Chilean deportees came on board, with clear intentions of starting a revolution in Chile. By July 9, the Peruvian authorities had become aware of this situation, and the Chilean Minister at Lima was officially informed that the Peruvian government was not involved in this affair.⁴⁰⁷ The expedition itself proved to be a total failure, and General Freyre was captured on August 28, at Chiloe. The Chilean government, skilfully manipulated by Diego Portales, the powerful Minister of Foreign Affairs, War and Interior, reacted by blaming the Peruvian government for having sponsored the expedition by providing men-of-war for this purpose. The excuse to declare war had been given, and consequently secret plans to attack first were prepared.

Well-recognized Peruvian and Chilean historians consider that neither Orbegoso nor Santa Cruz were aware that Freyre was engaged in such a poorly prepared venture.⁴⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the Chilean government was not willing to accept their innocence. Minister Portales' attitude towards Santa Cruz was clear: Chile could not afford the luxury of having him as ruler of Bolivia and South Peru,

405.- Ramón Herrera to Minister of War, Callao 31/8 & 29/9 & 5/10/36, A. H. de M. bergantín *General Orbegoso*; and 16/9/1836, A.H. de M. fragata *Monteagudo*. Paz Soldán IV: 75-76.

406.- A.H. de M. libro 847, 17/5/1836.

407.- Paz Soldán IV: 77-79.

408.- Denegri (1976) I: 485-492.

with enormous influence on the rest of Peru. Consequently, Santa Cruz's plans to confederate the three previously mentioned republics should be halted before its consolidation. The abrogation of the trade treaty with Peru, before Freyre's expedition, persuaded President Prieto to began hostilities.⁴⁰⁹ A loan was made to increase the number and readiness of the Chilean squadron and, even before Freyre's capture, two Chilean men-of-war, the brig *Aquiles* and the 5-gun brig-schooner *Colo Colo*, left Valparaiso for Peruvian waters, carrying Colonel Victoriano Garrido as High Commissioner to the Peruvian government.

The *Aquiles* arrived at Callao on 21 August 1836, finding at anchor the British frigate *Talbot*, under Captain Pennel, who recorded: "The *Aquiles*' Captain [Angulo], after his visit to the Port-Master, remained on shore for some hours with his companions, sending a person to Lima, with the Chilean Consul General coming to Callao".⁴¹⁰ When Captain Angulo returned to his vessel, he had a clear knowledge of the condition of the Peruvian men-of-war lying at anchor. They were the 12-gun bark *Santa Cruz*, the 6-gun brig *Arequipeño*, the schooner *Peruviana*, and the brig *Congreso*.⁴¹¹ As a result of the policy adopted by Orbegoso, these vessels were almost totally neglected and not in sailing condition, manned only by 77 men, 30 of them being Chileans. To worsen their situation, none of the Peruvian vessels had gun-power on board, and most of their small arms were still under repair on land.⁴¹² Above all this, there was no reason at all to fear hostility from vessels of a friendly nation visiting the port.⁴¹³

409.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Coquimbo, 13/3/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

410.- Mason to Walpole, 27/2/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

411.- Young to the Minister of War, Callao 27/6/1836; Young to the Jefe Superior Militar del Departamento, 1/7, 3 & 12/8/1836; Young to the Minister of War, Callao 20/8/1836, A.H. de M. bergantín *Congreso*.

412.- Young to the Jefe Superior Militar del Departamento, Callao 12 & 20/8/1836, A.H. de M. bergantín *Congreso* & corbeta *Libertad*.

413.- Denegri I: 492-496. Mason to Walpole, 27/2/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

Shortly after midnight, “not demanding any satisfaction or explanation or warning”, five boats with 80 armed men left the *Aquiles* to capture the first three of the above-mentioned Peruvian men-of-war. They succeeded in their purpose and at dawn the *Aquiles* anchored at San Lorenzo Island in company with her prizes.⁴¹⁴ Immediately, Garrido wrote to the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs and to Captain Pennel, justifying the attack as a mean of obtaining guarantee of the peaceful intentions of the Confederate government towards Chile.⁴¹⁵ The Chilean action was fully disapproved by the British, first by Pennel and Wilson, and afterwards by Mason and Rear Admiral Hammond, who considered it an act of utmost treachery.⁴¹⁶

The attack of the *Aquiles* not only gained British disapproval, but also from some Chilean historians, such as Vicuña Mackena, who described it as a disgrace for both Chile and her Navy.⁴¹⁷ Other Chilean authors justified the attack on the principle of self-defence, relating it to the expedition of Freyre and the intervention of Santa Cruz in Peruvian internal affairs.⁴¹⁸ I believe that neither the attitude of President Prieto, when he sent two men-of-war to commit hostilities against the Peruvian coast without prior declaration of war, nor that of Angulo, when he behaved falsely before the authorities of the Port of Callao, merit any justification whatsoever. If we assume that Chile had little possibility of challenging Peruvian naval power without a blow of this sort, it could be said that the only possible justification was the result.

414.- *El Araucano*, 23/9/1836. Garrido to Pennel, *Aquiles*, 22/8; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 8/12/1836, ADM 1/47.

415.- *El Araucano*, 23/9/1836. Garrido to Pennel, *Aquiles*, 22/8; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 8/12/1836, ADM 1/47.

416.- “Their Lordships will observe the treachery of the Chilian commander on this occasion”, Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 8/12/1836, ADM 1/47. Mason to Walpole, 27/2/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

417.- Benjamín Vicuña Mackena, *Historia de diez años de la administración Montt*, Valparaíso 1863, I: 64-65.

418.- Barros (1970): 120-121.

Santa Cruz's first reaction was to detain Ventura Lavalle, the Chilean Consul General at Lima, ordering an immediate attack on the Chilean vessels.⁴¹⁹ However, he soon realized that he did not have enough naval forces to retaliate, and it was far more convenient to accept Consul General Wilson's advice to negotiate a truce, avoiding in such a way a conflict which could endanger the Confederation itself. Conversations were held on board the *Talbot*, this being the first British intervention in this conflict.

On 27 August, Chilean and Peruvian delegates signed a provisional agreement, according to which the former would retain the vessels already captured until a definitive treaty was reached, being allowed to take the two men-of-war involved in General Freyre's expedition. The agreement was approved by Santa Cruz but rejected by Prieto, following Portales' advice.⁴²⁰

Even before Garrido's arrival at Valparaíso, a new expedition was prepared under the flag of Vice-Admiral Blanco Encalada. On 10 September 1836, Minister Portales revealed to the Admiral his feelings towards the Confederation: "With the triumph of your arms, you are really going to obtain the second independence of Chile [...] The Confederation must disappear forever from the American scene [...] because of the command that the new organization would try to exercise in the Pacific, taking it away from us [...] for all these reasons, the Confederation would soon smother Chile".⁴²¹

On October 19, five Chilean men-of-war departed Valparaíso for Callao, with the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mariano Egaña, as High Commissioner

419.- The brig *Congreso* still needed 25 days more to be ready for fighting, there was a limited number of ordnance at the port defenses, the sloop *Libertad*, due to arrive shortly, was unaware of the situation, and to buy and arm merchant vessels would take some time [Ramón Herrera to the Minister of War, Callao 26/8/1836, A.H. de M. bergantín *Congreso*].

420.- *El Eco del Protectorado*, 31/8/1836. Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 8/12/1836, and enclosed letter; Pennel to Mason, *Talbot*, Callao 10/9/1836, ADM 1/47. Ramón Sotomayor Valdes, *Campaña del Ejército Chileno contra la Confederación Perú-Boliviana en 1837*, Santiago 1896: 10-14.

421.- Barros: 114. Guillermo Feliu Cruz and Ernesto de la Cruz (editors), *Epistolario de Don Diego Portales 1821-1837*, Santiago 1936-1937, III: 452-454.

to negotiate peace. His instructions were quite simple: he must obtain the dissolution of the Confederation. Obviously, after the *Aquiles* incident, five Chilean ships at Callao was not the best expression of peaceful intentions. That feeling was expressed to Commodore Mason, by General Herrera, Governor of Callao, who assured him that the Peruvian government was “not disposed to treat with Chile, in the presence of their squadron”.⁴²²

Consequently, on October 30, when Admiral Blanco Encalada arrived at Callao, the Peruvian government, being “anxious for Peace and ready to make every reasonable sacrifice to obtain it [...] refused to admit the Chile Squadron to the Port, or to treat in the presence of a hostile force”. Following an exchange of correspondence, the Chilean High Commissioner left port on the night of November 11, stating that “it could be considered almost that war had been declared between Chile and the governments of the North and South-Peruvian states”.⁴²³

The Confederate government reacted by prohibiting all trade with Chile, establishing an embargo on Chilean vessels at Peruvian ports and adopting defence measures along the coast. A final direct attempt to settle peace, on November 20, with the mediation of the United States, France and Great Britain, only merited Portales’ rejection. Finally, on 2 February 1837, all maritime and land communications with Chile, were declared illegal.⁴²⁴

Naval operations began in November, when Admiral Blanco cruised off Guayaquil waiting for some Peruvian naval vessels who were at that port.⁴²⁵ By late November, the Peruvian sloop *Libertad* mutinied and headed for Valparaíso,

422.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47.

423.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 12/11/1836, ADM 1/47. *El Araucano* n° 338 y 340, 24/2 & 10/3/1837.

424.- *El Araucano* n° 340, 10/3/1837. *El Eco del Protectorado*, n° 26 y 49.

425.- *El Araucano*, n° 344, 7/4/1837: 2-3. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 413-414. Denegri (1976) I: 526-528. The *Valparaíso* and *Aquiles* left the blockade by November 23 [Loyola to the Minister of War, Callao 15/12/1836. A.H. de M. corbeta *Valparaíso*]. The only Confederate vessel which remained at Guayaquil was the *Catalina*.

where she joined the Chilean forces against Santa Cruz. As soon as this defection was known in Lima, the Confederate government requested the intervention of the British squadron for the *Libertad's* recapture. After initial thoughts in favour of this intervention, Commodore Mason finally declined, bearing in mind the Admiralty's disapproval of Captain Bingham's intervention with regard to the Chilean brig *Aquiles*, in 1828, and the advice of Consul General Wilson.⁴²⁶

Simultaneously, Chilean envoys tried to convince Argentinian and Ecuadorian rulers that they should declare war on the Confederation. The Argentinians were convinced and a small army was sent to attack Bolivia, an operation which achieved very little. In spite of his sympathy for the Chilean cause, the Ecuadorian President, General Vicente Rocafuerte, decided not to involve his country in the conflict.⁴²⁷

In the middle of this tense situation, British Consul Generals in Peru and in Chile, Belford H. Wilson and Colonel John Walpole, a former Secretary of Lord Palmerston, respectively, were to play a singular role as both were deeply involved in local internal affairs. While Wilson became a firm supporter of Santa Cruz, considering him as "the only man willing or capable of promoting the commercial and industrial interest of the country",⁴²⁸ Walpole did not recognize the Confederation and from a very early stage undertook a defence of the Chilean position. Each consular agent tried to get the Pacific Squadron involved in support his own point of view, and friction arose especially with Walpole.

Naval captains had their own perception of Santa Cruz and the conflict itself. Regarding Marshal Santa Cruz, Commodore Mason wrote:

426.- Denegri (1976) I: 528-530. Mason to Walpole, *Blonde* Valparaíso, 4/3/1847; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

427.- Mason to Hammond, Valparaíso, 11/4/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/6/1837, ADM 1/48. Barros: 117-118. Paz Soldán IV: 128-130. Sotomayor (1896): 28-35, 57-60.

428.- Celia Wu, *Generals and Diplomats, Great Britain and Peru, 1920-40*, Cambridge 1991: 67 y 78.

“trade had entirely revived and the very wise and salutary Reforms, and Regulations introduced by the Protector were beginning to operate for the benefit of Commerce; and in fact they are all calculated to call for all the great Resources of Peru; and such are its Resources that the Country only requires tranquillity to be prosperous. General Santa Cruz appears to me the only Man calculated to govern this restless and corrupted people. From the way in which he governed Bolivia, and put an end to the Revolution of General Salaverry, I formed my opinion”⁴²⁹

Mason considered that the conduct of the Chilean government was quite uncivilized and ill-intentioned “and wide convinces me that they will not stick at the means, by which they think they can distress Peru”. Making a comparative judgement between both governments, Mason stated that the Chilean ruled its countrymen in an almost semi-barbaric way, whereas the Peruvian had a more liberal attitude, acting moderately and in good faith. With regard to the conflict itself, he added “The object for which Chile contends appears to me unattainable, and if it could be attained, would not, I think, benefit for her”.⁴³⁰

The first attempt to get British naval vessels involved in the conflict was made by Consul General Walpole, who wrote at least three letters to Commodore Mason, of the *Briton*, stating that the vessels taking part in General Freyre’s expedition ought to be regarded as pirates, and therefore it was Mason’s duty to capture them wherever they could be found.⁴³¹ Mason, who was notified by Freyre himself before his departure from Callao on the expedition’s aim, considered that it was an internal affair and therefore had already decided not to interfere, unless piratical activities were committed.⁴³² Moreover, he was firmly convinced that the Peruvian government had not been an accomplice in the expedition, as was claimed by the Chilean government without producing any proof.⁴³³

429.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47.

430.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* 27/2 & 13/3/1837: enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

431.- Walpole to Mason, Valparaíso, 28 & 30/7, 4/8/1836, ADM 1/46.

432.- Mason to Walpole, *Briton* Valparaíso, 1/8/1836. ADM 1/46. Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Valparaíso, 14/3/1837, ADM 1/48.

433.- Mason to Walpole, 27/2/1837: enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

In early 1835, a similar request was made by Salaverry, but it was rejected equally, amongst other reasons because British men-of-war were unable to exert the right of search upon merchant vessels in peace time. Showing a keen understanding of the variability in South American politics, Mason stressed the fact that in these nations a man could be considered the worst enemy of his own country, while in exile, but on the day after his triumphal return he could be acclaimed as a saviour of his nation.⁴³⁴

In his report to Rear Admiral Hammond, Mason affirmed that any information coming from consular agents had to be regarded with much caution, since in most cases they were strongly influenced by local governments, losing the objectivity that they ought to maintain. Mason provided two examples to illustrate this affirmation, one of them related to the expedition of Freyre and the other one to the revolution of Salaverry. In the first case, Mason being already aware that something was about to happen in Chile, Walpole assured him that nothing should be expected in the following weeks. In the second case, scarcely two days before the start of Salaverry's revolution, Wilson assured Mason that he could give notice of any political unrest one month before it actually happened. Despite his low opinion with regard to the objectiveness of both consular agents, Mason was convinced that they, as well as naval Captains, had to make their best efforts in trying to stop a war between Chile and the Confederation, which could place British trade in the area at great risk.⁴³⁵ Moreover, taking into consideration the type of government ruling Peru, Mason believed that the naval service should be more effective than the consular one in this country.⁴³⁶

434.- Mason to Walpole, *Briton*, Valparaíso, 1 & 6/8; Mason to Hammond, 18/8/1836, ADM 1/46. Mason's attitude on this affair was fully approved by Rear Admiral Hammond, see Hammond to Wood, *Dublin Rio de Janeiro*, 12/10/1836, ADM 1/46.

435.- Mason to Hammond, 13/8/1836, ADM 1/46.

436.- Mason to Hammond, Callao, 26/12/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin Rio de Janeiro*, 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

Both consular agents, Mason and afterwards Rear Admiral Ross would make every possible effort to stop the war. Naval co-operation was closer with Consul General Wilson, and began following the attack of the *Aquiles*, when negotiations were held on board the *Talbot*, under Captain Pennel, as already mentioned.

Commodore Mason had been at Valparaíso since August, with the *Blonde* and some other British naval vessels, witnessing the arrival of the *Aquiles* with her prizes and the preparations of the Chilean squadron under Admiral Blanco Encalada. The latter had publicly shown his dislike for the attack of the *Aquiles*, an attitude which gained for him a high degree of respect from British and other foreign naval officers, in contrast with the poor opinion they had of the honourability of Chilean captains.⁴³⁷ This final aspect awoke additional fears among British captains, as they thought that any squadron with such captains might endanger neutral shipping.⁴³⁸

Blanco and Mason met on September 25, on the *Blonde*, learning then that the Chilean Admiral was not very pleased with his mission, which was to enforce a blockade of Callao if peace negotiations between Mariano Egaña and the Confederate government failed. Suspecting that Santa Cruz was ready to accept any conditions, difficult as they may be, so as to preserve peace, Mason expressed his hopes that war would finally be avoided. Blanco agreed with him and replied that he had real intentions of finding a peaceful arrangement for the conflict, as in fact he did.⁴³⁹

Even when war was not officially declared, some measures were taken by Santa Cruz as soon as he learnt of the rejection of the provisional agreement signed

437.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Coquimbo, 13/3/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

438.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde*, 27/2 & 13/3/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

439.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Valparaíso, 26/9/1836, ADM 1/47. Barros: 124. Wu (1991): 79.

on the *Talbot*. Amongst these measures, an embargo was placed on all vessels at Callao, to prevent the departure of the Peruvian brig-of-war *Congreso* being known, few days before the arrival of Blanco. Nonetheless, merchant vessels could sail “provided they were escorted far enough from the coast to prevent them being detained by the Chilean Squadron”. Commodore Mason, who arrived at Callao five days ahead of the Chilean squadron, offered his protection to British vessels, “as there has been no Declaration of War, and consequently the latter can possess no Belligerent Rights, I sent the *Talbot* out twice. The *Rover* also escorted one to Guayaquil”.⁴⁴⁰

Following his arrival, Mason was informed by General Herrera, Governor of Callao, who “called on me yesterday, before I anchored”, that the Peruvian government was “not disposed to treat with Chile, in the presence of their Squadron”.⁴⁴¹ When the Chilean squadron arrived, Mason requested guarantees from the Chilean Envoy for hostilities not to be committed while negotiations were under way. In reply, he was informed by Egaña that Chile and Peru were already at war. As Mason stated in one of his reports to Hammond, the attitude adopted by the Chilean government was far from the normal international usage, as explanations from the Confederation government should have been asked for, before declaring war, especially when the latter was willing to make every possible effort to avoid such a situation.⁴⁴²

On 16 December 1836, Chilean Admiral Blanco Encalada returned to Callao to blockade the port, informing Commodore Mason of his intention. However, taking into account that war between Chile and the Confederation had not been formally declared, Mason requested Blanco to exhibit “a less hostile attitude” towards the Peruvian government and not to interrupt trade.

440.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 12/11/1836, ADM 1/47.

441.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47.

442.- Mason to Walpole, *Blonde* Valparaíso, 27/2/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

Understanding that under these circumstances any forcible action would be rejected by foreign squadrons, and taking into account his own point of view towards this conflict, Blanco accepted Consul General Wilson's advice to negotiate peace with the Confederation. Bearing this in mind, General Herrera and Admiral Blanco met on board the *Valparaiso*, and on December 21, a 15-day truce was signed.⁴⁴³

After the signature of this agreement, Herrera and Blanco came aboard the *Blonde* to notify Mason of this truce and to request a British guarantee for any subsequent treaty that might be reached between the Confederation and Chile. At this stage, everything indicated that a final agreement on this matter could be reached, and that the arrival of authority for Blanco Encalada to negotiate peace was only awaited. Consul General Wilson's intervention was important, requesting permission from Santa Cruz to allow the Chilean Admiral to come on board the *Blonde*. On this occasion, on December 26, he insisted on a British guarantee for the peace treaty after it had been approved in Santiago.⁴⁴⁴ Ironically, on the same day, the Chilean Congress declared war on the Confederation, more precisely on Marshal Santa Cruz.

Some days later, this news reached Callao and hostilities continued. The Chilean squadron was to remain cruising off the port until late-February, returning then to Valparaiso to prepare a full scale expedition to invade South Peru. Already convinced that there is no room for further negotiations, Santa Cruz prepared his forces to fight, trying to increase his naval squadron with privateers, issuing regulations with this purpose.⁴⁴⁵

Both Chile and the Confederation understood that the first action of the war should take place at sea. Besides direct engagements between their naval forces, maritime war should include economic aspects, such as blockading enemy

443.- *El Araucano*, n 336, 10/2/1837: 7.

444.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 22/12/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

445.- *El Eco del Protectorado*, Lima 8/2/1837. Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 16/12/1837, ADM 1/50. Sotomayor (1896): 104.

ports or destroying its mercantile marine. Both opponents worked out some regulations in this sense, affecting in a variable degree neutral shipping and trade. Consequently, some incidents arose with consular agents, which eventually involved foreign naval forces.

Since the end of 1836, the Confederate government opened to foreign shipping a number of ports usually used only for coastal traffic, in order to prevent the negative effects that a blockade could have on trade. It was also announced that, if a blockade was established on the Chilean coast, certain periods of immunity would be allowed for neutral shipping, except for "Vessels of those Nations submitting to Blockades of the Coast of Peru, either by Chile or any other Country".⁴⁴⁶

This attitude was unusual in maritime war, since it forced neutral governments to choose between trading with Chile or with the Confederation. Apparently, such a proposal followed a subtle scheme suggested by the French diplomatic agent at Lima, about whom it was said that he even signed an agreement with the Confederate government "on the Subject of certain time being allowed for vessels from Europe entering Blockading Ports".⁴⁴⁷ Mason referred to this issue, condemning the attitude of those diplomatic and consular agents "who wish to vary their conduct according to circumstances or rather as shall to them appear best for the commercial interest of their countrymen".⁴⁴⁸

Chile also issued regulations for the treatment of neutral shipping in the case of a blockade being declared on the Peruvian coast. Mason considered that these regulations did not constitute a formal declaration of blockade, so he requested and obtained guarantees from Vice-Admiral Blanco Encalada that neutral

446.- Wilson to Mason, Lima 2/12/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Mason, *Dublin Rio de Janeiro*, 21/4/1837, ADM 1/47.

447.- Wilson to Mason, Lima 2/12/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Mason, *Dublin Rio de Janeiro*, 21/4/1837, ADM 1/47.

448.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde At Sea*, 25/1/1837, ADM 1/47.

vessels would receive every consideration from the Chilean squadron.⁴⁴⁹ Even though Mason firmly believed that Blanco Encalada was an honourable man, he feared that anything could be expected from Chilean captains, whose reputation was quite poor amongst the British Squadron. Taking this into consideration, and British naval regulations regarding the right of search, which forbade firing at merchant vessels to command them to strike their sails, Mason stated that he did not recognize the right of search for the Chilean squadron, declaring that British men-of-war were to recapture any vessel taken by the Chileans for offering resistance to search.⁴⁵⁰

In this general context, since late 1836, British merchants at Lima increased their demands for protection. Mason tried to attend to them as much as possible, reaching an agreement with Admiral Blanco in this sense. For this reason, even when he delayed his departure from Callao in early 1837, Mason considered that British trade was not under a real threat at that moment. Captain Pennel, of the *Talbot*, who also had to delay his departure from Callao, wrote in this sense: "I do not think that the merchants at Lima are the best judges of the distribution of the Squadron".⁴⁵¹

Mason's attitude at Callao was fully approved by Admiral Hammond, who instructed him to consult with Consul General Wilson concerning any action to be taken with regard to the hostilities between Chile and the Confederation. None of these two governments could claim belligerent rights without a formal declaration of war. Once it was issued, Mason was to observe the most absolute neutrality. Hammond's instructions were particularly precise regarding blockades, indicating that they should be accepted provided they were properly enforced and conducted within the usual custom of maritime warfare. In a general sense, Mason should "act

449.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 22/4/1837, ADM 1/47.

450.- Mason to Walpole, *Blonde* Valparaíso, 4/3/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

451.- Mason to Pennel, Callao 21/1/1837, ADM 1/47. Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

with regard to such blockades, agreeable to the principles maintained by the Government of Great Britain during the late war with France”,⁴⁵² until the Admiralty issued specific orders for this case. Foreseeing the difficulties that could arise, Hammond requested more ships to be stationed in the Pacific.⁴⁵³

Santa Cruz had won a very good reputation amongst foreign consular agents, who applauded the achievements of his five-year administration in Bolivia and expected that Peru might achieve the same order, so as to allow their citizens to carry on their activities with an acceptable degree of stability, and the country itself to honour its debts. With characteristic skill, Santa Cruz obtained the sympathy of the governments of Great Britain, France, the United States and the Vatican,⁴⁵⁴ which provided him with some advantage, and eventually foreign naval support. That is what happened in October 1836, when Santa Cruz requested to the French, North-American and British commodores a passage to Arica, to open the South-Peruvian Congress.⁴⁵⁵

Taking into account that war had not been formally declared, the advice of Consul General Wilson, and considering that Santa Cruz was “very anxious to go in the *Blonde*,” Commodore Mason promised to take him if possible, instructing the other captains of the Squadron.⁴⁵⁶ The Protector finally sailed to Arica in the French man-of-war *La Flore*, as Captain Pennel, of the *Talbot*, was unable to delay his departure from Callao.⁴⁵⁷ Some months later, in early May 1837, Santa Cruz returned to Callao in the *Harrier*, under Commander Carew, attending a request

452.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* At Sea, 25/1; Hammond to Mason, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 21/4/1837; and instructions dated early in 1837, ADM 1/47.

453.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 10/3/1837, ADM 1/47.

454.- Barros: 112, 119.

455.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47.

456.- Mason to Hammond, *Blonde* Callao, 12/11/1836; 24/11/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 16/4/1837, ADM 1/47.

457.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. *El Eco del Protectorado* n° 52. Accordingly to the Chilean newspaper *El Araucano* (n° 369, 22/9/1837: 3), Santa Cruz sailed on the *Bisson*, departing from Callao on 22 March 1837.

presented through Vice-consul Hugh Wilson.⁴⁵⁸ Commodore Mason, Consul General Wilson and the British merchants at Lima approved Carew's decision, considering "that you [Carew] have acted according to the best of your judgement for the promotion of the British interests"; recognizing, in quite a candid fashion, that the Protector would gain some political benefits from being convoyed in a British men-of-war.⁴⁵⁹

In fact, Santa Cruz had already strengthened his internal position by showing himself to be properly backed first by the French and afterwards by the British Naval Squadron. Carew acted with great candour in this matter, making his situation worse when he accepted the decoration of the Legion de Honor, a distinction which was previously granted to Mason, on 18 January, as Knight Commander.⁴⁶⁰ Both naval captains, especially Carew, as well as the already mentioned consular agents, were extremely ingenuous not taking into account the fact that their help to Santa Cruz would compromise British neutrality. Rear Admiral Hammond was quite aware of that, and completely disapproved of Mason's offer, while the Chilean Government complained strongly at Carew's attitude. The British Foreign Office was unable to do anything but to offer apologies, which were presented by Colonel Walpole in April 1838.⁴⁶¹

First Restorer Expedition (1837)

458.- Santa Cruz companions were Tomás Dieguez, Bishop Trujillo, Colonels Juan Larrea and Lorenzo Puente, assistances, Joaquín de Mora, private secretary, and eight servants [A list of passengers embarked on board H.M.S. Sloop *Harrier*, W.H. Carew Esq. Commander, at Arica for passage to Callao, 3/5/1837, ADM 1/51]. Torrico to H. Wilson, Palacio Protectoral, Tacna, 24/4/1837; enclosed with Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 16/8/1838; Carew to Ross, *Harrier* Callao 11/5/1838, ADM 1/51

459.- Carew to Ross, *Harrier*, Callao 11/5/1838, ADM 1/51.

460.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

461.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 16/4/1837; and enclosed Hammond to Mason, 21/3/1837, ADM 1/47. *El Araucano* n° 399, 20/4/1838: 2.

Chilean preparations finished by early-September 1837. The Restorer Expedition was formed by 3200 men, 400 of them forming a Peruvian Column, to be taken on 17 transports, under the protection of five men-of-war. Admiral Blanco Encalada, Commander in Chief of the Expedition, was also invested as Plenipotentiary as well as Colonel Antonio J. Irrisarri. Just before the departure of the expedition, part of the troops rebelled against the government at Quillota, Minister Portales, the most active enemy of the Confederation, being captured and shot dead. As soon as this news reached him, Santa Cruz tried to stop the war, but President Prieto was firm in his intention to destroy the Confederation, and the expedition departed on September 15.⁴⁶² A few weeks later, General Morán departed Callao with four men-of-war, to cruise along the Chilean coast. War was already in progress.

A minor Chilean operation, conducted against the Bolivian port of Cobija, provided a good opportunity to exert co-operation between French and British squadrons. An Army unit, formed by “200 convicts, ironically called the innocents by foreign merchants, who a few days before were liberated from Chilean prisons provided that they became soldiers”, was landed there to promote a revolt against Santa Cruz. The nature of these men made possible every sort of excess and, consequently, British merchants requested protection from the French man-of-war *Alacrity*, under Captain Clery. Fulfilling the agreement reached between Commodore Sullivan and the French Commodore, to complement each other, Clery provided the guarantees requested and protected the shipment of treasure.⁴⁶³

As happened during Salaverry's revolution, in 1835, when Mason agreed with the French Commodore to co-operate in the protection of their nationals, this sort of complementary action between both squadrons was exerted during the conflict between Chile and the Confederation. For this reason, when Captain Eden,

462.- *El Araucano* n° 353, 9/6/1837. Denegri (1976) I: 543-544. Sotomayor (1896): 62, 104-105.

463.- Sullivan to Hammond, *Stag* Valparaíso, 4/1/1838, ADM 1/51. *El Araucano* n° 373, 20/10/1837.

of the *Rover*, sailed with the Chilean expedition, he was instructed by Sullivan to protect both British and French citizens and properties.⁴⁶⁴

On September 24, the Chilean expedition reached and occupied Arica. A Company was landed to guard the Customs House, but instead of doing that, the soldiers began to loot the goods housed there. As most of them were British owned, Eden complained to the Chilean Admiral, who ordered a court-martial which found guilty the Company's leader, who was immediately executed. The goods stolen amounted to 3,000 pesos, which were "made good to the proper parties by Admiral Blanco, from the military chest."⁴⁶⁵

The next port of call was Islay. The Chilean expedition and the *Rover* entered on September 29, finding it already abandoned by local authorities and the keys of the Customs House in hand of the British Vice-consul Thomas Crompton. Taking into account that most of the goods guarded there were British owned, and as Admiral Blanco announced that no Chilean troops would be landed to protect them, Crompton requested such a protection from Captain Eden. Considering the risk involved and the responsibility assumed by Crompton, a marine party was landed from the *Rover* to protect the Customs House overnight. On the following day, the expedition continued to Quilca, where the expeditionary force finally landed on October 22.⁴⁶⁶

In the following days Blanco Encalada occupied Arequipa and established a provisional government headed by General Antonio Gutiérrez de la Fuente. Instead of going further inland to defeat Santa Cruz, the Expeditionary Army, known by current bibliography as the Army of Restoration, remained inactive at Arequipa. In a short time it was demoralised, facing local hostility and with its ranks suffering from illness. By mid-November, Blanco was forced to surrender near the village of

464.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 16/12/1837, ADM 1/50.

465.- Ibidem. Sotomayor (1896): 116.

466.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 16/12/1837, ADM 1/50. ADM 51/3373. Sotomayor (1896): 117-121.

Paucarpata, being unable to offer battle to superior forces under Santa Cruz. A treaty was signed on 17 November 1837. Chile recognized the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, renounced to interference in its internal affairs, and promised to return those vessels captured at Callao within eight days. In return, the Confederation recognized a debt to the Chilean government, for the loan taken out in London during the War of Independence.⁴⁶⁷ A few days later, Santa Cruz entered Arequipa while Blanco Encalada reembarked his troops at Quilca.

While these events happened in South Peru, a Confederate squadron, under General Moran's flag, cruised along the Chilean coast for almost a month, capturing the garrison of the Juan Fernández Islands and committing other hostilities. By late November, it was sighted off Valparaíso, and some measures were taken to defend the port. Amongst them, a hulk with two guns was anchored in a central position in the Bay. At 10:30 p.m. on November 30, the North American whaler *Maria* arrived and was received with gun-shot from the hulk. Fortunately, Commodore Sullivan, of the *Stag*, was at the anchorage, and intervened to stop such a dangerous mistake.⁴⁶⁸

Hostilities committed by the Confederate squadron included a single vessel attack on Huasco, on December 7. The British ketch *Basilik*, under Lieutenant Macdonald, was lying at anchor when it happened, demanding from the Peruvian Captain that he gave every consideration to the respect of British subjects and properties. This request was fulfilled and no incident arose during the attack.⁴⁶⁹ Shortly after that, Morán headed for Callao, learning then of the Peace Treaty signed at Paucarpata and of a decree issued by Santa Cruz on November 29, drastically reducing the Confederation's naval forces. The Protector was truly convinced that the Peace Treaty would be accepted by Chile, mainly because of the

467.- Sotomayor (1896): 156-158.

468.- Sullivan to Hammond. *Stag* Valparaíso, 18/12/1837, ADM 1/51.

469.- Macdonald to Sullivan, 16/12/1837; enclosed with Sullivan a Hammond. *Stag* Valparaíso, 5/1/1838, ADM 1/51.

assurance given by Consul General Wilson that the British Government would act as a mediator in the dispute.⁴⁷⁰ Relying on that promise, Santa Cruz considered that it was no reason to destroy the Chilean Army nor to maintain a very expensive naval force. If Wilson actually offered too much, Santa Cruz acted with extreme naiveté believing that a non-ratified Treaty will be enough to actually compromise Great Britain.⁴⁷¹

While Blanco Encalada and his army were at Arequipa, the *Rover* cruised between Quilca, Islay and Arica, the first two ports having been declared under embargo by the government established at Arequipa; and the latter under the same condition by the Governor of Tacna. As none of these embargoes had been issued by a proper authority, Captain Eden considered them illegal and announced that he was not ready to accept the detention of any British merchantmen. With that announcement and having escorted two British vessels and one from Hamburg departing from Islay, he forced to suspend these measures.⁴⁷²

The First Expedition of Restoration was a total failure, mainly due to poorly managed inland operations. Similarly, the Confederate expedition on the Chilean coast did not achieve much success, as it could have inflicted more considerable damage on Chilean shipping. British and French interests were properly protected by the joint effort of both squadrons, providing a prompt solution to the incidents that arose in the early stages of the Expedition of Restoration. As had been shown before, blockades and embargoes by both parties were not recognized by foreign powers, reflecting once again that European rules of maritime warfare were not easy to apply in this part of the world.

Second Expedition of Restoration (1838)

470.- Sotomayor (1896): 170-171. quotes *El Mercurio* 9/2/1838.

471.- Wu (1991): 81.

472.- Sullivan to Hammond. *Stag* Valparaíso, 24/11/1837, ADM 1/51.

The first transports with the Expeditionary Army on board arrived at Valparaíso on 16 December 1837. The day before, the British sloop-of-war *Rover* had entered the port, taking on board a Chilean officer with a copy of the Paucarpata Treaty.⁴⁷³ As soon as the terms of the treaty were known, President Prieto refused to ratify the treaty, considering that it “neither satisfies the demands of the Chilean Nation, nor repairs those offences committed by the Confederation against her”. He judged that the Chilean plenipotentiaries had acted far beyond their instructions and thence, since the treaty had no legal foundations, hostilities should be renewed “after this decision was notified to the government of General Andrés de Santa Cruz”.⁴⁷⁴

Despite his personal feelings towards the Chilean cause, Consul General Walpole attempted to restrain hostilities. As soon as he learned of the Chilean rejection of the treaty, and following Lord Palmerston’s instructions, he asked to be received by President Prieto to represent the British position towards this war. For three hours, Walpole explained the inconvenience of such a conflict, making clear that his government was highly interested that peace should be finally achieved between Chile and the Confederation.⁴⁷⁵ According to a Chilean source, the British Consul General was highly disrespectful and even expressed himself with insolence and threat.⁴⁷⁶

On 31 December 1837, five Chilean men-of-war departed Valparaíso for Arica, under Captain Simpson’s flag, to notify the rejection of the treaty and to capture as many Confederate men-of-war as possible.⁴⁷⁷ Shortly after one of these vessels delivered correspondence at Arica with that news for President Santa Cruz,

473.- Sotomayor (1896): 160-165 & 262-263. Sullivan to Hammond, *Stag*, Valparaíso, 18/12/1837 & 3/1/1838, ADM 1/51.

474.- *El Araucano* n° 382, 22/12/1837.

475.- Hernán Ramírez Necochea, “El gobierno británico y la guerra contra la confederación Perú-boliviana” en *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía*, Santiago 1961: 124.

476.- Sotomayor (1896): 181-182.

477.- Fuenzalida (1978) II: 431.

the Chilean squadron failed to capture a Confederate naval force at Islay.⁴⁷⁸ In the subsequent days, the Confederate sloop *Confederación*, with Bolivian General Ballivián on board, was taken by the Chileans off Callao.⁴⁷⁹ Simpson was to remain off Callao until 26 January, returning then to Valparaíso fearing another cruise of the Confederate Squadron along the Chilean coast.⁴⁸⁰

Santa Cruz's reaction to the Chilean attitude has been fully described by Celia Wu.

“It was with a clear sense of betrayal that he bombarded Wilson with pleas for action, proposing that the British minister should convoke a meeting of plenipotentiaries from Chile and the Confederation to meet on board a British warship at Islay, trusting that ‘Chile would listen to the counsels of reason and humanity and would respect the name of Queen Victoria’.”⁴⁸¹

The Protector even sent his private secretary to London, to represent his demands for British naval intervention. However, as the Treaty was not ratified and, consequently, the request for a British guarantee was not officially presented by both governments, British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, refused to intervene. In fact, Santa Cruz was too candid when he considered that British Consul General Wilson's promise of a British guarantee was enough to force the Chilean government to ratify the Treaty of Paucarpata. He acted worse when, based on that promise, he not only allowed the departure of Blanco Encalada with his men, equipment and vessels, but reduced his own army and naval forces.

It was already too late to regret that decision. Measures needed to be taken to fight the Chileans. By March 1838, Santa Cruz declared Valparaíso under blockade, and Prieto retaliated on April 2, declaring Callao, Ancón and Chorrillos,

478.- Sullivan to Hammond, *Stag* Valparaíso, 14/2/1838. ADM 1/51.

479.- Miller to Simpson and reply, 22/1/1838, A.H. de M. Presos. Morán al Jefe del Estado Mayor General, Callao 10/4/1/1838, A. H. de M. Juicios y Sumarios. *El Araucano* n° 390, 16/2/1838: 1-2.

480.- Fuenzalida (1978) II: 436-437, 442. *El Araucano* n° 373, 20/10/1837.

481.- Wu (1991): 81-82.

in the same condition.⁴⁸² Two weeks later, five Chilean men-of-war, under the flag of Captain Carlos García del Póstigo, left Valparaíso to enforce the blockade. This force sailed in company with the British ketch *Basilik*, under Lieutenant Macdonald, who was instructed to keep an eye on the Chilean activity.⁴⁸³ Shortly before that, the British fourth rate *President* entered Valparaíso, hoisting the flag of Rear Admiral Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross, Commander-in-Chief of the newly created Pacific Station.⁴⁸⁴

His appointment, by late 1837, marked the creation of a that naval Station, with an enormous area under his responsibility, from the western American coast to longitude 170 degrees West, comprising not only the several American republics but a large number of islands in Oceania. In the following years, these islands became a very sensitive part of the Station, as British, North-American and French, tried to gain influence over island chieftains, by commercial, religious and even naval means.⁴⁸⁵

British merchants along the west coast of America considered the creation of the Pacific Station as their achievement. In fact, many of them, privately or as a group, had asked and pressed on the British government for it. In the Peruvian case, as already mentioned, a formal request had been sent by British merchants resident in Lima in 1834. It seems that that mercantile interest, as well as the war between Chile and the Confederation, and on the other hand the South Sea's situation, finally moved the British government to create the Pacific Station.⁴⁸⁶ In March

482.- *El Eco del Norte* n° 75, 17/3/1838. Ross to Wood. *President* Valparaíso, 6/5/1838, ADM 1/51. *El Araucano* n° 397 & n° 398, 6 & 13/4/1838.

483.- Fuenzalida (1978) II: 441. Ross to Wood. *President* Rio de Janeiro, 18/4/1838, ADM 1/50. Morán to Pardo, Callao 2/5/1838, A.H. de M. Escuadra Nacional.

484.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 1/3/1838, ADM 1/50.

485.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 24 & 28/8/1837 ADM 1/48. An increasing number of missionaries arrived at the South Seas Islands during the 1830's, building a growing rivalry to gain influence among local rulers. At Valparaíso, Mason declined the request presented by a Roman Catholic group, lead by a French Bishop, to be convoyed to Tahiti, arguing that he was informed that two of the monks in this group were reported to have conducted themselves improperly during a former stay on this island.

486.- Ross to Barrow, Kingstone Cross, Portsmouth, 6/9/1837 ADM 1/48.

1838, when Admiral Ross entered the limits of the Station, he had five men-of-war under his command; besides two surveying vessels of the Hydrographic Office.⁴⁸⁷ With that scant number of vessels, Ross had to find ways of co-operation with the United States and the French Commodores,⁴⁸⁸ as previously British Commodores had done.

One of the first areas of agreement was in respect the Chilean blockade of Ancón, Callao and Chorrillos, which was rejected by Ross as well as by the French and the North American Commodores, arguing that it was illegal, unless it was established effectively and simultaneously. García del Póstigo considered that his force had done enough to establish an effective blockade in the neighbourhood of those ports, arguing that there was no rule establishing the distance at which a blockading force must be stationed from the coast under blockade. He considered this point particularly relevant in the case of Peruvian ports, since the prevailing South winds made it almost impossible for a naval force to remain off a single port. In a letter to Captain Bruce, of the *Imogene*, he said:

“In every single moment I am close to the three blockade ports and if at the present time the main effort is over Callao, it is because the other two ports do not have much traffic; but be sure that as soon as it increases I will change the deployment of my Squadron”.⁴⁸⁹

In spite of all these arguments, at the end of the day, the blockade became fruitless.⁴⁹⁰ In these circumstances, it was reasonable to expect incidents to arise, especially as the Chilean force was unable to blockade all the ports at once.

On May 4, a British merchantmen was intercepted by a Chilean sloop at Chorrillos. As soon as this detention was known, Commander Carew, of the *Harrier*, went to the Chilean flagship and received Commodore García del

487.- Ross to Wood, *President* Rio de Janeiro, 1/3/1838; at Sea, 19/3/1838, ADM 1/50.

488.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 1/7/1838, ADM 1/51.

489.- García del Póstigo to Bruce, *Libertad* Callao, 20/5/1838, ADM 1/51.

490.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 12/7/1838, ADM 1/51. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 442.

Póstigo's promise to release the British prize.⁴⁹¹ However, shortly after that he changed his mind, following the detention of another two British vessels (*Rose* and *Amelia*). Carew met the Chilean Commodore once again, being unable to modify the latter's point of view on the legality of the blockade. Even when none of the three captured vessels would be released, García del Póstigo promised not to detain more British vessels until reinforcements arrived from Valparaíso.⁴⁹² In spite of this, on June 12, a Chilean man-of-war fired upon the *Mary Marshal* (or *Warrell*), of Liverpool, after she was allowed to enter the port.⁴⁹³

When Admiral Ross entered Callao, four days latter, he not only protested and demanded explanations for these incidents, but also explained to García del Postigo his perspective on the blockade and his wish to remain neutral in the conflict.

The Chilean Squadron left Callao on June 17, supposedly to cruise between this port and Ancón, but truly to obtain wood, water and food at Huacho.⁴⁹⁴ This temporary suspension of the blockade gave the Peruvian government and foreign agents the most solid argument to repudiate it. Consul General Wilson addressed a letter to Admiral Ross supporting the Peruvian decision not to recognize the blockade any longer. Wilson quoted Andrés Bello's *Derecho de Gentes*, who stated that a blockade becomes void when the blockading force abandons its duties even for a short period of time; being necessary to repeat the entire process to re-establish its legality.⁴⁹⁵

Four days latter, on June 21, when the Chilean Squadron returned to Callao, Admiral Ross notified García del Póstigo that Britain would not recognize

491.- Bruce to Ross, *Imogene* Callao, 7/5/1838; Bruce to Carew, 4/5/1838; and Carew to Bruce, *Harrier* 5/5/1838, ADM 1/51.

492.- Bruce to Ross, *Imogene* Callao, 31/5/1838, ADM 1/51.

493.- Wilson to Ross, Lima, 15/6/1838; Ross to Bruce, *President* Callao, 16/6/1838; and Ross to Wilson, 30/6/1838, ADM 1/51.

494.- Ross to Bruce, *President* Callao, 16/6/1838, ADM 1/51.

495.- Wilson to Ross, Lima 23/6/1838, ADM 1/51. Andrés Bello, *Principios de Derecho de Gentes*, Santiago de Chile, 1832, 198.

the legality of the blockade any longer.⁴⁹⁶ Acting with unthinking rashness, Ross included in his letter some comments on the Chilean Squadron's raid on Huacho, condemning the distribution of inflammatory proclamations against the Confederation and his doubts respecting the way in which supplies were obtained at that port. The Chilean Commodore gave little importance to the suspension of the blockade, arguing that it was already suspended by May 25, when he was informed that British naval forces were not to recognize it unless the Chilean squadron was at all the three blockade ports at once. Regarding Ross' comments about Huacho, García del Póstigo not only made clear that he had paid for the supplies, but also stated that it was far from a neutral position to describe his proclamations as provocative.⁴⁹⁷

It seems that the Chilean Commodore was quite aware of how ineffective the blockade was, mainly due to the firm position adopted by foreign squadrons, rather than his actual ability to enforce the blockade at the three ports properly. By mid-1838, García del Póstigo had to deal with seven British men-of-war; with the North-American Squadron, formed by one ship-of-the-line, two sloops and one schooner; and the French Squadron, formed by a frigate and a brig, totalling almost 400 guns, while the Chilean Squadron mounted no more than 70 guns against 60 of the Confederates' ships.⁴⁹⁸ García del Póstigo even mentioned to Ross his personal disagreement with the blockade and his hopes that it would not be re-established, since Chile would not obtain any benefit from doing so but only incur the neutrals' ill will.⁴⁹⁹

It would appear that García del Póstigo was highly pragmatic on this matter, even though his opinion was not very consistent with his own mission.

496.- Morán to Pardo, Callao 25/6/1838, A.H. de M. Escuadra Nacional. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 444.

497.- García del Póstigo to Ross, *Libertad* Callao, 30/6/1838, ADM 1/51.

498.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 1/7/1838, ADM 1/51.

499.- Wilson to Ross, Lima, 23/6/1838, and Ross reply, *President* Callao, 30/6/1838, ADM 1/51.

Considering his previous experience in dealing with British, French and North-American squadrons, especially when his frigate, the *Libertad*, was detained by the British men-of-war *Sapphire* and *Tribune*, in 1830, the Chilean Commodore was quite aware that it was out of the question to enforce a blockade declared illegal by foreign powers. Consequently, he decided to compromise in order to avoid further problems with neutral powers.

Bulnes's Expedition

Chilean naval activity was not enough to defeat the Confederation, a new expedition needed to be sent to seal the fate of Santa Cruz on the battlefield. With this purpose, and based on the regiments sent in 1837, a second expeditionary army was raised with up to 5400 men. This army was ready to depart Valparaíso by late June,⁵⁰⁰ President Prieto travelling from Santiago to witness the expedition's embarkment and departure. According to a Swiss spectator, the Chilean President was not cheered by the troops and "many of them were embarked by force [...] wearing ponchos and unarmed, being tied in couples with ropes, and thrown in the boats".⁵⁰¹ Even though such a version was very similar to the one included in Admiral Ross' report, it differs from the "great enthusiasm" mentioned by some Chilean sources, and eventually accepted by Chilean historians.⁵⁰²

On July 10, twenty-six vessels departed from Valparaíso with the Second Expedition of Restoration, under General Manuel Bulnes. Three men-of-war escorted such a large fleet, sailing without disturbance and joining García del

500.- *El Araucano* n° 409 & 413, 29/6 & 27/7/1838.

501.- J. Jacobo von Tschudi, *Travels in Peru, during the years 1838-1842*, London 1847: 28.

502.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 12/7/1838, ADM 1/51. Gonzalo Bulnes, *Historia de la Campaña del Perú en 1838*, Santiago 1878: 22. Ramón Sotomayor Valdés, *Historia de Chile bajo el Gobierno del Jeneral D. Joaquín Prieto*, Santiago 1900-1903, III: 268. *El Araucano* n° 411, 13/7/1838: 2.

Póstigo at San Lorenzo.⁵⁰³ On August 7 and 8, the expeditionary force landed at Ancón and began to advance towards Lima.

A few days before, General Orbegoso, President of North Peru, had decided to break his ties with the Confederation and to recover his formal position as President of Peru.⁵⁰⁴ As this decision will led to an attack by Santa Cruz, General Bulnes tried to convince him to join efforts against the Protector, and conversations were held on this issue. However, Orbegoso overestimated his forces, considering that he could defeat Bulnes and thereafter negotiate with Santa Cruz from a better position. On August 14, Orbegoso broke off negotiations and prepared his forces for battle.⁵⁰⁵

Following an attack at Callao, the Restorer Army moved south and defeated Orbegoso's troops at Portada de Guía and occupied Lima on August 21. Four days later, a council of notable citizens of Lima decided to entrust the Government of Peru to General Agustín Gamarra, supported by the Chilean Army.⁵⁰⁶ Amongst Gamarra's first measures was the appointment of General Ramón Castilla as Minister of War and Navy, and the re-establishment of the Trade Treaty between Peru and Chile signed by Salaverry and abolished by Orbegoso.⁵⁰⁷

Meanwhile, Orbegoso with his remaining troops withdrew to Callao aiming to resist. Despite the efforts made by Gamarra to avoid further bloodshed, Orbegoso refused to surrender and, consequently, on August 31 Callao was declared by Gamarra under siege by sea and by land.⁵⁰⁸ On the following day, using the authority given by President Prieto on July 30, which included power to declare enemy ports under blockade, General Bulnes adopted such a measure for Callao,

503.- Fuenzalida (1978) II: 447-449.

504.- Basadre (1968) II: 155-156.

505.- Basadre (1968) II: 156-157.

506.- *El Araucano* n° extraordinario, 28/9/1838. Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 17/9/1838 & 1/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

507.- *El Araucano* n° 429, 16/11/1838.

508.- *El Peruano* n° 3, 31/8/1838.

Chorrillos and Ancón, from September 11 onwards. Proper notice was given to foreign consular agents and commodores present at Callao.⁵⁰⁹ However, Bulnes did not take into account the new situation created by the re-establishment of the Peruvian Government, placing Chile in quite an unusual position, since his forces were to blockade the ports of a government against which no formal declaration of war had been made. Furthermore, according to the Chilean Constitution, only the President could declare a blockade, and only after the Congress had approved it. A month later, on October 17, the Chilean Government declared war on Peru, and the blockade of the three above-mentioned ports.⁵¹⁰ However, it was too late to change the development of the situation at Callao that September.

Bulnes' blockading decree was immediately rejected by foreign consular agents and naval commodores. The latter (British Admiral Ross, French Captain Villeneuve and North American Captain Ballard), requested Bulnes to postpone the start of the blockade until September 14, in order to arrive at a joint decision with regard to its legality. It was obvious that none of them was ready to accept the blockade before the proposed date. On September 13, following a meeting on board the *President*, as well as a meeting of their consular agents, the three Commanders-in-Chief decided not to recognize the blockade. They stated two main points for their decision: 1° the blockade was established by a note, and not following the formal procedure; 2° Bulnes' authority was not enough to declare such a measure in respect of ports not under Santa Cruz's control, since Chile had declared war against him and not against Peru.⁵¹¹

Bulnes insisted on his point of view, arguing that the blockade was a response to the hostile attitude adopted by the Government of Orbegoso towards the Chilean Expedition. While this argument was valid in essence, it was not enough to make neutral commodores change their mind. However, taking previous

509.- Fuenzalida (1978) II: 455. Bulnes to Ross, Lima, 7/9/1838, ADM 1/51.

510.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 12/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

511.- Ross to García del Pósito & to Bulnes, *President* Callao, 10 & 19/9/1838, ADM 1/52.

advice from Consul General Wilson, Admiral Ross decided to recognize the blockade only to “the port’s defences”, taking into account that the Chilean Naval Force was adequate to establish it properly. But even so, he made clear that no interference to British merchantmen would be accepted.⁵¹²

This already difficult situation would become far more complicated on the following days, when the British Squadron used force against the Chilean Squadron as a consequence of an incident involving the Scottish doctor William Maclean.

Amongst the first measures adopted by President Gamarra was the re-establishment of the Peruvian Army. It was subordinated to General Bulnes, nominated as Commander-in-Chief of the United Army of Restoration.⁵¹³ To provide animals for the Cavalry, it was ordered that, since October 2 at 6 p.m. all horses in the city of Lima would be confiscated. Early in that day, groups of Chilean soldiers were placed at several points in the capital to undertake the requisition. One of these places was the stone bridge across the Rímac river, where the Scottish physician William Maclean was involved in a serious incident, as a result of which he was wounded in the head and deprived of his horse.

According to the available information, Maclean arrived at the bridge by 8:30 a.m. on horseback intending to leave Lima, being properly authorized to cross by a military party mounting guard there. Nevertheless, when he reached the other end, the Sergeant in charge of the guard asked him to deliver his horse. Maclean not only protested but he also tried to force his way through, being detained by a Chilean soldier who hit the Scotman’s head with a spear. In this confused incident, the Chilean Sergeant was wounded when trying to protect Maclean.⁵¹⁴

512.- Bulnes to Ross and reply, 15.19 & 20/9/1838; Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 12/11 & 1/12/1838, ADM 1/52. Luis Uribe Orrego, *Las Operaciones Navales durante la Guerra entre Chile i la Confederación Perú-Boliviana. 1836-37-38*, Santiago 1891: 135.

513.- *El Araucano* n° extraordinario & 432, 28/9 & 7/12/1838.

514.- Ross to Bulnes, *President Callao* 23/10 & 1/11/1838; Wilson to Bulnes 3/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

A formal protest was presented by Consul General Wilson before the Peruvian Government and General Bulnes, demanding a full investigation of the incident and the punishment of those found guilty. The Peruvian government answered immediately, promising to investigate; but Bulnes did not respond at all, as he considered that the military party was under the temporary service of the Peruvian government and therefore out of Chilean jurisdiction.⁵¹⁵

A preliminary report was received by Wilson, alleging that Maclean - referred to as "the foreigner", "the English",- began the incident by hitting one of the Chilean soldiers. As might be supposed, Wilson reacted against this insinuation, and blamed Minister Castilla for orchestrating public opinion in order to use this incident against all foreigners in Lima. The issue increased in importance, becoming a matter of serious discussion, with strong arguments proffered in favour of both parties involved. Some of them were published by a number of short lived newspapers, amongst them *El Periodiquito*, *Compatriotas* and *El Tribuno del Pueblo*, which were quite active not only in denouncing British support of Santa Cruz but even encouraging people to take revenge on every single British and foreign citizen in Lima.⁵¹⁶

On the very day of the incident, October 2, Admiral Ross addressed a strong protest to General Bulnes, demanding the immediate return of Maclean's horse and "to receive amends for such an outrage", stating that he would use every means under his control to obtain satisfaction.⁵¹⁷ Captain Scott, of the *President*, was instructed to deliver this letter personally, heading for Lima in company with the adjutants of the French and the United States Commodores. To make the situation even more complicated for the Chilean Commander-in-Chief, this small party was forced to protect itself during its journey from Callao, as Chileans

515.- Wilson to Ross, Lima 2/10/1838; Bulnes to Ross, Lima 4/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

516.- Wilson to Ross, Lima 19/10/1838, ADM 1/52. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 456-457. Basadre (1968) II: 416-417. Paz Soldán IV: 239-241.

517.- Ross to Bulnes, *President Callao*, 2/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

soldiers shot at them at least twice.⁵¹⁸ Finally, Scott held a meeting with Bulnes, receiving his promise that quick justice would be applied to solve the Maclean incident. Having remained at Lima for three days, waiting vainly for the results of this investigation, Scott and his companions returned to their ships.⁵¹⁹ During his visit, the British Captain realized that some British-owned farms and property had been plundered by Chilean troops. Obviously, his report contributed greatly to the strengthening of Ross' attitude towards Bulnes.⁵²⁰

By the end of that day, Ross had already decided to put pressure on Bulnes by detaining one of the Chilean men-of-war anchored at Callao. Accordingly, at 11:30 p.m. of October 2, sentinels on board the *Libertad*, anchored close to the mouth of the River Rimac, sighted the British sloop *Imogene* moving alongside. Surprised by such unusual movement, García del Póstigo sent an officer to the British vessel to ask the reasons for having changed her anchorage at that time of the night. The officer was informed that Admiral Ross had decided not to allow any movement of the Chilean vessel until satisfaction had been given respecting the Maclean incident. At daybreak, the *President* moved to the other side of the *Libertad*, while the *Samarang* sailed to Chorrillos Bay.⁵²¹

518.- Wilson to Bulnes, 4/10/1838, ADM 1/52. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 457.

519.- Ross to Bulnes, *President* Callao, 28/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

520.- Ross to Bulnes, *President* Callao, 1/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

521.- García to Ross, Bulnes to Ross & Ross to García, 3/10/1838, ADM 1/52. Midshipman Dalrymple, of the *Imogene*, refers to the detention of the *Libertad* as follows [Admiral R.H. Sir John C. Dalrymple Hay, *Lines from my log-books*, Edinburgh 1898: 61-62]:

"The Chileian Commodore's ship had unmoored at sunset, and seemed to be going to sea without settling the claim. At ten at night Captain Bruce returned from dining with the admiral. The anchor was weighed. Topsails and top-gallant sails and jib set, the stream cable passed through the stern port, the ship beat to quarters, and in about ten minutes the sail was shortened and the ship moored head and stern so as to be right athwart hawse of the Chilian. Our ship was literally between his buoy and his jibboom, which was over our larboard gangway. An officer came from the Commodore to expostulate, and made Captain Bruce understand that we had fouled his cable, and that he wanted to weigh his anchor. Bruce, who scarcely knew any Spanish, took him down to the main deck, showed him the men at quarters, and the shotted guns ready to rake him, and said, 'Mira aqui, Señor. Look at this, sir.' Then calling the captain's clerk M'Douall, who could speak a little Spanish, made him explain that if he attempted to weigh, we should sink him. I had the middle watch, and was desired to report if there was any movement on board the Chilian, but none took place. Next day the captain called on Commodore Postego [sic.],

Eight years ago, in 1830, García del Póstigo was in command of the then Peruvian sloop *Libertad*, when she was detained by two British men-of-war, following the *Hidalgo* incident. At that time, he was unable to offer resistance, but on this occasion he certainly could react. British and Chilean sources differ on this issue, as the former mentioned that no attempt was made to free the *Libertad*, while the latter reported that he was determined either to clear his way by using artillery or to blow up the sloop's magazine. In spite of what actually happened that night, no violent action was taken and on October 4, the *Libertad* was released from detention. Despite the final outcome of the Maclean incident, Admiral Ross was convinced that his energetic attitude had been enough to deter the Chileans from any other action against British subjects.⁵²²

The Chilean inquiry on the incident itself was to last some weeks, showing a growing animosity against Maclean, to such an extent that, at some stage, it was referred to as a trial against him. At this point, the Scottish physician decided that it was wiser to hide for a while, and thus the investigation itself became even more complicated.⁵²³ While the British Admiral and the Chilean General continued to exchange correspondence on this thorny issue, Santa Cruz's army approached Lima, forcing its evacuation by early November. In his last letter, Bulnes indicated that the investigation should continue, it being out of the question to undertake any immediate punishment in so far as there remained reasonable doubts respecting the responsibility of the soldiers involved in the incident.⁵²⁴

In essence, Bulnes considered that the Peruvian government was obligated to respond to the British claim, as the Chilean soldiers had been under its command

who returned the visit. The admiral came down in the *President* and anchored close to him, and the further settlement of the matter devolved upon the diplomatist."

522.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 27/11/1838; & Bulnes to Ross, Ancón, 11/11/1838. ADM 1/52. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 458-459.

523.- Bulnes to Ross, Lima, 29/10/1838. ADM 1/52. Ross to Bulnes. *President* Callao, 28/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

524.- Ross to Bulnes, & Bulnes to Ross, 9 & 11/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

when the incident actually happened.⁵²⁵ Ross disagreed with that point of view, as he considered that, despite any agreement between Chile and Peru which allowed the service of Chilean troops under Peruvian command, the Chilean government was solely responsible for offences committed by its troops against British subjects. Furthermore, taking into account that the decree establishing the embargo on horses had been revoked on October 2, the Chilean troops guarding the bridge had acted under the exclusive responsibility of their immediate Commanding Officer and not following instructions from the government they supposedly should obey.⁵²⁶

Some months later, the British government presented a formal protest to the Chilean government regarding the Maclean incident, requesting a review of the investigation conducted at Lima. A new inquiry was opened, and its results confirmed the innocence of the Chilean soldiers when they reacted to Maclean's insults and punches.⁵²⁷

From our point of view, the incident was poorly managed by Rear-Admiral Ross, whose impulsive attitude can be explained by Consul General Wilson's advice and to his own conviction that a firm posture would deter any other abuse against British subjects. Ross overrated Wilson's objectivity, blinded by his well-known enthusiasm for the Confederation. Moreover, the detention of the *Libertad* was sustained for too short a time, not enough to obtain the required satisfaction, it being hard to explain why the British Squadron did not continue the detention of this vessel. Finally, everything suggested that Maclean himself provoked the incident, furnishing Consul General Wilson with a different and more palatable version of what had occurred. Provided with this "evidence", Wilson requested the intervention of the British naval forces against the Expedition of Restoration.

525.- Bulnes to Ross, Lima, 4/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

526.- Ross to Bulnes, *President Callao*, 1/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

527.- Sotomayor (1900) III: 437-438.

In short, this incident triggered an inadequate use of force by the British Squadron, which was suspended before receiving satisfaction for an outrage supposedly committed.

The end of the Confederation

The defences of Callao proved strong enough to resist the attacks of the Expeditionary Army during October 1838, which had to face not only Orbegoso's resistance but also some restrictions in order to avoid damage on neutral property. Orbegoso himself placed the Callao Customs Office under the direct protection of foreign squadrons, as most of the goods housed there belonged to their nationals.⁵²⁸ As already mentioned, to avoid being driven into battle from an unfavourable position, in early November 1838 the Army of Restoration left the capital and marched to Ancón and afterwards to Huacho, while sick and wounded soldiers were embarked at Chorrillos.⁵²⁹

Already undefended, Lima was occupied by Santa Cruz on November 10. On the following morning, he received Consul General Wilson and Admiral Ross, expressing to them his great interest in reaching peace with Chile. Clever and astute, but mainly basing his approach on the predisposition of both British agents towards his policy, Santa Cruz asked Wilson to negotiate with the Chilean Minister Egaña on behalf of the Confederation as his plenipotentiary.⁵³⁰ Considering how important it was for British interests to restore peace between Chile and the Confederation, Wilson and Ross showed great enthusiasm for this possibility and agreed to undertake and to support such an unusual mission for a neutral consular agent.⁵³¹

528.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 27/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

529.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 10/10/1838, 12 & 27/11/1838, ADM 1/52. *Diario de la campaña que el Ejército Unido Restaurador abrió en el Territorio Peruano el año 1838 contra el jeneral Santa Cruz, titulado Supremo Protector de la Confederación Peru-Boliviana*, Lima 1840: 44-45.

530.- Santa Cruz to Wilson, 11/11/1838, PRO F.O. 61/51.

531.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 27/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

Even though we can explain Wilson's attitude, it is almost impossible to justify it. He acted mainly because of his personal commitment to Santa Cruz and the Confederation, feeling justified by Lord Palmerston's instructions to make every possible effort to secure peace between the two nations. In fact, Whitehall had offered British moral support to the Confederation since the very beginning of the conflict, but nothing further than that. At least two Confederate commissioners went to London and asked for British naval intervention to stop the war. None of them succeeded in their request, mainly because British mediation considered in the Paucarpata Treaty had not been formally requested by the Chilean government. The British reply was very clear: "H.M.'s government considers that Great Britain would not be justified in using its strength to reduce the two belligerent nations to a peaceful situation."⁵³² Nevertheless, Lord Palmerston instructed both Walpole and Wilson to work towards achieving a lasting peace between Chile and the Confederation, pointing out that Britain recognized the existence of the latter as a sovereign state and that he firmly believed that Santa Cruz was innocent of any involvement in the Freyre expedition.⁵³³

Provided with "a full delegation of powers from Santa Cruz, who authorized him to negotiate with Mr. Egaña in the most convenient terms, and undertook to accept every single decision taken on his behalf", Wilson came on board the *President* on the morning of November 12. On the following day, Ross' flagship joined the Chilean Squadron at Huacho.⁵³⁴

Conversations began that very day on board the *Confederación*. During them, Egaña proposed that both the Chilean and Santa Cruz's armies should leave Peruvian territory while a Congress, convoked under the 1834 Constitution, would decide if Peru was to accept or reject a federation with Bolivia. As this proposition

532.- *El Araucano* n° 454, 10/5/1839: 3.

533.- Ramírez Necochea: 124-125. Wu (1991): 82-83.

534.- *El Araucano* n° 436, 4/1/1839. Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 27/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

implied the Confederation's dissolution, to which "the Protector was linked by the treaties of Huaura and Sicuani", Wilson replied that

"the most he could accept was to withdraw the Bolivian Army, leaving in Peruvian territory those Peruvian troops under the Confederation; and then the Presidents of the North and South-Peruvian States would separately summon a Congress to decide if they were to remain in or leave the federation"⁵³⁵

This offer was for Egaña as unacceptable as his own proposal was for Wilson, and therefore negotiations ended. On November 21, the *President* returned to her usual anchorage at Callao, while the Restorer Army moved north.⁵³⁶

At this stage it is useful to make further comments on the attitude adopted by Consul General Wilson and Admiral Ross towards both belligerents. How acceptable was it for a Consular agent to become a plenipotentiary of a friendly government involved in a conflict in which his own nation was considered neutral? Did Wilson's arrival at Huacho on board a British man-of-war involve a certain degree of coercion?

In a general sense, it was well-known how sympathetic the British and some other foreign governments were towards Santa Cruz, although using one of their consular agents in this way went, in our view, far beyond what could be accepted. Both Ross and Wilson, as well as the French and United States commodores and consular agents, considered that the Restorer army had very little possibility of success, believing that its defeat would produce a revolution in Chile. In this sense, it seems that the Consul General and the Admiral agreed to get involved in order to conclude the conflict more quickly, which could only lead to Santa Cruz's victory. Making his involvement even more evident, Wilson did not suspend his consular status during negotiations with Egaña. On his part, Ross could have sent the Consul General in a less intimidating man-of-war than the

535.- *El Araucano* n° 436, 4/1/1839.

536.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 12 & 27/11/1838, ADM 1/52.

President, whose 52 cannons were enough to cope with the entire Chilean Squadron. Even when Wilson negotiated with skill and dexterity, without expressing anything which could be taken as direct menace from the British government, Egaña kept firmly to the Chilean point of view. Nevertheless, British intervention might have exerted a certain degree of influence upon Bulnes, moving him to accelerate his campaign in order to bring about a military decision in anticipation of new British mediation in support of Santa Cruz, as actually happened some months later.

By late 1838, having realized how important it was to have a well-fitted naval force, Santa Cruz decided to “foster in every possible way the creation of a Squadron, either by encouraging the spirit of adventure in some foreign merchants, or by instructing Mr. José Joaquín de Mora, his Minister at Paris, to acquire two vessels in the shortest possible time.”⁵³⁷ To provide a legal frame over these actions, and taking into account some observations made by British Admiralty lawyers, in December 1838, the Protector modified the privateering decrees issued in June 1837 and August 1838.⁵³⁸

Santa Cruz’s invitation to fit out vessels as privateers found a response amongst a number of foreign sailors of fortune, some of whom were commissioned as officers in the Confederate Navy. Simultaneously, some vessels were acquired, and by late 1838, the Confederate Squadron was formed by the 25-gun sloop *Edmond*; the 18-gun barque *Mejicana*, the 6-gun schooner *Perú*, and the 10-gun schooner *Shamrock* or *Smack*. There must be added the *Junín* and the *Yanacocha*, sold in August to the British merchant Alejandro Ellis, who was ready to lend them to the Confederate government. However, Wilson clearly stated that these two vessels were not again to receive British registration if they once entered the service of the Confederation.⁵³⁹

537.- Bulnes: 268.

538.- Ross to Wilson, *President* Callao, 12/12/1838, ADM 1/52.

539.- Panizo to Ministro de Guerra, Callao 4/12/1838; and Ellis to Panizo, Callao 5/12/1838, A.H. de M. Escuadra Nacional.

On 10 November 1838, the Chilean decree of October 17, declaring the blockade of Callao, was enforced by Captain Bynon with three men-of-war, the stronger of them being two schooners. However, Bynon “did not feel capable to repel an enemy attack with the vessels he had”, and eventually abandoned the blockade. Shortly after that, foreign commodores declared the blockade was no longer valid.⁵⁴⁰

Some naval activity was registered in the following weeks, with the Confederate squadron capturing two Chilean transports, the brig *Arequipeño*, and the Paita schooner *San Antonio*.⁵⁴¹ Finally, on 12 January 1839, the two Squadrons engaged at Casma Bay. The result of this action was inconclusive, both squadrons suffering severe damage and the Confederates the loss of their Commadore and the *Arequipeño*.⁵⁴² A new engagement was prevented by the intervention of the French frigate *Venus*, whose Captain demanded the handing over of the new Confederate Commadore, as he was a French deserter.⁵⁴³

The Confederation was certainly unable to give battle to the Chilean Squadron after Casma, and its Army was defeated, on 20 January 1839, near the city of Yungay. Santa Cruz and his closest collaborators escaped first to Lima and afterwards to Arequipa, while General Morán took control of the fortress of Callao to resist the Expeditionary Army's advance.

On the very date of the battle at Yungay, the *President* entered Santa with Admiral Ross and Consul General Wilson. The latter had fresh proposals from Santa Cruz, who was even ready to accept the Confederation's dissolution and his retirement to Bolivia. However, news of Santa Cruz's defeat at Yungay reached the anchorage even before Wilson presented any proposal. Having lost the purpose

540.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 1/12/1838, ADM 1/52. *El Araucano* n° 438, 18/1/1839: 3. López Urrutia: 181.

541.- Departamento de Marina del Callao 1838; Panizo to the Minister of War, Callao 16/12/1838, A.H. de M. Escuadra Nacional. Blanchet to Panizo, *Edmond* Callao, 16/12/-1838, *El Eco del Protectorado*, n° 138, 19/12/1838. Fuenzalida (1973) II: 464-465.

542.- Denegri (1976) I: 599-604.

543.- Paz Soidán: 25! Buñes: 283.

of re-establishing negotiations on behalf of Santa Cruz, the frigate returned to Callao on February 1.⁵⁴⁴

Moran's defence of the port lasted until 6 March 1839, when he surrendered to the Army of Restoration after several days of negotiations held at Lima. During Moran's absence from the fortress, rumours spread accusing him of being disloyal to the garrison. The troops, whose poor discipline was already close to being broken, mutinied endangering private property at the port. As soon as the news reached Morán, he returned to Callao attempting to regain control of his men. Having failed, he requested asylum on board the *President*, this being received on March 8.⁵⁴⁵ Almost simultaneously, copies of the capitulation were distributed to the Callao garrison, whose officers learned that the surrender terms were highly acceptable and therefore General Morán was not liable to be accused a traitor. Nevertheless, having broken discipline, it was almost impossible to stop the troops, who dispersed through the town committing robberies and abuses.⁵⁴⁶

In this situation the *President's* pinnace was sent ashore for watering, where it was almost overwhelmed by 40 persons asking for refuge on board a British men-of-war. Already out of control, the fort's garrison fired on the boat, wounding the master of the pinnace in the hand. Despite the injury, he was able to steer the boat with the refugees, back to the British frigate.⁵⁴⁷

Immediately after that, the officer who had been sent on shore to investigate the situation, returned with a letter from Mr. Smith, from the British Consulate at Callao, informing Admiral Ross that looting had already begun, endangering British lives and property. Taking into account that there was no authority at all at the port, Ross decided to land 50 marines and 50 sailors, under Captain Scott's command. While the boats carrying this force were heading to the

544.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 31/1/1839, ADM 1/52; 4/2/1839, ADM 1/53.

545.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 31/1/1839 ADM 1/53.

546.- Morán's report, *El Mercurio*, Valparaíso 9/4/1839 [Sotomayor (1900) IV: 21-22.

547.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 31/3/1839 ADM 1/53.

beach, four or five gun-shots were fired from the forts against the *President* and the French brig *Alacrity*, without any consequence.⁵⁴⁸

Captain Scott's instructions were quite clear, he was to protect British lives and property, but as soon as the first Chilean troops entered the town, he would request guarantees from their Commanding Officer and re-embark his party. The value of British property looted from the Customs House before Scott landed, was estimated at 60,000 dollars. "Shortly after this force landed, Colonel Coloma entered the port with a party of Chilean cavalry, being able to control the mob which was already sacking some State owned barracks."⁵⁴⁹ Chilean guarantees were easily obtained and Scott returned on board with several more refugees. At the end of the day, there were 60 refugees on board, most of them officers of the defeated Confederation.⁵⁵⁰

Moran requested permission from Admiral Ross to land with the British party, remaining on land when it re-embarked. Ross considered that Moran acted in such a way as to quiet the comments made by a number of officer-refugees on board, who blamed him for his lack of character. Most of these refugees were sent to Guayaquil in the following days, seventeen of them sailing on the *Basilik*, on 21 March 1839.⁵⁵¹

548.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 31/3/1839 ADM 1/53.

549.- Morán's report, *El Mercurio*, Valparaiso 9/4/1839 [Sotomayor (1900) IV: 21-22].

550.- Ross to Wood, *President*, 31/3/1839, ADM 1/53. Amongst the refugees aboard the *President* were: Colonel Enrique Pareja, José Barrenechea, Enrique Pareja, Valisco Arrizueño, José Rodríguez y Juan Panizo; Commanders José Rayo, Francisco Remolino, Francisco Vásquez, José Noriega, Miguel Barrón and A. Cárdenas; Major José Armaza; Captain Jose Fernández and Gómez, Lieutenants José B. Pito, Justo Mendizabal, Angel M. Boza, Ramón Valle Riestra, Felipe Larriva, Antonio Arriaga; Navy Lieutenants Guillermo Mason and Benito Caso; Pedro Arteaga; Felipe Cuenca; Midshipman Francisco Soro; civil Bartolomé Bruno; Ancito Robles; intendente de policía J. Martínez [Ross to Wood, *President* At Sea, 26/4/1839, ADM 1/53].

551.- General de brigada Gil Espino; comandante Miguel Barrón; mayor Manuel Huertas; capitán José Fernandez; coronel José Rodríguez; sirvientes Juan Vargas y Manuel Golones; tenientes Gómez, Pedro Arteaga, Felipe Larriva, Justo Mendizabal, Felipe Cuenca, Alcantara; subteniente Luque; sirvientes Martínez, Pirini; intendente de Policía J. Martinez [Ross to Wood, *Fly* Valparaiso, 5/6/1839, ADM 1/53].

The rescue of Santa Cruz by the *Samarang*

As already mentioned, after his defeat at Yungay, Santa Cruz went to Lima to make a new attempt to defend the Confederation. However, he soon realized that it was almost impossible from the capital, so he decided to move to Arequipa where he still had some loyal troops and was closer to Bolivia. Before departing Lima, in an effort to maintain morale amongst his few followers, Santa Cruz made public declarations claiming that his troops in South-Peru would be enough to reverse the situation. However, at the same time, Santa Cruz wrote a private and confidential letter to Wilson, expressing his conviction that the end of the Confederation was certain. Feeling already defeated, the Protector added quite an unusual request in his letter, asking Wilson to

“prepare for a warship to sail along the coast, sweeping the area between the port of Pisco (...) and the hills of Arequipa, with the object of offering me security in case I encounter some obstacle or risk in my journey that cannot be by-passed. In addition, during these hazardous circumstances another ship should remain in one of the ports between Arica and Islay”.⁵⁵²

Wilson immediately handed the request to Admiral Ross, who instructed Captain William Broughton, of the *Samarang*, to sail for Islay and to offer asylum to Santa Cruz if requested.

On February 14, Santa Cruz entered Arequipa, and three days later was met by Thomas Crompton, British Vice-consul at Islay, who informed him that the *Samarang* would soon arrive at that port, being ready to offer asylum if necessary.⁵⁵³ On February 19, it became known in Arequipa that General Ballivián had succeeded in a coup in Bolivia, overthrowing Santa Cruz as President of that nation. Under these circumstances, Santa Cruz resigned as Protector of the Confederation and left Arequipa for Islay. His departure from Arequipa occurred as groups of citizens assembled throughout the city to protest against him and to designate new authorities. Amongst the latter was Pedro José Gamio, a well-

552.- Santa Cruz to Wilson, 27/1/1839 PRO F.O. 61/58 [quoted from Wu (1991): 85].

553.- Crompton to Wilson, 17/2/1839, PRO F.O. 61/58 [Wu (1991): 85].

known enemy of Santa Cruz and firm supporter of Gamarra, who became the Prefect.⁵⁵⁴ Following the rebellion of his last loyal battalion, Santa Cruz's protection was reduced to Marshals Cerdeña, Miller and Riva Agüero, and a small group of officers and officials of the deposed regime. On their arrival at Islay, at 9 a.m. February 22, they found the *Samarang* at anchor.⁵⁵⁵ Asylum was immediately requested by Santa Cruz and granted by Broughton, the latter indicating that, according to Admiral Ross' instructions, the *Samarang* was to transport him to any port he requested. The British Captain pointed out that it would be highly advisable for Santa Cruz to come on board as soon as possible. However, overestimating his good fortune and unaware that a cavalry party had already been dispatched from Arequipa to "force Santa Cruz and his suite to evacuate Peruvian territory",⁵⁵⁶ the former Protector decided to remain on land until the following morning, as Mr. Crompton's guest.⁵⁵⁷

At dawn on February 23, Major Julio Brousset with his 12 lancers entered the village, asking for Santa Cruz. Fearing that more troops would arrive from Arequipa following this party, many residents came to Crompton's house seeking the British Vice-consul's protection.⁵⁵⁸ As soon as Major Brousset learnt of Santa Cruz's whereabouts, he came to the British Consulate to capture the former Protector. Obviously, Crompton refused to accept such an action, informing Brousset that Santa Cruz was already under British protection. At the same time, he attracted the attention of the *Samarang*, hoisting first "a white flag and [afterwards] the national colours",⁵⁵⁹ and firing off the rockets and Very lights

554.- Sotomayor (1900) III: 503. Modesto Basadre, *Diez años de Historia Política del Perú (1834-1844)*, Lima 1953.

555.- "El Republicano de Arequipa", *El Tribuno del Pueblo* n° 33, Lima 16/3/1839.

556.- "Violación del territorio", *El Tribuno del Pueblo* n° 33, Lima 16/3/1839: 2-3.

557.- Broughton to Ross, *Samarang* Islay, 24/2/1839; enclosed with Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 10/3 & 4/4/1839, ADM 1/53.

558.- Crompton to Gamio, Islay 28/2/1839, *El Araucano* n° 454, 10/5/1839: 2-3. Accordingly to Modesto Basadre, the chief of the cavalry party was Major Berenguel [Op. Cit.]

559.- "Violación del territorio", *El Tribuno del Pueblo* n° 33, Lima 16/3/1839: 2-3.

which Broughton had given him. Acting immediately, Lieutenant Wodehouse was sent ashore to investigate the situation, returning on board with the Vice-consul's request to land troops to protect his house and property, as well as Santa Cruz. Captain Broughton himself, landed and marched to the Consulate heading a column of seventy marines and sailors. On their arrival, Major Brousset was informed that Great Marshal Santa Cruz was under British protection and therefore he would be immediately escorted to the *Samarang*. Following a few minutes of tense deliberation, Brousset and his lancers abandoned Islay and Santa Cruz came on board without further delay, in company with Marshals Miller, Cerdeña and Riva Agüero; former Prefect José Rivero, former Ministers Antonio Irisari and García del Río; and Commanders Nataniel Calvo and Juan Lenevo. As a last homage, Santa Cruz was received on board with a 21-gun salute.⁵⁶⁰ Shortly after this incident the *Samarang* departed for Puna, arriving at Guayaquil on March 11, where Santa Cruz and his suite landed two days later.

Before Broughton sailed from Islay, a press campaign was stirred up at Arequipa, blaming the British for having violated Peruvian territory. British merchants, both at Islay and Arequipa, feared that this campaign would excite Peruvian nationalism to a point that their lives and properties would be placed at risk. Having learned of this situation, Captain Broughton decided that a party of marines should remain at Islay, to protect their nationals if necessary.⁵⁶¹

Both the press and the newly appointed authorities accused Crompton of having abused his privileges by offering asylum to Santa Cruz and considering his own house as extraterritorial. However, the most serious accusation was against the landing of British forces and the subsequent violation of Peruvian territory.⁵⁶²

560.- Broughton to Ross, 24/2/1839; enclosed with Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 10/3 & 4/4/1839, ADM 1/53. Byam gives quite a fantastic version of these events [Op. Cit. 194].

561.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 6/4/1839, ADM 1/53.

562.- Marcos Riglos, comandante del Resguardo, to Arismendi, gobernador militar, Islay 23/2/1839, *El Araucano* n° 450, 12/4/1839; 2. "El Republicano de Arequipa": "Violación del territorio", *El Tribuno del Pueblo* n° 33 al 36, Lima, 16, 23 & 26/3/1839. "Un Soldado Peruano", *El Republicano* tomo XIV n° 11, Arequipa, 20/3/1839: 1-4.

Prefect Gamio was the most severe critic, qualifying Crompton as “an enemy of my government, associated with the enemies of Peru, and violator and invader of Peruvian territory.” Exceeding his authority, Gamio refused to accept Crompton as British Vice-consul any longer, stating that he would remain at Islay only “as a private individual, with no right to hoist British colours at his house, having dishonoured it with his attitude, neither to use any other emblem usually accepted for Consuls and Vice-consuls”.⁵⁶³

Crompton replied to these accusations stating that “Commanding Officers of British warships are not under the orders of British Consuls or Vice-consuls.” Therefore, they followed the “instructions from their Commander-in-Chief and, in case of an extraordinary event, acted according to their best judgement, and always following the Law of Nations.”⁵⁶⁴ He added:

“The Commanding Officer of the *Samarang* landed a party as soon he realized that the British Consulate was surrounded by menacing forces, and he was forced to act in such a way because British warships around the World have no other object other than to ensure respect for British colours and not to allow any aggression against British citizens.”⁵⁶⁵

Regarding his condition as British consular agent and the use of his national colours, Crompton replied that the Prefect of Arequipa had no authority to deal with that kind of matter.⁵⁶⁶

The incident was finally overcome thanks to Wilson’s ability to justify the *Samarang*’s intervention as a humanitarian act, similar to what other foreign men-of-war had previously performed on behalf of several of the new authorities, including Gamarra and his wife. With such a direct reference, and no doubt inasmuch that one day it might be necessary again to seek asylum on a foreign warship, President Gamarra himself told Wilson that every single British consular

563.- Gamio to Crompton, Arequipa, 26/2/1839, *El Tribuno del Pueblo* n. 33, Lima 16/2/1839: 3-4.

564.- Crompton to Gamio, Islay 28/2/1839, *El Araucano* n° 454, 10/5/1839: 2-3.

565.- Crompton to Gamio, Islay 28/2/1839, *El Araucano* n° 454, 10/5/1839: 2-3.

566.- Crompton to Gamio, Islay 28/2/1839, *El Araucano* n° 454, 10/5/1839: 2-3.

agent in Peru deserved his most profound respect, including Crompton.⁵⁶⁷ In this way, and not pursuing the matter further, this incident was closed from the new government's point of view.

By late 1839, no Chilean forces remained on Peruvian territory. The Confederation was already part of the past, and in the following months Peru would be involved in the most terrible anarchy. The Chilean government had succeeded in its goal, destroying a State which might endanger its growing economy. A British witness wrote referring to these events and the Chilean government:

“They paid themselves their original debt; swelled out to a monstrous amount by all sorts of accumulation of interest; they employed a mutinous army and paid it out of Peruvian forced contributions; they created a navy, paid also by Peru; and, above all, they succeeded in their principal object, which was ruining Callao and throwing her growing prosperity back to Valparaiso”.⁵⁶⁸

If we are to judge the attitude adopted by the British Naval Station during the War against the Confederation, we should be quite critical of its Commander-in-Chief, Rear-Admiral Ross, as he acted far beyond the dictates of neutrality. In fact, Santa Cruz's rescue was the most significant event in a policy which strayed from the usual one adopted by previous Commanders-in-Chief. However, it could be stated in his favour that Ross acted with the full support of Consul General Wilson and their superiors, both the Admiralty and the Foreign Office. This support does not, however, relieve him of the responsibility then assumed. Santa Cruz, in British eyes, was the last chance for Peru and Bolivia to become a stable state. What came later was a very unstable period, with many revolutions and disorder, which forced more intervention from the British Naval Station.

567.- Wu (1991): 88.

568.- George Byam, *Wanderings in some of the Western Republics of America*, London 1850: 185.

The war against the Confederation was, without any doubt, the most important event on the Western Coast of South America in the second half of the decade 1830-1840. Nevertheless, many other things complicated the work of the newly created Pacific Station. Incidents arose in Central America, which had to be attended to by Ross with the small number of vessels at his disposal.⁵⁶⁹ To make things more complicated, between March and November 1838, México and France were involved in what was called the “guerra de los pasteles”, which led the latter to occupy the Mexican port of Veracruz. Even though this conflict was basically based on the eastern coast, the Pacific was also effected, mainly by the increment of the French Naval Station.

Another source of problems for the Pacific Station was the South Sea Islands, where the French and North-American presence notoriously increased throughout the decade. In the following years this area was to be the setting for a new sort of contest, this time without guns or artillery, more related to the influence which could be exerted on local rulers. In subsequent years this situation was to demand growing attention from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station, modifying the usual deployment of his ships.⁵⁷⁰

Interservice friction

The usual rivalry between the naval and consular services was to become quite clear in the relations of British naval captains and the Consul General in Chile, Colonel John Walpole. Problems began in February 1837, when Mason arrived at Valparaiso and found that the preparation of the First Expedition of Restoration was already underway. Aiming to deploy his vessels more effectively, Mason asked Walpole about the purpose of that expedition. The British Consul General not only answered that he knew nothing of the expedition, but also complained about Mason for having abandoned Valparaiso. Mason was righteously

569.- Ross to Wood, *President Valparaiso*, 12/7/1838, ADM 1/51.

570.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 10 & 23/1/1839, ADM 1/52.

angry with such a reproach, since despite the shortage of vessels, the squadron under his command was doing its best to protect British subjects along the West Coast of America, where many places required far more attention than Valparaíso. Walpole notified Mason that he would present a formal complaint to the Foreign Office, accusing him of not fulfilling his duties as Senior Officer of the British Naval forces stationed in the Pacific. Mason not only refused to accept Walpole's complaints but also informed him that the Admiralty had already approved his decision not to interfere with General Freyre's expedition.⁵⁷¹

The Chilean decree establishing the blockade of the Peruvian coast, issued in February 1837, provided another point of friction.⁵⁷² According to it, Chilean men-of-war would exert the right of search on neutral vessels from that date, not giving a proper time for those vessels already sailing for Peru. This attitude was considered by Mason and Wilson as unacceptable under the usual rules of maritime warfare, leading them to complain against it. However, for Walpole the decree was absolutely legal and, in any case, he argued that the 1820's blockade of Callao, not having been formally revoked, could still be considered to be in force.⁵⁷³

More friction arose between Mason and Walpole concerning letters from the Peruvian government brought by the former for General Casimiro Olañeta, who was sent to Chile by Santa Cruz to negotiate peace, by early 1837. When the *Blonde* arrived at Valparaíso, the letters were delivered to the mail boat, but shortly after this Mason learned that Olañeta had already departed. Consequently, he tried by every possible means to get back the letters, asking vainly for Colonel Walpole's support. The last mentioned replied that it should be regarded as a

571.- Mason to Walpole, *Blonde* Valparaíso, 28/2 & 2, 3/3/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

572.- Sotomayor (1896): 101. *El Araucano* n° 343.

573.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

private matter and, therefore, refused to intervene with the Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister.⁵⁷⁴

When Admiral Ross arrived at Valparaíso, in April 1837, a new incident arose with Walpole, this time with reference to precedence. According to the Regulations issued by the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, on 11 July 1827, consular agents were due to come aboard to pay a visit when an Admiral entered a port under their jurisdiction. The situation was just the opposite when a diplomatic agent was present, the Admiral having to land in this case. Colonel Walpole's condition was quite clear. He was British Consul General in Chile, and therefore he ought to come on board the *President* as soon as she arrived at Valparaíso, to present his respects to Admiral Ross. Walpole not only did not fulfil this duty, but he also complained against Admiral Ross for not having landed to salute him.⁵⁷⁵ The incident was forwarded to London, and in July 1838, putting aside his arrogance and following precise instructions from the Foreign Office, Walpole came aboard the *Fly*, anchored at Valparaíso, to present his respects and apologies to Admiral Ross.⁵⁷⁶

This incident hampered relations between both British authorities. Walpole's attitude respecting the Chilean Government's position towards the Confederation, was another point of friction. Ross complained about this several times, pointing out that Walpole continually failed to provide proper information respecting the expedition against the Confederation, forcing him to find other ways to be informed about Chilean movements.⁵⁷⁷ Consul General Wilson also disliked Walpole, which contributed towards making more difficult the relations between the British Consulate in Santiago and the Commander-in-Chief of the Station. This

574.- Mason to Hammond, 13/3/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin* Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

575.- Ross to Wood, *President* Valparaíso, 27/4/1838, ADM 1/51.

576.- Ross to Wood, *Fly* Valparaíso, 31/7/1839, ADM 1/53.

577.- Ross to Wood, *President* Callao, 10/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

sort of situation led Ross to comment: “how insignificant and unsatisfactory was the information received from Colonel Walpole, even at the last hour”.⁵⁷⁸

578.- Ross to Wood, *President Callao*, 10/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conveyance of Treasure on British warships

On 15 January 1834, British Consul General in Lima, Belford Hinton Wilson wrote a letter to Lord Palmerston, “complaining of the insufficient protection given to British interest in the Pacific, and particularly as contrasted with that afforded by the Vessels of War of France and the United States”, and stating that British captains were “too much occupied with the business of ‘freight hunting’ to be of much service to the various British communities.”⁵⁷⁹ A few years later, in 1845, Britain and the United States were at the edge of war for the Oregon territories. It was in these circumstances when Rear Admiral George Francis Seymour commanded Captain John Gordon, of the third-rate *America*, “to remain on station in support of British interest in Oregon, California, the Hawaiian Islands and elsewhere. Instead, he left the station contrary to orders after having displaced the sloop *Daphne* (18), Captain John Onslow, which was to have conveyed the freight home at the end of her commission.”⁵⁸⁰ On his arrival to Britain, Gordon was severely reprimanded, resigning shortly after that, in October 1846. There were some other cases in which Captains and even some

579.- Wilson to Palmerston, 15/1/1834, PRO/F.O. 61/26, quoted from W.M. Mathew, “The first Anglo-Peruvian Debt and its Settlement, 1822–49”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, U. of Cambridge, 2, 1 (1970), 85. Mason to Elliot, *Blonde*, Valparaiso, 27/1/1835, ADM 1/2211.

580.- Barry M. Gough, “Specie conveyance from the West Coast of Mexico in British Warships c.1820-1870: An Aspect of the ‘Pax Britannica’”, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, 69, n° 4 (November 1983), 425–426.

Commanders-in-Chief disputed their shares of the freight, justifying some comments as the one wrote by Admiral John Moresby, a midshipman on the *America*, respect to specie conveyance: “certainly was not to the moral advantage of any who were concerned in this particular form of privateering”.⁵⁸¹

These evidences, as well as many other complains from British merchants based in Spanish American ports, led some scholars to accept that the Royal Navy was more concern with “freight hunting” rather than to protecting their nationals in these places. W.M. Mathew, a well-known British scholar, wrote regarding this issue: “Trips lasting up to nine months were being made round the Horn and up to Rio and the east coast of Mexico in search of cargoes. Callao was visited by only one of the vessels, and the timing of the calls and the duration of the stay were determined largely by trading opportunities.”⁵⁸²

According to this sort of asseverations British Captains put their own personal commercial interest above their duties. However, Barry M. Gough, having study this particular kind of naval service on the west coast of Mexico, have a very different point of view. He concludes that conveyance of specie in British warships, despite temptations and a well-known cases of abuse, was conducted over a period of fifty years with credit to the Royal Navy. “British warships afforded security to merchants during precarious times of revolution and national emergence in Latin America”⁵⁸³

As we can see, in respect to specie conveyance, there are two different approaches to British naval vessels’ performance on the Pacific. According to one

581.- Ibidem, 428.

582.- Mathew (1970), 85.

583.- Gough (1983), 430.

of them, naval officers were far more concerned with obtaining as much freight as possible, leaving aside their main duty, which was the protection of British subjects and properties. According to the other approach, British naval officers did not neglect their duty, even when there were some cases in which they failed for monetary interest.

It is the aim of this chapter to discuss this issue, based on fresh evidence about conveyance of treasure and the frequency of British naval vessels' visits to Peruvian ports. We will try to prove that "freight hunting", being important as it was, could not be generalised as the main concern of British captains in the Pacific.

The legal frame

Since Phoenicians' times, merchants trading overseas followed a well-known sequence, which involved an initial investment in goods, their transport to and selling at the destination port, and the return with the profit, either in goods or in bullion. However, sea trade had always suffered some threats, such as pirates and enemy vessels during war time. By the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, piracy was almost exterminated from the main sea-routes. However, since the Seventeenth Century, maritime powers recognized that, in war time, naval vessels and privateers of any of the nations involved in the war could detain and search neutral vessels at the High Seas, removing the cargo belonging to its enemy. This belligerent right caused several problems, since bullion and valuable cargo was always a temptation to unscrupulous naval captains and privateers, who took advantage of their position to seize any or both of them.

British merchants found that the safest way to send treasure home was to entrust it to Royal Navy vessels, paying a certain amount for freight. A similar

solution was adopted by British authorities for the carriage of public treasure, without any payment until 1807, when the Admiralty charged 0.5 % for this service.⁵⁸⁴

By the early Nineteenth Century, while this practice had already been abandoned elsewhere, it became a normal usage along the West Coast of South America. Trading with Spanish America had been a long term dream for many British merchants. However, these dreams faced several limitations until the Spanish rule in America began to fall, then it could become a nightmare. A considerable number of British merchants, with an important quantity of goods, crossed the Atlantic hoping to participate in the newly open Latin American market. However, they had to deal with the difficulties raised by the struggle for the independence in South America, which lasted almost eighteen years (1808-1826). During this period of time, the navies of Spain and the new republics, as well as privateers from both sides, endangered sea trade, and posed a special risk to bullion or treasure. Consequently, those British merchants trading in the area, considered that the use of Royal Navy vessels for the conveyance of their money was the safest way to effect trade with Europe, and consequently were ready to pay a freight for this service. The other possibility was shipping it in private vessels. However, as Captain Basil Hall, of the frigate *Conway*, pointed out in the 1820's, the risk involved meant high insurance premiums and speculation on bill of lading sent to Europe by other routes.⁵⁸⁵

This peculiar naval service was almost a century, being framed by a number of Admiralty regulations, which established the amount of the freight to be charged

584.- Ibidem, 419.

585.- Hall, II, 183, 185, 191-191, 226-228, 257-258.

for the conveyance of treasure. In July 1819, King George III fixed “a Rate, and direct the Disposal of Freight Money, for the Conveyance of Specie and Jewels on board His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels’; commissions were set by proclamation for carriage as follows: from England beyond the Capes, 1% of the ‘public treasure’ in time of war or peace, 2.5% of ‘private treasure’ in time of peace, and 3% of ‘private treasure’ in time of war. Of the commission, one-quarter went to the admiral on station, one-half to the ship’s captain, and one-quarter to Greenwich Hospital for Seamen”.⁵⁸⁶

In June 1831, following the end of independence’s wars in Latin America, freight rates were reduced both for public and private funds, varying from 0.75% to 2% on time of war, according to the distance of the conveyance and the quality of the treasure; if the latter were gold or jewels, the freight was less expensive, whereas silver demanded a higher rate. Later in the 1830's the freight was changed once again, linking its value to the distance of the conveyance. Accordingly, treasure carried within the South Pacific or South Atlantic had to pay 1.5%; this figure raised to 2% if the shipment was from the North to the South Pacific, or from the West Coast to Rio de Janeiro, or from Rio to England. If the conveyance was from the Pacific to England it had to pay 2.5%. These figures were to remain in force until 1881, when it was reduced to a plain 1%, and finally eliminated in 1914.⁵⁸⁷

Gold coins, and Spanish pesos or dollars, as were call by foreigners, were the only one form in which gold and silver could be legally exported from Peru until 1823. Under normal circumstances, silver was obtained by a process of amalgamation, in which mercury was used to separate silver from earth and basic

586.- For the complete text of the Proclamations and other dispositions concerning this topic, see *The Navy List* from the 1850's onwards, section "Conveyance of Treasure".

metals. The product of this process was named “plata piña”, and “unless containing intermixed pieces of gold, worth 8 ¼ dollars the mark.”⁵⁸⁸ Once the “plata piña” was casted into bars, increases its value to 9 dollars the mark. Afterwards, to export the silver, the bars were coined at Lima Mint. As could be understand, Peruvian production of silver was seriously affected by the War of Independence, drooping from 476,508 marks, in 1820; to 118,781 marks, in 1821; reaching its lowest figure in 1823, when it only was 35,022 marks.⁵⁸⁹

Assuming that these figures are referred to silver bars, and not taking into account the already mentioned taxation for minting them, we could estimate that in 1820 and 1821 the total production of silver worth 5'357,601 dollars. In the same period of time, British naval vessels received on board at least twice this amount, whereas more treasure was exported in merchant vessels and North American naval vessels, not to mention another 3'000,000 dollars convoyed by the *Blossom* early in 1819. The logic consequence of this situation was a terrible shortage of currency in 1822, both for patriots and loyalist.

As the loyalist retained control of the principal area of silver mining, they continue to produce and even to mint it at Cusco. It was a different situation for the newly established government of Peru, whose first Minister of Economy, Hipólito Unanue, presented a dramatic situation in his address to the Congress, in September 1822, stating that in the last twelve months, only 1'611,133 dollars were minted, while 4'011,270 dollars had been shipped at Callao. Pressed by the

587.- Gough (1983), 420.

588.- Barry M. Gough (editor), *To the Pacific and Arctic with Beechey. The Journal of Lieutenant George Peard of H.M.S. Blossom, 1825-1828*, Cambridge. Hakluyt Society, 1973: 251.

589.- Gootenberg (1989), 162.

situation, he urged to modify the current regulations for trade, issued on September 1821.⁵⁹⁰ According to them, silver coins were to pay 5% as export duties, while gold was rated as 2.5%. It was forbidden to export non-minted silver or gold; as well as that already crafted.⁵⁹¹

Forced by the situation, which became more dramatic in the following months, these rules were modified by President Riva-Agüero, ruling the country from Trujillo, on 3 July 1823, allowing the export of silver bars, “plata piña” and non-minted gold, paying 10%, 5% and 6% duties, respectively.⁵⁹² The shortage of coinage was considerable increased by early 1824, due to the drop on silver production and the destruction of Lima Mint’s machinery by the loyalist when they occupied the city in 1823 and in 1824.⁵⁹³ Because of these facts, on 11 March 1824 a decree was issued establishing a temporary prohibition to export silver and gold coins, and modifying again the rules issued on July 1823. Therefore, export duties paid by silver bars were reduced to 5%, fixing its value as 8 dollars for mark, not making any difference for its purity. “Plata piña” will be valued at 7 dollars for mark, paying 5% for export duties, while gold taxation will remain at 6%.⁵⁹⁴

On 30 March 1826, having ended the struggle for Peruvian independence, following the surrender of the loyalist at Callao, a new decree restored pre-1824 conditions to export gold and silver, only coins could be used with that purpose

590.- P. Emilio Dancuart, *Anales de la Hacienda Pública del Perú. Historia y legislación fiscal de la República*, Lima, Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1905, I: 242-246.

591.- Paz Soldán, 235. Elías (1971-1974), II: 196.

592.- *Gaceta del Gobierno*, VI, nº 5 (27/3/1824): 1.

593.- Hipólito Unanue, “Memoria del Ministro de Hacienda del Perú, Dr. D. Hipólito Unanue, al Congreso de 1825, en su sesión de 14 de febrero de 1825”, en Dancuart, I: 259.

594.- *Gaceta del Gobierno*, VI, nº 5 (27/3/1824): 1.

under the 1821 Trade Regulations.⁵⁹⁵ Later in that year, on 6 June 1826, a second “Reglamento de Comercio” was issued, establishing a 5% export duty on “dobloones” and dollars. Worked gold could be exported paying 4% of its value, considering 2 dollars for every “castellano”; whereas silver was charged at 13%, fixing its value at 6 dollars per mark.⁵⁹⁶ In November 1833, another “Reglamento de Comercio” was issued, but it lasted very few months, being restored the previous one in March 1834. However, some articles were modified, establishing a difference between foreign and Peruvian vessels. While the latter could take silver or gold between two Peruvian ports without any payment, foreign ships were due to pay 1/2% on silver, either as bars or coins, and 1/4% on gold, for the same service. Foreign gold taken from one Peruvian port to another in a foreign vessel, should pay 1/2% if was already minted, and 1/4% if not. Export duties on Gold were lowered to 2%, and fixed on 6 reales per mark in the case of worked silver.⁵⁹⁷

During the civil between Orbegoso and Salaverry (1835), as the latter was at Lima, the former issued a decree on 21 May, authorizing the export of silver and gold in its primary form. However, on 9 October 1835, a new decree restored the prohibition to export plata piña and non minted gold.⁵⁹⁸

On 3 September 1836, having been established the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, Marshall Santa Cruz issued a “Reglamento de Comercio” for the North Peruvian State, which was adopted by the south Peruvian State, fixing the following export duties: gold in coins 1%, in dust or already worked 2 reales per

595.- Dancuart, I: 267.

596.- Ibidem, II: 81.

597.- Ibidem, II: 208.

598.- Ibidem, II: 224-225.

ounce; silver in coins 5%, worked 4 reales per ounce. Silver bars and “plata piña” were considered as non exportable goods.⁵⁹⁹

The basic idea behind this policy, which was very similar in Peru and in Mexico, was to secure “the advantage of manufacturing into dollars the whole of the silver produced”,⁶⁰⁰ receiving in this process almost 11.5 % of it’s value. That amount was increased with the already mentioned export duties, plus insurance and other expenses, in an additional 5%.⁶⁰¹ Obviously, a considerable number of merchants would try to avoid such a high taxation, by paying bribes to local authorities which were due to collect them.

The local situation

The first British naval vessel convoying treasure from Callao to England was the frigate *Stantard*, under Captain Fleeming, as early as 1811, taking on board almost 3’000,000 dollars, most of them belonging to local merchants. However, as already explained, the demand for this sort of service increased late in that decade, following the fate of the maritime war between loyalist and patriots in the South Pacific. The first shipment of treasure on a Royal Navy’s vessel from the West Coast during this period was in December 1817, when the frigate *Amphion* received 20,000 dollars at Callao and 180,000 dollars at Valparaíso.⁶⁰² Commodore Bowles, who was on board this vessel, reported to the Admiralty that

599.- *Colección de leyes, decretos y órdenes publicadas en el Perú, desde su independencia en el año de 1821, y abraza el tiempo desde el 1º de enero de 1835, hasta 31 de diciembre de 1837*, Lima, Imprenta de José Masías, 1841, V: 346.

600.- R.A. Humphreys, *British Consular Reports on the trade and politics of Latin America. 1824-1826*, London, The royal Historical Society, 1940: 150.

601.- *Ibidem*: 151.

602.- Jones: 258.

he declined to receive non British-owned treasure, and attitude which was followed by Captain Shirreff, of the *Andromache*, in May 1818.⁶⁰³

As mentioned in chapter two, albeit officially illegal, by late-1817 the Peruvian Viceroy was already granting permission to some British merchants to trade in Peru. Their presence at Callao and Lima was strongly criticized by the vast majority of local merchants, represented by the Tribunal del Consulado. However, as the situation became worst for the loyalist, a growing number of them changed their mind, realizing that they could take advantage of the situation to expatriate their capitals. Commodore Bowles and Captain Shirreff's refusal to receive non-British owned treasure on their ships, led some local merchants to nominate British agents, who were to receive their remittances for the purchase of British goods. Two local merchants, Licarazo and Francisco Murrieta, seems to be the first in taking advantage of this possibility. In October 1819, they shipped 348,000 dollars on the *Slaney*, with full-knowledge and the approval of Viceroy Pezuela, who recorded it in his diary that it was sent to Rio de Janeiro to buy any kind of goods, paying duties as they were imported from Panama, and giving an advance of 100,000 dollars.⁶⁰⁴ A few months latter, in May 1820, another local merchant, Manuel Ortiz de Villalta, was mentioned amongst those sending money to Britain on the *Tyne*, which departed Callao with 844 boxes with specie, 3'008,513 dollars worth.⁶⁰⁵ It seems that this treasure was really heavy, as 10 tons of iron ballast

603.- Bowles a Croker. *Creole*, Buenos Aires. 15/3/1819. ADM 1/24.

604.- Pezuela: 552.

605.- Pezuela: 720.

were left at Callao Naval Arsenal, being lost in the following years as a result of the confusion occasioned by the Independence War.⁶⁰⁶

We were unable to identify the British merchant to whom the treasure were consignee in the two previous cases; however, in December 1820, when the *Hyperion* departed Callao with more than 1'500,000 dollars,⁶⁰⁷ two local merchants, Larraza and Mocrai, consigned their part to Anthony Gibbs, from London. Manuel Ortiz de Villalta was to appear again amongst those shipping money in this naval vessel, sending this time 50,000 dollars to a non-identified London house.⁶⁰⁸

By mid-1820, the Chilean Squadron, under Admiral Cochrane, had already gained almost total control of the sea-routes between Callao and Spain, creating a growing panic amongst local merchants at Lima. Consequently, since that time until the end of the war, they try every possible way to get their money shipped in a British men-of-war. In 1820 and 1821, we have found eight British naval vessels receiving treasure on board at Callao or Ancon, destined to Rio de Janeiro and eventually to Britain. It seems to be impossible to obtain the total figure of the remittances taken on board Royal Navy's vessels during these years. According to Charles Milner Rickets, British Consul General in Lima in 1826, in the period 1819-1825, British men-of-war convoyed 26,9 million dollars from the West Coast of Spanish America, while a non-calculated amount was shipped by three North-American naval vessels and in merchant vessels, and something more was sent to

606.- Hart to Brown. *Creole*, Rio de Janeiro, 30/8/1823, ADM 1/28.

607.- Graham and Humphreys: 322.

608.- ADM 51/3214.

India.⁶⁰⁹ John Stoddard Jones provides some information in Pounds Sterling. As a rate of 5 dollars a Pound, he calculates that from 1822 to 1825, a total figure of 22'295,000 dollars were exported.⁶¹⁰

Even before San Martin occupied Lima, in July 1821, British merchants were already established in South Peru, trading with the loyalist and asking for naval support for the conveyance of their money. That was the reason why the H.M.S. *Conway*, called at Arica, Ilo and Mollendo in the first half of 1821. The amount of treasure received in those ports is unknown, but it was transhipped, on June 24, at Callao, to the *Owen Glendower*, which shortly after that departed for Valparaiso and Rio de Janeiro.⁶¹¹ In the following months, British merchants established in other Peruvian cities, such as Trujillo, Piura, Casma and Pisco, and consequently shipments of treasure on British naval vessels between several Peruvian ports to Callao, Valparaiso, Rio or England, became a normal usage.

As happened in Peru, British merchants also established themselves in other parts of the West Coast of America, and as early as 1822, the Pacific Squadron extended its visits to the coast of Mexico.⁶¹² However, for several reasons, this service was very irregular beyond Peruvian and Chilean ports. When Rear Admiral Baker assumed the Command of the Station, in late 1829, realized that Captains stationed on the Pacific found the most trivial reason to sail round the Cape,

609.- Rickets to Foreign Office, Lima, 27/12/1826. F.O. 61/8, P.R.O. Jones. 319. Humphreys (1940): 195.

610.- Jones: 404.

611.- ADM 53/249. ADM 50/151, 26/5/1821.

612.- Gough (1983): 420-421.

offering an inadequate service to the merchants.⁶¹³ To change that situation, he established the following policy.

“(...) a Ship should sail from Coquimbo for Rio Janeiro on the 25th of January, 25th of May, and the 25th of September every year; and that the Ship destined to the Coast of Mexico should sail for that port of the Station early in October, and to return to Coquimbo in time, either to take round the Collected Treasure, on the 25th of the following May, or to transfer what she might have on board to any other Ship appointed to that Service. When these Ships arrived at Rio Janeiro I was guided entirely by circumstances as to the mode of sending the Treasure on to England. Sometimes I sent it on by the Ships themselves, sometimes by other Ships or Packets.”⁶¹⁴

British merchants along Central America should be informed that this service will be regular, and a naval vessel would be sent to visit Society and Friendly Islands from time to time.⁶¹⁵

In the 1830's, South Pacific waters became more and more safe, and despite continuous revolutions and civil wars, the conveyance of treasure declined in a progressive way. Merchant vessels gained in safety and, consequently, insurance drop and their freights became more attractive for British merchants. Furthermore, as one of them pointed out, “Most of the freight in specie is sent home in merchant vessels, to avoid the delay so frequently occurring in the transshipment in ship of war from one to other, as they may be required for other services”.⁶¹⁶

Transshipment was really very frequent, and we were able to find quite a number of cases. In early times, one vessel was sent round the Cape with the sole purpose of convoying the treasure already collected by other men-of-war. That

613.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio, 15/2/1830, ADM 1/32.

614.- A Report of the present State and Duties of the South American Station, Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/12/1832, ADM 1/40.

615.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, 25/10 and 18/12/1829, ADM 1/32.

was the case of the *Tyne*, which sailed from Buenos Aires in August 1818, called at Valparaiso and Coquimbo, and arrived at Rio in January 1819; sailing once again in January 1820, calling at Valparaiso and Callao and returning to Rio in that August. Later in that decade, as a two-year service on the Pacific became the normal tour, treasure could be passed from one vessel to another, in order to reach the next one to depart for Rio de Janeiro. The brig-sloop *Alert* served in the Pacific for three years, since 1828 until 1831, receiving from British merchants in Peruvian ports a total amount of 781,188.31 dollars, besides additional treasure collected on two tours to the Mexican coast and one to Panama, and several visits to Chilean ports. At least in four occasions, the already collected treasure was transhipped to another man-of-war, twice to the *Forte* (December 1828 and February 1830), and twice to the *Seringapatam* (September 1830 and March 1831), totalling 392,677.56 dollars consigned to Rio and England. The largest part of the difference was shipped to Valparaiso, some other part from minor Peruvian ports to Callao, and 2,521.26 dollars taken on board on deposit, for security reasons. Once the *Alert* time of service in Peruvian waters elapsed, by August 1831, 310,004 dollars were transhipped from the *Clio* and the *Seringapatam*, and just before sailing round the Cape, the *Alert* received 22,500 dollars from the *Clio*, which had been collected at Guayaquil and Paíta.⁶¹⁷

Each one of these transhipments was done in order to convoy the treasure in the following naval vessel departing to Rio. For this reason, it was not unusual another transhipment at Valparaiso or even Coquimbo. That is was happened with

616.- Bowers II: 276-277.

617.- ADM 51/3015. Returns of treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop *Alert* between 1st of July and 9 December 1829; and between 29 December 1829 and 9 February 1830,

the *Forte*, in December 1828, and in both cases the *Seringapatam* received the *Alert*'s treasure. It seems that the *Forte* transhipped the treasure to the *Doris*, which was the next vessel to depart for Rio. However, as this vessel was found unfit to cruise round the Cape, and finally was sold at Valparaiso, the treasure was transferred once again to another man-of-war, which probably was the *Heron*, sailing round the Cape only by late 1829. Obviously, in this particular case, merchants whose treasure was been convoyed suffered a considerable delay.

Conveyance was not the only reason money was shipped on a British man-of-war. Security was another quite important one. It was already mentioned that the *Alert* received a certain amount of money in this condition, being charged at 1.5% as it was to be shipped to another port in the South Pacific coast of America. This sort of shipments were far more frequent in unsettled times, and the very reason of this charge was the fact that it became a risky business to collect them from the shore. Against Admiralty regulations, boat parties were usually rewarded by the merchants for the risk taken in bringing specie off from the shore.⁶¹⁸

As Barry Gough had studied, conveyance of treasure from the Mexican coast continue to be a profitable enterprise for British Captains for some more decades. Admiral Baker already realized that by 1829, considering that service was "usually attended by considerable advantages", to a point that the Commander-in-Chief himself nominated the vessel "as an incitement and a reward for zealous and correct conduct in the respective Captains"⁶¹⁹

ADM 1/32. Accounts of the treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop *Alert* between the 10th February to 30 June 1830, and between 1st of July to 30 September. ADM 1/34.

618.- Gough (1983): 427-428, 432 note 41.

619.- A Report of the present State and Duties of the South American Station, Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/12/1832, ADM 1/40

In the Pacific coast of South America, the situation gradually changed, as already mentioned, being more frequent the use of merchant vessels. It seems that the establishment of a steam service between Panama and Valparaiso, by the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, in 1840, led British merchants to take advantage of the regularity of this service, instead of using naval vessels. Nonetheless, in the two previous decades, the Royal Navy provided a much valuable service, despite the difficulties involved in fulfilling its main duties in a usually unstable area.

British Captains attitude

In 1820, during the war for Independence, the British man-of-war *Tyne* convoyed 3'008,513 dollars or pesos,⁶²⁰ the highest amount of treasure shipped in a British men-of-war from Peru in the period under research. The freight was 75,213 dollars, half of it (37,606 dollars) had to be shared by Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon with the captains of the *Andromache* and the *Slaney*, who originally received part of the treasure at Callao. Commodore Bowles, Commander in Chief of the South America Station, received 18,803 dollars for this treasure, amount which will be increased during his period of command by the treasure taken in other naval vessels either from the Pacific and from Buenos Aires and Brazil.

According to Admiral Seymour, Commander-in-Chief (1844-1847), for the period 1839-1843, the freight collected by the Pacific Station was 50,528 Pounds Sterling, placing it just behind the North American and West Indies Station. For

620.- Pezuela: 720.

the same period, the Brazil Station collected 27,984 Pounds Sterling.⁶²¹ If we use these figures as reference to previous years, we could consider that until 1837, when the Pacific squadron became a separate Station, the annual average freight received by the Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station was nearly 3,900 Pounds Sterling. This amount of money was substantially more than their normal salaries and, consequently, that command became very attractive to an admiral's appointment.

This very reason was to create some incidents between entering and departing Commanders-in-Chief, since they were entitled to receive a quarter of the freight while in command, a matter which was eventually referred to the moment of entering or departing the limits of the Station.⁶²²

However, those who were actually engaged in the task of convoying treasure and, consequently, receiving a more direct benefit from it, were naval captains. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, in some cases they were blamed for being "too much occupied with the business of 'freight hunting' to be of much service to the various British communities."⁶²³ This assertion raised a basic question. Did British captains abandon their duties for freight hunting?

In several occasions along this dissertation we had mentioned that the most important duty British captains had to fulfil in the Pacific, as well as in several other places, was to offer protection to their nationals and their interest. To accomplish this task, they represented the British government until the appointment

621.- Gough (1983): 432, note 27.

622.- Ibidem: 425, 428.

623.- Wilson to Palmerston, 15/1/1834, PRO/F.O. 61/26, quoted from W.M. Mathew, "The first Anglo-Peruvian Debt and its Settlement, 1822-49", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, U. of Cambridge, 2, 1 (1970): 85.

of British consular agents, supported them from thence onwards. As a number of British merchants established themselves in Peru, it became an important part of the Pacific Squadron's duty to support them by all available and legal means. Part of it was to provide enough security for the return of their treasure, by taking it from one place to another in naval vessels. Understandably, in unsettled times, merchants asked for a more close naval support, however, this support could not always be offered, since the extension of the area under the control of the Pacific Squadron was too big for the available number of vessels. These facts were the root of a number of complaints. In one hand, British commodores requesting for more vessels to be destined to the Pacific, and in the other hand, British merchants and consular agents, blaming British captains for not attending their particulars request of protection. Even when both parts had some reason on their claims, we have found no proof that British captains were only concerned with freight hunting.

Obviously they took advantage of any possibility to receive treasure in their vessels, in some cases, by advertising as much as possible their departing date, as Captain Searle, of the *Hyperion*, did at Callao by late 1820, being able to receive more than 1'500,000 dollars on board. As the Chilean government considered that this treasure was actually owned by loyalists instead of British merchants, Searle was accused for having paid for "put public notice for all those -the Spaniards on Lima- could save their properties". Searle replied that all the remittances were addressed to Britain, and were owned by British subjects.⁶²⁴

624.- O'Higgins III: 222-223; IV: 158-159. *Gazeta del Gobierno de Chile*, III, nº 7 (19/10/1821), nº 32 (16/11/1822). Denegri (1976a): 129-130.

As already mentioned, only British owned treasure could be shipped on British men-of-war. However, with local regulations being modified from time to time and with local and British merchants trying to avoid paying high export duties, British vessels began to receive non-authorized silver and gold. That is what happened at Callao in May and June 1821, when the *Owen Glendower* received silver pieces and “plata piña” from John Begg,⁶²⁵ and in July 1824, when the same merchant as well as Cochran and Company embarked dollars in the *Tartar*.⁶²⁶

Furthermore, it is possible to find some cases in which no British merchant was mentioned at all. That is what happened at Huanchaco, on 5 June 1824, when Agustín M. Andrade embarked several silver bars in the *Tartar*, valued 15,115 dollars, consigned to Felipe Santiago del Solar, in Valparaíso,⁶²⁷ and at Islay, on 13 September 1830, when M. Pareja shipped 6,083 dollars on the *Alert*, consigned to Rufino Guido, in Callao.⁶²⁸ Moreover, two years before, on 2 May 1828, at Islay, the last mentioned vessel received “plata piña” and dollars for a total value of 15,786 dollars from the French merchant vessel *Fulgar*.⁶²⁹

Why British captains were ready to accept these kind of treasure on board? We could consider that freight was a temptation, but none of these cases involved an important amount of money. With the available information, we only can assume that they were linked in a non-explicit way to a British merchant.

625.- ADM 51/3303.

626.- Valparaíso. 18/9/1824. An account of treasure transhipped from H.M.S. the *Tartar*, Thomas Brown. Esquire. Captain. into H.M.S. the *Aurora*, Henry Prescott. C.B., Captain, for conveyance as Per Bill of Lading. Callao Bay. July 1824. ADM 1/29.

627.- Ibidem.

628.- Account of the treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop *Alert* between the 1st of July to 30 September 1830. ADM 1/34.

629.- ADM 51/3015.

An additional problem was created when treasure was received without having paid export duties. As a British Commodore wrote in 1835, “high duties, monopolies, and prohibitions, produce the same effects as they do in other countries; and the gross corruption that prevails in every Departments enables merchants to evade the Laws.”⁶³⁰ The first case was reported on February 1819, when the *Blossom* departed Callao with 3’000,000 dollars. Viceroy Pezuela strongly protested for this illegality, and Spanish naval boats were sent to exert a close control of the *Blossom* and the *Andromache*, which also was at the anchorage. Despite Pezuela’s distrust on captains Hickey and Shirreff, they were not mentioned in the ensuing enquire. Instead of them, several influent personalities became involved, such as Pedro Abadia, factor of the Compañía de Filipinas, and some British merchants and customs officials.⁶³¹ This case suggest that a number of British merchants, as well as local merchants, were ready to use every possible way to get their remittances in a British man-of-war without paying taxes. For this purpose, it seems that they would not hesitate in falsify papers, showing that they had already fulfilled every legal condition to export their treasure.

Nonetheless, as already mentioned, in several occasions gold and silver was shipped in a form not properly authorized by the Peruvian government. That seems to happened in March 1834, when the boats of the U.S. schooner *Dolphin* were sent to shore at Chorrillos, a port not allowed to foreign trade and, consequently without a Customs Office. In that particular case, the Peruvian government complained to Consul General Wilson, having mistook that small schooner with the British frigate *Dublin*, under Captain Townshend. An incident followed this

630.- Mason to Eliot, *Blonde*, Valparaíso, 27/1/1835, ADM 1/2211.

631.- Anna, 146. *CDIP*, VIII (2): 354.

mistake, and Captain Townshend was to declare “that I consider myself, as well as every one of his Majesty Ships and Vessels, to be at full liberty to proceed to any part of the coasts of this country, and hold communications therewith, either by the boats, or otherwise, as may considered beneficial for the protection of British subjects, and their property”.⁶³²

Already warned of this situation, when Rear Admiral Graham Eden Hammond took command of the Station, in September 1834, he instructed his subordinated captains not to receive any treasure on board without the intervention of the local Customs officials. Commodore Mason, who was in command of the Pacific Squadron since August 1834 until July 1837, followed very closely these instructions, and in spite of Captain Townshend’s declarations, naval vessels under his command only received treasure in those ports already opened to foreign trade, such as Paita and Chorrillos, during the short time the latter was opened by President Orbegoso, in February 1835. When for some reason a man-of-war was sent to another port, previous consent from the Peruvian government, it was under strict orders not to receive any treasure on board.⁶³³

Even when Commodore Mason was very keen in observe these instructions, he did not hesitate in sending his own launch twice to the shore, during a revolution at Callao fortress, in January 1835, as the only available mean to save British merchants’s properties at this port. Obviously, in such a critic situation, no export duties were paid, but it was an exception, since he had previously refused to use his boats for this sort of service. He even mentioned that

632.- Townshend to Wilson, Callao 31/3/1834; enclosed in Townshend to Seymour, *Dublin*, Coquimbo, 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42.

633.- Mason to Wilson, *Blonde*, Coquimbo, 9/7/1836; enclosed in Hammond a Wood, *Dublin*, Rio, 6/9/1836, ADM 1/36.

at least twice in the period he was in command of the Pacific Squadron, merchants had requested British captains support to take on board treasure without paying duties. First Captain Paget, of the *Samarang*, before August 1835, and afterwards commander Eden, of the *Rover*, in January 1836 refused complying with a request from the merchants to smuggle off money. As Mason stated in a report sent to the Admiralty, in January 1835, “smuggling in all articles goes on from Peru to Mexico by the assistance of those who are appointed to prevent it (...) but the Navy are not implicated in it, and in fact, since I have been out I have heard merchants reprobate officers as being too scrupulous”.⁶³⁴

Nonetheless, it seems that in the following decades some naval captains became involved in clandestine operations in the Mexican coast, suggesting that they could have the same attitude in the Peruvian coast. According to Barry Gough, “The smuggling was known to captains and customs officers alike and in view of its benefits to both parties was carried on despite regulations to the contrary”.⁶³⁵

The illegal conveyance of treasure had another kind of problems, since those who were ready to falsify papers to avoid paying export duties, were also ready to foolish British Captains. That is what happened to captains Searle and Mackenzie, of the *Hyperion* and *Superb*, when unknowingly took lead from Callao. As treasure was shipped on already closed and sealed boxes, with the owner's mark on it, the Captain's clerk recorded the number of boxes and the value declared by the shipper, stating that the boxes' contents was unknown. However, the Captain had to issue a bill of lading, promising to deliver the treasure

634.- Ibidem. Mason to Eliot. *Blonde*. Valparaíso. 27/1/1835, ADM 1/2211.

635.- Gough (1983): 429.

supposedly received. In the case of Captain Mackenzie, following his arrival in Britain, he faced applications for “nearly one hundred thousand dollars, said to had been shipped at Lima, on board His Majesty’s Ship *Superb*, but which never came on board”. On July 1822, he wrote to the Admiralty on this issue, mentioning Sebastian Martin, o Morters, as the shipper “of this supposed treasure, and all the Bills of Lading hitherto presented to which my name has been forged, he appears to have negotiate, or sold”.⁶³⁶

The Admiralty took good notice of this unfortunate event, and therefore prevented the Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station to alert their captains. It seems that this lesson was enough, as Captain Brown, of the *Tartar*, realized that a bill of lading for two boxed containing silver bars valued 2,047.5 dollars, supposedly shipped by Cochran and C^o, had been falsified by J. W. Hele, Captain’s Clerk of H.M.S. *Tartar*.⁶³⁷ Furthermore, by 1826, “many captains refused to sign bills of lading specifying the weight of the silver or the number of dollars, on the grounds of their not being responsible for the amount inserted on it; and of their being only bound to subscribe conditionally, stating that the silver is said to weight, and that the dollars are said to be, so much or so many.”⁶³⁸

As such a bill of lading would not be acceptable in a court of law as proof of shipment, it became a common use that “every bar of silver, every coin was examined and counted”,⁶³⁹ before being boxed and shipped. Both, the ship’s

636.- Mackenzie to Croker, London. 16/7/1822, ADM 1/2188.

637.- ADM 50/147, 24/10/1824, quoting a letter from Captain Barrow dated September 1. Valparaíso, 18/9/1824. An account of treasure transhipped from H.M.S. the *Tartar*, Thomas Brown, Esquire, Captain, into H.M.S. the *Aurora*, Henry Prescott, C.B., Captain, for conveyance as Per Bill of Lading, Callao Bay, July 1824, ADM 1/19.

638.- Humphreys (1940): 152-153.

639.- Gough (1983): 427-428.

carpenters and the counters, were paid for their work, as well as the boat party. In grounds of their own security, it seems that local merchants accepted to cover this non-regulated service.

As already mentioned, the establishment of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, in 1840, provided British merchants a more frequent and regular service to Panama. Treasure and mail was taken in the steamers, under the direct protection of a naval party, being transhipped across the isthmus and sent by steamer to Britain. By the same time, the United States Pacific squadron had already increased its own commitment to conveyance of treasure, in direct relation with the importance of the North American investment in Peru. As early as 1836, Commodore Mason wrote in regard to this issue: "I can assert that the American Ships go to Ports for freight where ours never touch, besides having had a schooner exclusively employed on that service for upwards of ten years."⁶⁴⁰

In essence, from 1811 to 1839, almost every single British naval vessel calling at Peruvian ports was involved in conveyance of treasure, affording security to British and local merchants during a period of revolution, national emergence and international conflicts. British merchants relied very much on naval vessels for the conveyance of their treasure, a naval duty which offered some reward but also involved a risk. As the area under the responsibility of the Pacific Squadron, later Pacific Station, was so vast for the available number of vessels, it became impossible to attend every single request. Moreover, as at some times naval captains refused to attend British merchants' request for illegal shipments, they were blamed by the latter as not paying enough attention to their protection. Even when some naval captains, officers of men, were actually involved in illegal

activities, they were only a few cases, very well-known and punished by the Royal Navy itself. For all these reasons, we conclude that conveyance of treasure was an effective way in which the British navy supported the establishment of British trade in Peru, as well as in other parts of Spanish America.

To provide a better understanding of the role played by British naval vessels in this particular field, we have prepared a list of those particular man-of-war which were actually involved in it since 1811 to 1855. Based on this list we also include a graphic showing the value of the “Treasure convoyed by British naval vessels from, Peruvian ports” from 1811 to 1839.

For this purpose we have used a considerable data to identify places, dates, names and amount of bullion exported or transported from one port to another. Treasure received on a man-of-war, was usually very carefully recorded, stating the port of embarkation and destination; the names of the sender, the addressee and their agents; and the composition of the treasure (gold, silver, bullion, etc). Unfortunately, not all these registers have survived, and therefore, we have used collateral sources, such as ship’s logs, to complete the list includes as appendix to this chapter. Even so, there are several cases in which the information was unavailable, mainly due to gaps in the register, and no departure port or even country can be discovered. In these cases, the single entry was “West Coast” or “Pacific”. In other cases, when some urgent service called away the ship with the treasure on board, it was transhipped, and depending upon the situation this operation could be repeated more than once.

640.- Mason a Elliot, *Blonde*, Valparaíso, 27/1/1835, ADM 1/2211.

Appendix

List of naval vessels taking treasure on board

year	ship	pesos
1811	<i>Standard</i>	2'927,449
1816	no mention	33,000
1817	<i>Amphion</i> ⁶⁴¹	100,000
1818	<i>Andromache</i> ⁶⁴²	8 parcels with silver
	Transhipped to the <i>Tyne</i> at Valparaíso, in November 1818.	
1819	<i>Blossom</i> ⁶⁴³	3'000,000
	Callao, on January 22, a number of boxes with pesos were transferred from the <i>Andromache</i> .	
1820	<i>Slaney</i>	348,000
1820	<i>Tyne</i> ⁶⁴⁴	3'008,513
1820	<i>Hyperion</i> ⁶⁴⁵	1'500,000 to 3'000,000
1821	<i>Andromache</i> ⁶⁴⁶	1'500,000
1821	<i>Superb</i> ⁶⁴⁷	3'000,000
1821	<i>Conway</i> ⁶⁴⁸	no details
1821	<i>Owen Glendower</i> ⁶⁴⁹	148,060.00
1821	<i>Dauntless</i> ⁶⁵⁰	several boxes with treasure for Oceania
1822	<i>Creole</i> ⁶⁵¹	1'500,000
1822	<i>Conway</i> ⁶⁵²	3'000,000
	Plus half a million dollars received at San Blas. ⁶⁵³	

641.- Bowles a Croker, *Creole*, Buenos Aires. 15/3/1819, ADM 1/24.

642.- ADM 51/2131.

643.- Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 53/140

644.- Humphreys (1940), 195. ADM 51/3511.

645.- Humphreys (1940), 195. ADM 51/3214.

646.- Humphreys (1940), 195. ADM 51/3012.

647.- Humphreys (1940), 195. ADM 51/3445.

648.- ADM 53/249. ADM 50/151, 26/5/1821.

649.- ADM 51/3303. It should be added 74 pieces of gold.

650.- ADM 51/3144.

651.- Humphreys (1940): 195.

652.- Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 53/249.

1822	<i>Alacrity</i> ⁶⁵⁴	1'500,000
	Callao (April 13) 136,000 pesos; (June 4) received treasure, no details; (June 3) transferred treasure to the <i>Doris</i> ; (Nov. 22) received treasure, no details; (Jan. 8) from the merchant <i>Claudine</i> 80,000 pesos.	
1823	<i>Blossom</i> ⁶⁵⁵	2'700,000
1823	<i>Tartar</i> ⁶⁵⁶	15,000
1824	<i>Tartar</i> ⁶⁵⁷	149,001.50
	69 boxes at Callao, Huanchaco and Casma, transhipped to the <i>Aurora</i> in July 1824.	
1824	<i>Aurora</i> ⁶⁵⁸	2'500,000.00
1824	<i>Fly</i> ⁶⁵⁹	1'000,000.00
	Callao (November 14) 56 boxes with treasure to England	
1825	<i>Tartar</i> ⁶⁶⁰	820,000 to 1'200,000
1825	<i>Mersey</i>	
	Callao (11/12) transhipped treasure to the <i>Briton</i> .	
1828	<i>Ranger</i> from the Pacific	1'000,000
1828	<i>Volage</i> from the Pacific	700,000
1828	<i>Blossom</i> , from Mexico and Chile	no details
	At least 82 boxes of treasure were received at Mazatlan. ⁶⁶¹	
1828	<i>Alert</i> ⁶⁶²	332,265.40
1829-1830	<i>Alert</i> ⁶⁶³	364,106.38
1829	<i>Sapphire</i> ⁶⁶⁴	131,802
1829	<i>Heron</i> ⁶⁶⁵	73,953
1830	<i>Lightning</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁶⁶	500,000

653.- Gough (1983): 421.

654.- Humphreys (1940): 195. Treasure on board the *Alacrity* amounted 650,000 after Graham & Humphreys: 358

655.- Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 53/141.

656.- *Tartar*, Callao, 20/12/1823, ADM 1/29.

657.- Valparaíso, 18/9/1824, An account of treasure transhipped from H.M.S. the *Tartar*, Thomas Brown, Esquire, Captain, into H.M.S. the *Aurora*, Henry Prescott, C.B., Captain, for conveyance as Per Bill of Lading, Callao Bay, July 1824, ADM 1/19. Eyre to Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/8/1825, ADM 1/29.

658.- Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 51/3027.

659.- Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 51/3175.

660.- Humphreys (1940): 195. Entered Rio on January 31, 1826 [O'Byrne: 134.]

661.- Gough (1983): 422.

662.- ADM 51/3015.

663.- ADM 51/3015. Returns of treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop *Alert* between 1st of July and 9 December 1829; and between 29 December 1829 and 9 February 1830. ADM 1/32. Accounts of the treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop *Alert* between the 10th February to 30 June 1830, and between 1st of July to 30 September, ADM 1/34.

664.- Return of Treasure shipped on the *Heron*, enclosed to Baker a Croker. *Warspite*, Rio. 25/1/1830, ADM 1/32.

665.- Ibidem.

1830	<i>Forte</i> ⁶⁶⁷	213914
1830	<i>Seringapatam</i> ⁶⁶⁸	30513,50
1830	<i>Thetis</i> ⁶⁶⁹	306,172.00
1831	<i>Alert</i> ⁶⁷⁰	216,579.00
1831	<i>Seringapatam</i> ⁶⁷¹	52,487.00
1831	<i>Eden</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁷²	547,000.00
1831	<i>Clio</i> ⁶⁷³	162,027.75
1832	<i>Volage</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁷⁴	1'000,000
1833	<i>Samarang</i> from the Pacific	no details
1833	<i>Tyne</i> from the Pacific	500,000
1833	<i>Rattlesnake</i> from the Pacific	no details
1835	<i>Conway</i> from the Pacific	1'900,000.00
	Includes 450,000 pesos received by the <i>Challenger</i> on Oceania and other ports. The difference was received at Mexico. ⁶⁷⁵	
1836	<i>North Start</i> from Mexico ⁶⁷⁶	1'000,000.00
1836	<i>Sparrowhawk</i> from the Pacific	330,000.00
1836	<i>Rover</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁷⁷	300,000.00
1837	<i>Blonde</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁷⁸	1'200,000.00
1837	<i>Talbot</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁷⁹	570,000.00

666.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 13/12/1830, ADM 1/34

667.- A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's Ships on the South American Station, Thomas Baker, Esq, C.B., Rear Admiral of the White and Commander in Chief between the 1st day of January and the 30th day of June 1830, ADM 1/33.

668.- A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's ship *Seringapatam* between the 1st day of July and 30th day of September 1830, ADM 1/34.

669.- An account of treasure received on board and delivered from in His Majesty's ship *Thetis*, A.B. Bingham Esq., Captain, between the 1st day of October 1829 and the 30th day of June 1830, ADM 1/34.

670.- A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's Ships on the South American Station, Thomas Baker, Esq, C.B., Rear Admiral of the White and Commander in Chief between the 1st day of January and the 30th day of June 1830, ADM 1/33

671.- A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's Ship *Seringapatam*, between the 1st day of April and 30th day of June 1831; enclosed to Baker to Elliot, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 20/12/1831, ADM 1/37. Also Baker to Elliot, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 24/2/1832 & 6/6/1832, ADM 1/38.

672.- Baker to Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 22/4/1831, ADM 1/35.

673.- An account of Treasure received on board and delivered from His Majesty's Sloop *Clio*, John James Onslow Esquire Commander, between the 1st of July and 30th September 1831; enclosed in Baker to Elliot, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1831, ADM 1/37.

674.- Baker to Elliot, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 3/8/1832, ADM 1/39.

675.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 25/8/1835, ADM 1/44. Hammond to Dawson, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 11/3/1825, ADM 1/43. Gough (1983): 423.

676.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 29/8/1836, ADM 1/46.

677.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 7/5/1836, ADM 1/45.

678.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 23/8/1837, ADM 1/48.


679.- Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48.

1838	<i>Cleopatra</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁸⁰	1'586,000.00
1839	<i>Harrier</i> from the Pacific ⁶⁸¹	800,000.00
1839	<i>Imogene</i> from San Blas	1'641,158.00
1842	<i>Actaeon</i> from Mexico	1'381,000
1843	<i>Champion</i> from the Pacific	800,000
1846	<i>America</i> from Mexico	2'000,000
1848	<i>Sampson</i>	2'386,264
Includes 1'941,000 pesos received in Mexico by the <i>Juno</i> .		
1848	<i>Grampus</i> at San Blas	2'628,900
1853	<i>Thetis</i> at Mexico	3'000,000
1855	<i>Brisk</i> at Mexico	2'700,000
1855	<i>Alert</i> at Mexico	584,351
1855	<i>Havannah</i> at Mexico	740,789

680.- Ross to Wood, *President*, Callao, 12/7/1837, ADM 1/51.

681.- Gough (1983): 422. The next entries are from the same source.

Graphic: Treasure convoyed in British Naval vessels from Peruvian ports.



CHAPTER SIX

Internal Affairs

In previous chapters, we had seen how British naval captains stationed in Peruvian waters fulfilled their duties, since the creation of the South America Station until the collapse of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation. The most important task they had, all along that period, was to protect their nationals and to support and encourage the advance of British interest. However, Peru was not the only place they had to perform their duty, since the entire Pacific coast of America as well as several groups of islands in Polynesia, comprising almost half of the Pacific Basin, were also under their responsibility. If a modern navy had to perform a similar task nowadays, with the great help provided by modern technology, it would had to deal not only with a great number of states and cultures in such a large area, but also with a variety of logistic problems.

Naval vessels of the period covered by this research were able to stay at sea for months if necessary, having a high degree of autonomy; however, they required a regular provision of fresh water and food, and a lot of maintenance and even an occasional access to shore facilities to remain efficient enough through the period they were destined to the Pacific. Under normal circumstances, a British colonial port could provide these support, but that was not the case of the Pacific. For the period under research, aside one or two naval vessel destined to Australia, the Pacific squadron was the sole British naval force in an Ocean in which Port

Jackson was the single colonial port, far from the American coast and without enough resources itself. All these difficulties were rarely seen and understood by landlubbers. But in spite of that, naval captains were able to attend “the endless chorus of demands from British merchants to show the flag in all major ports along the west coast”.⁶⁸²

Notwithstanding, as some of these merchants complained for not receiving enough naval protection, it would be proper to study the usual kind of internal problems the Pacific Squadron, later Pacific Station, had to deal with and how they could affect their effectiveness to perform their duties. It seems to me that these problems could be grouped in two major topics. One related to the number of vessels destined to protect British citizens and interest in an enormous area in the Pacific, part of which was Peru; and the other one referred to the logistic difficulties that naval force had to face operating “baseless”. This chapter will include an appendix providing a complete list of those British warships stationed or calling at the West Coast of South America during the period under research.

British naval vessels in the Pacific

In several opportunities, we had mentioned that the number of British men-of-war stationed in the Pacific was not enough to cover in a permanent form all the area in which they were due to protect their nationals and to promote British interests. As a matter of fact, during the period covered by this research, seventy-three British naval vessels sailed along the West Coast of America, sixty-two of

⁶⁸².- John Bach, “Maintenance of Royal Navy vessels in the Pacific Ocean, 1825-1875”, *The Mariner's Mirror*, vol. 56, n° 3 (August 1970): 261.

them as part of the Pacific Squadron or Station, six as surveying vessels, and another five calling in the area either on their way to another destination or in an specific mission. Even when some vessels of the last two categories called at Peruvian ports and were involved in promoting British interests, as was the case of the *Standard*, in 1811, the *Dauntless*, in 1821, or the *Constitution*, in 1835-1836, those which actually had that mission were in the first category.

As six of these vessels were commissioned twice to the Pacific, we could properly consider a total figure of sixty-eight British naval vessels forming the Pacific Squadron or Station since 1813 until December 1839. Three of them did not called at Peruvian ports, but all the rest did it, with a variable length of time.

We were able to prepare a list of all these vessels, alphabetically and chronologically ordered, with relevant information respect their stay in Peruvian ports. Using that information, we already presented a graphic showing the number of vessels stationed in the Pacific every 1 March since 1818 until 1839 (page 162). It also was possible to elaborate two other graphics showing how many days each one of these man-of-war stayed in Peruvian ports; and the comparison between their time of service in the Pacific with the time destined to Peruvian ports. These two graphics are in chronological order, and because the number of vessels involved it was impossible to show all their names. For this particular reason, these two graphics should be referred to the chronological list which is just before them.

It is clear that the first group of British vessels sent to the Pacific (1813-1815) had a pure naval mission, under direct orders of the Admiralty, to chase enemy vessels and to protect British whalers. Peruvian ports were used only for refreshment and repairs, and most of their time in the Pacific was devoted to fulfil their main task. Even when the South American Station became partially involved

in this period, when the *Cherub* joined the chase of the *Essex*, in 1813, the Pacific remained out of its control. The Admiralty was to state this issue in 1813, when Captain Hillyar, of the *Cherub*, claimed the prize for the capture of the *Essex*, ratifying its previous statement (1811), when the *Standard* sailed to Chile and Peru, to take deputies and treasure to Cadiz.⁶⁸³

Things changed since 1817, following the establishment of a number of British merchants in Valparaíso and the risk that maritime war between the Viceroyalty of Peru and the newly independent Chilean government. Shortly before that, in December 1816, the limits of the South America Station were defined, as follows: “to the southward of the line and to the westward of the 30th meridian of west longitude”.⁶⁸⁴ No western limit was mentioned until 1820, when the East Indies and China Station was extended eastwards to the meridian 170° West longitude. In the meantime, since May 1817, attending to the fast changing situation on the West Coast of South America, the Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station extended his jurisdiction to that coast by sending a number of vessel round the Cape, a decision which was fully approved by the Admiralty.⁶⁸⁵

Within four years, the Pacific Squadron grew considerably, from one to six men-of-war, not taking into account the sloop *Dauntless*, from the East Indies Station, arrived in 1821. As most British merchants were already established in Chile and Peru, the squadron devoted most of its efforts to these two countries, only two of its vessels sailing to other parts of the Pacific: the *Blossom*, in 1818, at Mexico and the Northwest Coast, and the *Andromache*, in 1820, to Panama. Even

⁶⁸³.- Dixon to Croker, *Achile*, Rio de Janeiro, 1/9/1814, ADM 1/22; Croker to Dixon, London, 12/12/1814, ADM 2/934.

⁶⁸⁴.- Admiralty Minute, London, 18/18/1816, ADM 3/88.

when the area under the Pacific Squadron comprises a number of Polynesian islands, no vessel was sent there. In the same period, the average length of time each vessel served in the Squadron was 290 days, one hundred of which were destined to Peruvian ports.

In the next years, until 1828, an average of five British men-of-war were stationed in Peruvian waters yearly, not taking into account the short visit of the *Blonde*, in 1825, on her way to Polynesia. Up to this time, Chile and Peru remained as the most important part of the area under the squadron's protection; however, the significance of the Mexican trade grew, being visited by three men-of-war (*Aurora*, in 1824; *Alacrity*, in 1826; and *Jaseur*, in 1827). Two of these vessels called at Guayaquil, and other more visited the Colombian coast up to Panama (*Mersey*, in 1827). The average time of service in the Pacific squadron increased considerable to 24 months, nine of which were destined to Peruvian ports. During this period, the frequency of visits to Peruvian ports increased considerable, reaching its highest point in 1826, when British vessels totalized 902 days. It is possible to say that more than two British naval vessels were at some Peruvian port, all around that year. As this frequency drooped in the following years, some merchants as well as Consul General Wilson could compare and claim for lack of protection.

The number of British vessels calling at Peruvian ports suffered a temporary drop in 1831-1832, as a logical consequence of the brig *Hidalgo* incident. However, within the next five years, that number was increased from three to eight naval vessels, besides six survey vessels. The average time of service

⁶⁸⁵. - Bowles to Croker, *Amphion*, Buenos Aires, 24/5/1817, and Admiralty minute, London, 25/8/1817, ADM 1/23.

in the Pacific was 17.5 months, remaining in Peruvian ports only 4.5 months, half of the time they used to stay in the previous period. It was clear that other parts of the Pacific became more important for the Squadron. Almost every year, a vessel was sent from Callao or Valparaíso to the Mexican coast, calling at Guayaquil, Panama, Nicoya and others ports in-between. Moreover, in 1830, 1834 and 1839, the islands of Polynesia were visited by the *Seringapatam*, the *Challenger*, and the *Sparrowhawk*, respectably. Despite these facts, when the war between Chile and the Peru-Bolivia Confederation threatened British interests, British naval vessels increased their presence in Peruvian ports, up to eight of them in 1837.

The number of vessels commissioned to the Pacific Station will be increased in the following years, up to sixteen, in 1847, and an average of twelve, at least until 1874. Since 1842, steam-ships were sent to the Station, helping old sailing vessels to attend an area which was defined in 1837, running from 170° West longitude to Cape Horn meridian, and from Behring Strait to the Antarctic Circle.⁶⁸⁶ The western limit of the Station was reduced in 1866, “by the Meridian of 160° West longitude to 12° North latitude, thence along the Meridian Northward to Behring Strait”, transferring to the Australia Station the control of the Phoenix, Samoa, and Friendly Islands. A further reduction was made in 1893, when the western limit of the Station became “the meridian of 149° 30' West longitude (Tahiti), from the Antarctic Circle to the Equator; thence along that line west to the meridian of 160° West longitude; thence on that meridian northward to 12°

⁶⁸⁶.- *Parliamentary Papers* 1847-1848 (XXI) 1st part: 10-11, return of H.M.S. and vessels on different stations ... (1835-1848), Admiralty 17/3/1848. *Parliamentary Papers* “Accounts and Papers” 1867-1868 XLV, return of H.M.S. and vessels on different stations ... (1847-1867), Admiralty 16/3/1868.

North latitude, along that parallel to the meridian of 180°; thence on that meridian north to the shores of Asia”.⁶⁸⁷

During the 1840's, Polynesia became the area of major concern for the Pacific Station, and in the following decades, when a naval base was established in Esquimalt, Vancouver Island, that part became important too. The Peruvian ports will continue to be visited by British men-of-war, with some degree of involvement in the local situation. But that time was far beyond the chronological limits of the present research.

In general terms, we could see how the Pacific Squadron, later Station, redistribute its vessels to attend the areas where British interests were considered in peril by local situations. Any consular agent, as well as any merchant, will see his own part of the pie, considering himself as deserving most attention from naval captains; however, it was impossible to satisfy all their claims, and unless we could understand this issue today, we will continue to see this service through the eyes of a very partial witness.

A “baseless” naval force

Amongst the problems faced by the Pacific Squadron, and later by the Station, one of the most relevant was the lack of a well-equipped colonial port, with a naval depot and proper facilities to maintain its vessels and crews. During the period covered by this research, the nearest colonial ports were Port Jackson, in Australia, and Port Stanley, in the Falklands, both very far from the normal area of operation of the Squadron and most of the time unable to provide a good

⁶⁸⁷.- Gough (1971): 246.

logistic support. Actually, at least in the first years of the South American Station, only Rio de Janeiro could provide this kind of support, at least in certain degree. In the following decades, Spanish authorities and afterwards independent governments in the Pacific and in the Atlantic coast offered facilities ashore to the British vessels calling there. However, as the British men-of-war had often to act against local authorities, these kind of facilities became unavailable or at least unreliable. The establishment of naval facilities at Esquimalt, Vancouver, by 1848, gave partially relief to this situation, but since 1813 until 1839 several measures were adopted to cope with this kind of problems.

Any vessel need maintenance, specially during long periods at sea, as well as men needed fresh food and water. When maintenance fails, accidents could happen, and when fresh food and water fails, crew members' health was affected. These basic issues were faced in different forms by British Commodores and Admirals stationed in the Pacific. Part of their duties as commanding officers was to kept naval vessels under their command in proper conditions. If they failed, the principal mission of the Squadron, offering protection to their nationals, could be seriously affected. It is our aim to discuss the way in which British captains in the Pacific fulfilled this part of their duties, at least in relation to Peru.

Until 1866, when a 2000 tons capacity dock became available at San Francisco, it was impossible to conduct major repair works in the area under the control of the Pacific Station. In fact, the nearest docks were at China and India, and only available in the 1840's. This situation changed in 1868, when a large iron floating dock, capable of taking 6000 tons dead-weight, entered in service at

Callao.⁶⁸⁸ Nevertheless, when a vessel required urgent repairs, they were conducted in the best possible way.

Until the independence of Chile, the West Coast of America only had two naval establishments: the Maritime Departments of Callao and San Blas. If the latter had some importance in the exploration of the Northwest Coast, its facilities were certainly reduced, being forced, from time to time, to send its naval vessels to Callao for major repairs. Between 1813 and 1815, when the first group of British naval vessels were sent to the Pacific, Britain and Spain were allies against France. For this reason, they received a certain degree of logistic support at Callao Naval Arsenal. That was the case of the *Raccoon* and the *Indefatigable*, in 1813 and 1815, respectively, who were provided not only with stores for their sails and rigging, but also with the help of carpenters and caulkers.⁶⁸⁹ Obviously, the Arsenal had its own limitations, being unable to attend a similar request for the *Tagus* and the *Briton*, in December 1814.⁶⁹⁰

This kind of limitations was increased during the war for the Peruvian independence, forcing British captains to essay other possibilities, specially for the safe return to Britain. Already in 1814, Captain Black, of the *Raccoon* was very conscious of this necessity, pointing it out on his report to the Admiralty, “Atlho, the *Raccoon* bottom kept pretty tight, yet I think it right to proceed round the Cape during the summer months”.⁶⁹¹

⁶⁸⁸.- A.H. de M. Expedientes Administrativos, Compañía del Dique del Callao. Bach: 267.

⁶⁸⁹.- ADM 51/2765, 16/8/1813. ADM 51/2463, September to November 1815.

⁶⁹⁰.- A.A.B. Expediciones a Indias, legajo 53 (1815), Vivero al Secretario de Marina, 6/6/1-815, nº 293, Lima, 1/12/1814.

⁶⁹¹.- Black to Croker, *Raccoon*, Lima, 30/8/1814. ADM 1/22.

At least since 1828, a survey was conducted before a vessel, with treasure of board, sailed from Valparaiso to the Atlantic. If some repair was needed, its departure could be delayed and even the treasure transhipped to another vessel. That happened in August 1828, with the *Doris*. As the works lasted for almost a year, the British Consul General in Chile obtained from that government a vessel for the *Doris*' crew.⁶⁹² At the end, as the works were conducted with severe limitations, they were finally suspended and the hulk was sold to the Chilean government, by early 1830.⁶⁹³ In the same year, the *Sapphire* arrived at Valparaiso from San Blas, with 600,000 dollars, having orders to proceed directly to Rio de Janeiro. However, Captain Coghlan, Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron, considered that urgent repairs were needed on the *Sapphire*, and transhipped the treasure to his own vessel, the *Forte*, sailing afterwards to Rio de Janeiro.⁶⁹⁴ The repairs were conducted in a short time, and the *Sapphire* departed Valparaiso for Coquimbo and Callao almost one month later, to be involved in the brig *Hidalgo* incident.

Even when some repairs could be done at Rio de Janeiro, they also had some limitations. In November 1823, for instance, the schooner *Driven*, from the Africa Station, arrived to Rio de Janeiro to be repaired. A survey was ordered by Admiral Eyre, Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station, being found that the repairs could be done. Even so, Eyre decided to send her to Britain.⁶⁹⁵ A similar decision was taken by Admiral Baker, in early 1832, when the recently commissioned *Tyne* was sent to Britain to repair her damaged bow. In the next

⁶⁹².- Otway to Croker, *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 23/11/1828, ADM 1/31.

⁶⁹³.- ADM 51/3148.

⁶⁹⁴.- Baker a Croker, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 14/4/1830, ADM 1/32.

year, Admiral Seymour took the risk of doing major repairs on the sloop *Satellite*, which had to be hove down with this purpose. The Admiralty was not very enthusiastic on doing this kind of works in foreign ports, and for this reason, in 1837, when the Pacific Station was created, Admiral Ross was specifically instructed to “make only patch repairs on the station and to send all serious work home to Britain.”⁶⁹⁶

The principal difficulty to provide a proper maintenance to British naval vessels stationed in the Pacific was the absence of adequate shore facilities and qualified workers. But there were also other problems. Timber could be available in several places, but as no shipyard was functioning during the period of our research, it was almost impossible to find it properly prepared for naval use. Naval supplies were even more difficult to obtain, and if available at all it was highly overpriced, normally in hands of British merchants. For this reason, these kind of supplies were normally provided directly from Britain, although there were exemptions to this rule, basically related to urgent repairs or to price opportunities. That actually happened in 1823, when Commodore Hardy instructed Captain Brown, of the *Tartar*, that “hemp has been purchased and made into small cordage and twine with advantage”; and in 1824, when an anchor from the “time of the Spanish rule, when ships of the line arrived at this port”, was bought for the *Cambridge* at Callao, paying for it 1040 pesos.⁶⁹⁷

The problem of having a permanent provision of coal only appeared in 1842, following the commission of the steamer *Salamander*. Even when it was

⁶⁹⁵. - Eyre a Croker, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 7/1/1824, ADM 1/29.

⁶⁹⁶. - Bach: 266-267.

beyond the chronological limits of the present research, it should be mentioned that, five years later, the 5th-rate *Naiad* arrived at Callao, to remain there as a floating depot until 1866,⁶⁹⁸ when a contract was signed with the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, to use the depots the company already had from Panama to Valparaiso.⁶⁹⁹

If facilities for the maintenance of naval vessels were a problem for the British Station, building up a regular system to procure fresh provisions and water was even more complicate and delicate.

Since 1813 until 1815, during the War with the United States, each man-of-war commissioned to the Pacific took on board as much stores as possible, sharing it with those already there. Such was the case with the *Phoebe*, *Cherub* and *Raccoon*, who departed Rio bound for the West Coast in July 1813, each with seven months provisions,⁷⁰⁰ and the *Indefatigable*, who entered Callao in December 1814, with 2666 pounds of bread and 8 casks of beef for the *Phoebe*.⁷⁰¹ However, as in some cases they remained for longer periods than previously considered, they had to buy some provisions at Valparaiso or Callao. That happened in August 1814, when the *Raccoon*, under Captain Black, entered Callao already short of provisions, with bread for only four days, after a long period at sea. Black was able to refresh some supplies, although he mentioned that “wood is one article not to be procured at any price at Lima”, sailing afterwards to continue on his cruise along

⁶⁹⁷. - Hardy a Croker, *Creole*, Río de Janeiro, 23/8/1823, ADM 1/22. A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 847: 16/5/1830.

⁶⁹⁸. - Admiralty to Seymour, London, 6/1/1847, ADM 2/1601. ADM 53/5776-5777

⁶⁹⁹. - Bach: 268-269.

⁷⁰⁰. - Dixon to Croker, *Montagu*, Río de Janeiro, 12/7/1813, ADM 1/21.

⁷⁰¹. - ADM 51/2675. ADM 51/2463.

the northern Peruvian coast in search for enemy vessels. Three months latter, the *Briton* and the *Tagus* departed Valparaiso for Callao, aiming to obtain at the Peruvian port some “species of provisions, particularly cocoa and sugar”, which were unavailable at Chile.⁷⁰²

From 1817 until 1826, once a permanent squadron was stationed on the Pacific, supplies were sent from Rio de Janeiro to Valparaiso from time to time, using hired vessels. On their arrival at Valparaiso, the cargo was transferred to the British man-of-war there stationed, whose captain had to redistribute it amongst the other vessels of the squadron. Naturally, this system underwent several changes over the years, when British captains became more aware of local products and prices. Thus, at least since August 1823, the Squadron was instructed to obtain bread, flour and salted provisions at Valparaiso; and cocoa and sugar in Callao. Prices will change a little bit in the succeeding years, and by 1827, the Victualling Office had already compare them at England, Valparaiso, Callao and Rio de Janeiro. Even when in all cases coca, bread and sugar could be obtained at a lower price in England, the differences was so small that it not justify to ship them to the Pacific. For this reason, British captains in the Pacific Squadron were instructed in 1827 to buy cocoa and bread at Valparaiso, and sugar in Peru. It should be noticed that the differences of prices between the three South American ports were very important. For instance, cocoa cost almost twice at Rio de Janeiro than at Valparaiso, bread at Callao cost three times the Valparaiso’s price; whereas sugar cost twice at Valparaiso. Local supply to British warships was mainly in

⁷⁰².- Staines to Dixon, *Briton*, Valparaiso, 15.16/10 to 9/11/1814. Black a Croker, *Raccoon*, Lima, 30/8/1814. ADM 1/22.

British merchants hands, at least until 1827, when especially chartered ships were dispatched by the Victualling Office, with stores and supplies to the Pacific.⁷⁰³

Since that year, one transport were due to sail from England every four months or two every six months with bread, beef, pork, spirit and other supplies, like clothes and medicines. In the latter case, one of the transport would be bound for Rio and the other directly to Valparaiso, where the Pacific Squadron gathered to receive the cargo. The total allowance of the South American Station, for 1827, was as follows:⁷⁰⁴

bread	369,000	pounds
beef	4,324	pounds of 8th
pork	8,648	pounds of 4th
spirits	11,530	gallons
flour	12,972	pounds
peas	360	bush
sugar	8,648	pounds
cocoa	11,530	pounds
tea	3,844	pounds
coals	25	charcoals

However, this service was not as regular as expected, and soon some delays happened. According to the schedule established in 1827, the following storeships were due to arrive to Valparaiso in the stated dates: *Lord Wellington* (20/2/1827), *Baltic Merden* (31/8/1827), *Orestes* (28/2/1828), *Lord Wellington* (31/8/1828) and *Kains* (20/2/1829). However, the second tour of the *Lord Wellington* was delayed for almost six weeks, a time in which the entire Pacific squadron was forced to remain at Valparaiso, not only affecting its normal duties,

⁷⁰³.- Hardy to Brown, *Creole*, Rio de Janeiro, 30/8/1823, ADM 1/28. PRO F.O. 61/18, 305. A list of the different prices paid for cocoa, sugar and bread at Rio, Valparaiso, Callao and England, in 1826-1827, ADM 1/31.

⁷⁰⁴.- Victualling Office to Otway, 7/7/1827, ADM 1/31. Transport vessels *Eggin*, *Lord Wellington* and *Royal Sovereign* are reported at Callao between May and June 1827 [*El Telégrafo de Lima* from May 5 onwards].

but also producing a shortage of supplies. Moreover, as the *Kains* was expected only fifteen weeks later, the Squadron would have to deal with an overstock of such a bulky commodity as bread.⁷⁰⁵

As this particular kind of cargo deteriorated faster than others supplies, in 1831, Rear-Admiral Baker reduced by half the amount of bread sent to the Pacific, the other half was to be obtained locally. Moreover, he authorized the Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron to return any supply sent in excess, taking advantage of the two storehouses the Station had at Rio de Janeiro.⁷⁰⁶

Even when Baker's instructions alleviated some of the difficulties related to provisions, it was still a problem to concentrate the squadron at Valparaiso for the arrival of the storeship. A better solution could be to hire a storage place either at Valparaiso or at Callao, as the United States Squadron had already done, at Callao, in 1830.⁷⁰⁷ Taking this into account, in 1831, Captain Waldergrave hired a small storehouse at Valparaiso, an attitude which was provisionally approved by Admiral Baker, but instructing him to use the transport *Arab* as storeship once the hiring period of the storehouse had elapsed.⁷⁰⁸

Since July 1833, before that order could be carried out, Admiral Seymour began to sent the cargo to the Pacific Squadron by private freight, consignee to the Senior Officer or to the British Consul at Valparaiso. The first cargo supplied on

⁷⁰⁵.- Victualling Office to Otway, London, 7/7/1828; Otway to Croker. *Ganges*, Rio de Janeiro, 11/10 & 4/12/1828, ADM 1/31.

⁷⁰⁶.- One storehouse was hired at Island Cobras, paying for it 1'200,000 reis yearly, and the other one was at Braganza, free of charge since 1815 until april 1831, when an annual payment of 1'000,000 reis was fixed by the Brazilian government [Baker's instructions to Captain Waldegrave, enclosed with Baker to Elliot, 5/6/1831, ADM 1/35].

⁷⁰⁷.- A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 847.

⁷⁰⁸.- Baker to Croker. *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, nov/1829, ADM 1/32. Baker to Elliot, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 5/6/1831, ADM 1/35.

this condition arrived on the transport *Columbian*, in October that year, forcing Consul General White to hire another storehouse.⁷⁰⁹ Even when Captain Townshend, Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron, reported that from it was absolutely necessary to rent this second storehouse, paying 350 pesos yearly for it, the Admiralty only approved this decision in March 1836.⁷¹⁰

Nevertheless, storing supplies on a foreign soil presented several problems, which were basically related to the control that local Customs exerted over the goods landed and stored for the British Squadron. To exercise it properly, Chilean authorities kept the keys of the storehouse, attending British Captains' request with a 24-hour previous notice and only between 1000 and 1500 hours. Obviously, this sort of limitation represented a serious problem for a naval force, which was increased by the poor knowledge of the location of the items stored, as no storekeeper was appointed to organize them. Finally, bad weather imposed restrictions, forcing British boats to remain aside their ships after a first trip, unable to return to shore for a second cargo, or to re-embark the party landed to handled the cargo. This situation might become even more complicated when urgent situations required a quick cargo, as happened in July 1837, during the war between Chile and the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, when the *Imogene*, under Captain Bruce, was instructed to take supplies at Valparaíso as fast as possible and sail back to the Peruvian coast. To accomplish that order, Captain Bruce hired a lighter and loaded it with all the necessary provisions within the hours allowed by the Customs,

⁷⁰⁹.- Seymour to Townshend, *Spartiate*, Rio de Janeiro, 16/7/1833, ADM 1/41.

⁷¹⁰.- Mason to Hammond, 4/9/1835 and Admiralty Minute, London, 7/3/1836, enclosed with Hammond to Wood, *Dublin*, Rio de Janeiro, 17/12/1835, ADM 1/45.

planning to use his own boats afterwards to take the supplies on board from the hulk. Unfortunately, bad weather intervened and the hulk sunk with its cargo.⁷¹¹

Mainly due to this sort of problems, Rear-Admiral Ross insisted on the idea of a storeship, suggesting the use of a 10-gun brig, which would be able both to store supplies and to offer permanent protection to British subjects at Valparaíso. During the winter, that brig could be stationed at Callao, a place which could be reached more easily by the ships of the Station. An important point in favour of this idea was the rising cost of the Valparaíso stores, which increased more than twice, from £ 233.6.11, in 1836, to £ 553.4.2, in 1838. This price includes £ 50 for the Vice-Consul, £ 160 for the rent itself, £ 93 for opening charges, and £ 230 for handling expenses.⁷¹² Finally, in May 1844, the proposal of a storeship was accepted by the Admiralty and the 42-gun frigate *Nereus* was stationed at Valparaíso as a floating depot. She was to perform this duty until 1874.⁷¹³

Another source of problems was the supply of fresh water, especially along the Peruvian and Chilean coast, which are largely a desert. Until the late 1830's, fresh water was obtained directly from watercourses, but this system was very time-consuming and eventually dangerous, in unsettled times. Therefore, when a British subject, named Davis, built a watering tank at Valparaíso, British captains preferred to pay one dollar per ton of fresh water instead of taking the risk to send a party to shore with that purpose. Even when this solution was satisfactory, it had a sensible cost, leading Admiral Ross to considered far more convenient to have a

⁷¹¹.- Bruce to Ross, *Imogene*, Callao, 3/10/1838; Broughton to Ross, *Samarang*, Callao 8/10/1838; both enclosed with Ross to Wood, *President*, Callao 11/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

⁷¹².- Broughton to Ross, *Samarang*, Callao 8/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

⁷¹³.- Seymour to Admiralty, *Collingwood*, Valparaíso 4/2/4846, ADM 1/5561.

fresh-water deposit hired by the Pacific Station.⁷¹⁴ Finally, the *Nereus* will give this service from 1844 onwards.

Another problems which could affect the effectiveness of the Pacific Squadron were desertion and sickness. Even although both were present from the start of the Pacific squadron, it seems that desertion caused more difficulties than sickness, basically because it affected discipline and morale. In a general sense, first the Spanish and afterwards the Peruvian authorities provided as much assistance as possible to the British captains in their efforts to control both problems, pursuing deserters and allowing the landing of British sailors to recover their health.

Desertion at Callao was not a monopoly of the British Squadron, as many similar cases were reported in the United States and French squadrons, as well as in merchant vessels arriving from different nations. However, since British men-of-war were admitted to Peruvian ports several years before any foreign merchant vessel, the first reports of deserters are to be found in naval records. In fact, the very first British naval vessels arriving at Callao, the *Phoebe* and the *Racoon*, in 1814, suffered the desertion of five sailors. Local authorities helped both British Captains to recover their deserters, even allowing marines to be landed for their search. Moreover, they authorized the completion of the British crews by taking over some British sailors who were in jail and by allowing to enlist some others already released.⁷¹⁵

Following the Independence of Peru, the number of deserters increased considerably. This rise had several reasons, amongst them the great illusion the

⁷¹⁴.- Broughton to Ross. *Samarang*, Callao, 8/10/1838; enclosed with Ross to Wood, *President*, Callao 11/10/1838, ADM 1/52.

⁷¹⁵.- ADM 51/2675. ADM 51/2765

Peruvian market offered to the establishment of British merchants, and the urgent necessity of able seamen for the mercantile marine and the newly formed Peruvian Navy. We had already seen how this last reason caused several problems between Peruvian and British naval authorities.

Another issue in which British captains intervened was in the establishment of health facilities for British seamen at Callao. As any other port in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, Callao's health conditions were not very high. However, this situation became worst between 1824 and 1826, during General Rodil's resistance to the patriot's attempts to take the port. Mortality was great amongst loyalist and patriots, and a number of dead bodies remained unburied as late as 1829, contributing to make less hygienic the local environment.⁷¹⁶

Aiming to relieve the plight of their fellow countrymen who landed for sickness, in 1825, John McCulloch, a British merchant based in Callao, began to offer medical care for British sailors in his own house.⁷¹⁷ This situation was further improved in 1827, when Consul Rickets requested permission from the Peruvian government to use the former Naval Hospital at Bellavista, which had been abandoned and partially destroyed during the war. Authorization was granted to use "a ward next to the garden, and even the garden itself",⁷¹⁸ and Dr. Sagan, a British physician, was appointed to take care of British seamen at that hospital, under McCulloch's supervision. Other sources mentioned Dr. Logan, as another

⁷¹⁶.- McCulloch to Townshend, enclosed with Townshend to Baker, *Dublin* Callao 22/8/1832; enclosed with Baker to Elliot, 10/12/1832, ADM 1/40.

⁷¹⁷.- *Idibem*.

⁷¹⁸.- Vivero to the Minister, Callao, 5/11/1829, A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 847.

British physician involved in this humanitarian task.⁷¹⁹ For each sailor admitted at the hospital, the British Consulate agreed to pay 14 reales daily, 8 of them (one dollar) for bed, food, medicines and cleaning; and the other 6 for the doctor salary.⁷²⁰ By the same time, the U.S. frigate *Brandywine* arrived at Callao from Panama with some men with dysentery. As his captain requested the same permission from the Peruvian government, the sick North American sailors were allowed to use another ward at the entry of the Hospital.⁷²¹

Dr. Sagan died by mid-1830, just a few weeks after the brig *Hidalgo* incident. First Captain Bingham and afterwards Captain Waldegrave, being the sole British authority in Peru, tried to appoint another British physician to replace Dr. Sagan. However, as no one was inclined to work for such a low payment, Waldegrave decided that sick seamen should be treated on board the British naval vessel stationed at Callao, being transferred as many times as the vessels changed. As this situation could not last for long, taking into account the kind of service warships of the squadron were expected to fulfil, in April 1831, having requested permission from the Peruvian government, Waldegrave appointed Dr. Archibald Smith, a well-known physician, to take care of British sailors at the Hospital of Santa Ana, an institution destined for females since its creation in the Sixteen Century. The British ward was placed under the supervision of the above-mentioned John McCulloch. A similar appointment was granted to Dr. Smith by the United States

⁷¹⁹.- A.H.M. 1829, carp. 12, leg. 29, doc. 19 & 123. Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatam*, Valparaiso, 16/9/1831, ADM 1/37. Baker to Elliot, *Warspite*, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1832, ADM 1/40.

⁷²⁰.- Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatam*, Valparaiso, 16/9/1831, ADM 1/37.

⁷²¹.- Vivero to the Minister, Callao, 8/4/1830, A.H. de M. Libro Copiador 847.

consul, so both British and North-American sailors were placed under his care.⁷²²

In April 1833, on the arrival of Consul General Wilson, Mr. Barton was appointed Consul at Callao, being instructed to supervise the medical service at Santa Ana, and Dr. Smith was confirmed at his post.⁷²³

Waldegrave inspected the hospital in 22 August 1831, finding there four British and four North American sailors. In his report, he mentioned that in the period from May to August, ten British seamen were hospitalised, four of them died from asthma, hepatic abscess, syphilis and heart attack, while the other six suffered from dysentery, rheumatism and tertian.⁷²⁴

Callao was not the only place where this kind of service was offered. In 1833, it was recorded that Charles Higginson, British Vice-Consul in Paita, undertook the care of those sailors landed for sickness from the great number of whalers calling at that port.⁷²⁵ However, we had found no evidence involving the Pacific Squadron with this particular service.

In general terms, it is possible to say that British captains in the Pacific coped with the logistic problems related to operate in distant waters, without the support of a British naval base. Nowadays, it would be easy to criticise some of the measures adopted by the Admiralty, the Victualling Office, the Commander-in-

⁷²².- Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatam*, Valparaiso, 16/9/1831, ADM 1/37.

⁷²³.- Wilson to Smith, Lima, 14/4/1833; Wilson to Barton, 23/4/1833, P.R.O., F.O. 61/23. Dr. Archibald Smith spent several years in Peru, writing a book entitled *Peru as it is: a residence in Lima, and other parts of the Peruvian republic*, London, Richard Bentley, 1839, 2 volumes.

⁷²⁴.- Waldegrave to Baker, *Seringapatam*, Valparaiso, 16/9/1831, ADM 1/37.

⁷²⁵.- Wilson to Higginson, Lima, 27/4/1833, and Higginson's reply, Paita, 6/5/1833; Wilson to Bidwell, Lima 20/3/1833, P.R.O., F.O. 61/23.

Chief of the Station or the Senior Officer of the Squadron; however, despite some failures and mistakes, the Pacific Squadron, later Station, was able to fulfil their main duty, which was to offer protection to their nationals. British merchants not only obtained protection but also some profits with the operation of the squadron, since they gained control of the local market of shipping supplies very shortly after Independence.

As we had seen, Valparaiso became also the most important logistic port for the Pacific Squadron, mainly for being the first calling port in the Pacific arriving from the Atlantic, but also because the liberal policy of the Chilean government, attracted a great number of foreigners and their trade. Callao, which had been the most important port of the West Coast until Independence, capable to provide help to the British men-of-war calling there, was to loose part of that capacity in the 1820'. Only its better natural conditions and its relative central position, until the end of the period covered by this research, would retain there a number of British men-of-war. This situation changed in the following decades, as other parts of the Pacific increased their importance.

Appendix One

British warships stationed in the Pacific (1813-1839)

This appendix includes all British naval vessels commissioned to the Pacific Squadron or Station, during the period covered by this research. It also includes

five surveys vessels sailing in the area during the same period, as well as another two naval vessels calling in Peruvian ports on her way to other destination.

This list provides several details for each vessel, in alphabetic order.⁷²⁶ The first one, following the ship's name, is her rating according to the system adopted in 1792, which classified British warships in six rates, plus smaller vessels like schooners, sloops and gunboats, whose command was entrusted to Lieutenants. As part of the ship's rate, the total number of guns is presented in parenthesis (). The next detail is the tonnage, quoted in builder measurements or tons of capacity, which was the standard system up to 1873, when displacement tonnage was introduced. Finally, relevant chronological data is presented in brackets. It includes the date in which the ship entered and left British naval service, and other names before and after her service in the West Coast of South America.

In a second paragraph, dates and ports visited by each one of the warship are listed. Dates are presented as the day/month of arrival, and date/month of departure (for instance 12/3 to 15/3 means that the vessel arrived on March 12th and departed on March 15th). When departure was on the day after arrival, a comma was used to link the days (for instance 12, 13/5, means that the vessel arrived on May 12 and departed on the following day).

Following the alphabetic list, there is another one, in chronological order, taking as reference the arrival to the first port on the West Coast until December 1839. With this information we were able to produce the three enclosed graphics, which were already described at the beginning of the present chapter.

⁷²⁶.- Details were taken from J.J. Colledge, *Ships of the Royal Navy: an historical index*, Newton Abbot, David & Charles, 1969, 2 vols.

Alphabetic list

- 1.- *Actaeon*, 6° (26) 620 [1831-1889]
Rio de Janeiro (31/5/1836) - Valparaiso (25/7 to 29/8) - Polynesia (3/10 to 13/1/1837) - Valparaiso (2 to 10/2) - Callao (22/2 to 23/3) - Puna, Guayaquil (30 to 11/4) - Callao (30/4 to 16/6) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (6/7 to 2/11) - Rio de Janeiro (13/12/1837)
- 2.- *Alacrity*, brig-sloop (10), Cherokee class, 236 [1818-1835]
Rio de Janeiro - Valparaiso (22/11 to 14/1/1822) - Callao (23/1 to 12/6) - Valparaiso (30/6 to 21/9) - Arica (30/9 to 6/10) - Sama (8/10) - Quilca (10 to 30/10) - Callao (3/11 to 8/2/1823) - Valparaiso (28/2 to June 1823)
- 3.- *Alert*, brig-sloop (18), Cruiser class, 388 [1813-1832]
Montevideo (19/1/1828) - Valparaiso (14/2 to 1/3) - Arica (10 to 14/3) - Iquique (18, 19/3) - Cobija (26 to 28/3) - Arica (30 to 2/4) - Cobija (10 to 13/4) - Arica (15 to 24/4) - Islay (26 to 8/5) - Coquimbo, Valparaiso, Cobija (27/5 to 20/6) - Iquique (22, 23/6) - Arica (24/6 to 21/7) - Cobija (1 to 8/8) - Arica (14 to 25/8) - Islay (27 to 6/9) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Cobija (23/9 to 29/10) - Arica (1 to 15/11) - Islay (18 to 25/11) - Pisco (29 to 1/12) - Callao (2 to 4/12) - Puna (12 to 21/12) - San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (16/1 to 19/3/1829) - Panama (20 to 25/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (28/5 to 29/6) - Callao (11/7 to 2/9) - Samanco (4 to 9/9) - Huanchaco (10 to 14/9) - Lobos de Afuera (15 to 18/9) - Callao (29/9 to 12/1/1830) - Valparaiso (9/2 to) - Callao (7/4 to 12/5) - Arica (12 to 20) - Callao (8/5 a 12/8) - Arica (28 to 30/8) - Islay (2 to 13/9) - Callao (17 to 19/9) - Concepcion, Valparaiso, Cobija (11/10 to 7/11) - Arica (10 to 17/11) - Islay (19 to 1/12) - Paíta (9 to 14/12) - Huanchaco (23 to 26/12) - Callao (5/1 to 7/3/1831) - San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (17/4 to 12/6) - Paíta (12 to 16/7) - Callao (31/7 to 5/9) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (21/9 to 13/10) - Rio de Janeiro (17/11/1831)
- 4.- *Amphion*, 5° (32) 914 [1798-1820]
Rio de Janeiro (24/8/1817) - Valparaiso (16/10 to 3/11) - Callao (12/11 to 19/12) - Valparaiso (10/1 to 7/2/1818) - Rio de Janeiro (20/3/1818)
- 5.- *Andromache*, 5° (38) 1029 [French *Junon*, 1799-1812, *Princess Charlotte* - 1828]
Rio de Janeiro (3/4/1818) - Valparaiso (23/5 to 25/6) - Callao (7/7 to 3/8) - Valparaiso (27/8 to 1/11) - Callao (11/11 to 14/2/1819) - Valparaiso, Talcaguano (6/3 to 19/12) - Callao (30/12 to 10/1/1820) - Panama, Quibo (9/2 to 16/3) - Callao (23/4 to 8/5) - Valparaiso (27/5 to 10/12) - Callao (20/12 to 7/2/1821) - Huacho (9 to 23/2) - Callao (25/2 to 9/4) - Valparaiso (28 to 9/5) - Rio de Janeiro (26/6/1821)
- 6.- *Aurora*, 5° (38) 1083 [French *Clorinde* 1814-1815]
Rio de Janeiro (23/5/1822) - Valparaiso (25/6 to 5/7) - Arica (19 to 21/6) - Callao (27/6 to 10/11) - Valparaiso (29 to 10/12) - Iquique (14/12) - Arica (15 to 18/12) - Quilca (20 to 29/12) - Arica (4 to 12/1/1823) - Callao (18/1 to 28/8) - I. Hormigas - Callao (6/9 to 8/11) - Galapagos - San Blas (8/12 to

16/2/1824) - Puna (29/3 to 10/4) - Huanchaco (26/4 to 10/5) - Callao (20 to 27/5) - Pisco (1 to 5/6) - Callao (7 to 4/7) - Valparaiso (20/7 to 10/10) - Rio de Janeiro (21/10/1824)

7.- *Basilik*, ketch (6) 161 [1822-1846]

Rio de Janeiro (6/7/1835) - Valparaiso, Cobija (19/8 to 28/9) - Arica (1 to 3/10) - Islay (6 to 14/10) - Cobija, Valparaiso (27/10 to 14/11) - Callao (23 to 3/12) - Islay (16 to 6/1/1836) - Quilca (7 to 10/1) - Islay (12/1 to 20/2) - Arica (25 to 28/2) - Iquique (2/3) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Valdivia, Talcaguano (9/3 to 18/5) - Callao (26 to 8/6) - Paíta (13 to 15/6) - Puna, Guayaquil, Panama, Tumaco (17 to 13/8) - Paíta (16 to 19/8) - Huanchaco (26 to 28/8) - Callao (4 to 14/9) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Copiapo, Cobija (1 to 28/10) - Arica (31 to 2/11) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Copiapo, Coquimbo (11/12/1836 to 12/4/1837) - Arica (16 to 11/5) - Valparaiso, Cobija (25/5 to 8/8) - Arica (15 to 18/8) - Islay (21 to 23/8) - Cobija, Valparaiso (2/9 to 12/10) - Arica (15/10) - Islay (18 to 29/10) - Valparaiso, Copiapo, Cobija (24/11/1837 to 21/2/1838) - Islay (1 to 6/3) - Callao (11 to 5/4) - Valparaiso, Huasco, Mejillones (30/4 to 13/5) - Arica (18 to 26/5) - Islay (29/5) - Cobija, Valparaiso (6 to 27/6) - Callao (8 to 18/7) - Pisco (22,23/7) - Arica (3 to 5/8) - Pisco (12/8) - Callao (14/8 to 30/9) - Chilca (4 to 6/9) - Callao (7 to 12/9) - Huacho (13 to 15/9) - Ancon (17/9) - Callao (18 to 23/9) - Cobija (9,10/10) - Arica (12 to 14/10) - Cobija, Valparaiso (24/10/1838 to 4/1/1839) - Callao (13 to 16/1) - Huacho (17,18/1) - Casma (19, 20/1) - Samanco (20,21/1) - Santa (22/1) - Huanchaco (23, 24/1) - Santa (26/1) - Callao (31 to 5/2) - Huacho (7,8/2) - Callao (10/2 to 21/3) - Huanchaco (23, 24/3) - Paíta (25,26/3) - Cabo Blanco (27/3) - Puna, Guayaquil (28 to 6/4) - Paíta (9,10/4) - Huanchaco (18 to 21/3) - Callao (27 to 29/4) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Coquimbo (19/5 to 12/7) - Arica (22 to 24/7) - Islay (27 to 29/7) - Callao (3 to 6/8) - Huacho (7/8) - Puna, Guayaquil, Panama (12/8 to 4/9) - Paíta (25, 26/9) - Valparaiso (20/10 to 25/11) - Cobija (1 to 15/12) - Valparaiso (1 to 20/1/1840) - She will continue in the area until late 1843.

8.- *Blanche*, 5° (46) 1074 [1819-1865]

Rio de Janeiro (26/10/1825) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (7/12/1825 to 18/3/1826) - Callao (28/3) - Huacho (30 to 4/4) - Callao, Chorrillos (7 to 2/5) - Valparaiso (18/5 to 23/6) - Arica (2 to 12/7) - Quilca (15, 16/7) - Callao (19/7 to 28/9) - Valparaiso (17 to 26/10) - Arica (4/11 to 9/12) - Quilca (16 to 22/12) - Valparaiso (16 to 24/1/1827) - Callao (3/2 to 14/3) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (11/4 to 28/5) - Rio de Janeiro (30/6/1827)

9.- *Blonde*, 5° (46) 1103 [1819-1870, *Calypso* -1895]

Rio de Janeiro (25/6/1834) - Valparaiso (6/8 to 15/8) - Callao (24 to 1/9) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Valdivia, Talcaguano (22/9 to 10/11) - Arica (18/12) - Islay (20/12) - Callao (24 to 31/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (27/1 to 5/2/1835) - Arica (11 to 13/2) - Callao (18/2 to 31/5) - Valparaiso, Concepcion, Coquimbo, Cobija (15/6 to 27/7) - Arica (30,31/7) - Islay (1 to 5/8) - Callao (9/8 to 2/10) - Valparaiso (19 to 23/10) - Callao (3/11 to 25/1/1836) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (22/2 to 4/3) - Arica (9,10/3) - Islay (11 to 13/3) - Callao (19/3 to 19/4) - Arica (4 to 8/5) - Islay (9 to 15/5) - Callao

(19 to 29/5) - Valparaiso (18/6 to 29/9) - Arica 14, 15/10) - Callao (21/10 to 24/12) - Pisco (29 to 4/1/1837) - Callao (6 to 23/1) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Cobija (16/2 to 11/4) - Callao (21 to 10/5) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (15/5 to 20/7) - Rio de Janeiro (22/8/1837)

10.- *Blossom*, sloop (18) 427 [1806-1848]

Rio de Janeiro (10/3/1818) - Talcahuano, Valparaíso (3/5 to 13/7) - Callao (23 to 27/7) - Columbia river (1/10 to 12/10) - Monterrey (3 to 11/11) - Callao (16/1 to 14/2/1819) - Talcahuano (7/4 to 9/4) - Rio de Janeiro (21/5/1819)

Montevideo (15/10/1821) - Valparaiso (22/11 to 25/11) - Callao (6 to 24/12) - Valparaiso, Concepcion (15/1 to 10/5/1822) - Rio de Janeiro (10/7 to 2/1/1823) - Valparaiso (27/1 to 17/3) - Callao (28/3 to 13/4) - Quilca (30 to 3/5) - Talcahuano, Valparaíso (26/6 to 20/9) - Iquique (30/9) - Arica (1 to 10/10) - Quilca (13/10 to 14/11) - Callao (18 to 2/12) - Valparaiso (20/12 to 21/1/1823) - Rio de Janeiro (5/3/1823)

11.- *Briton*, 5° (38) 1080 [1812-1860]

Rio de Janeiro (March 1814) - Valparaiso (21 to 31/5) - Callao (18/6 to 28/6) - Paíta - Tumbes, Santa Helena, La Plata, Salango, Galapagos - Otaheti, Marquesas, Pitcairn - Valparaiso (15/10 to 20/11) - Callao (29/11 to 22/1/1815) - Juan Fernandez, Valparaiso (13/2 to 28/3) - Rio de Janeiro (27/4/1815)

Montevideo (26/9/1824) - Concepcion, Valparaíso (13/11 to 16/3/1825) - Callao (27/3 to 17/4) - Chorrillos (17 to 2/5) - Callao (3 to 11/5) - Chorrillos (12/5 to 10/8) - Valparaiso, Valparaíso, Coquimbo (23/8 to 1/11) - Chorrillos (7/11/ to 11/12) - Callao (11/12 to 15/2/1826) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (10/3 to 3/4) - Rio de Janeiro (26/5/1826)

12.- *Cambridge*, 3° (80) 2139 [1815-1869]

Rio de Janeiro (12/3/1824) - Valparaiso (4 to 27/5) - Callao (8/6 to 26/10) - Ancon, Chancay (26 to 28/10) - Callao (28 to 15/11) - Chancay (15 to 18/11) - Ancon (19 to 21/11) - Callao, Chorrillos (21/11 to 18/1/1825) - Huacho (19 to 22/2) - Chorrillos, Callao (25/2 to 16/4) - I. Chincha (23, 24/4) - Quilca (5 to 11/5) - Arica (18 to 28/5) - Iquique (31 to 1/6) - Valparaiso, Talcahuano, Coquimbo (15/6/1825 to 26/1/1826) - Callao, Chorrillos (5/2 to 19/3) - Huacho (21 to 4/4) - Callao, Chorrillos (7/4 to 28/9) - Salinas 29 to 10/10) - Callao, Chorrillos (12/10 to 9/12) - Valparaiso (28/12 to 8/2/1827) - Rio de Janeiro (22/3/1827)

13.- *Challenger*, 6° (28) 603 [1826-1835 wrecked on Chile]

Papeete (26/12/1832) - Valparaiso (4/2 to 24/2/1833) - Rio de Janeiro (6/4) - Spithead - Rio de Janeiro (21/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Cobija (16/2 to 10/3/1834) - Arica (12 to 28/3) - Islay (29 to 23/4) - Valparaiso (8 to 13/5) - Callao (22 to 10/6) - Puna (16 to 19/6) - Polynesia - Valparaiso, Cobija (25/10 to 16/11) - Arica (20 to 4/12) - Islay (6 to 15/12) - Cobija,

- Valparaíso, Coquimbo (26/12/1834 to 2/2/1835) - Rio de Janeiro (11/3) - Concepcion (19/5/1835)
- 14.- *Cherub*, sloop (18) 424 [1806-1820]
Rio de Janeiro (9/7/1813) - Galapagos (Sept.) - Tumbes (4 to 14/10) - Galapagos (Nov.) - Callao (3/12 to 11/1/1814) - Valparaiso (4 to 18/4) - Callao (28 to 1/5) - Galapagos, Polynesia (May to August) - Valparaiso (22/9 to 17/10) - Rio de Janeiro (28/11/1814)
- 15.- *Cleopatra*, 6° (26) 918 [1835-1862]
Rio de Janeiro (15/3/1837) - Valparaiso (10/5 to 2/6) - Callao (10/6 to 28/8) - Valparaiso (16 to 3/10) - Callao (11 to 23/10) - Paíta (28/10) - Puna, Guayaquil (30 to 13/11) - Punta Arenas, Nicoya, Libertad, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (21/11/1837 to 1/5/1838) - Valparaiso (21/6 to 1/7) - Rio de Janeiro (4/8/1838)
- 16.- *Clio*, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 389 [1807-1845]
Montevideo (21/1/1831) - Valparaiso, Talcaguano, Cobija (28/2 to 26/6) - Arica (30 to 2/7) - Islay (5 to 17/7) - Callao (21/7 to 21/8) - Paíta (25/8) - Guayaquil (26 to 4/9) - Paíta (8, 9/9) - Coquimbo (29 to 13/10) - Callao (22 to 25/10) - Paíta (29, 30/10) - Panama, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (6/11/1831 to 15/4/1832) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (3/6 to 28/9) - Rio de Janeiro (17/11/1832)
- 17.- *Conway*, 6° (20) 451 [1814-1825]
Valparaiso (19/12 to 27/1/1821) - Callao (5/2 to 1/3) - Valparaiso (18/3) - Arica (7 to 9/6) - Mollendo (14 to 19/6) - Callao (9 to 17/7) - Ancon (17 to 1/8) - Huacho (3/8) - Chorrillos (8, 9/8) - Valparaiso, Chiloe, Coquimbo, Totoral (28/8 to 25/11) - Callao (9 to 17/12) - Pacasmayo (20/12) - Guayaquil, Acapulco, San Blas (25/12/1821 to 15/6/1822) - Rio de Janeiro (1822)
- 18.- *Conway*, 6° (26) 652 [1832-1861, *Winchester* -1871]
Rio de Janeiro (March 1834) - Valparaiso (13/5 to 21/5) - Islay (1/6 to 1/7) - Arica (8 to 11/7) - Cobija (18 to 5/8) - Islay (10 to 17/8) - Cobija, Valparaíso (26 to 1/10) - Callao (9 to 16/10) - Tumbes (20,21/10) - Guayaquil, Galapagos, G. Nicoya, Realejo, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (22/10/1834 to 23/4/1835) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (5/6 to 22/7) - Rio de Janeiro (23/8/1835)
- 19.- *Creole*, 5° (36) 949 [1813-1833]
Rio de Janeiro (1/2/1821) - Valparaiso (13/3 to 14/4) - Callao (22/4 to 30/4) - Valparaiso, Chiloe (16/5 to 31/7) - Arica (8 to 9/8) - Callao (15 to 26/8) - Ancon (27 to 1/9) - Callao (2 to 8/9) - Ancon (11 to 13/9) - Valparaiso (27/9 to 28/10) - Mejillones (1/11) - Callao (8/11 to 11/2/1822) - Valparaiso (9 to 28/3) - Rio de Janeiro (10/5/1822)
- 20.- *Doris*, 5° (36) 870 [East Indiaman *Pitt*, 1808-1830 sold in Valparaiso]

Rio de Janeiro (10/2/1822) - Valparaiso (27/4 to 19/5) - Arica (27 to 29/5) - Callao (4/6 to 23/8) - Valparaiso (14/9 to 16/10) - Rio de Janeiro (18/11/1822)

Montevideo (21/1/1827) - Valparaiso (5/3 to 19/4) - Callao (30/4 to 5/7) - Valparaiso (6/8 to 10/10) - Mejillones (15 to 17/10) - Arica (20 to 28/10) - Pisco (31 to 2/11) - Callao (4/11 to 13/12) - Valparaiso, Juan Fernandez, Talcaguano, Cobija (9/1/1828 to 26/5) - Iquique (29, 30/5) - Arica (1 to 30/6) - Islay (7 to 19/7) - Pisco (21 to 25/7) - Callao (28 to 11/8) - Valparaiso (30/8/1828 to 18/2/1830)

- 21.- *Dublin*, 3° (74) 1772 [1812-1826, reduced to (40) -1885]
 Rio de Janeiro (22/1/1832) - Valparaiso (8/3 to 21/3) - Callao (30 to 15/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, (4/5 to 10/6) - Callao (27/6 to 23/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Talcaguano (9/9 to 20/11) - Callao (30 to 24/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (24/1/1833 to 18/3) - Callao (28/3 to 1/6) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (16/6 to 3/7) - Callao (10/7 to 21/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (13/9 to 21/10) - Callao (30/10 to 12/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Talcaguano (1/1/1834 to 24/2) - Callao (5/3 to 27/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (10 to 11/6) - Rio de Janeiro (20/7/1834)

- 22.- *Eclair*, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 387 [1807-1831]
 Rio de Janeiro (22/2/1825) - Valparaiso (18/4 to 4/5) - Arica (12, 13/5) - Quilca (15/5) - Valparaiso, Chiloe (10/6 to 28/7) - Chorrillos, Callao (9/8 to 20/10) - Pisco (25 to 29/10) - Arica (19/11 to 9/12) - Chorrillos, Callao (15 to 31/12) - San Blas, Mazatlán, Acapulco, Puna, Guayaquil (7/2/1826 to 28/5) - Huanchaco (10 to 15/6) - Casma (18/6) - Callao (26 to 20/7) - Valparaiso (2 to 6/8) - Iquique (19/8) - Arica (23 to 2/9) - Quilca (4 to 23/9) - Arica (1 to 14/10) - Quilca (16 to 22/10) - Pisco (25,26/10) - Callao (27/10 to 20/12) - Valparaiso (18 to 24/1/1827) - Arica (1 to 18/2) - Quilca (27 to 7/3) - Callao (11 to 1/4) - Rio de Janeiro (26/5/1827)

- 23.- *Eden*, 6° (24) 451 [1814-1833]
 Montevideo (28/6/1830) - Valparaiso (12/8 to 25/8) - Callao (3/9 to 11/1/1831) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (8 to 26/2) - Rio de Janeiro (16/4/1831)

- 24.- *Electra*, sloop (18) 462 [1837-1862]
 Rio de Janeiro (10/4/1839) - Valparaiso (10/6 to 2/7) - Islay (11 to 15/7) - Callao (20 to 24/7) - Realejo (8 to 3/9) - Valparaiso (18/10 to 9/3/1840) - She will continue in the area until early 1841

- 25.- *Fly*, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 384 [1813-1828]
 Rio de Janeiro (26/5/1823) - Valparaiso (11 to 17/7) - Callao (24 to 17/8) - Valparaiso (10/9 to 11/1/1824) - Callao (21/1 to 19/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (11 to 28/5) - Quilca (9 to 23/6) - Callao (28 to 14/7) - Pisco (21 to 23/7) - Quilca (21 to 3/9) - Valparaiso (29/9 to 30/10) - Callao (7 to 15/11) - Chancay (15 to 18/11) - Quilca (7, 8/12) - Callao (14, 15/12) - Chorrillos (16/12 to 1/1/1825) - Valparaiso (27 to 14/2) - Rio de Janeiro (15/4/1825)

- 26.- *Fly*, sloop (18) 485 [1831-1903]
Rio de Janeiro (28/9/1837) - Valparaiso - Puertos Intermedios - Valparaiso (27/4 to 15/5/1838) - Pitcairn, Society and Friendly Islands - Valparaiso (Jan. to August) - Rio de Janeiro (16/9/1839) as flag ship
- 27.- *Forte*, 5° (38) 1155 [1814-1844]
Rio de Janeiro (23/6/1828) - Valparaiso (20/8 to 8/11) - Callao (18 to 10/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (2/1/1829 to 29/6) - Callao (9 to 19/7) - Coquimbo, Valparaiso (4/8 to 21/11) - Mejillones (25/11) - Arica (28 to 2/12) - Callao (7 to 26/12) - Valparaiso (16/1 to 9/3/1830) - Rio de Janeiro (9/4/1830)
- 28.- *Harrier*, sloop (18) 486 [1831-1840]
Rio de Janeiro (5/1/1837) - Valparaiso, Cobija (9/2 to 6/3) - Arica (9 to 11/3) - Islay (13,14/3) - Arica (17 to 1/4) - Islay (2 to 12/4) - Arica (19 to 3/5) - Callao (9 to 13/5) - Arica (30/5 to 30/6) - Cobija (10/7) - Arica (16 to 18/7) - Cobija, Valparaiso (19/7 to 21/8) - Callao (31/8 to 5/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (29/12/1837 to 11/1/1838) - Callao (21/1 to 1/7) - Pisco (4 to 9/7) - Callao (10, 11/7) - Arica (28 to 31/7) - Islay (2 to 9/8) - Valparaiso (23 to 29/8) - Iquique (6/9) - Arica (7 to 9/9) - Islay (10/9) - Callao (13 to 19/9) - Guayaquil, San Blas, Mazatlan (25/9/1838 to 17/1/1839) - Valparaiso (18/3 to 4/4) - Rio de Janeiro (5/5/1839)
- 29.- *Heron*, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 387 [*Rattlesnake*, 1812-1831]
Rio de Janeiro (1/11/1828) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (31/1 to 7/2) - Callao (15/2 to 20/3) - Valparaiso, Chiloe, Coquimbo (11/4 to 13/6) - Arica (20 to 27/6) - Islay (30, 1/7) - Callao (6 to 16/7) - Islay (11 to 19/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (8/9 to 17/10) - Rio de Janeiro (6/12/1829)
- 30.- *Hyperion*, 5° (32) 978 [1807-1833]
Montevideo (6/1/1820) - Valparaiso, Juan Fernández (15/2 to 4/7) - Punta Coles (July/August) - Valparaiso (27/8 to 4/9) - Callao (13/9 to 12/12) - England (Feb. 1821)
- 31.- *Icarus* brig- Sloop (10), Cherokee class, 234 [1814-1861]
Buenos Aires (8/4/1819) - Valparaiso (8/5 to 3/10) - Rio de Janeiro (15/11/1819)
- 32.- *Imogene*, 6° (28) 660 [1818-1831 *Pearl*, -1840]
Rio de Janeiro (28/5/1837) - Valparaiso (15/7 to 8/8) - Polynesia (9/8 to 9/12) - Valparaiso (2/1 to 6/2/1838) - Callao (15 to 22/2) - Valparaiso (18 to 4/4/) - Callao (12/4 to 18/6) - Valparaiso (13 to 4/8) - Arica (13/8) - Callao (19 to 25/8) - Valparaiso (10 to 23/9) - Callao (1 to 8/10) - Puna, Guayaquil, Panama, Realejo, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (14/10/1838 to 21/5/1839) - Valparaiso (23/7 to 6/8) - Rio de Janeiro (19/9/1839)
- 33.- *Indefatigable*, 3° (64) 1400 [1784-1795, reduced to (44) -1816]
Rio de Janeiro (24/11/1814) - Valparaiso, Concepcion (30/1/1815 to 23/4) - Valparaiso (26/4 to 21/5) - Callao (1 to 19/6) - Callao (30 to 3/7) - Salango,

Galapagos (4/7 to Sept.) - Callao (21/9 to 12/11) - Valparaiso (6/12 to 25/1/1816) - Rio de Janeiro (13/3/1816)

- 34.- *Jaseur*, brig- Sloop (18), Cruzier class, 387 [1813-1845]
 Rio de Janeiro (18/4/1826) - Valparaiso (18 to 21/6) - Callao (7/7 to 10/9) - Huanchaco (12, 13/9) - Malpelo (17/9) - Puna, Guayaquil (18 to 28/9) - Paita (3, 4/10) - Pacasmayo (11 to 16/10) - Huanchaco (18 to 23/10) - Santa (27 to 29/10) - Huacho (5 to 8/11) - Callao (11 to 9/12) - Valparaiso (10 to 20/1/1827) - Callao (1, 2/2) - San Blas, Acapulco (21/3 to 29/4) - Callao (14/6 to 10/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (6/9 to 6/10) - Rio de Janeiro (15/11/1827)
- 35.- *Menai*, 6° (26) 449 [1814-1853]
 Rio de Janeiro (28/6/1827) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (6/9 to 5/10) - Arica (11 to 13/10) - Callao (18/10 to 29/11) - Arica (26/12 to 2/1/1828) - Islay (4 to 9/1) - Coquimbo, Valparaiso, Cobija (26/1 to 21/2) - Arica (24 to 14/3) - Islay (15 to 30/3) - Pisco (1 to 4/4) - Callao (5 to 10/4) - Valparaiso (27/4 to 3/6) - Pisco (11 to 13/6) - Callao (15/6 to 1/12) - Cobija (23/12) - Arica (26/12 to 1/1/1829) - Islay (2 to 7/1) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (27/1 to 1/3) - Arica (10, 11/3) - Callao (18 to 10/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (1/5 to 7/6) - Rio de Janeiro (21/7/1829)
- 36.- *Mersey*, 6° (26) 451 [1814-1852]
 Rio de Janeiro (28/12/1823) - Valparaiso, Chiloe (13/2/1824 to 8/8) - Callao (18 to 20/8) - Samanco (22 to 25/8) - Huanchaco (26 to 31/8) - Pacasmayo (1 to 3/9) - Huanchaco (5 to 7/9) - Santa (11 to 13/9) - Casma (14 to 16/9) - Huacho (24 to 26/9) - Callao (30 to 8/10) - Quilca (22/10 to 3/12) - Mollendo (7,8/12) - Arica (14 to 18/12) - Quilca (20 to 30/12) - Callao (4/1/1825) Chorrillos (5 to 7/1) - Valparaiso (1/2 to 4/5) - Coquimbo (7 to 10/5) - Chorrillos (19 to 31/5) - Quilca (22 to 9/7) - Valparaiso, Talcaguano, Coquimbo (29/7 to 29/9) - Arica (5 to 9/10) - Chorrillos (15 to 13/11) - Huanchaco (16 to 1/12) - Huacho (12 to 14/12) - Chorrillos (17/12 to 26/1/1826) - San Francisco, Colombia (19/2 to 21/2) - Tobago (22 to 5/3) - Callao (1/4) - Huacho (3, 4/4) - Callao (7/4 to 10/5) - Arica (31 to 16/6) - Quilca (19 to 29/6) - Callao (3 to 27/7) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (16/8 to 29/9) - Rio de Janeiro (10/10/1826)
- 37.- *North Star*, 6° (28) 501 [1824-1860]
 Rio de Janeiro (6/7/1835) - Valparaiso (25/8 to 22/9) - Callao (29/8 to 6/11) - Puna, Guayaquil, Nicoya, Libertad, San Blas, Guaymas, Mazatlan (12/11/1835 to 21/4/1836) - Valparaiso (17/6 to 22/7) - Rio de Janeiro (28/8/1836)
- 38.- *Orestes*, sloop (18) 460 [1824-1905]
 Rio de Janeiro (5/10/1839) - Valparaiso, Juan Fernández (26/11/1839 to 9/2/1840) - She will continue in the area until mid-1841
- 39.- *Owen Glendower*, 5° (36) 951 [1808-1884]

Montevideo (14/12/1820) - Valparaiso (22/1 to 27/3/1821) - Callao (5/4 to 28/4) - Salinas (28/4 a 1/5) - Huacho (2/5) - Barranca (4/5) - Callao (11 to 18/5) - Ancon (18 to 30/5) - Salinas, Huacho (30/5) - Callao (6/6 to 14/7) - Valparaiso (13/7 to 10/10/1821) - Rio de Janeiro (17/11/1821)

- 40.- *Phoebe*, 5° (36) 926 [1795-1841]
Rio de Janeiro (9/7/1813) - Galapagos (Sept.) - Tumbes (4 to 14/10) - Galapagos (Nov.) - Callao (3/12 to 11/1/1814) - Valparaiso (8 to 31/5) - Rio de Janeiro (27/7/1814)
- 41.- *President*, 4° (52) 1537 [1829-1903, *Old President* - 1903]
Rio de Janeiro (1/3/1838) - Concepcion, Valparaíso (3/4 to 29/5) - Callao (7/6 to 12/11) - Huacho (13 to 20/11) - Callao (21/11 to 10/4/1839) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (3/5 to 10/7) - Islay (5/8) - Callao (8/8/ to 11/12) - Cañete (13 to 18/12) - Callao (20/12 to 31/5/1840) - She will continue in the area until early 1842
- 42.- *Pylades*, sloop (18) 433 [1824-1845]
Rio de Janeiro (17/7/1833) - Chiloe, Valparaiso, Cobija (15/9 to 26/10) - Arica (19 to 6/11) - Islay (8/11 to 15/12) - Juan Fernandez, Valparaíso, Coquimbo (31/12/1833 to 27/1/1834) - Rio de Janeiro (13/3/1834)
- 43.- *Racoon*, sloop (18) 426 [1808-1838]
Rio de Janeiro (9/7/1813) - Galapagos, Columbia river, San Francisco (Sept. to June 1814) - Callao (10/8 to 20/9/1814) - Valparaiso (15/10 to 9/11) - Rio de Janeiro (1815)
- 44.- *Ranger*, 6° (28) 502 [1820-1832]
Montevideo (3/11/1825) - Valparaiso (8/12 to 5/1/1826) - Chorrillos, Callao (14/1 to 6/3) - Valparaiso (24 to 6/3) - Rio de Janeiro (18/4 to 5/8/1827) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (3/9/1827 to 5/2/1828) - Rio de Janeiro (18/3/1828)
- 45.- *Rattlesnake*, 6° (28) 503 [1822-1860]
Montevideo (10/2/1832) - Concepcion, Valparaíso, Coquimbo, Copiapo, Cobija (18/3 to 29/6) - Arica (2 to 17/7) - Islay (22/7 to 22/8) - Valparaiso (10 to 23/9) - Callao (4 to 23/10) - Panama, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (7/11/1832 to 23/4/1833) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (14/6 to 29/6) - Rio de Janeiro (27/8/1833)
- 46.- *Rover*, sloop (18) 590 [1832-1845]
Rio de Janeiro (14/10/1835) - Valparaiso (12/12 to 17/12) - Callao (28 to 9/2/1836) - Valparaiso (1 to 26/3) - Rio de Janeiro (4/5 to 12/5/1836) - Valparaiso, Talcaguano (8/7 to 1/10) - Callao (9 to 27/10) - Puna, Guayaquil, Nicoya, Realejo, Libertad, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (2/11/1836 to 2/5/1837) - Valparaiso (16/6 to 15/9) - Iquique (22,23/9) - Arica (24 to 26/9) - Islay (29,30/9) - Quilca (1 to 10/10) - Arica (17 to 19/10) - Islay (23/10 to 23/11) - Valparaiso, Cobija (16/12/1837 to March 1838) - Rio de Janeiro (1/5/1838)

- 47.- *Samarang*, 6° (28) 500 [1822-1883]
 Rio de la Plata (Nov. 1832) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (Jan. to 4/2/1833) - Rio de Janeiro (29/3 to 17/8) - Valparaiso (25/9 to 6/10) - Callao (19 to 22/10) - Panama, Acapulco, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (2/11/1833 to 25/3/1834) - Valparaiso (15/5 to 24/5) - Callao (4/6 to 25/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (13/9 to 9/10) - Rio de Janeiro (20/11/1834)
- Rio de Janeiro (16/7/1838) - Valparaiso (28/8 to 6/9) - Arica (17 to 29/9) - Callao (26/9 to 12/11) - Huacho (14 to 20/11) - Callao (22 to 1/12) - Santa (3/12) - Samanco and Huanchaco (4/12) - Paita (7/12) - Puna, Guayaquil (9 to 14/12) - Paita (17 to 21/12) - Huanchaco (28 to 1/1/1839) - Santa (4/1) - Callao (11 to 16/1) - Huacho (17/1) - Santa (20 to 26/1) - Callao (1 to 6/2) - Islay (21 to 28/2) - Puna, Guayaquil (11 to 14/3) - Callao (4/4 to 10/8) - Valparaiso (23/8 to 3/11) - Callao (13 to 16/11) - Valparaiso (5 to 7/12) - Mazatlan (16/1 to 28/1/1840) - She will continue in the area until July 1840
- 48.- *Sapphire*, 6° (28) 604 [1827-1864]
 Rio de Janeiro (26/12/1828) - Valparaiso, Cobija (1/2/1829 to 21/2) - Arica (23/2 to 26/3) - Islay (28 to 4/4) - Callao (8/4 to 19/7) - Puna, Guayaquil, Panama, San Blas, Guaymas, Mazatlan (26/8 to 23/12) - Coquimbo, Valparaiso (16/2/1830 to 30/4) - Callao (8 to 30/5) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (11 to 28/6) - Rio de Janeiro (9/8/1830)
- 49.- *Satellite*, sloop (18) 456 [1826-1849]
 Rio de Janeiro (6/8/1834) - Valparaiso (3/10 to 17/10) - Callao (26/10 to 21/2/1835) - Santa (25,26/2) - Huacho (8,9/3) - Callao (12 to 14/3) - Chinchu, Pisco (17 to 21/3) - Arica (2 to 9/4) - Islay (11 to 4/5) - Callao (7 to 16/5) - Arica (1 to 4/6) - Islay (7,8/6) - Arica (11 to 14/6) - Coquimbo (3 to 5/7) - Arica (14 to 21/7) - Islay (22 to 8/8) - Arica (15 to 19/8) - Islay (23 to 27/8) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Coquimbo (7/9 to 30/10) - Rio de Janeiro (5/12/1835)
- 50.- *Seringapatam*, 5° (46) 1152 [1819-1873]
 Rio de Janeiro - Coquimbo, Valparaiso (-13/2/1830) - Eastern Island, Vavao - Callao (25/7 to 18/9) - Talcaguano, Valparaiso, Coquimbo (8/10/1830 to 27/2/1831) - Callao (9/3 to 15/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Concepcion, Cobija (30/4 to 4/8) - Arica (7 to 14/8) - Callao (20 to 26/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Talcaguano, Huasco, Copiapo, Cobija (12/9/1831 to 13/1/1832) - Arica (16 to 18/1) - Islay (21 to 24/1) - Callao (29 to 22/2) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (17/3 to 19/4) - Rio de Janeiro (31/5/1832)
- 51.- *Slaney*, 6° (20) 460 [1813-1838]
 Buenos Aires (24/3/1819) - Valparaiso, Concepcion (6/5 to 13/9) - Callao (22 to 29/9) - Ancon (29/9 to 11/10) - Callao (12/10 to 4/11) - Valparaiso (3/12 to 29/2/1820) - Arica (8 to 11/3) - Punta Coles (14, 15/3) - Chilca (27, 28/3) - Pucusana (28 to 1/4) - Callao (2 to 19/4) - Valparaiso (17/5 to 1/7) - Rio de Janeiro (12/8/1820)
- 52.- *Sparrowhawk*, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 385 [1807-1841]

Rio de Janeiro (15/5/1835) - Valparaiso (11/7 to 16/7) - Callao (24 to 13/8) - Islay (3, 4/9) - Arica (7 to 9/9) - Islay (11 to 15/9) - Coquimbo, Cobija (5 to 13/10) - Iquique (14,15/10) - Arica (17 to 5/11) - Islay (8 to 13/11) - Arica (17 to 24/11) - Cobija (3 to 5/12) - Iquique (6/12) - Arica (7 to 23/12) - Islay (24 to 4/1/1836) - Cobija, Valparaíso, Coquimbo (16/1 to 21/3) - Arica (30 to 1/4) - Islay (3, 4/4) - Callao (8/4 to 15/6) - Coquimbo, Valparaíso (3 to 23/7) - Iquique (5/8) - Arica (8 to 10/8) - Islay (13/8) - Arica (16 to 21/8) - Islay (23 to 29/8) - Cobija, Coquimbo, Valparaíso (8/9 to 26/10) - Rio de Janeiro - Spithead (23/12/1836)

Rio de Janeiro (6/1/1839) - Valparaiso (2/3 to 6/3) - Callao (18 to 3/4) - Arica (19 to 21/4) - Islay (23 to 25/4) - Cobija, Valparaíso (10/5 to 1/7) - Polynesia (29/7 to 12/11) - Cobija, Concepcion (14/12/1839 to 19/2/1840) - She will continue in the area until July 1840

53.- *Stag*, 5° (46) 1,218 [1830-1866]

Rio de Janeiro (1/5/1837) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (26/6 to 3/8) - Arica (15 to 19/8) - Callao (24 to 5/9) - Valparaiso (21/9 to 23/5/1838) - Rio de Janeiro (28/6/1838)

54.- *Superb*, 3° (74) 1919 [1798-1826]

Valparaiso (5 to 31/7/1821) - Arica (8 to 9/8) - Callao 15/8 to 5/9) - Ancon (5/7 to 22/9) - Callao (22/9 to 3/12) - Valparaiso (27 to 20/1/1822) - Rio de Janeiro (7/3/1822)

55.- *Tagus*, 5° (38) 949 [*Severn*, 1813-1822]

Rio de Janeiro (Feb. 1814) - Valparaiso (13/4 to 31/5) - Callao (18 to 28/6) - Paíta, Tumbes, Santa Helena, La Plata, Salango, Galapagos - Polynesia - Valparaiso (15/10 to 20/11) - Callao (29/11 to 22/1/1815) - Juan Fernandez, Valparaiso (18 to 28/2) - Rio de Janeiro (1815)

56.- *Talbot*, 6° (28) 500 [1824-1896]

Rio de Janeiro (5/2/1836) - Valparaiso (30/3 to 7/4) - Arica (14 to 16/4) - Islay (18 to 11/5) - Cobija (22 to 24/5) - Iquique (27/5) - Arica (28 to 2/6) - Islay (4 to 9/6) - Valparaiso (26 to 7/7) - Callao (20/7 to 26/11) - Huanchaco (29/11) - Paíta (2 to 6/12) - Lobos de Afuera (9,10/12) - Lambayeque (10 to 12/12) - Huanchaco (16 to 21/12) - Callao (1/1 to 2/2/1837) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (20/2 to 16/3) - Rio de Janeiro - Spithead (19/6/1837)

57.- *Tartar*, 5° (36) 949 [1814-1859]

Rio de Janeiro (30/8/1823) - Valparaiso (4/10 to 10/10) - Callao (18/10 to 21/1/1824) - Valparaiso (21 to 2/3) - Arica (9/3) - Quilca (18 to 4/4) - Callao (12 to 26/4) - Ferrol - Huanchaco (1 to 12/6) - Casma (15 to 21/6) - Callao (29/6 to 21/7) - Valparaiso (8/8 to 22/9) - Callao (1/10 to 11/1) - Samanco (13/11) - Santa (15/11) - Huanchaco (16/11) - Huacho (26/11) - Callao (31 to 14/12) - Ancon (16,17/12) - Chorrillos (19 to 23/12) - Panama, San Blas, Acapulco (11/1/1825 to May) - Huanchaco (15 to 29/6) - Santa (2 to 7/7) - Huacho (14 to 16/7) - Chorrillos (18 to 5/8) - Pisco (11, 12/8) - Valparaiso (5 to 28/9) - Rio de Janeiro (17/11/1825)

- 58.- *Thetis*, 5° (46) 1086 [1817-1830]
 Buenos Aires (27/9/1829) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (13/11/1829 to 4/2/1830)
 - Callao (18 to 4/3) - Valparaiso (25/3 to 15/6) - Callao (24/6 to 5/8) - Puna,
 Guayaquil (19 to 21/8) - Callao (13/9 to 25/9) - Valparaiso - Rio de Janeiro
 (9/11/1830)
- 59.- *Tribune*, 5° (36) 884 [1803-1832, reduced to (24) -1839]
 Montevideo (11/2/1830) - Talcaguano, Valparaíso, Coquimbo (18/3 to 1/5) -
 Callao (8 to 30/5) - Valparaiso (11/6 to 24/10) - Callao (2 to 6/11) -
 Huanchaco (9, 10/11) - Paita (12, 13/11) - Puna, Guayaquil, Panama,
 Acapulco, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (14/11/1830 to 19/3/1831) -
 Valparaiso, Coquimbo (20/5 to 9/6) - Rio de Janeiro (22/7/1831)
- 60.- *Tyne*, 6° (24) 446 [1814-1825]
 Montevideo (24/1/1820) - Valparaiso (13 to 26/3) - Callao (6/4 to 2/6) - Rio
 de Janeiro (1/8/1820)
- 61.- *Tyne*, 6° (28) 600 [1826-1862]
 Rio de Janeiro (20/12/1832) - Valparaiso, Cobija (12/2 to 6/3) - Iquique (7
 to 10/3) - Arica (11 to 16/3) - Islay (19 to 28/3) - Callao (31 to 5/4) - Cobija
 (27,28/4) - Arica (2 to 10/5) - Islay (12 to 23/5) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo,
 Huasco, Cobija (1/6 to 13/7) - Arica (19 to 2/8) - Islay (4 to 23/8) -
 Valparaiso (10 to 27/9) - Rio de Janeiro (18/11/1833)
- 62.- *Volage*, 6° (28) 516 [1825-1874]
 Port Jackson, Sidney (6/1/1827) - Valparaiso (19 to 22/2) - Arica (3/3) -
 Quilca 5/3) - Callao (9/3 to 10/5) - Coquimbo, Valparaíso (26/5 to 17/6) -
 Arica (25 to 15/7) - Islay (18/7) - Quilca (19 to 27/7) - Callao (31/7 to 31/8)
 - Pisco (4 to 7/9) - Arica (24 to 30/9) - Iquique (19/10) - Arica (20 to 11/11)
 - Islay (14 to 24/11) - Pisco (27 to 30/11) - Callao (2/12 to 23/6/1828) -
 Valparaiso - Rio de Janeiro (Late 1828)
- Rio de Janeiro - Concepcion, Valparaíso (11/12/1831 to 27/2/1832) -
 Puertos Intermedios - Coquimbo (12/6) - Rio de Janeiro (28/7/1832)

Surveying vessels, under the Hydrographic Office's orders

- 1.- *Adelaide*, tender survey vessel () 95 [1827-1833]
 Rio de Janeiro - Chile (1829) - Rio de Janeiro
- 2.- *Adventure*, transport (10) 314 [1809-1821 *Aid*, 1817 survey ship - sold at
 Valparaiso 1833]
 Montevideo (17/11/1828) - Chile - Montevideo (23/5/1830)
- Montevideo (6/12/1833) - Valparaiso (22/8 to)

- 3.- *Beagle*, brig- Sloop (10), Cherokee class, 236 [1820-1863, survey ship 1825, WV7 -1870]
Copiapo (2/6/1835) - Iquique (12/7) - Callao (19/7 to 30/8) - Galapagos (15/9)
- 4.- *Constitution*, surveying schooner tender to the *Beagle* () [1835 - sold at Paíta]
Valparaiso (1835) - surveying Peruvian coast (August 1835 to June 1836)
- 5.- *Starling*, schooner (4) 108 [1829-1844]
Montevideo (11/4/1836) - Valparaiso (8/6 to 22/7) - Callao (9 to 16/8) - Puna, Guayaquil (22/8 to 28/12) - Garachina (26/1/1837) - Taboga (29/1 to 16/3) - Realejo (9 to 12/4) - Libertad (14 to 22/4) - San Blas (25/5 to 29/5) - Mazatlan (3, 4/6) - Oceania, Noutka, Sitka - San Blas (19/12 to 29/12) - Panama (17/2 to 22/2/1838) - Realejo (20 to 23/3) - I. Cocos (4 to 7/4) - Puna, Guayaquil (8 to 15/5) - Callao (16/6 to 29/8) - Paíta (2 to 4/9) - Puna, Guayaquil (6/9 to 11/10) - Taboga (22 to 31/10) - Realejo (18/11 to 9/1/1839) - Nicoya (18/1 to 22/2) - R. Pueblo Nuevo (28 to 8/3) - Panama (15 to 27/3) - Oceania, R. Columbia -
- 6.- *Sulphur*, bomb (10) 375 [1826-1830, survey vessel - 1857]
Valparaiso - Callao (7 to 16/8/1836) - Paíta (21/8) -Ecuador, Panama, Central America, Mexico, Oceania, Columbia, California - Callao (3/6/1838 to 8/8) - Cañete (12 to 28/8) - Paíta (2 to 4/9) - Ecuador, Centroamérica, Panamá, Oceanía, Columbia, California, Mexico (June 1840)

Independent naval vessels calling at Peruvian ports

- 1.- *Blonde*, 5° (46) 1103 [1819-1870, Calypso -1895]
Rio de Janeiro (18/12/1824) - Valparaiso (4 to 19/2) -Juan Fernandez - Valparaiso (26 to 5/3) - Chorrillos (14, 15/3) - Callao (16,17/3) - Oceania (6/5 to 18/7) - Valparaiso (7 to 22/9) - Concepcion (30/9 to 12/10) - Valparaiso (14/10 to 3/12) - Coquimbo (5/12 to 11/6) - I. Santa Helena (23/1/1826)
- 2.- *Dauntless*, sloop (18) 423 [1808-1825]
Sidney (2/8/1821) - Valparaiso (19/9 to 7/10) - Pisco (17 to 20/10) - Callao (22/10 to 16/11) - Supe (18 to 26/11) - I. Cristine and Dominique (23/12/1821)
- 3.- *Standard*, 3° (64) 1370 [1782-1816]
Gibraltar (30/4/1811) - Valparaiso (25/7 to 12/8) - Callao (22/8 to 17/12) - Cadiz (27/4/1812)
- 4.- *Lightning*, sloop (18) 463 [1829-1832, *Larne* -1866]

Buenos Aires (6/9/1830) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (12/10 to 29/10) - Rio de Janeiro (6/12/1830)

5.- *Tyne*, 6° (24) 446 [1814-1825]

Buenos Aires (11/8/1818) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (4/10 to 19/11) - Rio de Janeiro (2/1/1819)

Chronological list


ship	arrival on the first port	departure from the last port	total days	days in Peru	proportion
Cherub	1/09/13	17/10/14	411	52	12,65
Phoebe	1/09/13	31/05/14	272	49	18,01
Racoon	1/09/13	9/11/14	434	41	9,45
Tagus	13/04/14	28/02/15	321	64	19,94
Briton	21/05/14	28/03/15	311	64	20,58
Indefatigable	30/01/15	25/01/16	360	73	20,28
Amphion	16/10/17	7/02/18	114	37	32,46
Blossom	3/05/18	9/04/19	341	33	9,68
Andromache	23/05/18	9/05/19	351	254	72,36
Slaney	6/05/19	1/07/20	422	71	16,82
Icarus	8/05/19	3/10/19	148	0	0,00
Hyperion	15/02/20	12/12/20	301	90	29,90
Tyne	13/03/20	2/06/20	81	57	70,37
Owen Glendower	22/01/21	10/10/21	261	85	32,57
Creole	13/03/21	28/03/22	380	129	33,95
Superb	5/07/21	20/01/22	199	112	56,28
Alacrity	22/11/21	1/06/23	556	265	47,66
Blossom	22/11/21	21/01/23	425	95	22,35
Conway	19/12/21	15/06/22	178	66	37,08
Doris	27/04/22	18/11/22	205	82	40,00
Aurora	25/06/22	10/10/24	838	496	59,19
Fly	11/07/23	14/02/25	584	189	32,36
Tartar	4/10/23	28/09/25	725	252	34,76
Mersey	13/02/24	29/09/26	959	294	30,66
Cambridge	4/05/24	8/02/27	1010	586	58,02
Briton	13/11/24	3/04/26	506	199	39,33
Eclair	18/04/25	1/04/27	713	296	41,51
Blanche	7/12/25	28/05/27	537	195	36,31
Ranger	8/12/25	5/02/28	789	51	6,46
Jaseur	18/06/26	6/10/27	475	171	36,00
Volage	19/02/27	1/10/28	590	407	68,98
Doris	5/03/27	18/02/30	1081	177	16,37
Menai	6/09/27	7/06/29	640	304	47,50
Alert	14/02/28	13/10/31	1337	414	30,96
Forte	20/08/28	9/03/30	566	85	15,02

Heron	31/01/29	17/10/29	259	60	23,17
Sapphire	1/02/29	28/06/30	512	162	31,64
Thetis	13/11/29	10/10/30	331	63	19,03
Seringapatan	1/02/30	19/04/32	808	134	16,58
Tribune	18/03/30	9/06/31	448	30	6,70
Eden	12/08/30	26/02/31	198	130	65,66
Clio	28/02/31	28/09/32	578	46	7,96
Volage	11/12/31	12/06/32	184	0	0,00
Tyne	12/02/32	27/09/33	593	74	12,48
Dublin	8/03/32	11/06/34	825	300	36,36
Rattlesnake	18/03/32	29/06/33	468	65	13,89
Challenger	26/12/32	19/05/35	874	83	9,50
Samarang	1/01/33	9/10/34	646	85	13,16
Pylades	15/09/33	27/01/34	134	45	33,58
Conway	13/05/34	22/07/35	435	49	11,26
Blonde	6/08/34	20/07/37	1079	423	39,20
Satellite	3/10/34	30/10/35	392	227	57,91
Sparrowhawk	11/07/35	26/10/36	473	176	37,21
Basilik	19/08/35	29/11/43	3024	532	17,59
North Start	25/08/35	22/07/36	332	69	20,78
Rover	12/12/35	1/03/38	810	109	13,46
Talbot	30/03/36	16/03/37	351	234	66,67
Actaeon	25/07/36	2/11/37	465	77	16,56
Harrier	9/02/37	4/04/39	784	365	46,56
Cleopatra	10/05/37	1/07/38	417	92	22,06
Stag	26/06/37	23/05/38	331	16	4,83
Imogene	15/07/37	6/08/39	752	88	11,70
Fly*	1/12/37	31/08/39	638	30	4,70
President	3/04/38	30/01/41	1033	659	63,79
Samarang	28/08/38	31/07/40	703	241	34,28
Sparrowhawk	2/03/39	11/07/40	497	29	5,84
Electra	10/06/39	4/03/41	633	31	4,90
Orestes	26/11/39	27/07/41	609	112	18,39

* There is no information on the time the *Fly* remained in Peruvian ports, however, as she visited Puertos Intermedios, we had estimated 30 days.


Graphic one

Time each British naval vessel remained in Peruvian waters (chronologically)




Graphic two:


Time each British naval vessel remained in Peruvian waters (chronologically)



British naval vessels (total time the Pacific/Peru)



British naval vessels (total time the Pacific/Peru)



Appendix Two

Commanding Officers of British Naval Forces in the Pacific

Comanders in Chief of the South America Station 1819-1837

		Date of appointment
Rear Admiral	William Sidney Smith	25-01-1808
Vice Admiral	Michael de Courcy	18-05-1809
Rear Admiral	Manley Dixon	1812
Commodore	William Bowles	1816
Commodore	Thomas Hardy	1819
Rear Admiral	George Eyre	17-11-1823
Rear Admiral	Robert Waller Otway	15-10-1826
Rear Admiral	Thomas Baker ⁷²⁷	09-01-1829
Rear Admiral	Michael Seymour ⁷²⁸	12-04-1833
Rear Admiral	Graham Eden Hammond	16-09-1834

Commodores of the Pacific Squadron

Captain	James Hillyar	1813-14
Captain	Thomas Staines	1814-15
Captain	John Fyffe	1815-16
Captain	William Bowles	1817-18
Captain	William Henry Shirreff	1818-21
Commodore	Thomas Masterman Hardy	1821-22
Captain	Frederick Earl Spencer	February 1822
Captain	Henry Prescott	July 1822
Captain	Thomas Brown	October 1823
Captain	Thomas James Maling	May 1824
Captain	John Gordon Sinclair	March 1827
Captain	Coghlan (Francis Rogers ?)	August 1828
Captain	A. B. Bingham	November 1829

⁷²⁷.- Captain James Townshend replaced Baker during the second half of 1831, as the Admiral sailed to assume the Command of the Cape Station. On December 1832 he finally departed from Rio, delivering the Station to Captain Townshend.

⁷²⁸.- Admiral Seymour died on 9 July 1834, being replaced by Captain Tait until the arrival of the new Commander in Chief.

Captain	William Earl Waldegrave	July 1830
Captain	James Townshend	March 1832
Captain	Francis Mason	August 1834
Captain	Thomas Ball Sullivan	July 1837

Comanders in Chief of the Pacific Station
1837-1900

Rear Admiral	Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross	04-09-1837
Rear Admiral	Richard Thomas	05-05-1841
Rear Admiral	George Francis Seymour	14-05-1844
Rear Admiral	Thomas Phipps Hornby	25-08-1847
Rear Admiral	Fairfax Moresby	21-08-1850
Rear Admiral	David Price	17-08-1853
Rear Admiral	Henry William Bruce	25-11-1854
Rear Admiral	Robert Lambert Baynes	1857
Rear Admiral	Thomas Maitland	05-05-1860
Rear Admiral	John Kingcome	31-10-1862
Commodore	John W. S. Spencer	-1863
Rear Admiral	Joseph Denman	10-05-1864
Rear Admiral	George Fowler Hastings	21-11-1868
Rear Admiral	Arthur Farquhar	01-11-1869
Rear Admiral	Charles Farrel Hillyar	09-07-1872
Rear Admiral	Arthur Auckland Leopold	
	Pedro Cochrane	06-06-1873
Rear Admiral	George Hancock	15-04-1876
Rear Admiral	Algernon Frederic Rous de Horsey	06-08-1876
Rear Admiral	Frederick Henry Stirling	21-07-1879
Rear Admiral	Algernon McLennan Lyons	10-12-1881
Rear Admiral	John Kennedy Erskine Baird	13-09-1884
Rear Admiral	S. Michael Culme-Seymour	13-09-1885
Rear Admiral	Algernon Charles Fieschi Heneage	20-09-1887
Rear Admiral	Charles Frederick Hotman	04-02-1890
Rear Admiral	Henry Frederick Stephenson	04-05-1893
Rear Admiral	Henry St. Leger Bury Palliser	19-06-1896
Rear Admiral	Lewis Anthony Beaumont	22-06-1899
Rear Admiral	Andrew Kennedy Bickford	15-10-1900

Conclusions

Along this research we had covered a very complicated period in Peruvian History, running from the last years of Spanish rule, coming through the Independence Wars, the first years of the newly formed Republic, its federation with Bolivia and the latter's aborted conclusion brought about by Chilean intervention. Each one of these episodes created a number of difficult situations for British captains, which may be considered as highly representative of the wide range of problems the British Naval Station had to deal with during the Nineteen Century, not only in Peru but also in other Latin American countries. In this sense, the trends that become evident in this study of this period could be of some help for those who eventually undertake further research on the British Naval Station's activities until its termination, in the beginning of this century, following the reform of the British Navy undertaken by Admiral Lord Fisher; and for those scholars interested in the relations between Great Britain and Latin American countries in the last century.

Framed by this situation, and also having to attend a wide variety of problems in a very large area in the Pacific, British captains showed great activity, doing every possible action to fulfil their main mission, which was to protect British citizens and interests. In general terms, they respected local regulations, an attitude which not always was recognized by the very unsettled Peruvian government, neither by local British merchants and consular agents. In fact, they

were even blamed for not behave as North Americans and French captains did, placing themselves above local regulations.

As normally happened, even today, complains deserved far more attention than congratulations, and consequently, Foreign Office records had more of the former. With some few exceptions, current historiography had heavily relied on this kind of records, taking them at is face value in respect to the effectiveness of the Pacific Squadron. However, even when consular agents' reports reflected their point of view respect naval captains' activity in Peru, it should be remembered that they only represented a very small part of a larger area. In real terms, it would be impossible to satisfy each one of the British consular agents and merchants spread along the West Coast of South America, or in Polynesia.

In this sense, the passiveness and underemployment of British Naval Forces in the Pacific accepted by current historiography, should be reviewed, in the light of the evidence provided by Admiralty records. Doing so, it will be possible to have a better general view of the effort done by the Pacific squadron and to understand some specific decisions, which affected their presence in Peru at any specific moment.

Very closely related to this topic is the one concerning the number of vessels destined to the Pacific. A decision adopted by the Admiralty and, in some cases, by the Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station, it was basically referred to the relative importance given by the British government to the area. As no local naval force, neither any foreign squadron, but the single raid of the U.S. frigate *Essex*, matched the strength the British had in the Pacific, its importance to the British government should be referred to political, economic and even prestige reasons. In fact, since 1821 until 1839, there were an average of five British men-

of-war stationed in the Pacific, almost half the total strength of the South American Station.

They sailed between three major zones: a) Chile and Peru, b) Mexico and Central America, and c) Polynesia. The length of time each British naval vessel remained in one of these zones, was also linked to the importance it had at any specific moment. For this reason, during the 1820's, most of the time spent in the Pacific was devoted to the coast of Chile and Peru, something which changed in the following decade, when British trade in Mexico and Central America increased considerable. Towards the end of the period covered by this thesis, Polynesia was visited with certain regularity, not only because British trade there increased but also due to the growing presence and influence of the French and North Americans, something which will increase in the following decades.

In each one of these moments, the Pacific squadron acted accordingly to the importance given by their government to any specific zone. Obviously, there were some cases in which one of the zone was abandoned for a period of time, as it was impossible to cover the entire east Pacific with the available number of vessels. However, during the period covered by this thesis, Peru and Chile were the area in which British naval vessels remained most of the time, not only attending the protection of local British communities, but also for logistic reasons.

One of the key elements to measure the importance of any specific area was the amount of British trade and investments involved there. As the Pacific was a new area to this sort of enterprises, being very unsettled until the 1830's, the presence of British naval vessels provided a valuable help for their merchants. A number of problems they had to deal with, could be solved by direct naval action or pressure on the local government, as was done several times in Peru, but there

were some others which could be far more complicated, as privateering or even piracy. British naval vessels played quite an important role to avoid these perils, convoying from one port to another, in the safest and cheapest possible way, the merchant's funds.

As this service involved a payment from the merchants, it was the source of several complains. Some of them conceived that naval vessels should attend their remittances with priority, whereas other considered that naval captains were more concern in "freight hunting" than in offering protection to their nationals. It is impossible to deny that this sort of things actually happened, but that was not the general rule. In our opinion, this service proved efficient while it lasted, helping to the establishment of the British trade in Peru and in the Pacific.

As the area became more safe, merchants found other ways to ship their treasure from one port to another, but this was a second step, impossible to achieve without the support provided in the first decades by the Pacific squadron.

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